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Foreword from the editors of this volume: 
On crossing perspectives 
If the reader slowly takes his pleasure on the process of reading by 
stopping, relaxed and nonchalant, on every single contribution to 
appreciate its specificity, he may be pleasantly confused by the rich­
ness and variety of figures and issues, themes and questions ap­
proached in this collective volume: Paul Rabinow, Eric Wolf, Clifford 
Geertz, Bronislaw Malinowski, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Robert Antelme, 
Victor Klemperer, Geneviève De Gaulle Anthonioz, Jorge Semprun, 
Jean Geoffroy, Juri Vella, anthropologists' diaries, survivors' diaries, 
the nature/culture distinction, colonial memory, Estonian events in the 
40s, theatre representation, and so on. Studies on less known figures 
of camp survivors stand side by side with studies on renowned 
anthropologists, anthropologic reflections on cultural matters alternate 
with semiotic analyses of literary texts. What is the leading thread 
bringing into a unitary path such variety and abundance, such apparent 
diversity? 
In 2006, June 2-3, we organized at the French section of studies of 
the Department of German and Romance Languages, in collaboration 
with the Department of Semiotics of the University of Tartu, an 
international conference "Between Semiotics and Anthropology. 
Crossed Perspectives on Signs and Cultures",1 whose main idea was 
essentially to bring together various anthropologists and semioticians, 
different specialists of camp literature and life histories to discuss 
specific problems such as the interrelation existing between signs and 
cultures and the parallel question of experience and its transformation 
into a narration. As a consequence, 'signs' and 'cultures', 'experience' 
1 In French: "Entre sémiotique et anthropologie. Questionnements croisés sur 
les signes et les cultures"; in Estonian: "Semiootika ja antropoloogia kokkupuutes. 
Kõrvutavaid arutlusi märkide ja kultuuride üle". As an exception for Sign Systems 
Studies, we publish five articles in this volume in French. 
282 Foreword 
and 'narration' are the crucial axes around which revolve the 
contributions collected in this volume. They convey, along with 
essential results in single disciplines, the open-minded atmosphere 
reigning during the conference and the effort of crossing perspectives 
manifested by all participants. 
More exactly, what the different essays share is the (amazing and 
always difficult to define) (i) passage from a single sign to a more 
global and pervasive culture and the (ii) generation of a concrete 
narration from a fluid and volatile experience originally situated in a 
specific time and space. If the general and recurrent question posited 
concerns the definition of signs and cultures, here the focus is laid 
more on the epistemological foundations of methodologies, on the 
comparisons of approaches and interpretations of processes. The basic 
presupposition and aim of the conference was in effect to let 
disciplinary theories and practices interact in order to see, in this 
fruitful exchange, how to enrich one another, how to go over internal 
discursive boundaries and hermeneutical positions. More than a 
simple international conference, it could be said that Tartu, on the 2nd 
and the 3rd of June 2006, became a meeting place for anthropologists 
and semioticians to question each other on their respective disciplines, 
on the possibilities and potentialities these disciplines possess, on the 
goals they presuppose in order to seize reality and social interactions. 
The conference foresaw two complementary sections: a first and freer 
section on anthropologic and semiotic issues where participants could 
intervene by choosing their subjects and a second and more specific 
section concerning survival life histories originating in France and 
Estonia. This parallel may seem somewhat strange to readers. What do 
survival life histories have to do with epistemological foundations of 
disciplines such as anthropology and semiotics? 
The first answer is that even if different under some aspects, above 
all for the evident consequences and tremendous impact on personal 
lives, both anthropologists and survivors draw on their experience to 
transform it into a real and true story codified, implicitly or explicitly, 
through semiotic strategies. The second answer is that the extreme 
experience lived by survivors calls for a redefinition of culture and 
humanity and this concept, improved, neglected, redefined, either 
assumed sceptically or optimistically, is the main theme upon which 
anthropologists base their work. Any school of thought in anthro­
pology strives for defining, overtly or implicitly, culture and humanity 
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in a way that is every time more comprehensive and total, more 
corresponding to modern life and to global world. Conversely, theore­
tical problems raised by anthropologists and semoticians, such as 
definitions of concepts and 'seizures' of objects of knowledge, are 
practically encountered in extreme life conditions by survivors. In 
short, survivors do a work comparable to the work of anthropologists 
and semioticians because they try to redefine humanity after a terrible 
event such as, for example, the Holocaust; they use condensed se­
miotic elements in their writing; they catch experience through effec­
tive signs. 
In addition, it is not to be forgotten that survivors tell their expe­
riences, and very often their perplexity towards a positive sense of 
humanity, by resorting to a written 'translation' of an experience lived 
in concentration camps, an experience that tends to become a real and 
true literary genre, that is a literature of its own. By using the term 
'genre', nobody wants to affirm that what was lived by survivors was 
false or invented, but that, once in a written form, an experience is 
inevitably codified and based on a narrative structure. Contributors of 
this collective volume explore the most recurrent or unusual narrative 
structures used by survivors in their texts and the way survivors catch 
glimpses of phenomenological experiences. Besides it, this issue 
raises another important point and parallel with anthropologists and 
semioticians. What is the threshold between the 'literary' and the 
'non-literary', between what is considered as 'fiction' and what is 
considered as 'experience'? 
When an anthropologist goes to an exotic place (and even when he 
stays at home, in his own culture), he needs to live Otherness 
concretely in his own experience and, eventually, he has to transform 
himself into a writer, a translator for his 'departure culture'. In other 
words, an anthropologist is a witness who has to prove his own truth, 
an individual who adapts himself to the 'Other', a translator and a 
writer. For a survivor, all these roles are filled by risking his life and 
against his will. Sometimes more than an anthropologist, a survivor 
has to find new ways to utter an extreme experience, new ways which 
disrupt received distinctions and concepts such as, for example, 
'fiction', 'literary', 'realistic', 'invented', 'testimony', 'experienced', 
and so on. This aspect is taken into account in this collective volume 
both from anthropological and semiotic viewpoints. 
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In this perspective, camp literature is also extremely interesting to 
investigate because it amplifies some fundamental dichotomies 
inscribed in our texts and cultures: (i) the external referent and the 
internal narrative organization; (ii) the mimetic truth and the narrative 
structure; (iii) the reality and convention opposition; (iv) the 
difference between experience and its codification; (v) the nature and 
culture distinction. In one way or another, survival life histories 
combine these oppositions in a new manner. In the new light shed by 
camp literature, the study of these features is pertinent both for 
semiotics and anthropology. If, then, semiotic modalities through 
which these events are caught are important for history and man in 
itself, it is also central to investigate the ways through which these 
forms of humanities and non-humanities are conceived, imposed, 
tolerated, reinvented. All the contributions in this collective volume, 
in one way or another, take into account some directions leading to the 
better understanding of these central (op)positions present in our 
culture or in single authors, in anthropology or in semiotics. 
More specifically, in this issue one can find a semiotic reflection 
on the epistemological foundations of some anthropologic theories 
(Peeter Torop, Eric Landowski, Irene Portis-Winner, Stefano Montes, 
Art Leete and Piret Koosa) or a reflection on some disciplinary fields 
and distinctions (Elena Moratidou). At the same time, one can also 
find an anthropologic viewpoint on central concepts in semiotics 
(Richard Pottier). In addition, as already explained, some 
contributions study life histories (Gabriella D'Agostino, Eva Toulouze 
and Liivo Niglas) and deportation and camp literature (Licia Tavema, 
Luba Jürgenson, Michael Rinn, Tiiu Jaago).2 
Licia Taverna3 
Stefano Montes4 
2 Acknowledgements. Along with all participants we would also like to mention 
and thank Kalevi Kull for his enthusiasm and collaboration. This issue received 
support from the Estonian Scientific Foundation (ETF Grant 6791) whose related 
research is "Semiotics of Histories of Survival. A Comparative Perspective on 
France and Estonia" ("Ellujäämislugude semiootika. Eesti ja prantsuse võrdlev 
käsitlus"). 
1 Author's address-. Department of French Studies, University of Tartu, Ülikooli 
Str. 17, 50090 Tartu, Estonia; e-mail: licia.taverna@tiscalinet.it. 
1 Author's address. Department of French Studies, University of Tartu, Ülikooli 
Str. 17, 50090 Tartu, Estonia; e-mail: montes.stefano@tiscalinet.it. 
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Semiotics, anthropology and 
the analysability of culture 
Peeter Torop 
Department of Semiotics, University of Tartu 
Tiigi 78, Tartu 50410, Estonia 
e-mail: peeter.torop@ut.ee 
Abstract. For each culture-studying discipline, the problem of culture's 
analysability stems from disciplinary identity. One half of analysability 
consists of the culture's attitude and the ability of the discipline's methods of 
description and analysis to render the culture analysable. The other half of 
analysability is shaped by the discipline's own adaptation to the characteristics 
of culture as the object of study and the development of a suitable descriptive 
language. The ontologisation and epistemologisation of culture as the subjcct 
of analysis is present in each culture-studying discipline or discipline 
complcx. Culture analysts are therefore scholars with double responsibilities. 
Their professionalism is measured on the basis of their analytical capability 
and the ability to construct (imagine, define) the object of study. The analy­
tical capability and the ability to construct the object of study also determine 
the parameters of analysability. Be the analyst an anthropologist or a culture 
semiotician, the analysability of culture depends on how the analyst chooses 
to conduct the dialogue between him/herself and his/her object of study. 
The proliferation of definitions of culture and their frequent disparity 
clearly indicate that the principles of defining culture are numerous 
and sometimes very different. Numerous indeed, as we still cannot 
speak of the science of culture as a single discipline. The second 
reason why we still lack a uniform discipline of science of culture is 
the heterogeneity of culture itself. Culture, as the cause of all its 
definitions, is such a complex object of study that it is near impossible 
to list and rank all culture-related disciplines by their importance. 
Methodologist P. Feyerabend (1993) uses the notion of epistemolo­
gical anarchism to describe the randomness and lack of hierarchy in 
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the choice of research methods, i.e. all disciplines and all methods are 
equally valid for the study of culture and we have no reason to regard 
one as better than the other. It is not even really possible, since even 
the strictest scientific analysis is but one approach to culture, which 
cannot in any case rule out the others. Thus, the study of one and the 
same culture gives rise to numerous and different views and snapshots 
of that culture, and the analysis of culture as a fragmented object of 
study becomes the analysis of cultures. Essentially, we can speak of 
two fundamental pluralities — the plurality of the scientific research 
methods is complementary to the plurality of culture as a complex 
object of study. 
However, the notions of culture that are born out of different 
disciplines and viewpoints can hamper the comprehensive under­
standing of culture, since the synthesis or complementary linking of 
those notions is near utopie, as it would be to be aware of all the quali­
ties of culture: 
Culture is the product of interacting human minds, and hence a science of 
culture will be a science of the most complex phenomenon on Earth. It will 
also be a science that must be built on interdisciplinary foundations including 
genetics, neuroscience, individual development, ecology and evolutionary 
biology, psychology and anthropology. In other words, a complete explana­
tion of culture, if such a thing is ever possible, is going to comprise a 
synthesis of all human science. Such a synthesis poses significant conceptual 
and methodological problems, but also difficulties of another kind for those 
contributing to this science. Scholars from different disciplines are going to 
have to be tolerant of one another, open to ideas from other areas of 
knowledge. (Plotkin 2001: 91) 
Science of culture and disciplinarities 
Thus, there are two discernible tendencies in culture-studying discipli­
nes. On one hand, the scholars try to ascertain what exactly is being 
studied and how it is being studied when a particular approach is 
applied; and what can possibly be the proper field of study for a 
general science of culture. This implies that culture is not merely an 
existing object of study that is simply "out there", but equally a 
created or constructed object of study. Thus, culture is an object of 
study that requires disciplinary adjustment for scientific analysis, i.e. 
the creation of analysability and therefore culture is both a proto-' and 
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metaobject at the same time; it is both immediate and mediated. On 
the other hand, scholars seek to establish the principles of meta-
discipline or methodology of the science of culture that would permit 
the description of the research results of various culture-studying 
disciplines on a uniform basis, and thus their so-called translation into 
a commonly understood language. In one case, the definition of 
culture is discipline-bound (culture is what one or the other discipline 
can analyse), in the other, the disciplinary perceptions of culture are 
described as the parameters of culture that can be synthesised into a 
comprehensive understanding of culture (as a theoretical ideal). Even 
if we concretise this problem on a most basic level by moving from 
the level of general human culture through ethnic and social culture to 
the level of individual culture, the complexity of uniting those two 
tendencies will remain. 
If we examine the analysability of culture from the 21st century 
point of view, we can notice two distinct tendencies. On one hand, 
culture-studying disciplines interweave on the level of methods and 
the language of description, and the boundaries between cultural 
philosophy, cultural sociology, culture studies and their subdisciplines 
have become blurred. Of course, it is also natural that such an 
intermingling produces new disciplinary identities. The inevitable 
consequence of interdisciplinarity is new disciplinarity, after all, 
sooner or later. These are natural tensions, inherent in the develop­
ment of science, which can be observed in the effort to clarify the 
relationship between anthropology, ethnography and ethnology and in 
the attempt to differentiate cultural anthropology from social anthro­
pology, etc. In addition to differentiations and boundary redefinitions 
between those disciplines, we can also observe such differentiation 
that in fact brings disciplines closer together. The fact that reflexive 
anthropology and reflexive sociology exist side by side independently 
of each other is an example of this. Therefore a few notions have 
emerged (reflexivity, symbolism, interpretative etc.) that draw various 
essentially different trends in science closer together via the language 
of description (i.e. metalanguage). 
A qualitative change seems to be nascent in the development of 
humanities and social sciences. It is related to changes in the emer­
gence and establishment of disciplinary and interdisciplinary identi­
ties. On one hand, humanities and social sciences have demonstrated 
metadisciplinarity already for a long time, which means that certain 
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disciplines serve as vehicles of innovation or as methodological 
generali sers. Among others, this metadisciplinary role has been played 
by linguistics and literature studies, and also by film studies. During 
the last few decades, this role has often been attributed to semiotics. 
Whereas linguistics enters the domain of other disciplines and sup­
ports methods based on language analogies (language of movies, 
language of theatre, language of literature etc.), literature and film 
studies tend to accept more innovative impulses and are more 
synthesising in general. Psychoanalysis, colonial or gender studies 
have enriched those disciplines, but they have also given rise to hybrid 
knowledge forms and prestige languages. Thus, the heterogeneity of 
those disciplines has been increased. 
On the other hand, we can see a lot of dedisciplinarity, which is the 
cornerstone of cultural studies. The story of cultural studies is a good 
example of how culture-oriented analytical activities have been able to 
make their existence a meaningful one. Since cultural practices often 
outrun the capabilities of theoretical interpretation, the analysts cannot 
always avoid transgressing discipline boundaries and using other 
methods and means. Such an analyst uses all available means to 
understand the culture and in principle operates on three levels 
structuralist, culturalist and receptive. On the structuralist level, cultu­
ral processes can be observed and explained in terms of the structure 
of society, a hegemony of a social class or a dominant ideology. The 
culturalist level allows you to see the ubiquitous cultural uniqueness 
and interpret everything pertaining to society as culture — on this 
level, the in depth analyses of texts employ the widest range of 
methods (semiotic, post-colonial, feminist etc.). The receptive level 
interprets everything as cognitive processes, since the actual 
functioning of culture is determined by its receiver and, for example, 
the participation of a single work of art in culture depends on how it is 
received (audience analyses and polls) on one hand and its scale of 
distribution (the number of copies printed, success at the box office, 
manner of presentation) on the other. As a result, we have a number of 
parameters that allow us to analyse various aspects of culture without 
the desire to elevate these analyses to the status of a scientific 
discipline. In reality, dedisciplinarity does not oppose science, but 
supports flexible and transdisciplinary research. 
Dedisciplinarity is an attempt to establish ad-hoc research as 
parameter-based and justify it with the need to understand the modern 
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culture that immediately surrounds the researcher. Whereas meta-
disciplinarity combines different disciplines and creates a language of 
mediation between them, dedisciplinarity connects the different 
aspects of the object of study and permits the use of different research 
methods as means to identify the different parameters of the object. 
Since the primary object of study for cultural studies is modern 
culture, dedisciplinarity can be seen as the limitation of disciplinarity 
arising from the "diversity of the object of study" (Burgass 1999: 
100). However, critical theory interprets the same phenomenon as the 
representation of cultural studies in different disciplines and in their 
methods, assuming that "[...] culture is based on discursive practices 
and that the subjectivities involved in making it are themselves 
socially constructed" (Rowe 1998: 3). The diversity of the object of 
study in this context is inseparable from the (inter)discursive represen­
tation of that diversity, i.e. the analyst is aware of the correlation 
between cultural diversity and the diversity of disciplinary or hybrid 
metalanguages that describe it. 
As a result, we can interpret the same problems in terms of the 
diversity of disciplines and methods, aspects of the object of study, or 
the opinions of scholars. This multi-diversity has both its pros and 
cons. Pros are related to the notion of competence mastering, which 
denotes the emergence of the analysability of the symbiosis of diffe­
rent competence levels and types. The cons include the proliferation of 
half-competence or incompetence in education. Harold Bloom has 
alluded to it in relation to the modern training of philologists: 
Precisely why students of literature have become amateur political scientists, 
uninformed sociologists, incompetent anthropologists, mediocre philosophers, 
and overdetermined cultural historians, while a puzzling matter, is not beyond 
all conjecture. They resent literature, or are ashamed of it, or are just not all 
that fond of reading. (Bloom 1994: 521) 
One reason for amateurism and incompetence in university education 
is the discrepancy between disciplinary identities and explanation 
practices (see Woody 2003). Discrepancy between disciplinary iden­
tity as methodological homogeneity and explanation practices as 
discursive or metalanguage heterogeneity is in its turn based on the 
interpretation of the disciplinary object of study and its dynamics, but 
first and foremost on the relationship between the terminology 
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necessary for the description of the scientific model of the object of 
study and the actual terminology in use. 
One solution to the discrepancy is to return to the disciplinaiy 
object of study and its clarification or reconceptualisation. The other 
possibility is the clarification of interdisciplinary relations and move­
ment towards a complex approach. A possible example of the latter 
development can be the movement of metadisciplinarity and 
dedisciplinarity towards transdisciplinarity, and it is worth noting that 
one characteristic feature of "transdisciplinary identity" is precisely 
the introduction of the "critical imperative" to the interdisciplinary 
field: 
A different "transdisciplinary" identity appears in interdisciplinary fields that 
have a strong critical imperative. In the humanities, certain sectors of the 
social sciences and, in science, technology, and society studies, the term 
connotes not only wide scope and a new conceptual framework but also 
radical critique. Any transdisciplinary effort is implicitly a critique of the 
existing structure of knowledge, education or culture. (Thompson Klein 2000: 
51) 
Transdisciplinarity can be perceived as an attempt to transcend the 
diversity (heterogeneity) of both the object of study and relevant 
disciplines and achieve a balance in the integration of knowledge 
products and in the integration of knowledge processes. Of course, 
this balance presupposes answers to the questions, which disciplines 
are to be integrated, why and how it is to be done, when it will be 
done, who will do it and where the integrated knowledge can be 
applied (Sage 2000: 248). 
Whereas in the interdisciplinary field integrated knowledge is 
based on the shared part of the disciplines and thus also, at least 
partially, on interference, in the transdisciplinary field the disciplines 
preserve their identity and the integration process consists of the 
creation of a complementary synthesising framework. In general the 
synthesising framework depends on the aims of the research and 
consequently the role of disciplines may change in the integration 
process. In a most general manner this functional change is expressed 
in the difference between the descriptive perspective and prescriptive 
perspective of the problem solution. Thus, knowledge integration or 
transdisciplinarity is the most important component in modern 
knowledge management (Sage 2000: 249). Knowledge integration or 
transdisciplinarity becomes relevant in areas that have developed 
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within disciplinary constraints up to a certain point, but have then 
strayed into the interdisciplinary field and together with methodolo­
gical and methodic enrichment have become heterogeneous and have 
abandoned their original relation with their object of study. Con­
sequently the discipline needs to be reconceptualised or at least made 
more coherent. At any rate, the problems related to the ontology of the 
object of study (the methodology of defining the object of study) and 
the epistemology of the object of study (the methodology of studying 
the object of study) of the given discipline will resurface again. 
With respect to transdisciplinarity, there is another important 
historical problem that J. Mittelstrass highlights in his description of 
the characteristics of transdisciplinarity: 
In other words, transdisciplinarity is first of all an integrating, although not a 
holistic, concept. It resolves isolation on a higher methodological plane, but it 
does not attempt to construct a "unified" interpretative or explanatoiy matrix. 
Second, transdisciplinarity removes impasses within the historical 
constitution of fields and disciplines, when and where the latter have either 
forgotten their historical memory, or lost their problem-solving power 
because of excessive speculation [my italics — P. Т.]. For just these reasons, 
transdisciplinarity cannot replace fields and disciplines. Third, trans­
disciplinarity is a principle of scientific work and organisation that reaches out 
beyond individual fields and disciplines for solutions, but it is no trans-
scientific principle. The view of transdisciplinarity is a scientific view, and it 
is directed towards a world that, in being ever more a product of the scientific 
and technical imagination, has a scientific and technical essence. Last of all, 
transdisciplinarity is above all a research principle, when considered properly 
against the background I have outlined concerning the forms of research and 
representation in the sciences, and only secondarily, if at all, a theoretical 
principle, in the case that theories also follow transdisciplinary research 
forms. (Mittelstrass 2001: 498) 
Hence, the history of disciplines and their reconceptualisation should 
contribute to the definition of disciplinary and interdisciplinary identi­
ties. A new interpretation of historical sources also demonstrates that 
the disciplines defined today may have different sources or the 
justification of the innovativeness of a discipline is associated with the 
actualisation of new sources in history. The latter may mean the 
association of the same sources with different scientific branches. 
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Semiotics of culture 
Thus. R. Posner links the historic development of cultural semiotics to 
E. Cassirer's symbolic forms (as sign systems) in his comprehensive 
treatise of tasks of cultural semiotics: 
Cultural semiotics is that subdiscipline of semiotics which has culture as its 
subject. According to Cassirer, it has two tasks: 
a) the study of sign systems in a culture (in the sense of Herder or Tylor) 
with respect to what they contribute to the culture, 
b) the study of cultures as sign systems with respect to the advantages and 
disadvantages which an individual experiences in belonging to a specific 
culture". (Posner 2005: 308) 
At the same time, J. M. Krois, a leading expert on Cassirer, empha­
sises that the three-volume and 1162-page opus Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms was envisioned by its author to be a treatise on 
philosophical anthropology: "Despite its size, it was, in Cassirer's 
eyes, unfinished. He intended to publish a further, concluding volume 
that was supposed to include among other things a text on 'The 
Problem of the Symbol as the Basic Problem of Philosophical Anthro­
pology'" (Krois 2005: 560; cf. also Vandenberghe 2001). From a nar­
rower point of view, G. Ipsen, relying on his attitude towards techno­
logy, regards Cassirer as an important source for new historical media 
semiotics. It is precisely Cassirer whom Ipsen relied on to reach the 
important conclusion "technology is always the articulation of some­
thing already existent in society" (Ipsen 2003: 48). Media develop­
ment, inseparable from the context of cultural values and practical use, 
cannot be reduced to technological innovations. The historical 
interpretation of media thus becomes semiotic due to its very nature 
and according to Ipsen, we should speak of the complementarity of 
three branches: 
The first is the semiotics of the media, which may be understood as the 
semiotics of individual media. This branch of semiotics looks into the sign 
processes that are characteristic for a specific medial form. Its subject matter 
includes any media, ranging from the computer to the stamp. The second 
important field is the semiotics of culture. Having been established some 
decades ago. its research has meanwhile covered any aspect of cultural life. 
The third branch of semiotics important for our project is the semiotics of 
history. Though none of the three approaches deals with the history of the 
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media specifically, all of them have produced methods that are valuable for 
analyzing evolutionary medial concepts. (Ipsen 2003: 49) 
The synthesis of the semiotics of media, culture and history is essen­
tial for the semiotics of culture even outside historical media semio­
tics, since the dynamics of the cultural environment and the relation­
ship between immediate and mediated study of culture are precisely 
linked to the historical development of media. A valid insight into 
these problems is offered by evolutionary cultural semiotics. In 1989 
W. A. Koch wrote in the foreword to his series Bochum Publications 
in Evolutionary Cultural Semiotics on the notion of culture that it is 
[...] a phenomenon whose true integrative potentialities have not yet been fully 
discovered or explored. For a semiotics thus conceived, structure and process 
are not different phases of reality and/or sciences but rather mere faces of a 
unitary field. In the view of this series, then, any fruitful attempt at semiotic 
analysis will be based on premises of macro-integration — or evolution — 
and of micro-integration — culture. (Koch 1989: v) 
Evolution and culture are joined in the global cultural environment, 
which evolves from word and picture media, at first, towards printed 
media and then telemedia. Today we are already surrounded by the 
environment of new media. In a most general sense, it is a movement 
from immediate communication towards the diversification of forms 
of mediated communication. The technological and historical evolu­
tion of communication forms has indeed strongly influenced the 
growth in the value of history. 
On the other hand, the importance of history has been emphasised 
by Tartu-Moscow school of cultural semiotics. Thus, in the foreword 
of Sign Systems Studies vol. 25 (the last one to appear during his 
lifetime) Juri Lotman writes: 
During the past decades semiotics has changed. One achievement along its 
difficult path was unification with history. The understanding of history 
became semiotic, but semiotic thinking obtained historic traits. [...] The 
semiotic approach tries to avoid the conditional stopping of the historical 
process. (Lotman 1992: 3) 
Building on the notion of semiosphere (coined by Lotman), V. Ivanov 
already wrote programmatically in the epilogue to his treatise "Out­
lines of Prehistory and History of Semiotics": 
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The task of semiotics is to describe the semiosphere without which the 
noosphere is inconceivable. Semiotics has to help us in orienting in history. 
The joint effort of all those who have been active in this science or the whole 
cycle of sciences must contribute to the ultimate future establishment of 
semiotics. (Ivanov 1998: 792) 
Lotman's treatment of history implicitly also includes Claude Lévi-
Strauss's approach to structural anthropology. According to the latter, 
anthropology and history are very close disciplines, though psycho­
logically different: 
They share the same subject, which is social life; the same goal, which is a 
better understanding of man; and, in fact, the same method, in which only the 
proportion of research techniques varies. They differ, principally, in their 
choice of complementary perspectives: history organizes its data in relation to 
conscious expressions of social life, while anthropology proceeds by 
examining its unconscious foundations. (Lévi-Strauss 1968: 18) 
The concept of time logically also becomes a focal point for clarifying 
the disciplinarity issue. In his view, ethnography, ethnology and 
anthropology do not constitute separate disciplines or lines of 
investigation: "They are in fact three stages, or three moments of time, 
in the same line of investigation, and preference for one or another of 
these only means that attention is concentrated on one type of 
research, which can never exclude the other two" (Lévi-Strauss 1968: 
356). 
Anthropology 
Lévi-Strauss regarded anthropology as a key concept due to its central 
location in the interdisciplinary field. To illustrate his point, he 
provided a diagram (Fig 1). "In the above diagram, the horizontals 
mainly represent the view of cultural anthropology, the verticals that 
of social anthropology, and the obliques both" (Lévi-Strauss 1968: 
359; see also the chapter "The place of anthropology" in the book: 
Johnson 2003: 12-30). Juxtaposing geography, anthropology, psycho­
logy, sociology, linguistics and archaeology as culture-studying 
disciplines, Lévi-Strauss emphasised that their difference primarily 
lies in their perspectives, not in their objects of study, and therefore he 
also considered the attempt to unify their terminologies to be futile. 
Lévi-Strauss characterised the special status of anthropology in terms 
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of three qualities: objectivity, totality and meaningfulness. Whereas 
totality denotes the observation of social life as systematic, and 
systematicness in its turn, the identification of a universal structure, 
the manifestations of which indeed constitute social life, the aspira­
tions towards meaningfulness are primarily associated with the study 
of social life in oral tradition cultures (lacking written language) (cf. 
controversy on written language and writing and the comparison of 
Lévi-Strauss and Derrida: Doja 2006). Objectivity aspirations differ 
from those in economics or demography, since social sciences employ 
the methods of natural sciences, but anthropology has closer ties with 
the humanities. Humanist and systematic interest towards hidden 
structures and meanings in culture is the reason why Lévi-Strauss 
predicts the transformation of anthropology into a semiotic discipline: 
"Anthropology aims to be a semeiological science, and takes as a 





Figure 1. Location of anthropology in interdisciplinary field according to 
Lévi-Strauss (1968: 359). 
The notion of semiotic anthropology has indeed surfaced by now and 
its foundations include those disciplines, where, according to Lévi-
Strauss, cultural and social anthropology meet, i.e. linguistics and 
archaeology: "Perhaps the most striking result of this movement 
toward the semiotic, in both linguistic and sociocultural anthropology, 
is the way it has helped to overcome an entrenched (and not 
particularly useful) division between idealist or symbolic approaches 
and more materialist forms of analysis" (Merz 2007: 344). Thus, 
semiotic anthropology possesses a significant methodological value: 
"A further advantage of semiotic anthropology for today's socio­
cultural anthropologists is that it supports more flexible and expansive 
approaches to defining where and how we can do our research" (Merz 
296 Peeter Torop 
2007: 345). In archaeology we can also detect a similar metho­
dological partnership with semiotics — belief that semiotics offers a 
common language with which we can understand the structure of 
contrasting interpretative approaches and communicate across these 
boundaries while at the same time acknowledging the validity of our 
different theoretical commitments" (Preucel, Bauer 2001: 93). 
Although semiotics is perceived as a possibly useful means to 
bring internal order and coherence to disciplines, to achieve holism 
and a methodology that understands a common language, at the same 
time, both humanities and social sciences nevertheless continue to be 
afraid of inordinate homogenisation and hiérarchisation (cf. Chakra-
varthy, Henderson 2007). G. L. Ribeiro postulates that "anthropology 
is a cosmopolitan political discourse about the importance of diversity 
for humankind" (Ribeiro 2006: 365), and claims, "Monological 
anthropology needs to be replaced by heteroglossic anthropology" 
(Ribeiro 2006: 364). The 'world anthropologies' project is founded on 
the concept of heteroglossia (introduced by M. Bakhtin): 
The 'world anthropologies' project wants to contribute to the articulation of a 
diversified anthropology that is more aware of the social, epistemological, and 
political conditions of its own production. The network has three main goals: 
(a) to examine critically the international dissemination of anthropology — as 
a changing set of Western discourses and practices — within and across 
national power fields, and the processes through which this dissemination 
takes place; (b) to contribute to the development of a plural landscape of 
anthropologies that is both less shaped by metropolitan hegemonies and more 
open to the heteroglossic potential of globalization; (c) to foster conversations 
among anthropologists from various regions of the world in order to assess the 
diversity of relations between regional or national anthropologies and a 
contested, power-laden, disciplinary discourse. Such a project is part of a 
critical anthropology of anthropology, one that decenters, re-historicizes and 
pluralizes what has been taken as 'anthropology' so far. It questions not only 
the contents but also the terms and the conditions of anthropological 
conversations. (Ribeiro 2006: 364) 
Since anthropology's object of study is in a state of constant change, 
another of Bakhtin's concepts — chronotope — has been used to 
describe the diversity. For example, T. Turner attributes pluralism to 
the change that has occurred in the transformation of the social space-
time or chronotope from linear diachronic chronotope to the 
chronotope of synchronic pluralism (Turner 2006: 17) or decentralised 
synchronic pluralism (Turner 2006: 22). 
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The same philosophy is expressed in the 'systematically eclectic 
approach' in sociology, which is also based on the realisation that "no 
one same theory may apply to all aspects of social life, all situations 
and all historical configurations" (Silber 2007: 226). The language 
that shapes and controls the theoretical thinking of a particular field is 
also systematically eclectic: 
Both humanities and the social sciences [...] have been deeply affected by the 
emergence and diffusion of new 'master metaphors', as I have termed it 
elsewhere, i.e. metaphors not simply used to adorn or enliven sociological 
writing, but actually playing a central role in the shaping and controlling of 
sociological theory and research (Silber 1995). I have in mind, for example, 
the impact of such potent literary metaphors as 'culture as text' and related 
ideas (i.e. genres, scenarios, narratives), as well as a whole range of economic 
(e.g. 'capital', 'market', 'goods'), spatial (e.g. social 'space', 'fields'), and 
artistic (e.g. 'repertoires') metaphors, combining or competing with older 
metaphors such as 'organism', 'system' or 'code'. (Silber 2007: 222) 
Linguistic shift has also affected the principal concepts of culture and 
theory. The concept of culture has shifted towards both plurality and 
adjectivity — culture as cultures on one hand and culture as a 
collection of certain attributes or 'cultural' on the other: 
Even in the plural, however, cultures were things that could in principle be 
isolated, analyzed, and ultimately compared — Balinese culture, Navajo 
culture, American culture, and so on. During the last quarter century, this 
concept of culture has been further softened and is now more comfortably 
expressed as an adjective. Questions that so exercised an earlier generation of 
anthropologists — what was 'a culture', how it could be defined, how 
coherent or disjunctive it was, how one culture intersected another — seem 
now anachronistic. But American anthropologists are still quite comfortable 
with culture as a modifier that denotes the symbolic or subjective dimension 
of life: 'cultural this', 'cultural that', 'cultural anthropology'. To say that 
something is 'cultural' still carries theoretical meaning for many, but this 
meaning is diffuse and not definitive; it depends on the thing that is modified. 
In the process, 'culture' has become loosely evocative and theoretically fuzzy 
even as it is deeply sedimented in anthropological sensibility. (Knauft 2006: 
412) 
The concept of anthropological theory has undergone the same 
transformation: "First 'Theory', then 'theories', now 'theoretical'. 
Increasingly, theory in anthropology emerges not in itself but as a 
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modifier of specific topics and issues to which theoretical articulations 
are applied, explored, and expressed" (Knauft 2006: 412). 
Such dynamics are the result of the constant tension between the 
theoretical and applied, or theoretical and non-theoretical anthro­
pology. The suggested solution to alleviate the tension between diffe­
rent approaches within one discipline, is the same that disciplines 
always resort to in difficult times, namely the dialogue within the 
discipline needs to be increased and, for the dialogue to work, its 
language must be simplified to the point that it will be generally 
understood by the parties involved. This process naturally takes place 
conjointly with methodological dialogue, i.e. striving for clarity of 
disciplinary thought: 
In prosaic terms, it would help if anthropological writing were simpler and 
more direct. Much discourse by anthropologists, especially in books and 
monographs, is heavy with in-house terminology and overwritten evoca­
tions — long on innuendo but short on exposition. Clear and concise 
statements of purpose, implication, and relevance would create more rather 
than less space for ethnographic illustration through examples that are 
creative, carefully chosen, and powerfully rendered. Structural and presenta­
tional clarity throws anthropological insights into bolder relief and fosters 
greater rigor as analysis is organized and orchestrated. (Knauft 2006: 423) 
At the same time, the internal heterogeneity of anthropology has also 
increased due to a significant shift within its object of study. Anthro­
pology, which has so far studied alien or other cultures, now studies 
its own culture or the universal global culture. Such a situation raises 
questions: 
How is a scientific discipline which was originally designed as a cognitive 
instrument for the understanding of 'others' (who, in the case of living 
societies, were always others with no chance of answering back) now 
transforming itself as a project in the degree to which groups within societies 
that are the traditional object of anthropological study start to use this 
cognitive instrument in order to gain anthropological knowledge both of their 
own sociocultural reality (in the immediate sense) and of global sociocultural 
reality as seen from their specific, local perspective? What are the distinctive 
characteristics of these Other Anthropologies when compared to the originals? 
How do their emergence and presence modify the whole of anthropology, that 
is, world anthropology? What would have to change within both dominant and 
emergent anthropologies to allow us to exploit better than we are currently 
doing their cognitive potential as single yet plural. How can we speed the 
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renewal of a discipline distanced once and for all from monocentrism and 
unitarism? (Krotz 2006: 234) 
To answer these questions requires significant metatheoretical activity 
within anthropology, i.e. the anthropology of anthropology (Krotz 
2006: 236). 
Culture studies 
Since anthtropology has close ties with cultural sociology, then it is 
only natural that cultural sociology is also willing to accept the role of 
so-called understanding methodology. Understanding of culture in 
cultural sociology has developed hand in hand with anthropology; the 
only significant difference is their language of self-description: 
We take for granted here many of the changes in our understanding of culture 
which have been established in the work of the last twenty years, by contrast 
with (what have at least been retrospectively constructed as) more static, 
overgeneralized, functionalist understandings current in the mid-twentieth 
century. These developments include (a) reaffirmation of a shared under­
standing that cultural sociology is not limited to the study of specialized 
cultural systems such as art, media, or science but rather that it is an analytic 
perspective on any social arena (b) a shift to analyzing specific meaning-
making processes from earlier conceptualizations of culture as an integrated 
whole (c) increasing focus on cognitions, categories, and practices more than 
values and attitudes (d) an emphasis on the ways in which power relations — 
both dominance and resistance — are mediated through discourse (e) the 
analysis of three different elements of cultural process — practices, dis­
courses, and institutionalized cultural production, and (f) a shared under­
standing that meaning-making processes should not be reduced to properties 
of individuals, as in the simple use of aggregated survey data, but rather 
should be investigated as trans-individual processes. (Jacobs, Spillman 2005: 
2) 
And in the present situation, cultural sociology wants to be a uniting and 
balancing force: "Cultural sociology is the disciplinary crossroads 
where macro and micro, agency and structure, theory and data all meet; 
bounded by the institutionalized practices of the subdisciplines it 
gathers together, it is shaped by the very intellectual fields that it helps 
reshape in turn" (Jacobs, Spillman 2005: 13). 
Mention should also be made of one more characteristic change in 
relation to cultural studies. The industrialising and ideologising inter-
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pretation of culture has become the culturifying interpretation of 
industry and power (culturification: see Lash 2007. 74). So, in order to 
avoid the ideological burden implicit in the notion of cultural studies, 
other notions such as cultural research (Lash 2007: 74) or culture 
studies (Bennett 2007b: 611) have been proposed. For the purpose of 
the present paper it is also important to mention the attempt by S. Lash 
to formulate the aspects of disciplinary ontology and epistemology: 
I have spoken of a shift as we moved to the post-hegemonic power regime as 
hegemony from the symbolic to the real, from semiotics to intensive language, 
and most of all from epistemology to ontology. Here I have understood the 
symbolic, semiotics, representation, as basically epistemological and the real, 
intensive language, and the communication as basically ontological. 
Epistemology has to do with the understanding of the things we encounter, 
while ontology and the real have to do with the thing itself that is never 
encountered. The thing itself, and the real, is never encountered — it is a virtual, 
a generative force; it is metaphysical rather than physical. (Lash 2007: 71) 
Return to the original principles of the discipline and their redefinition 
under new circumstances is indispensable for the preservation and 
development of the disciplinary identity. Without constant clarifica­
tion of ontological and epistemological issues, communication on 
subdisciplinary levels will be hampered, since the hybridisation of 
theories and metalanguages will not result in a new synthesis or 
identity. In a hybrid stage, if we return to original principles and try to 
clarify them and adapt them to new circumstances, we will, on one 
hand, have the opportunity to typologically reorganise the discipline 
from within, irrespective of whether the typology is hierarchical or 
heterarchical. On the other hand, the history of the discipline, i.e. its 
self-reflection, will also re-evaluate itself. The situation in various 
humanities and social sciences today can be understood with the help 
of science history, the logic of changes in the discipline's historical 
self-description and of different actualisations of its original sources. 
The contact of every culture-studying discipline with its object of 
study is historical and at every point in history this contact has been 
complicated by contacts with other disciplines studying the same 
object. And, if on one hand, these contacts fall under the categories of 
inter-, multi- or transdisciplinarity, then on the other hand, a historical 
approach, a "radical historisation" of science, is required to understand 
these contacts. T. Bennet writes, "...our understandings of both 
culture and the social need to be radically historicized if we are to 
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produce an adequate basis for understanding the specific contempo­
rary forms of their interrelations" (Bennett 2007a: 43). We can say 
that the historical dimension is an essential component of analysability 
and the fact that the notion of globalisation has penetrated culture-
studying disciplines indicates the need to consider new historical 
realities both empirically and theoretically (see, e.g., Bazin, Selim 
2006). 
Opposite to the trend of globalisation is the pull of localisation. As 
researchers, we have hardly reached the level of universal, when we 
already need to consider the local. Whereas anthropology is indeed the 
history of cultural analysis, then, for example, the history of organisa­
tion theory was for a long time "culture-free" (so to speak): 
Traditional organization theories were culture-free because the researcher, the 
researched and the audience were largely US. Culture was considered to be 
similar to all and thus had little explanatory power to contribute, except when 
researching certain ethnic groups or minorities. Now, however, in a globally 
competitive context, culture is likely to have considerable power (both 
theoretical and statistical) to explain differences in perception, behavior and 
action. Its importance is now integral to any effort at theorizing or model 
building in the international context. (Mukherji, Hurtado 2001: 110) 
The eschewal of culture is also present in the history of psychology. In 
1996, while presenting his future discipline of cultural psychology, M. 
Cole pointed out that due to its difficult analysability, culture had been 
undervalued in psychology up to now and that the mission of the new 
discipline was precisely the study of the role of culture in the psychic 
life of humans (Cole 1996). Culture in an organisation and culture in 
human psyche are rather different matters in themselves, yet there are 
many similarities in the methodology of their analyses. In both cases 
the analysability of culture is an important issue. Another important 
aspect is the relation with environment. In organisation theory it has 
been described by juxtaposing the high and low degree of analysabi­
lity and the high and low degree of control (Fig. 2). 
In order to understand the diagram of Fig. 2 from the point of view 
of general cultural analysis we should tie the aspect of analysability 
with the position of an analyst and the aspect of control with the 
theoretical position used for analysis and the related terminology. It is 
difficult to analyse culture in motion, its dynamics. It is far easier to 
analyse culture statically, since you can rely on (at least operationally) 
clearly defined units. A high degree of control is linked to proper 
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research that relies on an established theory or concept and to a 
supporting metalanguage. A low degree of control is linked to ad hoc 
analyses, which attempt to deduce the analysability of the object 
studied and the metalanguage for its description on the basis of the 
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Figure 2. Dimensions to classify the environment (from Mukherji, Hurtado 2001 : 
110). 
The situation becomes more complicated if we consider that the 
notion of culture also encompasses its own self-description or cultural 
worldview that expresses via oral or written communication its 
individual self-awareness, consensual ideology or cultural perception 
suggested by the cultural elite (Matsumoto 2006: 35-37). The 
description of culture of a culture analyst should correlate with this 
self-description (culture as a system of self-descriptions). Ideally, this 
would mean dialogue or cooperation between the one who describes 
and the one described (Chun 2005: 535; cf. also Strauss 2006). 
Reflexivity-based disciplines have enlisted a new member, autoethno-





















DEGREE OF CONTROL 
Semiotics, anthropology and the analysability of culture 303 
anthropology: "In autoethnography, the subject and object of research 
collapse into the body/ thoughts/ feelings of the (auto)ethnographer 
located in his or her particular space and time" (Gannon 2006: 475). 
Therefore, the relationship between the self-description and the 
description of others is an important problem in cultural analysis. 
Another important problem is the relationship between the describer 
and the described. That relationship can be either implicit or explicit. 
It is important for cultural semiotics that the position of the analyst is 
clearly evident, since the visibility of the observer's position is 
indicative of the objectivity or the precision of the analysis. 
Semiotics and anthropology 
A. Piatigorsky, one of the founders of the Tartu-Moscow school of 
semiotics, has emphasised that the definition of culture cannot be 
separated from the observer, since culture is a metaconcept, i.e. a 
concept of description and self-description (Piatigorsky 1996: 55). 
And understanding the observer is as important as understanding the 
observed, since "the language of world description cannot exist simply 
because there is no single natural language that can be used to 
describe the world as a single object of study" (Piatigorsky 2002: 9). 
Thus, when in anthropology the problem of the subjectivity of the 
describer primarily exists in autoethnography and that of the 
subjectivity of the described in its general theory (Luhrmann 2006; 
Strauss 2006; Ortner 2005), then in general methodology, description 
is associated with the use of general qualitative research methods and 
especially with the concept of participant observation. Participant 
observation consists of four strategies that may be realised through the 
direct contact of the observer with the observed, but also as a psycho­
logical attitude. 
Complete participation may imply an attempt on the part of the 
observer to influence the processes either on the object-level or meta-
level, by his or her behaviour or by publishing analytical writings. A 
participant as observer behaves in a more reserved manner and is more 
analytical than a complete participant, often less ideologically-minded. 
An observer as participant may possess only general behavioural 
experience and attempts to find theoretical support for it. For an 
observer as participant, the visibility of his/her theoretical position is 
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already an important consideration. Complete observation is a theory-
based process of relating with the analysed and presupposes the 
explicity of the attitude towards the object of study and the study 
methods used. It is probably easier to operate with different observa­
tion strategies in cultural semiotics than in anthropology, but the 
nuancing of observation is important in both disciplines. 
It is easiest to observe the progress towards a general science of 
culture in the synergy of anthropology and semiotics. Here, the 
foundation has been laid by B. Malinowski, who was among the first 
to emphasise (A Scientific Theory of Culture, 1941) that the flippant 
attitude on the part of scholars towards the scientificity of the study of 
culture is both despicable and immoral. According to Malinowski, 
history, sociology, economics and law studies must come together 
with other social sciences to combine an intellectual force that would 
be able to withstand and balance the physical force of the natural 
sciences. The first step towards scientificity is the definition of the 
sphere of study. It was precisely the ability to identify the studied 
phenomena in the course of their observation or comparison that 
seemed to be lacking in the study of culture at that time. In his 
functional analysis of culture, Malinowski distinguished three dimen­
sions of the cultural process — artefacts, organised groups or human 
social relations and symbolism or symbolic acts. On these premises, 
Malinowski realised that in culture everything must be studied in 
context and in terms of the function of the object of study. Malinowski 
formulated the conceptuality of observation in the modern sense: "To 
observe means to select, to classify, to isolate on the basis of theory. 
To construct a theory is to sum up the relevancy of past observation 
and to anticipate empirical confirmation or rebuttal of theoretical 
problems posed" (Malinowski 1969: 12). Malinowski's attitude 
towards the object of study is highly relevant today, the need to be 
constantly aware of the relationship between the discipline and its 
subject matter: "Our minimum definition implies that the first task of 
each science is to recognize its legitimate subject matter. It has to 
proceed to methods of true identification, or isolation of the relevant 
factors of its process" (Malinowski 1969: 14). 
Without attempting a systematic historical overview of the 
progress towards the science of culture, mention still should be made 
of two parallel events occurring at the same time. In 1973, 
Interpretation of Cultures by C. Geertz was published and in the same 
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year cultural semiotics manifested itself as a discipline for the first 
time — more precisely, the cultural semiotics of the Tartu-Moscow 
school (Theses 1998 [1973]). Geertz's book was a clear sign of 
anthropology moving towards semiotics. The author claims that the 
aim of the semiotic approach to culture is to help us to gain access to 
that conceptual world where the studied people live and to start a 
dialogue with them. Geertz believes that the semioticity of his inter­
pretation of culture lies in the desire to reach meanings. Therefore, he 
represents the interpreting science as meaning-oriented, apart from 
experimental science, which is law-oriented (Geertz 1973: 5). Geertz's 
desire is to move from static description to dynamic interpretation, i.e. 
a thick description. In order to achieve that, culture must be seen as a 
text, which becomes an acted document in the analysis process, and 
not a universal structure (Geertz 1973: 9-10). 
Looking at the membership and research topics of the Tartu-
Moscow school, we can say that this particular cultural semiotics is a 
semiotic science engaging in cooperation with anthropology. The 
programmatic Theses on the Semiotic Study of Cultures begin with the 
following passage: 
In the study of culture the initial premise is that all human activity concerned 
with the processing, exchange, and storage of information possesses a certain 
unity. Individual sign systems, though they presuppose immanently organized 
structures, function only in unity, supported by one another. None of the sign 
systems possesses a mechanism which would enable it to function culturally 
in isolation. Hence it follows that, together with an approach which permits us 
to construct a series of relatively autonomous sciences of the semiotic cycle, 
we shall also admit another approach, according to which all of them examine 
particular aspects of semiotics of culture, of study of the functional correlation 
of different sign systems. From this point of view particular importance is 
attached to questions of the hierarchical structure of the languages of culture, 
of distribution of spheres among them, of cases in which these spheres 
intersect or merely border upon each other. (Theses 1998 [1973]: 33) 
According to the logic of the Theses on the Semiotic Study of Cultu­
res, the essence of culture is semiotic by its very nature, since its 
foundation is information and communication. On one hand, the study 
of culture would be possible via the semiotisation of culture-studying 
disciplines, which would bring them closer to the essence of culture. 
The birth of the notion of semiotic anthropology is an example of such 
a development, which, together with disciplinary analysis capability, 
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would increase the level of analysability of culture. On the other hand, 
cultural semiotics offers a systematic approach to culture and creates a 
complementary methodology, which ensures the mutual under­
standing of different culture-studying disciplines. This is the develop­
ment prospect of cultural semiotics. 
Analysability of culture 
Thus, the intersection of culture and culture-studying disciplines raises 
questions that the new century must attempt to answer, or reformulate. 
The first set of questions touches upon culture as a complicated object 
of study and relates to disciplinary possibilities in the culture-studying 
sciences. Will it be possible to transform culture as a complicated 
object of study into a single or multiple disciplinary objects of study? 
Hence the issue of a single complex science. F. Rastier has raised the 
question about universal transsemiotics and differentiates between two 
poles with respect to the study of culture: sciences of culture (.sciences 
de la culture) is represented by Ernst Cassirer, and the semiotics of 
cultures {sémiotique des cultures) by the Tartu school. Between these 
two poles lie the questions: one or many sciences? culture or cultures? 
(Rastier 2001: 163). The second set of questions touches upon the 
relationship between the culture-studying disciplines. Is it possible to 
conceive of a hierarchy of culture-studying disciplines; could any of 
them, cultural semiotics for example, be assigned the role of 
methodological base discipline? This implies that the culture-studying 
disciplines themselves, their capability of dialogue with both the 
object of study and neighbouring disciplines should become separate 
subjects of analysis. Therefore, the question that needs to be answered 
is about the nature of relations between disciplinarity on one side and 
multi-, trans-, inter-, and dedisciplinarity on the other. 
With respect to mutual understanding it is characteristic that a 
methodological and even ethical attitude towards translation, 
translating and translatability has emerged in different culture-
studying disciplines. Already Malinowski used the notion of transla­
tion and that primarily in the sense of methodological translation 
(translatability). Translatability also implied observability for him, 
when he wrote about the transition from theory to empirics and 
claimed "that every theoretical principle must always be translatable 
Semiotics, anthropology and the analysability of culture 307 
into a method of observation, and again, that in observation we follow 
carefully the lines of our conceptual analysis" (Malinowski 1969: 14). 
The same principle is still relevant in 2006: "The challenge of cultural 
analysis is to develop translation and mediation tools for helping make 
visible the differences of interests, access, power, needs, desires, and 
philosophical perspective" (Fischer 2006: 363). Yet the notion of 
translation is also used on the object-level: 
Like a translation, culture is relational. Like a translation, culture links a 
source languaculture, LC2, to a target languaculture, LCI. Like a translation, 
i t  m a k e s  n o  s e n s e  t o  t a l k  a b o u t  t h e  c u l t u r e  o f  X  w i t h o u t  s a y i n g  t h e  c u l t u r e  o f X  
for Y. [...] Culture is a construction, a translation between source and target, 
between LCI and LC2. The amount of material that goes into that translation, 
that culture, will vary, depending on the boundary between the two. (Agar 
2006: 5-6) 
From the point of view of methodology, the introduction of the 
notions of translation and translating into the context of cultural 
analysis is of crucial importance, since it demonstrates perhaps most 
eloquently the naturalness of the co-existence of the static and the 
dynamic (see also Torop 2002b, 2007; Sütiste, Torop 2007). 
Translating a language-text from one language into another seems to 
be a most concrete activity that can partially even be subjected to 
formalised rules, if we recall machine translation. Yet translating the 
same text as a culture-text into another culture we face indefinability. 
The competences to evaluate translation into language and into culture 
differ, since in language the translation is a ready text, but in culture 
the same text is different for different readers and its so-to-speak 
average evaluation is largely hypothetical due to the mentality of that 
text. 
For each culture-studying discipline, the problem of culture's 
analysability stems from disciplinary identity. One half of analysability 
consists of the culture's attitude and the ability of the discipline's 
methods of description and analysis to render the culture analysable. 
The other half of analysability is shaped by the discipline's own 
adaptation to the characteristics of culture as the object of study and the 
development of a suitable descriptive language. The ontologisation and 
epistemologisation of culture as the subject of analysis is present in each 
culture-studying discipline or discipline complex. Disciplinary ontology 
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and disciplinary epistemology constitute the methodological foundation 
of every discipline. 
Cultural semiotics also has an important historical dimension. It is 
safe to say that cultural semiotics has developed from linguistic 
semiotics via text semiotics towards the semiotics of semiosphere (see 
also: Portis-Winner 1999, 2002; Torop 1999, 2002a, 2003, 2005). In 
addition to historical logic, this process also follows theoretical logic. 
Cultural semiotics started from the realisation that in a semiotical 
sense culture is a multi-language system, where, in parallel to natural 
languages, there exist secondary modelling systems (mythology, 
ideology, ethics etc.), which are based on natural languages, or which 
employ natural languages for their description or explanation (music, 
ballet) or language analogisation (language of theatre, language of 
movies). 
The next step is to introduce the concept of text as the principal 
concept of cultural semiotics. On one hand, text is the manifestation of 
language, using it in a certain manner. On the other hand, text is itself 
a mechanism that creates languages. From the methodological point of 
view, the concept of text was important for the definition of the 
subject of analysis, since it denoted both natural textual objects (a 
book, picture, symphony) and textualisable objects (culture as text, 
everyday behaviour or biography, an era, an event). Text and 
textualisation symbolise the definition of the object of study; the 
definition or framework allows in its turn the structuralisation of the 
object either into structural levels or units, and also the construction of 
a coherent whole or system of those levels and units. The development 
of the principles of immanent analysis in various cultural domains was 
one field of activity of cultural semiotics. Yet the analysis of a defined 
object is static, and the need to also take into account cultural 
dynamics led Juri Lotman to introduce the notion of semiosphere. 
Although the attributes of semiosphere resemble those of text 
(definability, structurality, coherence), it is an important shift from the 
point of view of culture's analysability. Human culture constitutes the 
global semiosphere, but that global system consists of intertwined 
semiospheres of different times (diachrony of semiosphere) and 
different levels (synchrony of semiosphere). Each semiosphere can be 
analysed as a single whole, yet we need to bear in mind that each 
analysed whole in culture is a part of a greater whole, which is an 
important methodological principle. At the same time, every whole 
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consists of parts, which are legitimate wholes on their own, which in 
turn consist of parts, etc. It is an infinite dialogue of whole and parts 
and the dynamics of the whole dimension. 
Yet the text will remain the 'middle' concept for cultural semio­
tics, since as a term it can denote both a discrete artefact and an 
invisible abstract whole (a mental text in collective consciousness or 
subconsciousness). The textual aspect of text analysis means the 
operation with clearly defined sign systems, texts or combinations of 
texts; the processual aspect of text analysis presupposes definition, 
construction or reconstruction of a whole. Thus the analysis assembles 
the concrete and the abstract, the static and the dynamic in one con­
cept — the text. These two interrelated aspects can be presented as 
shown in Table 1. 
Consequently, the aspects of the analysability of culture are insepar­
ably related to the interpretation of methodological problems. From the 
ontological aspect of the methodology of cultural semiotics, the static 
and dynamic forces are defining factors on all three levels: on the level 
of language, the important distinction is between discrete (natural 
language) and continual (iconic-spatial) languages (language of pictu­
res, movies or theatre); on the level of text between textuality and pro-
cessuality; and on the level of semiosphere between narrative (linearity) 
and performance (simultaneity). Every further clarification also implies 
the more precise definition of the object of study and the ontologisation 
of analysability, i.e. imagination of the object of study as analysable. 
From the epistemological aspect of cultural semiotics, the static 
and dynamic serve as clarifying analysis strategies. On the level of 
language, on one hand we have the definition of the object of study 
(disciplinary/ terminological) and its dialogisation (finding a flexible 
and emphatic language of description) on the other. On the level of 
text, on one hand we have analysis strategies that are based on the 
characteristics of the subject matter (structural) and the organisation of 
the subject matter (compositional). On the other hand, we can speak 
either of spatio-temporal (chronotope-based) or media-oriented (multi­
media etc.) analysis strategies, which do not depend directly on the 
composition of the text or the subject matter. On the level of semio­
sphere, the line runs between the levels of narrative and performance, 
the basis for linear and simultaneous analysis strategies. From the 
epistemological aspect, analysability is determined by the choice of 
study strategy. 
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Table 1. Static and dynamic aspects of text. 
TEXT 
TEXT AS TEXTUALITY TEXT AS PROCESSI'ALITY 
M ETACO M M UN 1  ATION INTERCOMMUNICATION 





CREOLE TEXTS INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE 
MENTALITY 






MEMORY OF TEXT MEMORY OF SIGN SYSTEMS 
Culture analysts are therefore scholars with double responsibilities. 
Their professionalism is measured on the basis of their analytical 
capability and the ability to construct (imagine, define) the object of 
study. The analytical capability and the ability to construct the object 
of study also determine the parameters of analysability. Culture as the 
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object of analysis often dictates its own analysability, which is why ad 
hoc theories, as theories based on their object of study, are in a promi­
nent position in culture-analysing disciplines. Culture analysis and 
also its analysability begin with the understanding of the object of 
study, the commencement of dialogue with the object of study, and 
finding a suitable language (scientific or simply analytical) for that 
particular dialogue. Regarding the thinking of an analyst, Lotman 
(2000: 143) has said that "the elementary act of thinking is transla­
tion". At the same time he has also added that "the elementary mecha­
nism of translating is dialogue" (Lotman 2000: 143). Dialogue in itself 
does not mean the use of an existing common language, but the 
creation of a language for communication that suits the purposes of 
the dialogue: "...the need for dialogue, the dialogic situation, precedes 
both real dialogue and even the existence of a language in which to 
conduct it" (Lotman 2000: 143-144). Thus, be the analyst an anthro­
pologist or a culture semiotician, the analysability of culture depends 
on how the analyst chooses to conduct the dialogue between 
him/herself and his/her object of study. 
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Семиотика, антропология и анализируем ость культуры 
В науках, изучающих культуру, наблюдаются две тенденции. С од­
ной стороны, видно стремление к уточнению того, как и что в куль­
туре изучается при разных подходах. И что может быть предметом 
общей науки о культуре. Это значит, что культура — не просто 
существующий объект изучения. Культура — еще и создаваемый 
или конструируемый объект изучения. С другой стороны, видны 
поиски метадисциплины или методологических принципов науки о 
культуре, позволяющих описывать на единой основе результаты 
разных культуроведческих дисциплин и так сказать переводить их 
на общепонятный язык. В одном случае культура определяется 
дисциплинарно (культурой является то, что в ней может изучать та 
или другая дисциплина), в другом случае дисциплинарные подходы 
к культуре описываются в качестве параметров культуры, посредст­
вом которых возможно приблизиться к целостному пониманию 
культуры (как к теоретическому идеалу). 
Проблема анализируемости культуры начинается для каждой из­
учающей культуру науки с дисциплинарной самоидентификации. 
Одна сторона анализируемости формируется на основе отношения к 
культуре и «подгонки» культуры для анализа посредством анали­
тических и дескриптивных средств данной дисциплины. Другая 
сторона анализируемости формируется на основе приспособления 
самой дисциплины к культуре как специфическому объекту изучения 
Semiotics, anthropology and the analysability of culture 315 
и вырабатывания подходящего языка описания. Онтологизация и 
эпистемологизация культуры как объекта анализа происходит в 
каждой культуроведческой дисциплине или комплексе дисциплин. 
Аналитик культуры является ученым с двойной ответственностью. 
Его профессиональность состоит в способности как анализа, так и 
создания (обрамления, представления) объекта изучения. Способности 
анализа и создания объекта изучения определяют и параметры 
анализируемости. Таким образом, анализируемость культуры зависит 
от того, как аналитик развивает диалог между самим собой и своим 
объектом изучения, будь он антрополог или семиотик культуры. 
Semiootika, antropoloogia ja kultuuri analüüsitavus 
Kultuuri uurivates teadustes on märgatavad kaks tendentsi. Ühelt poolt 
püütakse täpsustada seda, kuidas kultuuri või mida kultuuris mingi lähe­
nemise korral uuritakse. Ja mis võiks olla üldise kultuuriteaduse uurimis­
valdkond. See tähendab, et kultuur ei ole pelgalt olemasolev uurimis­
objekt. Samavõrra on kultuur loodav või konstrueeritav uurimisobjekt. 
Teiselt poolt otsitakse metadistsipliini või kultuuriteaduse metodoloogia 
põhimõtteid, mis võimaldaksid kirjeldada erinevate kultuuri uurivate 
distsipliinide tulemusi ühtsel alusel ja nii öelda tõlkida need aru­
saadavasse keelde. Ühel juhul määratletakse kultuuri distsiplinaarsena 
(kultuur on see, mida üks või teine distsipliin suudab kultuuris analüü­
sida), teisel juhul kirjeldatakse distsiplinaarseid kultuurikäsitlusi kultuuri 
parameetritena, mille sünteesimise kaudu on võimalik (teoreetilise 
ideaalina) jõuda kultuuri tervikkäsitluseni. 
Kultuuri analüüsitavuse probleem algab iga kultuuri uuriva teaduse 
jaoks distsiplinaarsest identiteedist. Analüüsitavuse üks pool kujuneb 
kultuuri suhtumisest ja kultuuri muudetavusest analüüsitavaks antud 
distsipliini kirjeldus- ja analüüsivahenditega. Analüüsitavuse teise poole 
kujundab distsipliini enda kohandumine kultuuri kui uurimisobjekti 
spetsiifikale ning sobiva kirjelduskeele väljaarendamine. Kultuuri kui 
analüüsiobjekti ontologiseerimine ja epistemologiseerimine toimub igas 
kultuuri uurivas distsipliinis või distsipliinide kompleksis. 
Kultuurianalüütik on seega kahekordse vastutusega teadlane. Tema 
professionaalsus seisneb nii analüüsivõimes kui uurimisobjekti loomise 
(kujutlemise, piiritlemise) võimes. Võime luua uurimisobjekti ja analüüsi­
võime määravad ära ka analüüsitavuse parameetrid. Seega sõltub kultuuri 
analüüsitavus sellest, kuidas analüütik dialoogi enda ja oma uurimis­
objekti vahel arendab, olgu ta siis antropoloog või kultuurisemiootik. 
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Abstract. Testing the other. It is nowadays a commonplace of academic 
discourse on social sciences, especially when it comes to such disciplines as 
anthropology and semiotics, to oppose the old (and old-fashioned) methods of 
the "structuralists" to post-modern and post-structural epistemological 
attitudes. Structuralism, it is said, was based on the idea that it is possible to 
apprehend the meaning of cultural productions from an exterior and therefore 
objective standpoint, just by making explicit their immanent principles of 
organization. Today, on the contrary, a totally distinct approach of cultural 
productions would stem from the consciousness of a strict interdependence, or 
even of an identity in nature between subject and object at all levels of the 
process of knowledge, at least in the area of the humanities. However, such a 
crude opposition proves insufficient when one observes the effective practices 
of current research. The example here analysed is the account given by the 
American anthropologist Paul Rabinow of his first mission abroad: Reflec­
tions on Fieldwork in Morocco. The analysis, based on the use of a semiotic 
modelling of interaction, consists in exploring the variety of positions respec­
tively adopted by the anthropologist and his informants according to circums­
tances and contexts. Four regimes are in principle distinguishable: program­
mation, based on regularity and predictability of the actors' behaviour, 
manipulation, based on some kind of contractualization of their relationships, 
adjustment, based upon reciprocal sensitivity and various strategies permitting 
to both partners of the interaction to test one another, and a regime of consent 
to the unexpected or the unforeseeable. The main result of the analysis resides in 
the possibility of showing that at each of these styles of pragmatic interaction 
corresponds a specific regime at the cognitive level as well. This leads to 
stressing the complexity, if not heterogeneity, of the strategies of knowledge 
involved at various stages of anthropological research, from the collection of 
data to the cooperative production of new forms of understanding. Taking the 
risk of generalization, one might also consider the interactional device, which is 
here tested through the reading of P. Rabinow's report as a metatheoretical 
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model describing the various epistemological stances at work and at stake in the 
practices of research in social sciences at large. 
1. En quête de l'objet 
La sémiotique et l'anthropologie ont au moins ceci de commun, en tout 
cas dans leurs versions d'inspiration structurale respectives, que d'une 
part, sur un plan extrêmement général, elles ont en dernière instance 
l'ambition l'une et l'autre de cerner ce qui fait en même temps l'unité et 
la diversité des formes de l'entendement et de l'imaginaire humains, et 
que d'autre part la mise en œuvre de ce projet à long terme passe, pour 
l'une et l'autre, par le recours à des procédures d'analyse empirique 
appliquées à des objets ayant le statut, comme on dit en sémiotique, de 
"manifestations". Peu importe qu'il s'agisse de textes ou de pratiques 
(de "mythes" ou de "rites"), d'oeuvres ou de produits de l'industrie 
humaine, de comportements individuels ou d'usages collectifs, de 
normes ou d'institutions, pourvu qu'il s'agisse de productions 
signifiantes présentant un caractère suffisamment concret ou articulé 
pour qu'elles se prêtent à la description. Encore faut-il fixer, parmi 
l'infinité des manifestations qui s'offrent, celles qu'on tiendra pour 
pertinentes dans la perspective d'une recherche déterminée. D'où un 
problème de base, en apparence purement pratique mais dont les 
implications sont cruciales dans les deux cas : pour la sémiotique, celui 
de la constitution du corpus, et pour l'anthropologie, celui du recueil des 
données. C'est lui qui va nous retenir dans ce qui suit. 
Sur le plan méthodologique et technique, les questions à résoudre 
se présentent selon des modalités distinctes pour chacune des deux 
disciplines. Du côté sémiotique, elles ont trait aux conditions du choix 
et de la délimitation des textes-objets, ou bien, lorsque l'analyse porte 
non pas sur des textes mais sur des pratiques (comme c'est couram­
ment le cas en socio-sémiotique), à la recherche de critères adéquats 
pour la clôture du champ d'observation. Du côté anthropologique, le 
problème concerne la définition de la conduite à suivre sur le terrain 
en vue de la collecte et de l'enregistrement des données. Mais c'est sur 
un second plan, d'ordre théorique ou même épistémologique, que 
surgissent les difficultés les plus ardues. On peut les formuler en gros 
dans les mêmes termes pour les deux disciplines. Elles tiennent au 
simple fait, aujourd'hui largement reconnu de part et d'autre, que ni 
les procédures concernant, en sémiotique, la délimitation d'un corpus 
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textuel ou la clôture d'un espace d'interaction pris pour objet, ni celles 
relatives à la constitution des données d'une recherche anthropolo­
gique ne constituent jamais des opérations neutres par rapport au tra­
vail d'analyse ou d'interprétation "proprement dit", qui, selon une vue 
de bon sens, devrait chronologiquement leur faire suite. Certes, pour 
analyser un corpus ou interpréter des données, il faut bien que les 
éléments à analyser ou à interpréter aient préalablement été recueillis. 
Mais comme leur sélection engage par elle-même une manière déter­
minée de découper le réel, elle constitue en fait déjà, à elle seule, 
l'équivalent d'une première analyse et d'une interprétation implicite. 
Très souvent, le découpage du réel que le chercheur prend ou 
reprend alors, implicitement, à son compte n'est autre que celui que 
lui fournit spontanément son informateur. Ainsi, lorsqu'un sémioti-
cien entreprend par exemple de développer une sémiotique de la 
"littérature" et, pour cela, décide d'analyser tel roman considéré com­
me un chef d'œuvre de l'art littéraire, que fait-il sinon identifier 
l'objet "littéraire" à partir des critères de reconnaissance en vigueur 
dans les milieux de l'enseignement ou de la critique ? En d'autres 
termes, il sélectionne son corpus en s'en remettant aux autorités 
informées, et non pas sur la base de critères sémiotiques — et pour 
cause, puisque par hypothèse, à ce stade, de tels critères n'existent pas 
encore ! Peut-être n'y a-t-il pas d'autre point de départ possible, mais 
il va de soi que le travail sémiotique proprement dit ne commencera 
que du moment où le chercheur tentera de substituer aux critères que 
lui livre son informateur social une définition de la "littérarité" qui 
relève de la conceptualisation sémiotique. Tâche de longue haleine, 
comme on sait ! A moins qu'il ne se propose, plus modestement, de 
rendre compte de la manière même dont la culture considérée cons­
truit la notion d'objet "littéraire" — auquel cas le sémioticien se mon­
trerait sans doute plus proche de l'anthropologue que précédemment. 
Car la construction du savoir anthropologique, elle aussi, ou elle en 
premier lieu, s'effectue moyennant une relation dialectique complexe 
qui, tout en partant des catégories à l'aide desquelles Y informateur — 
lui de nouveau — décrit sa propre culture, vise à les dépasser en vue 
d'en rendre compte sur un plan théorique plus général. 
Il est vrai qu'ici nous jouons un peu sur le sens du mot "infor­
mateur", mais on va le voir, ce jeu n'est pas gratuit. Dans la perspec­
tive sémiotique, il est convenu de désigner indifféremment par ce 
terme toute instance susceptible d'être constituée en source de savoir à 
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l'initiative d'un observateur quelconque ; dans ces conditions, même 
les choses inanimées — un paysage, la topographie d une ville par 
exemple — ont vocation à tenir lieu "d'informateurs". Par leur simple 
apparaître, elles disent en effet quelque chose d'elles-mêmes dès que 
quelqu'un porte sur elles son regard. De la même façon, comme nous 
le savons d'expérience, notre visage joue à lui seul, indépendamment 
de nos intentions et souvent même à notre corps défendant, le rôle 
d'un informateur pour autrui dans la mesure où, que nous le veuillons 
ou non, chacun, de l'extérieur, peut y lire (en interprétant juste ou en 
se trompant, c'est une autre question) l'expression de nos états d'âme 
supposés. En revanche, en anthropologie — conformément à l'usage 
lexical courant —, le terme d'informateur ne s'emploie en général que 
pour désigner un type d'acteurs plus restreint, à savoir une classe de 
sujets dotés à la fois de compétence cognitive et d'intentions, et dont, 
en raison de leur statut et de leur position, d'autres sujets, à la fois 
cognitifs et intentionnels eux aussi, simples curieux ou enquêteurs 
professionnels, peuvent, dans certaines conditions, espérer la commu­
nication d'une partie du "savoir" qu'ils sont censés détenir. 
C'est dans la tension qui joue entre ces deux acceptions de la 
notion d'informateur que se noue à notre sens le problème même de la 
construction de l'objet dans les deux disciplines considérées. On a là 
en effet l'esquisse de deux régimes épistémiques qui, bien que très 
différents et même opposés, imprègnent à divers degrés, l'un et 
l'autre, les pratiques de recherche de l'une et de l'autre. Les deux 
disciplines, on le sait, ne cessent effectivement de balancer entre une 
vision objectivante et une conception intersubjective de la construc­
tion du savoir. Dans le cadre classique d'une anthropologie ou d'une 
sémiotique à dominante structurale, le regard du chercheur, et lui seul, 
était censé prendre une part active à la construction de l'objet de 
connaissance, construction qui, selon cette optique, passe par la réduc­
tion de l'autre — de l'informateur — au statut d'un non-sujet. Non 
seulement le "sauvage" lointain (le primitif), mais aussi l'auteur, si 
soucieux soit-il de contrôler ce qu'il écrit, et plus généralement enco­
re, l'acteur social, ne sait pas lui-même ce qu'il pense ou, en tout cas, 
ne connaît pas la raison de ce qu'il pense, et ce n'est pas à lui de 
rendre compte de ce qu'il fait. Seul le savant, fort de sa position 
extérieure, sera à même de (lui) révéler ce qu'il en est moyennant une 
analyse méthodiquement conduite des manifestations qu'il produit 
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sous la forme de textes, d'objets matériels, de comportements ou de 
pratiques, ou simplement de réponses aux questions qu'on lui pose. 
La problématique alternative, qui, à la vérité, surtout en anthropo­
logie, ne date pas d'aujourd'hui et n'est pas l'apanage des seuls "post­
structuralistes", n'est pas moins prégnante. Elle se fonde sur l'idée que 
la compréhension de l'autre, ou du moins de ses manifestations, ne 
peut résulter que d'un dialogue — mieux, d'une véritable interaction 
— entre analysant et analysé. Il est vrai que cette option comporte un 
risque. C'est que, sous prétexte qu'au lieu d'observer l'autre de l'exté­
rieur et à distance comme un objet l'analysant s'implique désormais 
dans une relation de type intersubjectif avec cet autre, il en vienne à 
oublier que son objectif ultime reste de rendre compte du sens des 
actions ou des discours de l'autre et finisse par ne plus se soucier que 
de ses propres réactions et états d'âme face à cet autre devenu, en 
somme, l'in-analysé. Ce serait réduire le travail de l'anthropologue ou 
du sémioticien à bien peu de chose que de substituer ainsi une démar­
che introspective aux procédures d'antan ! Mais une fois écartée cette 
éventualité, la vraie difficulté demeure. Elle consiste à essayer de 
définir une démarche dialectique (proche de la phénoménologie) qui 
permette de penser Y interaction même entre le "sujet" et Г "objet" — 
et plus précisément la manière dont leur face à face met l'un à 
l'épreuve de l'autre, non pas psychologiquement mais sur le plan de 
leurs principes respectifs de compréhension du monde (et donc de 
l'autre) — comme le lieu d'émergence d'un sens qui, n'appartenant en 
propre ni à l'un ni à l'autre, ne peut résulter que des modalités de leur 
rencontre. Ce qui revient ni plus ni moins à admettre qu'en deçà des 
questions de méthodes, c'est, autant que l'objet de la recherche, la 
nature même de la connaissance visée qui change, dans une certaine 
mesure, quand on passe d'un pôle de l'alternative à l'autre. 
Cependant, les choses seraient trop simples si le choix se posait en 
termes aussi catégoriques. En réalité, il suffit de laisser de côté les 
proclamations de principe (dont beaucoup sont destinées surtout à 
conforter l'identité des écoles rivales), d'oublier les schématisations 
dramatisantes chères aux pédagogues et aux médias, et d'observer les 
pratiques effectives des chercheurs dans les deux champs discipli­
naires pour constater que les deux conceptions ont beau s'opposer sur 
le plan des options épistémologiques fondamentales, elles cohabitent 
bel et bien sur le plan des démarches heuristiques, donnant lieu à 
toutes sortes de procédures d'enquête et d'interprétation à caractère 
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hybride. Autrement dit, il n'y a pas que nous qui nous permettions de 
jouer en même temps avec les deux acceptions du mot "informateur" ! 
Et si beaucoup d'anthropologues, de même qu'une certaine proportion 
(plus réduite) de sémioticiens se montrent aujourd'hui à la fois en 
quête de distance objectivante et conscients de leur propre implication 
dans la relation à l'objet, et par suite jouent eux aussi "sur les deux 
tableaux", ce n'est ni par goût du compromis ni par quelque faiblesse 
méthodologique. C'est bien plutôt, à ce qu'il nous semble, parce que 
la contradiction, ou en tout cas la tension entre les deux pôles de 
l'alternative fait partie des données constitutives de nos recherches. 
Certes, il est toujours possible de ne pas en tenir compte et d'opter 
pour l'un ou l'autre extrême. Mais c'est alors au prix d'un réduction-
nisme pire que le statu quo : fuite en avant vers un pur subjectivisme 
(le "déconstructionnisme"), ou au contraire régression vers un posi­
tivisme parfaitement "scientifique" mais stérile. 
Loin de se réduire à un pur débat académique, le problème touche 
donc aux conditions mêmes et à la signification du travail de recher­
che. De plus, on voit qu'il concerne autant le sémioticien que l'anthro­
pologue. Ceci nous incite à tenter de confronter deux travaux de 
réflexion émanant respectivement de l'une et de l'autre discipline et 
qui, l'un et l'autre, témoignent d'une vision dialectique — et non 
catégorique — des tenants et aboutissants du travail de recherche. Il 
s'agit d'une part de la "réflexion sur une enquête de terrain" menée 
par l'anthropologue Paul Rabinow (1988) dans Un ethnologue au 
Maroc, livre qui met en lumière la complexité des régimes de sens et 
d'interaction en jeu dans la construction d'une certaine forme de 
savoir à travers la rencontre avec l'autre, et d'autre part d'un modèle 
que nous avons nous-même élaboré en vue de penser — nous aussi, 
mais en termes sémiotiques et sur un plan théorique d'ordre géné­
ral — l'articulation entre plusieurs régimes de construction du sens 
dans l'interaction (Landowski 2005). 
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2. Régimes d'interaction 
Quelques mots tout d'abord à propos du modèle interactionnel que 
nous proposons. Il a été construit à partir du schéma narratif proposé 
par Greimas, et en le prolongeant1. Pour l'introduire, commençons par 
quelques généralités. 
Quel que soit le projet à réaliser, la démarche à entreprendre, le 
problème à résoudre ou l'affaire à mener à bien, c'est un fait empiri­
quement constatable que chacun, dans la vie quotidienne et a fortiori 
dans les moments les plus graves, est enclin (en fonction de sa culture 
ou de quelque idiosyncrasie personnelle) à privilégier un modus 
operandi déterminé, un certain style d'action, une "stratégie" de préfé­
rence à telle ou telle autre. Beaucoup d'entre nous, par exemple, ne se 
sentant en confiance que dans un environnement bien ordonné et 
maîtrisé, rêveraient de pouvoir programmer le comportement des 
autres personnes aussi bien que l'ordre des choses de façon à s'assurer 
jusque dans le plus menu détail le contrôle du déroulement de la 
moindre opération dans laquelle ils se trouvent impliqués. D'autres, ne 
voyant partout que machinations et complots, pensent ne pouvoir 
arriver à leurs fins qu'en manipulant eux-mêmes, de manière aussi 
contournée que de besoin, ceux avec qui ils ont à traiter. D'autres 
encore préférent se fier à leur intuition, au flair, à leur capacité de 
sentir sur le moment même, en acte, les tenants et aboutissants d'une 
situation ou les dispositions intimes de ceux auxquels ils ont affaire, 
prêts à s'y ajuster et à en tirer parti en saisissant l'occasion "aux 
cheveux". D'autres enfin, écartant toute idée de plan, de calcul ou de 
syntonic avec autrui, croient plus sûr de s'en remettre tout simplement 
à leur bonne étoile, à la chance, et se contentent de se croiser les 
doigts en attendant quelque heureux accident que la providence aura 
décidé pour eux. 
Autant de manières d'être au monde qui, tout en correspondant 
chacune à une manière spécifique d'appréhender ou de construire le 
"sens de la vie", se traduisent respectivement dans des styles de con­
duite différenciés sur le plan des interactions avec les objets, avec 
autrui, avec soi-même. Ces variantes comportementales relèveraient 
du simple donné psychologique et nous n'aurions rien de mieux à 
Pour une présentation des éléments de base de la grammaire narrative, cf. 
Greimas, Courtés (1979), en particulier les entrées "Narrativité", "Sujet", "Syn­
taxe narrative". 
324 Eric Landowski 
faire que de les constater si les régimes de sens et d'interaction aux­
quels elles renvoient ne s'articulaient eux-memes les uns aux autres en 
fonction de principes structurels qui ne doivent rien à la psychologie 
mais se révèlent sémiotiquement analysables. 
Pourtant, parmi ces divers régimes de sens et d'interaction qui 
nous sont intuitivement familiers, il se trouve que la sémiotique narra­
tive n'en avait jusqu'à présent reconnu et thématisé que deux : d'un 
côté, "l'opération", ou action programmée sur les choses, et de l'autre, 
la "manipulation", entre sujets. En reprenant les définitions classiques 
de ces deux régimes, il n'est pas difficile de faire apparaître que le 
premier est fondé sur un principe général de régularité — principe 
qui, manifesté en surface par l'immuabilité des rôles assignés aux 
protagonistes de l'action, garantit (en principe) l'efficacité de nos 
interventions sur le monde environnant —, et que le second a quant à 
lui pour base un principe d'intentionnalitê dont la mise en œuvre 
suppose elle-même la reconnaissance réciproque des partenaires de 
l'interaction en tant qu'actants sujets dotés de "compétences modales" 
(du type vouloir, croire, pouvoir, etc.) sans cesse changeantes. C'est 
ainsi que la grammaire narrative a mis à l'honneur la figure du mani­
pulateur et, plus accessoirement, celle du programmateur. 
En revanche, ni le sujet confiant dans sa capacité de sentir in vivo 
les potentialités d'une situation, de tourner à son avantage la propen­
sion des choses ou des gens, de saisir et d'exploiter à Г improviste le 
kairos — baptisons-le Y opportuniste—, ni le fataliste décidé à s'en 
remettre coûte que coûte au seul hasard, ne trouvaient de place dans ce 
cadre. L'observation de l'interaction, et d'abord l'expérience même 
que nous en avons, nous obligeaient pourtant à les prendre eux aussi 
en considération. Pour pouvoir analyser tant soit peu exhaustivement 
l'éventail des régimes de construction du sens qui sous-tendent la 
diversité des pratiques relationnelles effectives, il était par conséquent 
nécessaire d'enrichir le modèle. D'où notre initiative d'introduire à 
côté des deux régimes "standards" déjà mentionnés — et qui, en per­
dant leur monopole, ne perdent pour autant rien de leur pertinence — 
deux régimes d'interaction complémentaires fondés, respectivement, 
sur un principe de sensibilité et sur un principe d'aléa : le régime de 
"l'ajustement" à l'autre, quel qu'il soit, et celui de "l'assentiment" aux 
décrets du sort (Fig. 1). 
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Figure 1. Quatre régimes de sens et d'interaction. 
Formant système et ayant par suite vocation à s'articuler et à se com­
biner entre elles, les quatre formules auxquelles nous aboutissons de la 
sorte permettent à notre sens de rendre compte de la variété et du 
caractère le plus souvent composite, hybride ou polyvalent des prati­
ques interactionnelles observables sur les terrains les plus divers, y 
compris celui de la construction de l'objet de connaissance dans nos 
disciplines à vocation scientifique. 
A l'intérieur de ce dispositif, quelle pourrait alors être la place de 
l'ethnographe ? Celle d'un habile manipulateur ? D'un subtil oppor­
tuniste ? Quoi encore ? Ou bien, étant donné que ce modèle typologi­
que fait en même temps fonction de diagramme topologique (ce que le 
tracé orienté de l'ellipse a pour but d'indiquer), quels pourraient être 
les parcours que l'enquêteur y effectue, amené qu'il doit probablement 
être à changer de position — à passer d'un régime à un autre — au gré 
des circonstances ou en fonction des contextes ? Plus largement, dans 
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quelle mesure les stratégies relationnelles définies par la syntaxe du 
modèle, et les postures que chacune implique face à l'Autre, permet-
tent-elles de rendre compte de niveaux spécifiques, de conceptions 
particulières ou de moments déterminés touchant à la praxis ethno-
anthropologique en tant que quête de savoir ? — C'est pour tenter de 
répondre, au moins en partie, à ce genre de questions que nous nous 
appuierons maintenant sur la lecture du livre déjà cité de Paul Rabi-
now, dont l'intérêt tient pour nous en premier lieu au fait qu'il se situe 
à mi-chemin entre le récit d'une "expérience vécue" et la réflexion 
d'ordre épistémologique — ou mieux, qu'il réussit à articuler très 
finement ces deux volets. 
3. Un épistémologue en acte 
Au fil de la narration, l'auteur — ou plus exactement le narrateur, tel 
qu'il se met lui-même en scène — rencontre toute une série d'infor­
mateurs potentiels. Avec quelques-uns d'entre eux, la rencontre tourne 
vite au fiasco : ils ne font pas l'affaire. Ce n'est pas une raison pour 
nous de les ignorer. D'abord, la confrontation entre le texte de Paul 
Rabinow et notre modèle serait biaisée si nous ne prenions en compte 
que quelques éléments du premier en passant les autres sous silence. 
Et qui plus est, il se trouve que dans le cadre même de ce modèle, le 
repérage des compatibilités et des incompatibilités entre régimes dis­
tincts nous permet d'esquisser aussi une théorie de l'erreur stratégi­
que, du quiproquo, bref, de Y interaction manquée. Commençons donc 
par les échecs et les rencontres avortées. 
Richard, Ibrahim, Mekki : autant de déceptions pour "M. Paul", le 
narrateur, notre héros. Leur principe commun est simple et immédiate­
ment déductible de la petite combinatoire que le modèle invite à 
construire. Pour qu'il y ait interaction, il faut évidemment, au mini­
mum, qu'il y ait deux parties ; si nous postulons que chacune d'elles 
privilégie nécessairement un régime de sens et un mode d'interaction 
déterminé (soit de façon générale, soit dans une situation concrète 
particulière), nous pouvons obtenir déductivement une série de 
schèmes de rencontre virtuels (au nombre de seize, pour être précis) 
simplement en inventoriant toutes les combinaisons possibles deux à 
deux entre le style stratégique qu'adopte l'un des actants et celui — 
identique ou différent — qui guidera l'action en réponse de l'autre 
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actant. On peut prévoir qu'il résultera de chacun de ces schèmes des 
effets de sens distincts, et en même temps des effets pragmatiques 
diversifiés, du succès presque garanti à l'échec assuré. 
Sans entrer dans le détail d'un tel calcul, admettons par exemple, 
pour la commodité du raisonnement, que pour que les conduites d'un 
adepte du régime de la programmation aient le plus de chances de 
succès sur le plan pragmatique, il faille (et probablement il suffise) 
qu'elles aillent à la rencontre d'un partenaire lui-même déjà program­
mé (tel un ordinateur) ou, pour le moins, "programmable" (comme le 
chien de Pavlov) ; que, de même, un manipulateur, pour être sûr de 
réussir, ait besoin d'interlocuteurs qui soient eux-mêmes tant soit peu 
"manipulables" ; et ainsi de suite. De telles concordances n'ont sans 
doute rien d'exceptionnel ; cependant, comme on ne choisit pas tou­
jours à qui on a affaire, il se peut tout aussi bien qu'elles fassent 
défaut. Qu'adviendra-t-il alors, quand un programmateur devra faire 
face à un fataliste, à un opportuniste ou à un manipulateur ? Ou réci­
proquement. On doit s'attendre à ce que des déconvenues de types 
qualitativement différenciés apparaissent en pareils cas, en fonction de 
la diversité des types de mal-appariements possibles entre les régimes 
auxquels se soumettent respectivement chacune des deux parties. 
Les infortunes de M. Paul procèdent systématiquement d'un de ces 
divers cas prévisibles, toujours le même. En bon ethnographe, il n'est 
pas disposé à se contenter d'informations figées dans des discours de 
convention qui lui paraîtraient pré-programmés par le milieu ambiant. 
Malheureusement, Richard, la première personne avec qui il entre en 
contact, ne sait que lui répéter indéfiniment les mêmes clichés sur la 
vie locale. Ibrahim, ensuite, avec qui il compte s'initier à l'arabe, a 
beau être fier de sa langue, son enseignement ne dépasse pas la récita­
tion de listes de vocabulaire trouvées dans un vieux manuel. Quant à 
Mekki, faute du moindre recul par rapport à son propre univers social 
et culturel, il reste prisonnier de schémas dogmatiques et convenus. 
Au bout de peu de temps, l'ethnologue se rend compte qu'il serait 
vain d'espérer entraîner de tels interlocuteurs vers le genre d'échanges 
intellectuels qu'il recherche, que ce soit en essayant de les manipuler 
ou de s'ajuster à eux : ce ne sont, en tout cas en ce qui concerne leurs 
rapports avec un visiteur étranger de son genre, que des non-sujets, 
des acteurs au comportement étroitement programmé. 
Or, de toute évidence, ce qui peut être communiqué entre deux 
interlocuteurs dépend du régime de rapports que chacun d'eux est en 
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mesure de mettre en oeuvre face à son partenaire du moment. Que 1 un 
ou l'autre d'entre eux — ici, c'est l'informateur, mais ailleurs cela 
pourrait être aussi bien l'enquêteur — s'enferme dans le cadre d'une 
programmation discursive déterminée, aussitôt cela affecte le statut de 
l'information transmise et, d'un point de vue anthropologique, sa 
valeur. Un "bon" enquêteur devrait donc être capable au moins de 
deux choses : de repérer les réponses préfabriquées qu'on lui adresse, 
et de trouver (lorsque c'est possible) le moyen de substituer aux rap­
ports intersubjectifs de convention que sa posture professionnelle tend 
à susciter un régime d'interaction plus ouvert qui lui permette d'obte­
nir de la part de l'enquêté un discours plus libre et par suite, avec un 
peu de chance, plus éclairant. — Réciproquement, un "bon" informa­
teur ne saurait être au fond que celui qui, capable premièrement de 
reconnaître les questions préformatées que se croirait en devoir de lui 
poser un ethnographe trop bien programmé (par exemple, trop enclin à 
suivre à la lettre les manuels de méthode et les guides de comporte­
ment sur le terrain), saurait ensuite comment amener son interlocuteur 
— l'enquêteur — à se poser à lui-même des questions moins rebattues 
et à lui en adresser, à lui l'enquêté, de moins ennuyeuses et peut-être, 
du coup, de plus judicieuses. 
Nous ne retiendrions pas l'idée, un peu impertinente bien que 
rigoureusement logique, d'une telle inversion des rôles si le récit de 
Paul Rabinow ne soulignait lui-même à quel point l'enquêteur a 
besoin d'une participation active de l'enquêté pour que l'échange 
devienne fructueux. Voyons à cet égard ce qu'il en est des rencontres 
du narrateur avec Ali, Rashid puis Malik, et finalement Driss ben 
Mohammed. 
"Ali était un informateur remarquable". Le texte le décrit comme 
un homme de caractère, à l'esprit et au comportement très libres (à tel 
point qu'il s'en trouve socialement marginalisé), et toujours plein 
d'initiative. C'est presque un petit bandit ! "M. Paul" lui doit néan­
moins beaucoup, y compris sur un plan à première vue extra-profes­
sionnel. Guidé par lui, il passera "la plus belle journée" qu'il lui fut 
donné de passer au Maroc (Rabinow 1988: 64-70). Ce jour-là, Ali 
ayant eu l'idée de l'inviter à l'accompagner pour une promenade en 
montagne avec deux de ses amies, il se laisse entraîner dans une 
"expérience étonnante" à la faveur de laquelle il va perdre peu à peu, 
avec ravissement, tous ses repères habituels : 
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Je ne voyais pas du tout où nous allions [...] ; de temps à autre, je m'avisais 
que les séquences n'obéissaient à aucune cohérence, que les orientations et les 
relations causales étaient fautives [...] ; je sentais une jubilation croissante, 
comme si nous abandonnions aussi toute inhibition personnelle, toute conven­
tion sociale. 
En un mot, "c'était l'aventure". Aucune norme ordinaire de conduite, 
aucune programmation du temps, de l'action, du discours n'a plus 
cours : notre héros se trouve transporté dans un monde aux antipodes 
de la régularité rassurante du quotidien, un monde du tout-est-possi­
ble, de l'accident heureux auquel il consent par avance : "nous nous 
laissions simplement porter par le flot des événements". On ne saurait 
mieux illustrer ce que nous appelions plus haut le régime de Y assenti­
ment à l'aléa. 
Le "sentiment d'euphorie et d'amicale complicité" éprouvé ponc­
tuellement à l'occasion de cette idyllique journée "d'aventure" par les 
deux compères (qui n'en restent pas moins, l'un vis-à-vis de l'autre, 
"l'ethnologue" et son "informateur") contribuera à renforcer entre eux 
un lien déjà établi au fil du temps dans le cadre d'un autre régime, plus 
prosaïque, celui de la manipulation réciproque. Le récit ne donne 
guère de précisions sur la manière dont l'ethnologue obtient au jour le 
jour la coopération d'Ali. Il se borne à évoquer les motivations 
générales, "surtout pragmatiques" selon lui, qu'il lui suppose, et qui, 
d'ailleurs, seront les mêmes par la suite dans le cas, par exemple, de 
Malik ou de Rashid : en échange de leur travail, ils comptent sur un 
petit revenu, éventuellement quelques menus services (à un moment 
donné, M. Paul servira de chauffeur à pratiquement tout le village) et 
un certain gain de prestige devant leur entourage (surtout pour Rashid, 
qui "se pavane dans la notoriété acquise par son travail avec l'ethno­
logue"). 
A ce style de relations interpersonnelles correspond de nouveau 
une délimitation assez précise de la nature et la valeur de l'information 
recueillie par l'ethnologue. Avec Rashid, et plus encore avec Malik — 
dans son cas, ce régime d'échanges prendra la forme d'un véritable 
contrat, renouvelable de mois en mois —, la collaboration ne 
dépassera que difficilement les limites d'un travail "assez mécanique" 
portant sur des tâches "bien délimitées" tels le tracé des généalogies, 
la description du régime foncier, du réseau d'irrigation ou du système 
de parenté. Autrement dit, on reste alors dans le cadre d'une épistémo-
logie objectivante très classique, et cela, apparemment, dans la mesure 
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même où l'interaction s'inscrit strictement dans le cadre de rapports 
contractuels. Mieux, plus ces rapports sont formalisés, plus le cadre 
épistémologique du travail d'enquête mené à deux paraît étroit. 
Au contraire, avec Ali, c'est un lien d'affinité réciproque, d'ordre 
purement "amical", qui, malgré des brouilles passagères, va se nouer 
et s'épanouir sur la base de "relations de réciprocité libres et sans 
contraintes, relativement non définies". Dans ce cadre, Ali apportera à 
l'ethnologue une aide décisive pour l'approfondissement de sa problé­
matique. Dans les termes de notre modèle, cette nouvelle forme de 
relation nous fait passer du régime de la manipulation à celui de 
Y ajustement, régime plus risqué où l'interaction se joue souvent à la 
limite de l'accident. Ali s'y révèle excellent, et l'ethnographe assez 
bon à l'occasion d'un incident qu'il nous faut résumer (Rabinow 
1988 : 48-55). 
Ali, une fois de plus, avait invité M. Paul à l'accompagner, mainte­
nant à un mariage. Il lui avait promis qu'ils ne s'y attarderaient pas 
trop longtemps. Mais la promesse ne sera pas tenue : une fois sur 
place, tandis que la fête se prolonge tard dans la nuit, l'ethnologue 
attend, se morfond, s'irrite de plus en plus à mesure que les heures 
passent. Après quoi, enfin sur le chemin du retour, au volant, il boude. 
"Es-tu heureux ?" lui demande d'abord Ali. Puis, insistant : "Mais 
pourquoi es-tu malheureux ?" Et finalement, à trois reprises, la derniè­
re en ouvrant la portière et menaçant de sauter en marche : "Si tu es 
malheureux, alors je m'en retourne à pied". L'ethnologue arrête la 
voiture, le laisse descendre, repart sans lui — la mort dans l'âme : la 
brouille va-t-elle être définitive ? 
En termes narratifs, la provocation, dont on a ici un bon exemple, 
constitue une des figures répertoriées de la manipulation. Elle joue sur 
les connotations dévalorisantes de l'image que le manipulateur pré­
tend se faire de celui qu'il cherche à manipuler, l'idée étant que le 
second accomplira le programme voulu par le premier dans le but de 
lui prouver (et peut-être de se prouver) qu'il n'est pas si incapable, si 
faible, si lâche ou si mauvais que l'autre le croit ou fait semblant de le 
croire. Mais en l'occurrence, Ali ne cherche à faire faire par M. Paul 
rien de particulier, et certainement pas à obtenir qu'il le fasse descen­
dre de sa voiture. En le mettant au défi de l'abandonner en rase 
campagne, il ne vise aucun objectif d'ordre pragmatique. Son seul but, 
comme le dit à deux reprises le narrateur, est de "mettre à 1 'épreuve" 
son interlocuteur, de mesurer son degré de résistance, de l'évaluer en 
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tant que partenaire d'une interaction qui pourra ou bien s'arrêter là si 
l'autre ne se montre pas à la hauteur, ou bien, au contraire, prendre un 
nouveau départ s'il se révèle capable de répondre adéquatement à son 
geste. 
Un peu par hasard, il se trouve que la fermeté dont Г anthropoloque 
témoigne par sa réaction constitue précisément la bonne réponse — la 
réponse juste — du point de vue de son partenaire. Par son intransi­
geance, M. Paul permet en effet à Ali de sentir qu'il a face à lui un 
homme, si on peut dire, de sa propre trempe. La manipulation, qui 
n'était en l'occurrence qu'une sorte de leurre — qu'un procédé tacti­
que subordonné à une fin stratégique le dépassant—, n'aura donc 
servi, ici, qu'à tester la possibilité d'un ajustement entre deux hexis, 
deux manières d'être-au-monde2. "Dans une autre situation, peut-être 
mon geste se serait-il révélé irréparable. Mais au Maroc, jouer avec le 
feu est chose usuelle, quotidienne, et en user avec finesse une néces­
sité vitale". Il n'y a, à vrai dire, pas qu'au Maroc qu'il faille "jouer 
avec le feu" pour que deux sensibilités, deux tempéraments ou même 
deux esprits (pour peu qu'ils soient un peu vifs) parviennent à 
s'ajuster l'un à l'autre. L'acceptation du risque de catastrophe, 
l'assentiment anticipé à l'accident éventuel, représentent au contraire 
d'une manière générale une donnée constitutive de ce régime où, par 
construction, les potentialités de l'interaction ne se révèlent pleine­
ment qu'au seuil de la rupture possible entre les protagonistes. 
Toujours est-il qu'à la suite de cet affrontement qui aurait pu tourner à 
la catastrophe, loin de se distendre, les liens entre les deux hommes se 
resserrent : "nous fûmes depuis lors les meilleurs amis du monde". Et 
cela n'est pas sans conséquences sur le plan de la conduite de l'enquê­
te ethnographique : "Ce fut seulement après cet incident qu'Ali com­
mença à me révéler deux aspects de sa vie qu'il avait précédemment 
dissimulés". 
Cependant, la tâche d'un ethnographe n'est pas simplement d'éta­
blir de bons rapports avec ses informateurs, ce qui reviendrait au fond, 
de sa part, à payer de sourires les "révélations" ponctuelles qu'on 
voudrait bien lui faire. Ce qui importe davantage, c'est le fait qu'ici 
encore une fois, le passage d'un régime de sens et d'interaction à un 
autre va de pair avec un saut qualitatif concernant aussi les modalités 
Le narrateur relève aussi, en passant, une autre tactique coutumière chez Ali 
pour "sonder l'autre" : son humour, "plus explosif et personnalisé" que les "plai­
santeries mesurées" auxquelles s'en tiennent les autres informateurs. 
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de l'interaction entre enquêteur et enquêté sur le plan cognitif lui-
même. A partir du moment où deux partenaires ont, comme Ali et son 
chauffeur du jour, éprouvé qu'il leur est possible de "s'entendre" par 
ajustement sur un plan en quelque sorte existentiel, il y a des chances 
pour que s'ouvre plus facilement entre eux la possibilité d'interagir 
positivement dans des termes comparables également sur le plan 
intellectuel. C'est ce que le narrateur confirme : "avec Ali vint à émer­
ger un terrain d'entente et d'expériences communes aménagé grâce à 
nos efforts mutuels, un domaine du sens commun". Et la forme même 
de leur confrontation, où chacun, par de petites provocations, sonde 
l'autre et le pousse à se dépasser, est identique sur les deux plans. Au 
fil de leur travail de réflexion sur ce qui les rend chacun autre vis-à-vis 
de l'autre en même temps que face à la réalité sociale et politique 
qu'ils ont prise en commun pour objet, chacun se trouve tour à tour 
"perturbé dans sa démarche usuelle", tout comme chacun avait été 
troublé par le geste de l'autre dans l'incident du mariage. Sur le plan 
affectif et psychologique comme sur le plan intellectuel, l'ajustement 
est un processus "dialectique" selon l'acception même de ce terme 
sous la plume de Paul Rabinow : "ni le sujet ni l'objet n'y demeurent 
statiques". 
Dans le cadre contractuel caractéristique du régime de la manipula­
tion, une certaine quantité d'information était fournie à l'ethnographe 
à proportion de ce qu'il était susceptible de proposer en échange. 
Réglé sur le mode du donnant-donnant, un tel système avait vocation à 
porter essentiellement sur des transferts d'objets, les uns cognitifs, les 
autres non (de l'argent, des services, des cadeaux), mais tous à carac­
tère discret et d'une valeur de préférence quantifiable. En revanche, 
sous le régime de l'ajustement, ce qui est en jeu n'est plus la trans­
mission d'informations moyennant juste contrepartie mais la produc­
tion même d'une forme de connaissance toute différente puisque, loin 
de préexister — comme une marchandise en stock — à la passation 
d'un contrat entre les partenaires de la communication, elle doit être 
construite par eux-mêmes, ensemble, en sorte que s'il parviennent 
effectivement à la construire, elle n'existera finalement que comme le 
fruit de leur coopération. ïl ne saurait par conséquent plus être ques­
tion ici d'une quelconque phase de "recueil" de l'information à 
considérer comme distincte du travail "d'interprétation". En fait, il n'y 
a même plus de "données" à proprement parler mais, selon les termes 
de Paul Rabinow, un pur "rapport d'interaction entre enquêté et en­
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quêteur". La torme de savoir anthropologique qui peut se constituer 
dans l'espace de ce rapport sera par construction plus proche de la 
compréhension phénoménologique que d'une problématique de l'in­
formation et de son traitement. 
On comprend ainsi que ce soit à Ali, ce maître de l'ajustement, que 
le narrateur déclare en conclusion devoir son "appréhension de la 
culture marocaine dans son immédiateté, en tant qu'expérience 
vécue". Pourtant, c'est finalement avec Driss ben Mohammed que le 
narrateur nous dit avoir ressenti la possibilité "d'aller plus loin" 
qu'avec tous ses autres informateurs. Avec lui, l'expérience de terrain 
devait atteindre des "profondeurs affectives et intellectuelles nouvel­
les". Il n'est pas facile, à la lecture du court chapitre final, consacré 
précisément à cette ultime rencontre, de déceler exactement ce qui, 
aux yeux du narrateur, en fait l'expérience la plus riche de toutes. On 
y retrouve l'ensemble des composantes relevées au fil des développe­
ments précédents : l'aléa et la programmation, posés comme deux 
contraires : "Au hasard, sans projets ou programmes concertés [...] 
nous eûmes une série de conversations à bâtons rompus" ; la manipu­
lation, évoquée également en négatif : "Ben Mohammed n'avait pas 
peur de moi [...], il ne chercha pas non plus à tirer profit de moi (il 
refusait presque tous les cadeaux)" ; et pour finir, par dessus tout, 
l'ajustement. 
Or la profondeur exceptionnelle de cette amitié ne tiendrait-elle pas, 
précisément, à la forme particulière — sublimée ? — d'ajustement 
intellectuel auquel parviennent les deux hommes, une forme qui se 
déploie apparemment dans un pur rapport "d'esprit à esprit", comme 
libéré du contexte social immédiat ? Tous les autres informateurs 
étaient fortement influencés, jusque dans leur manière de penser, par 
la pression de leur milieu. Mekki, exemple type du locuteur program­
mé, qui avait été "littéralement imposé" à l'ethnologue par le village, 
parle une sorte de langue de bois. "A cela, nul remède". Malik, bien 
que l'esprit beaucoup plus délié, n'a pas non plus une parole libre : 
conservateur, affectivement très solidaire de son groupe, il se laisse au 
fond manipuler par la communauté : "il était le parfait représentant de 
l'orthodoxie". A l'opposé, Rashid et, plus nettement encore, Ali, sont 
tous deux "en position de porte-à-faux" par rapport à la vie villageoi­
se, en sorte que leurs discours de "rebelles" et leur côté "aventureux", 
délibérément cultivés pour s'opposer à la communauté, en sont d'une 
certaine façon le reflet : ils restent ainsi, malgré eux, inexorablement 
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"imbriqués dans le réseau de leur propre univers local . Les rencontres 
avec Driss ben Mohammed échappent à tout cela. Elles se déroulent 
loin des routines programmées du quotidien aussi bien qu'à l'écart des 
manipulations clochemerliennes. Et, tout imprégnées d'une sorte de 
sérénité bucolique, elles ne laissent aucune part à l'attente 
d'événements aléatoires ou providentiels. "Nous étions assis à flanc de 
coteau sous les figuiers, une paire d'amis passant ensemble un brûlant 
après-midi d'été sous un ciel sans nuages" : espace idéal pour une re­
cherche conçue comme forme de vie à la fois intérieure et partagée, un 
peu à la manière socratique : "deux sujets connaissants, confrontés 
l'un à l'autre". 
Sur cette scène, le livre, ou plutôt le récit, s'achève. Car la partie 
narrative est encadrée par deux morceaux d'une autre nature : une 
conclusion de l'auteur, qui tire la "morale" — anthropologique — du 
récit, et (dans l'édition française) une préface de Pierre Bourdieu, qui 
statue — magistralement — sur le tout. Entre les deux, donc, le dis­
cours de "M. Paul", à la fois narrateur et héros à la Ulysse ("Je quittai 
Chicago [...]" ... "[...] j'étais de retour" — Rabinow 1988: 15 et 
133). Qui est donc, finalement, ce "je" auquel la parole est déléguée ? 
Un pur simulacre, rendu crédible par la magie d'une écriture habile­
ment tournée ? Cela est possible mais peu importe. A la limite, il n'y a 
peut-être même jamais eu aucun "ethnologue au Maroc" du nom de 
M. Paul ! Peut-être que toute cette aventure n'est que fiction et que 
"Paul Rabinow" — ou celui qui se donne ce nom sur la couverture — 
n'est qu'un bon faiseur de roman. En ce cas, et c'est ce qui importe, le 
roman est bon, à deux points de vue. Esthétique, car il se lit agréable­
ment. Et à proprement parler, scientifique, parce que, fictif ou non, le 
texte met en scène le travail même d'une recherche : M. Paul, simple 
être de papier ou véritable ethnologue au Maroc, est dans tous les cas 
un authentique épistémologue, et qui plus est, en acte. De ce point de 
vue, l'expérience rapportée en son nom, quel que soit le statut énon-
ciatif qu'on voudra lui attribuer, revêt en elle-même une portée tout à 
fait générale, et c'est à cela que tient sa valeur. 
A chacun des régimes d'interaction par lesquels passe la quête 
d'intelligibilité qui nous est contée correspond un régime de savoir 
différent. D'un de ces régimes à l'autre, le caractère inter-actif du pro­
cessus de connaissance est très inégalement marqué. Quand l'ethno­
graphe a affaire à un locuteur programmé (qui ne sait que réciter sa 
leçon), c'est à l'enquêteur et lui seul qu'il revient d'agir, et encore 
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bien peu puisqu'au fond son rôle se limite alors à enclencher (selon 
une sorte de schéma stimulus-réponse) la récitation par l'enquêté d'un 
discours déjà tout prêt. Et si au contraire l'ethnographe lui-même était 
trop "programmé", si par exemple il n'avait appris à voir en l'autre 
que l'image qu'en donne sa propre culture, il aurait encore moins à 
interagir avec ses informateurs puisqu'il lui suffirait alors de les 
observer du dehors pour retrouver en eux tout ce qu'il en savait déjà 
avant de les rencontrer3. C'est aussi à une relation à coefficient 
interactif très faible, ou même nul, que donne lieu le régime de l'aléa : 
à la limite, l'enquêteur n'a ici rien de mieux à faire que d'attendre 
patiemment la révélation providentielle, l'illumination que l'autre, 
sans le vouloir ni même probablement le savoir, lui procurera par 
accident, sans que rien lui ait été demandé (Greimas 1979). 
Il y a en revanche interaction au sens plein du terme dans les deux 
autres configurations. Entre manipulateur et manipulé, la transmission 
du savoir s'inscrit dans un cadre à la fois contractuel, où chacun a à 
défendre ses intérêts propres, tant pragmatiques que cognitifs, et 
dialogique, où les réponses de l'enquêté sont fonction de la pertinence 
des questions de l'enquêteur ; le savoir est donc cette fois l'enjeu de 
toutes sortes de stratégies : on se persuade, se dissuade, on cache, on 
feint, on menace, on promet, on provoque. Mais ces interactions ne 
sortent pas d'un cadre fonctionnel — on manipule pour savoir—, et 
le savoir qu'elles ont pour enjeu reste en quelque sorte extérieur à 
Г interagir lui-même. Au contraire, les deux aspects, connaissance et 
interaction, se rejoignent et même finissent par se confondre dans la 
dynamique de cette sorte de danse de l'interlocution qu'engage le 
processus de l'ajustement mutuel : sous ce dernier régime, c'est le 
processus même de reconnaissance réciproque dans le mouvement de 
la pensée qui a valeur de découverte. 
Notre propos n'était certes pas, au départ, d'enfermer l'ethnologue 
(ni a fortiori le sémioticien) dans l'une ou l'autre des cases d'un 
modèle prédéfini ! Telle est encore moins notre intention à l'arrivée. 
Au contraire, la manière dont le texte analysé conduit à préciser les 
conditions de fonctionnement, les implications et les limites respecti­
ves de chacun des régimes inventoriés, mais aussi les interférences ou 
Cf. Landowski 1997, en particulier le chapitre Voyageurs et passagers (99— 
109). 
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les chevauchements qui complexifient leurs rapports, nous invite 
surtout à enrichir le modèle. 
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Испытание Другого 
В современном академическом дискурсе социальных наук, особенно в 
таких дисциплинах, как антропология и семиотика, стало традицией 
противопоставление старой (и устаревшей) методики структуралистов 
и эпистемологических высказываний постмодернистов и постструкту­
ралистов. Структурализм по утверждению зиждется на идее, что, 
объяснив внутреннее строение продукта культуры, возможно понять 
его значение с внешней (и, следовательно, объективной) точки зрения. 
По крайней мере, гуманитарные науки в настоящее время подходят к 
явлениям культуры с совершенно противоположной стороны, остро 
сознавая взаимозависимость всех явлений культуры. 
Все же такая простая оппозиция оказывается недостаточной в 
контексте современных практик научной деятельности. В настоящей 
статье в качестве примера приводится описание американским 
антропологом Полом Рабиноу своего первого исследователького 
путешествия за границу: Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco. Анализ 
опирается на семиотическую модель общения, которая конструи­
руется путем изучения разных позиций, занимаемых антропологом и 
его информантами в разных контекстах и ситуациях. Можем вы­
делить четыре главных режима: (1) программирование, которое 
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основывается на регулярности и предсказуемости поведения дейст­
вующих лиц; (2) манипуляция, которая основывается на частной 
договоренности их взаимных отношений; (3) адаптация, которая 
основывается на взаимном внимании и разных стратегиях, позво­
ляющих обоим партнерам по общению испытать себя; (4) готовность 
к неожиданностям и непредсказуемости. 
Основное достижение нашего анализа состоит в понимании, что 
каждому прагматическому стилю общения соответствует и модаль­
ность на когнитивном уровне. В результате важно подчеркнуть 
комплексность, если не гетерогенность, стратегий понимания на 
разных этапах антропологических исследований (начиная с собира­
ния данных до создания новых форм знания). 
Рискуя излишним обобщением, можно рассматривать интерак­
тивную методику, опробованную в настоящей статье на основе 
матерьяла П. Рабиноу, в качестве метатеоретической модели, описы­
вающей эпистемологические позиции, действующие в социальных 
науках. 
Teise proovilepanek 
Tänapäeva sotsiaalteaduste akadeemilises diskursuses, eriti sellistel eri­
aladel nagu antropoloogia ja semiootika, on tavaks saanud vastandada 
strukturalistide vana (ja vanamoodsat) metoodikat ning postmodernistide 
ja poststrukturalistide epistemoloogilisi sõnavõtte. Strukturalism tugineb 
väidetavalt ideel, et seletades ära teatud kultuuriprodukti sisemise ehituse, 
on võimalik mõista selle tähendust väliselt — ja seega objektiivselt — 
vaatepunktilt. Vähemalt humanitaarteadused lähenevad tänapäeval 
kultuuriproduktile täiesti vastupidiselt, teadvustades teravalt kõigi pro­
duktide täielikku vastastikkust sõltuvust. 
Siiski osutub taoline lihtsakoeline vastandus hetkel läbiviidava teadus­
tegevuse praktikate kontekstis ebapiisavaks. Käesolevas artiklis tuuakse 
näiteks ameerika antropoloogi Paul Rabinow kirjeldus tema esimesest 
uurimisreisist välismaale: Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco. Analüüs 
põhineb semiootilisel suhtlusmudelil, mis konstrueeritakse antropoloogi 
ja tema informantide poolt erinevates kontekstides ja situatsioonides 
võetud hoiakute uurimisel. Võime eristada nelja peamist režiimi: (1) 
programmeerimine, mis põhineb tegelaste käitumise regulaarsusel ja ette-
ennustatavusel; (2) manipuleerimine, mis põhineb nende vastastikuste 
suhete osalisel kokkuleppelisusel; (3) kohandumine, mis tugineb vastas­
tikusel tähelepanelikkusel ja mitmesugustel strateegiatel, mis lubavad 
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mõlemal suhtluspartneril teineteist proovile panna; (4) valmisolek oota­
matuks ja etteennustamatuks. 
Käesoleva analüüsi peamine saavutus seisneb arusaamises, et igale 
pragmaatilisele suhtlusstiilile vastab ka modaalsus kognitiivsel tasandil. 
Selle tulemusena on oluline rõhutada antropoloogiliste uuringute erine­
vatel astmetel (alates andmekogumisest kuni uute teadmise vormide 
loomiseni) esinevate teadmisstrateegiate komplekssust — kui mitte 
heterogeensust. Riskides liigse üldistamisega, võib käesolevas artiklis P. 
Rabinow' materjali põhjal läbi katsetatud interaktiivset metoodikat käsit­
leda kui metateoreetilist mudelit, mis kirjeldab sotsiaalteadustes tervikuna 
toimivaid epistemoloogilisi hoiakuid. 
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Abstract. This paper discusses Eric Wolfs (1923-1999) analysis of power in 
his last monograph, Anthropology (Wolf 1964) and last book Envisioning 
Power (Wolf 1999). In Anthropology, Wolf (1964: 96) wrote that the 
"anthropological point of vantage is that of a world culture, struggling to be 
born." What is worth studying is human experience in all its variability and 
complexity. His aim was to set the framework bridging the humanities with 
anthropology. He never gave up this quest, only expanding it. In the new 
introduction to his 1964 monograph, thirty years later, he commented that 
such a synthesis had not occurred. Rather there were growing schisms in the 
field. In the preface to Envisioning Power, he held that human sciences were 
unable or unwilling to come to grips with how cultural configurations 
intertwine with considerations of power. In 1990 he had addressed the 
American Anthropological Society, holding that anthropologists favored a 
view of culture without power, while other social sciences have advanced a 
concept of ideology without culture. He wrote that his aim in his last book 
was to explore the connection of ideas and power observed in streams of 
behavior and recorded texts. Since minds interpose a selective screen between 
the organism and environment, ideas have content and functions that help 
bring people together or divide them. While ideas compose the entire range of 
mental constructs, Wolf understands ideology as configurations or unified 
schemes to underwrite or manifest power. Power is, according to Wolf, an 
aspect of all relations among people. Within this framework Wolf analyzes 
three cases, the Kwakiutl, the Aztecs, and Nazi Germany. The comparisons 
are very revealing, both the wide differences and similarities in power 
configurations and in the role of imagination. 
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In my first paper about Eric Wolf (1923-1999), entitled "Eric Wolf: 
the crosser of boundaries" (Portis-Winner 2002a) I wrote that I 
discerned three streams in Wolfs thinking. To recapitulate, they were: 
(1) Wolf the sensitive poet. The exemplar was Sons of the Shaking 
Earth, 1959, which was the focus of my discussion. (2) Wolf the 
economic and political revolutionary anthropologist who founded 
peasant studies and abolished forever the notion of the static, ahisto-
rical, unchanging, isolated groups composed of closed structures, 
whether tribe or peasant village. His own field work extended from 
Mexico to European peasants, a major topic was peasant history 
ironically entitled Europe and the People Without History (1982). The 
role of symbolism so fundamental to his early work in Sons of the 
Shaking Earth was not ignored in his later work, note his study of 
Christmas symbolism entitled "Santa Claus: Notes on a collective 
representation" (1964). Finally, (3) Wolf the theoretician and philo­
sopher as well as the scientist who grappled with the notion of power 
and tentatively explored semiotic concepts in this endeavor, which is 
the subject of this discussion. While all these streams reverberate in all 
Wolfs works none were so ambitious as the question of power. In fact 
what is power? In what way is it a factor in control of others? In what 
sense does something like power ubiquitously permeate all human 
societies? Does it have any universal properties and what are its 
forms? This is the main theme of Wolfs last monograph, Envisioning 
Power, which I discuss in this article.1 
This is an exploration barely depicted by anthropologists though 
particular agents and signs having kinds of power or social control are 
described in many ethnic studies. It has been left to European philo­
sophers from Nietzsche and onward, to Marx and to French philo­
sophers critiquing culture and society primarily in their contemporary 
forms, to discuss the universal pertinence of power variously 
manifested. Anthropologists' romantic search for Utopian equalitarian 
societies has long been abandoned. But they have not dealt with the 
issue of power in the broad and comparative sense as has Wolf. 
Indeed the response to the ubiquitous and pivotal penchant for 
transformation and hidden manifestations of power in our era is over­
whelmed by the postmodern collapse when such potential universal 
1 Portions of this paper were delivered at the International Semiotics Associa­
tion Meetings, Lyon, France, July 2004. 
Eric Wolf: A semiotic exploration of power 341 
problems are abandoned for subjectivism, reductionism and 
deconstruction. Or power is reduced and simplified as special cases 
related to standard categories such as ecology, calories, myths and 
elements of the relatively static social structure. 
By gaining a perspective on this general puzzle I look briefly at 
two French thinkers, Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault, who may 
be thought of as philosophers and theoreticians of the grand concepts 
of power in culture and society. Their concern has been essentially 
with complex societies but not with specific case histories of whole 
cultures, although Foucault, for example, has considered modern 
institutions such as prisons and hospitals. 
Turning to Bourdieu, a part of his theory of practice, meaning all 
symbolic activities, is the concept of "symbolic power [...] based on 
diverse forms of capital which are not reducible to economic capital" 
(Bourdieu 1993: 60). This position involves Bourdieu's concept of 
"cultural field" which is characterized as a "radical conceptualization" 
which supposes an "analysis of the position of the field with the 
broader field of power" (Bourdieu 1993: 9). His primary examples are 
literary, following Jakobson's and Tynjanov's concept of literary 
system (Bourdieu 1993: 10), although misunderstanding Jakobson's 
major works, since Bourdieu holds Jakobson's position, not true of his 
major works, in so far as it remains formalism (Bourdieu 1993: 9). 
Bourdieu praises Bakhtin, who in thinking of literature, holds it cannot 
be understood without the social context (Bourdieu 1993: 13). Of 
course Bakhtin did not limit his examples to literature, omitting social 
context, for example his famous study of the carnival. Bourdieu notes: 
"the degree of autonomy of a certain field is measured by its ability to 
reject external determinants and obey only the specific logic of the 
field" (Bourdieu 1993). Bourdieu's method "is to incorporate three 
levels of social reality": (1) the position of any cultural field within the 
"field of power"; (2) the structure of the field including any relevant 
agents; and (3) the genesis of the producers' habitus, which means the 
structured dispositions that generate practice (Bourdieu 1993: 1, 14). 
I cannot in this short paper discuss Bourdieu and power further 
except to say that this is not the path of static structuralism or 
deconstruction and is in fact closer to the semiotics of the Prague 
school, the Tartu-Moscow school and particularly Lotman and also 
Bakhtin. 
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I turn now to Foucault, another French thinker grappling with the 
issue of power. In a volume edited by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) 
entitled Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 
the editors assert that Foucault "is able to explain the logic of 
structuralism's claim to be an objective science and also the apparent 
validity of the hermeneutic counter-claim that the human sciences can 
only legitimately proceed by understanding the deepest meaning of 
the subject and his tradition" (Dreyfus, Rabinow 1982: xii). According 
to the editors, his method of interpretive analytics shows how human 
beings become the sort of "objects and subjects hermeneutics and 
structuralism discover and analyze" (Dreyfus, Rabinow 1982: xii). For 
Foucault totalizing is "bio-technical power" meaning ordering of all 
realms under the guise of improving the welfare of the individual and 
the population, which is simply a strategy to increase power and order 
(Dreyfus, Rabinow 1982: xxv). Foucault says he is writing a history of 
the present. He adopts the term "déchiffrement" where social practices 
have a meaning radically different from that available to the actors, 
suggesting Lévi-Strauss's disguised meanings. 
The final chapter of this book is devoted to Foucault's conception 
of "Truth and power" (Dreyfus, Rabinow 1982: 184-226), which 
involves rituals of power and bio-power. Bio-power links the political 
technologies of the body, the discourses of human sciences and the 
structure of domination over the last 200 years. Here we note that 
power is not context free, not ahistorical, not an objective description. 
Power is not a formal theory. Rather it is a cluster of relations, which 
are mobile. Power is the operations of the political technologies 
throughout the social body, through political rituals of power that set 
up non- egalitarian asymmetrical relations, but power is not restricted 
to political relations. It is multidirectional and "operating from the top 
down and from the bottom up" (Dreyfus, Rabinow 1982: 185), and 
power and institutions are not identical. When these technologies are 
localized within specific institutions, bio-power takes off. Power is 
exercised upon the dominant as well as the dominated. 
Examples are schools, hospitals and prisons. In sharp remarks 
concerning power, the editors write that for Foucault, "The spread of 
normalization operates through the creation of abnormalities which it 
then must treat and reform. Bio-power is spread under the banner of 
making people healthy and protecting them. Then if it fails it justifies 
more of the same" (Dreyfus, Rabinow 1982: 196). A political problem 
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is recast into the language of science and becomes transformed into a 
technical problem. For example, bio-power establishes how welfare 
institutions work and not what they mean or what they do (Dreyfus, 
Rabinow 1982: 196). Foucault's account of normalizing science is 
similar to Kuhn's account of how sciences work (Dreyfus, Rabinow 
1982: 197). Normalizing technologies preserve an increasingly 
differentiated set of anomalies and normalizing society becomes a 
powerful form of domination (Dreyfus, Rabinow 1982: 198). 
As the editors tell us, Foucault calls for an interpretive analysis 
asking why these practices work. Calling on history and knowledge to 
unveil the truth, means that to understand the cultural practices is to 
"grapple with the history of the present" (Dreyfus, Rabinow 1982: 
204). Foucault explains that he wants to understand the different 
modes in culture, which transforms people into subjects. The worst 
diseases of power are fascism and Stalinism. He outlines three types 
of struggles: (1) against forms of domination, ethnic social and 
religious; (2) against exploitation; and (3) struggles against forms of 
subjectivity and submission (Dreyfus, Rabinow 1982: 212). Language 
is involved in all these forms of power. Systems of communication, 
that is language as a system of signs may be imbued with power 
relations. Over and above purely: objective information, language and 
nonverbal communication implicates power in the following ways: (1) 
the tying of the message with power that consists of obligatory tasks 
of all kinds including nonverbal gestures, etc. and (2) finalized 
activities thus modifying the field of information between partners, 
producing effects of power (Dreyfus, Rabinow 1982: 218). 
Turning to the nature of power, it exists only when it is put into 
action where actions modify others. "Power and freedom's refusal to 
submit cannot be separated" (Foucault 1983: 221). "Power relations 
are rooted deep in the social nexus" (Foucault 1983: 226) and must be 
analyzed from different perspectives. "A society without power 
relations can only be an abstraction" (Foucault 1983: 223). This and 
its forms and objective differentiations are imbued in the social 
structure, how it is institutionalized etc. "Power relations are rooted in 
a system of social networks" (Foucault 1983: 222) leading to the 
conclusion that domination is a central phenomenon in the history of 
societies, taking universalizing form and locking together power with 
relations of strategy and the results proceeding from their interaction. 
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I turn to Eric Wolfs final quest and I stress that he was 
independent enough to attack the problem of the relation of power and 
ideas in culture, seeing power as a relational concept that has many 
possible forms, and is ubiquitous, as was also held by Foucault and 
Bourdieu, but Wolf added another dimension, that is, to explore and 
compare how power is grounded in specific culture forms exemplified 
by three case studies, namely the Kwakiutl, the Aztecs and National 
Socialist Germany. Thus, the relation of power to specific cultural 
configurations and ideas and the question of its general qualities 
constitute his quest. 
Before discussing Wolfs last monograph and second to last book, 
Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Dominance and Crises (1999), I 
look at an earlier publication of Wolf in which his comments are I 
think emblematic of this scholar. After extensive fieldwork and 
theoretical excursions into complex societies, he was asked by the 
Council of the Humanities of Princeton University to contribute a 
volume on anthropology, which appeared in 1964 (Wolf 1964). In that 
study he emphasized "anthropology's role in bridging science and the 
humanities, bringing a multidimensional understanding of what it is to 
be human: the most scientific of the humanities and the most 
humanistic of the sciences" (Wolf 2001: 11). He wrote that he hoped 
that the interdisciplinary character of anthropology would give rise to 
a new synthesis. However, ten year later when writing a new intro­
duction, he noted that such a synthesis had not occurred (Wolf 2001: 
11), and even though in his last monograph he was still searching, he 
reached some stimulating hypotheses and conclusions which inter­
relate power laden ideas, ideology and imaginative worlds, which beg 
for deeper and more extensive investigation. 
The knot that he wants to deconstruct and reconstruct is imaged in 
the preface of his final monograph where he argued that the humane 
sciences have "not come to grips with how social relations and 
cultural configurations intertwine with considerations of power. If 
anthropologists have favored a view of culture without power, other 
social analysts have advanced a concept of 'ideology' without culture" 
(Wolf 1999: ix). 
Thus he wanted "to explore the connection between ideas and 
power" (Wolf 1999: 1). Power not being an abstract theory but a 
relational term "demands finding out ways to define the relations of 
power that are played out in social arrangements and cultural 
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configurations and trace out the possible ways in which these relations 
of power implicate ideas" (Wolf 1999: 3). 
The theoretical aspect of the discussion that follows in certain 
respects recalls Bourdieu and Foucault, but these writers did not 
undertake case studies in the anthropological sense in order to 
examine power in culture, although Foucault considered certain 
institutions in modern society such as hospitals and prisons, etc. Of 
course neither were obliged to use the anthropological method but my 
point is that Wolf alone trod the double path, megatheory and also its 
applications in its various forms in three very different societies 
separated in time and space, the cultures of which differed in 
complexity, their economies ranging from hunting and fishing to 
cultivators to modern industrialism. Finally Wolf reached out to ask 
how to apply Peircian semiotics to an underlying fundamental issue 
which seemed to fall through the cracks of anthropological studies, 
that is the question of meaning and how meaning is communicated, 
and how to detect elements of power in modes of communication. 
Even in Wolfs earliest book, Sons of the Shaking Earth (1959) there 
lurked this quest in the highly metaphoric and mythological study of 
the history of the Middle American Indians and the rise of the Aztecs. 
In our discussion of Wolfs last monograph, I pay particular 
importance to his basic theme, "Ideas, Power and Communication" as 
well as the section entitled "Contested Concepts". Like Bourdieu and 
Foucault, Wolf distanced himself from the simplified view of ideas as 
mere reflections of the external world. Rather, minds interpose a 
selective screen between the organism and the environment. Indeed, 
mental constructions have content and functions. They have an 
important role in the play of power, resonating with Peirce's signs (the 
world is profuse with signs). Ideas for Wolf cover the entire range of 
mental constructs, while ideologies are specific schemes to underwrite 
power. Wolfs questions are how do ideas become concentrated into 
ideologies, and how is power understood as an aspect of all group 
relations? 
Wolf (1999: 5) distinguished four ways in which power is woven 
into social relations: (1) power of potency characterized by a parti­
cular individual; (2) the analysis of an ego to impose its will on social 
action upon an other; (3) tactical or organizational power, where 
individuals circumscribe the actions of others in tactical or organi­
zational power; (4) structural power, if powerful enough, that 
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organizes the settings and specifies the direction and distribution of 
energy flow. Wolf compares this Marxist view of structural power to 
Foucault's "governance" to meaning "the exercise of 'action upon 
action'" (Wolf 1999: 5, cit. Foucault 1984: 427-428). But while Fou­
cault was referring to structural relations that govern consciousness, 
Marx was thinking of class economic forces. Essentially I believe 
Wolf was attempting to combine or relate economic power with power 
over consciousness. 
In a most important discussion, Wolf explores how ideas are a 
form of communication. He underlines the many modes of meaning 
that ideas embody. This is a much neglected area in anthropological 
studies where meanings are often reduced to locations, techniques, and 
other cognitive formal qualities and overlooked are verbal and 
nonverbal vehicles that are a part of communication and are 
potentially polysémie and poly-functional, subjective and metaphoric 
including ritual dress, culinary codes, codes of appropriate behavior, 
etc. But they must be decoded, as we know so well from Lévi-Strauss. 
These codes are not fixed. They vary with social contexts. Yet their 
dynamics have not been Lévi-Strauss's abiding interest even though 
they were implied in his depiction of the sad state of particular South 
American tribes. For Wolf, the dynamic changeability of codes, 
including the many nuances of meaning over and above the cognitive 
ones was fundamental — issues not limited by the static map of 
Saussure. Indeed, how codes are interpreted varies according to the 
domains they address — such as economic, political and languages, 
religion, etc. It also varies according to the characteristics of the 
sender, which involve different accesses to power. Their decoding 
depends on the choice of interprétants strained through the mind of the 
receiver. But neither encoding nor decoding are entirely arbitrary 
since at some level signs maintain some relation to the object 
signified, as Peirce has held. Thus "power equalities or differentials 
are at work in defining who can address whom from what symmetrical 
or asymmetrical positions. The grid formed by these rankings and 
positions in turn sets up the contexts for how things are said and 
performed and codifies how they are to be understood" (Wolf 1999: 
7). Accordingly there is a tension between adhering to the formal 
properties of codes and fostering their variability. Wolf stresses the 
social and public quality of reproducing or modifying codes. While 
one cannot deny that inventing an isolated language by a single 
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individual will not be understood, we cannot overlook the aesthetic 
realm of creativity where object of invented messages may eventually 
be understood by some sectors. 
Returning to the primary issue of power for Wolf, he holds that 
"ideas [...] are often monopolized by power groups" (Wolf 1999: 7). 
Wolf criticizes linguistic and semiotics that do not address what the 
communicative act is about (Wolf 1999: 8) but this could hardly apply 
to the Prague or Tartu-Moscow school. But it is true that the 
Saussurian code accounts only for denotative meaning and is thus 
inadequate. However, Geertz's "Cock Fight" tells in symbolic terms 
much about the entire culture as does that of Victor Turner's study of 
the Ndembu and others. Wolf does accept Bourdieu's habitus which 
shows how people "acquire durable and transposable dispositions" 
conveyed by the institutional landscape of social settings. Such 
dispositions become symbolic systems that can become instruments of 
domination (Bourdieu 1992: 115-139; Wolf 1999: 10). 
The linkage between ideas and power are the theme of the three 
case studies, the Kwatkiutl, the Aztecs of the 15th and 16th century, 
and Germans who peopled the Third Reich (Wolf 1999: 10). In 
discussing the dialectics and dynamic of language as oppose to 
Saussure, Wolf turns to Bakhtin who held that signs and their accents 
vary with social categories such as gender, occupation, status, and 
different interpretations of traditions. Such multi accentualities could 
turn communication into an "arena of struggle" (Voloshinov 1986: 23; 
Wolf 1999: 53). 
Wolf is also attracted to Peirce's infinite regression, an open 
construct that permits the widest kinds of interpretations. For Peirce, 
the interprétant as well as the sign being interpreted must, as I have 
noted, have some relation to the object, whether it is by convention, in 
Peirce's terms symbolic, which some Saussurians call arbitrary, or by 
indexicality or contiguity with the object whether in the present or 
displaced by time or space, or by similarity or iconicity. All signs that 
are fully developed participate in all these levels although one level 
may dominate another. While Peirce did not consider culture as such, 
his concept of habits was close to that of culture and his many pithy 
examples of signs signifying the dynamics of context include the hot 
stove, where a child would interpret the hot stove differently than the 
knowing adult, and the Alps that may be interpreted as signs of danger 
or beauty depending on the perceiver. For Wolf, Peirce's interprétants 
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all have different priorities and degrees of power (Wolf 1999: 55) 
which is not inconsistent with the Peircian world of signs. 
I must limit myself to a few remarks bearing upon Wolfs case 
studies. The Kwakiutl story is an epic of transnationalism and 
imperialism and their ambivalent effects. Wolf sees the story of the 
Kwakiutl as an outstanding drama, which calls forth the unraveling of 
the connections of power and ideas, and reveals the effects upon the 
weaker society. There may be few transnational societies such as the 
Kwakiutl that utilizes such varied and perfuse symbolic signs in 
myriad types which bear complex meanings. Wolf writes that the 
Kwakiutl compose "a salient case explicating particular links between 
power and ideas" (Wolf 1999: 70). He traces the devastating years of 
contact and conflict between the Kwakiutl and the British forces, 
including laws of British Columbia and Canada restricting fishing and 
hunting reserves and making illegal potlaching and winter dancing in 
1888. As we know and as Wolf (1999: 82) describes it, "the socio-
politics of rank hierarchy, descent and succession v/ere intertwined 
with transfers of ceremonial titles and privileges" of marriages and 
with ritual, their control of rituals, myth, histories and emblematic art, 
much, has been preserved in memories of the past. Artistic traditions 
were remembered and found new outlets in markets. In 1951 the 
potlach was legalized and in 1979 objects once seized were returned 
and tourist trade was encouraged. Thus the Kwakiutl epic is one of the 
ambivalence of transnational power and the power of traditional 
cultural signs. While the Canadian authority remained, the Kwakiutl 
reenacted primordial myths and ceremonies, in this sense preserving 
their identity and culture and at the same time participating in the 
culture of the larger power. 
It would not be possible to analyze all the signs prevalent in the so 
called totem pole and in all aspects of the art and politics and 
hierarchy and exchange where the giver is more powerful than the 
receiver, since this requires the full context of the Kwakiutl history, 
customs and beliefs which Wolf has tried to summarize from the 
immense literature of this tribe. Thus we must satisfy ourselves with a 
glimpse here. 
The second case is the Aztecs, known for human sacrifice. This 
society dominated central Mexico from the 15th century until the 
Spanish conquest in 1521. In asking about the relation between ideas 
and power, Wolf discusses the relation of Aztec ideology and 
Eric Wolf: A semiotic exploration of power 349 
structural power. Here he focuses on social relations between 
producers of tribute and receivers of tribute (Wolf 1999: 124). The 
Aztecs, or more correctly the Tenochea, were a part of the Toltec 
domain which disintegrated after 1000. This group adopted a Toltec 
solar cult and sacrifice by heart incision (Wolf 1999: 137). As 
Tenochea gained power they claimed to be the Chosen People of the 
god Huitizlopochtli "who destined them for universal dominance" 
(Wolf 1999: 135). They became successful warriors. They believed 
that they should maintain the cosmos and they appropriated land labor 
and tribute from those they defeated (Wolf 1999: 141). They built 
temples and constructed a new society and calendar. Nobles wore 
special clothing, headdresses and ornaments. The chief ruler was in 
charge of the military and warriors were charged with the task of 
bringing back enemies to be sacrificed, which were associated with 
public rituals. 
The cosmology and beliefs of the Aztec are too complex to be 
summarized here. Syncretic forms, Spanish and indigenous traditions, 
were intertwined. The Spanish destroyed the great temple, Te-
nochtitlan, all sacred texts and executed many of the priests. But 
memories of the past persisted, performances and festivals continued. 
And encouraged by the Mexican revolution of 1910, a florescence of 
the plastic and performative arts and "elements and themes drawn 
from was long thought of as a dead culture signal a live presence 
under new circumstances" (Wolf 1999: 195). 
The third and final case is National Socialist Germany. The Third 
Reich lasted twelve years after its birth in 1997. To attempt to 
understand power and ideas in this case is more than ambitious. In 
close to 100 pages, Wolf attempts such an analysis (Wolf 1999: 197— 
273) and I can only choose some high points here. Wolf sees an 
analogy of German National Socialism to cargo cults and ghost 
dances, although it is not like other revitalistic movements since it 
links vitality to apocalyptic visions of racial corruption (Wolf 1999: 
198). While we cannot fully explain this movement, Wolf asks us to 
try. And he refers to various attempts that he believes are not mutually 
exclusive. Wolf is partial to the concept of "Sonderweb", which stres­
ses the historical peculiarities of the development of the Germanics 
(Wolf 1999: 199). As a distinctive trajectory of German history (Wolf 
1999: 198-199) reaching back to the 30 years war that ended in 1648 
and earlier, demonstrate how ancient were the traditions that were 
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mixed with populism, mass party organizations, capitalism etc. (Wolf 
1999: 201). 
Prussia became powerful after the 30 years war, and was the pivot 
of German unification. Thus after the defeat of France, Germans 
became strikingly more nationalistic and the German federation of 
loosely knit states became a movement towards self-cultivation, as 
opposed to nation building in France. The middle classes stressed 
training in the values of German Burgertum (pride of middle classes). 
Germans distinguished the Volks as part of nature as opposed to 
political and intellectual nations (Wolf 1999: 211). The dream was of 
a Reich Empire based on popular myths... 
Prussia became stronger after the Treaty of Vienna (1915) when it 
was awarded new territory in West Germany and militarism was 
dominant. The defeat in WWI created greater hostility and depriva­
tion. Volk and Geist were projected by the National Socialists to racial 
health, meaning eliminating undesirables: Jews, gypsies, misfits, etc. 
Wolf concludes that National Socialism has not disappeared from 
the world. He writes that he finds it in new forms, in cries for regional 
autonomy and ethnic separatism. In the face of international finance 
and commerce and corporations, public policy is being challenged by 
demands for privatization including means of violence acquired by 
armed entrepreneurs linked up with mafia types. 
The above can only be a sample of some of the main points of 
Wolf. The treatment of all these cases would require several lengthy 
articles and the German case would need still more. 
This study concludes with a Coda (Wolf 1999: 274—291). While it 
summarizes and compares three cases, Wolf says they are incom­
mensurate. He analyzes the kind of structural power that organizes 
each society but he brilliantly interweaves the role of imaginary 
worlds with his concept of power, and here on an abstract level these 
societies are commensurable. He unites the many different segmented 
approaches to culture and power with an overriding concept, that of 
imagination. 
The following discussion from the Coda and my comments ex­
pands on the above conclusion. The three case studies were societies 
under maximum stress. In each case they developed an ideology 
fashioned out of preexisting cultural materials but power permeated 
the new agenda. Specifically, power organized and structured social 
labor "rooted in the nature of the cosmos" (Wolf 1999: 274). In 
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Wolfs words "Old ideas were rephrased to fit different circumstances 
and new ideas were presented as age-old truths [...] [which] were 
resolved through the exercise of power" (Wolf 1999: 275). 
The Kwakiutl society was stressed by contact with the modern 
powerful peoples who leveled various restrictions on the Kwakiutl and 
altered the economy. The Tenocha went from a local band to control 
of a regional empire. National Socialist Germany was preceded by a 
sudden unification, introduction of industrialism and dominance of a 
militaristic Prussia. And the loss of WWII ended National Socialist 
attempt at world conquest. 
Turning to the cosmology of these three societies, they had in 
common that they sanctioned and underwrote the power of the elite. 
Kwakiutl cosmological rationale provided that chiefs reenact animal 
ancestors and hold special privileges. That required a redistribution 
which transferred vital powers to guests. Chiefs were initiated giving 
them the control of life and death issues between spirits and the living 
(Wolf 1999: 276). The advancing capitalism increased sources of 
wealth and epidemics, diminished the population including chiefly 
heirs, which led to an inflationary competition for privileges including 
the newly rich (Wolf 1999: 270). 
The Tenocha economy was based on tribute paid by commoners to 
hereditary chiefs. Toward the end of the 15th century a military 
faction took over and revived mythological history supported by 
monumental art. The rulers considered that they had special power 
from the god of conquest and plunder and were responsible for 
sustaining time and the sun and offering human sacrifice to feed an 
ideology of world renewal. 
In the first two cases discussed, the rulers had a special relation to 
plants and animals, and depended on rhetorical skills by which they 
projected the imagined worlds in which power holders had strategic 
power (Wolf 1999: 278). 
Also in the case of National Socialist Germany, Wolf finds some 
analogies on the abstract level of power intertwined with cosmologies 
and imagined worlds. When Germany was dominated by the 
Prussians, the call was for a unified Volk which was further 
underwritten by the defeat in WWI. National Socialist ideology called 
for the rearmament of the national will and for building a war 
machine. While the Tenocha and the Kwakiutl saw human groups and 
plants and animals in constant struggle, the National Socialists devised 
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the conception that human races had distinct origins, and history 
became a struggle in nature for the predominance of the superior 
Aryan race (Wolf 1999: 279). Ideological rhetoric extolled what we 
today call ethnic cleansing. 
As from the point of view of history, and socio-economic type, 
these three societies are incommensurable, as I have noted, but in all 
three cases power depended on cosmological imperatives not limited 
to organizing society, but depending also "on relationships with 
imaginary elements and beings projected beyond tangible experience 
into metaphysical worlds" (Wolf 1999: 281). 
Wolf calls our attention to the limitations of models of anthro­
pologists explaining ideas and culture as for example functionalism, 
ecological factors, and structural and binary oppositions rooted in the 
biophysics of the mind. Helpful as these explanations are, the equally 
important area is what all this activity is about. What is the content of 
these practices? 
Wolf is aware of Benveniste's (1971) insistence on the semantics 
of the sentence and the referent and thus context, for which he thought 
semiotics accounted (Wolf 1999: 282). But here something important 
is lacking since the Prague School's rebellion against Saussure was 
promulgated in the Theses of 1929. Accordingly the authors laid the 
basis for Prague school semiotics, which was led particularly by 
Mukarovsky, and was then taken up by the Tartu-Moscow school, 
particularly by Lotman who pioneered semiotics of culture. 
When Wolf asks to what cultural signs point, or entail, what world 
is envisaged, who is setting up the valuation and for whom, and when 
he notes that some of the referents may be imaginary and many human 
beings and objects etc. may be ascribed imaginary power, here Wolfis 
in fact calling for a semiotics of culture (Wolf 1999: 282), a whole 
domain barely touched by American anthropologists. Wolf states: "the 
ideology of these three cases envision and project such imaginary 
worlds" (Wolf 1999: 283). Thus "the Kwakiutl assigned transhuman 
values to certain kinds of objects and made their distribution and ex­
change a major theme of their lives" (Wolf 1999: 283). The Tenocha 
imagined that the gods gave them life and had to be repaid by war and 
sacrifice The National Socialists thought they were carrying out the 
law of nature to preserve the Aryan race and destroy inferior types, 
and particularly the Jews. 
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The persistence of sacred propositions, Wolf explains, is the power 
of ascribing to them transhuman forces giving their spokesmen "a 
special aura of authority and enhancing the efficacy of their words and 
ritual performance" (Wolf 1999: 285). Here Wolf suggests the perti­
nence of Austin's "perlocutionary" or "performative" speech acts 
producing perlocutionary performative truths (Wolf 1999: 285). 
Wolf comments on the limitation of those who oppose enlighten­
ment universal rational truths to the organic and spiritual whole 
culture, that is the invoking of ancient customs and folklore and 
tradition. Wolf argues for preserving the notion of culture in spite of 
all these conflicting views and ambiguities since culture accounts for 
human practices and discourses "covered neither by progressive 
universalism or by retrograde parochialism" (Wolf 1999: 287). As he 
argues, the human ability to construct figments in our mind, to think 
of metaphors and metonyms, is still not understood. Nor do we know 
how culture connects with power. Wolf advances the notion of 
structural power and its relation to ideology and imagination. He 
believes that the human capacity to envision imaginary worlds is 
beginning to elicit more interest as is also the question of how culture 
and power connect (Wolf 1999: 291). 
I conclude with a message from Peirce with which Wolfs ideas 
interestingly resonate. As Peirce holds, the world is perfused with 
signs and all signs have three levels, one of which will be dominant, 
namely iconic, indexical and symbolic. Wolf has called our attention 
to the importance of Peirce's interprétant, which accounts for the 
infinite process of semiosis. The interprétant is not fixed but depends 
on the interpreter and thus the element of power communicated by the 
sign is variable. Like Jakobson's invisible oil that changes all the 
relationships of the ingredients of the salad, power is ubiquitous and 
transposing and thus is hard to be dealt with satisfactorily. Signs are 
what Jakobson called 'context sensitive' and their meanings will 
change depending on context, history, and the mindset of the senders 
and receivers. Their subliminal and disguised aspects are ever-present 
forces, but since forms of power are typically clothed and disguised in 
clichés, myths or what has been called double speak, such paradigms 
may be hard to detect, which helps to account for their frequent 
neglect. For power is embedded in signs, which must be interpreted. 
Peirce's comments about imagination, although in this case 
referring to literature, are pertinent to Wolfs perception. He defines 
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the real as "that whose characters are independent of what anybody 
may think" (CP 5.405), whereas the fictive [Peirce sometimes uses the 
term 'figment' instead of fiction] is the opposite of reality, namely 
the product of somebody's imagination; it has such characters as his thought 
impresses upon it [...] [and is] independent of how you or I think [...] There 
are, however, phenomena within our own minds, dependent upon our thought, 
which are at the same time real in the sense that we really think them. But 
though their characters depend on how we think, they do not depend on what 
we think those characters to be. (CP 5.405) 
I conclude that relevance is not the only criterion for important studies 
but in this case surely Wolfs power and imagination and ideology and 
Peirce's fictive worlds are important and relevant. 
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Эрик Вольф: семиотическое изучение власти 
Рассматривается анализ власти в последней книге Эрика Вольфа 
Envisioning Power (1999). В своей короткой книге под названием 
«Антропология» Вольф пишет, что «антропологическая исходная 
точка — это постоянно образующаяся мировая культура». Т.е. 
нужно изучать людской опыт во всей ее изменчивости и сложности. 
Его целью была создать обрамление, соединяющее гуманитарные 
науки и антропологию. Свой проект он не закончил, а только 
расширял. В новом введении к его книге 1964 года, 30 лет спустя, он 
пришел к выводу, что ожидаемый синтез не состоялся, а скорее 
наоборот — выросли новые преграды. В предисловии к Envisioning 
Power он полагает, что гуманитарные науки были неспособны или не 
имели желания принять к сведению тот факт, что культурные конфи­
гурации тесно переплетены с силами власти. В 1990 году он написал 
Американскому антропологическому обществу, что антропологи 
предпочитают рассматривать культуру безотносительно к власти, в 
то время как другие социальные науки выдвигают понятие идео­
логии без культуры. Он написал, что цель его последней книги — 
разъяснить связь идей и власти, основываясь на поведении и запи­
санных текстах. В то время как разум выдвигает разделяющий экран 
между организмом и его окружением, идеи имеют содержание и 
функции, помогающие объединять или разделять людей. Несмотря 
на то, что идеи составляют суть ментальных конструкций, Вольф 
понимает идеологию как конфигурацию унифицированных схем, 
обеспечивающих или манифестирующих власть. Власть есть по 
Вольфу аспект всех межчеловеческих взаимоотношений. Внутри 
такого теоретического обрамления Вольф изучает 3 разных случая: 
Kwakiutl, ацтеков и нацистской Германии. Сравнения хорошо по­
казывают как различия так и сходство в конфигурациях власти и в 
роли воображения. 
356 Irene Portis- Winner 
Eric Wolf: semiootiline uurimus võimust 
Vaatluse all on võimu analüüs Eric Wölfl viimases monograafias Envi­
sioning Power (1999). Oma lühiteoses pealkirjaga "Antropoloogia" kirju­
tab Wolf, et "antropoloogia vaateplatvormiks on hetkel sündimasolev 
maailmakultuur" (1964: 96). Oluliseks uurimisobjektiks on just inim-
kogemus kogu tema mitmekesisuses ja muutlikkuses. Wolfi eesmärgiks 
oli luua humanitaarteaduseid ja antropoloogiat ühendav raamistik. Seda 
püüdlust ei hüljanud ta kunagi, vaid arendas pidevalt edasi. Oma uues 
sissejuhatuses 1964. aastal kirjutatud raamatule 30 aastat hiljem jõuab ta 
järeldusele, et oodatud süntees ei leidnud aset, vaid hoopis vastupidi — 
ühinemise teele kasvasid uued tõkked. Eessõnas raamatule Envisioning 
Pow er väidab ta, et humanitaarteadused ei ole olnud võimelised või siis ei 
ole soovinud mõista seda, kuidas kultuurilised konfiguratsioonid põimu­
vad võimukaalutlustega. 1990. aastal pidas Wolf Ameerika Antropoloogia 
Seltsis kõne, milles väitis, et antropoloogid eelistavad vaadelda kultuuri 
võimust eraldi, samal ajal kui teised sotsiaalteadused tõstavad kilbile 
kultuurist lahutatud ideoloogia mõiste. Ta kujutas, et tema viimase raa­
matu eesmärgiks on selgitada ideede ja võimu vahelisi seoseid, tuginedes 
käitumispraktikatele ja kirjalikele tekstidele. Kuna mõistus tekitab orga­
nismi ja teda ümbritseva keskkonna vahele eraldusloori, on ideedel sisu ja 
funktsioonid, mis aitavad inimesi lahutada või ühte siduda. Kui ideed on 
Wolfi jaoks mentaalsete konstruktsioonide põhisisuks, siis ideoloogiat 
mõistab Wolf kui võimu toimimiseks või näitamiseks vajalikke malle või 
ühtlustatud skeeme. Võim on Wolfi järgi kõikide inimestevaheliste suhete 
üks aspekt. Taolise teoreetilise raamistiku sees vaatleb Wolf kolme erine­
vat juhtumit: kwakiutlid, asteegid ja natslik Saksamaa. Võrdluses on hästi 
näha nii sarnasus kui erinevus võimu konfiguratsioonides ja ettekujutuse 
rollis. 
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Just a foreword? Malinowski, Geertz and 
the anthropologist as native 
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Abstract. Read through semiotic analysis, the narrative intrigue of (the 
evenemential and cognitive dimension of) the anthropologist's work reveals 
the epistemological configuration encasing some central and interrelated 
questions in anthropology: the communication-interaction between anthropo­
logists and other inter-actants, their invention-application of some meta­
languages and the subsequent intercultural translations of concepts and 
processes. To explore this configuration, I compare a foreword written by 
Malinowski and another one written by Geertz. In these forewords, they resort 
to refined stories to frame complex argumentations. In Malinowski's fore­
word, two superposing stories are told: (1) a tale of a subject's performance 
newly endowed with professional competences (the ethnologist) and a discip­
line possessing a more modern and positive knowledge (Functionalist ethno­
logy) and (2) a symmetric tale of exchanged messages (with relative sanction 
and counter-sanction) between an enunciator (who has to lay the foundations 
of this science) and an addressee (who has to confirm the validity of mes­
sages). To lay these foundations, the cnunciator implicitly proposes an episte-
mology based on some values (such as 'penetration', 'progression', and the 
'overcoming of limits') privileging the metaphor of space and the cumulative 
aspect of process. As far as Geertz's foreword is concerned, the enunciator 
has recourse to two different stories: (1) one concerning the interaction 
between Geertz and his editor (rather than with natives) to justify his herme-
neutic position and (2) another one, larger and including, concerning the 
reversal of causality relationships to reaffirm the value of coincidence. If in 
Malinowski's foreword, stories are used to redefine some programmatic 
principles ('discontinuity' and the combination of 'three different oxymora') 
through which ethnology can be given a scientific nature and a new founda­
tion, in Geertz's foreword, on the contrary, value is given to 'coincidence' and 
'writing' in its multiple forms and (paradoxically, for an intcrpretativist) a 
binary discursive epistemology and a style of thought privileging the non-
terminative and imperfective process have been combined. 
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Even if a beginning is the inevitable start of a positive project, I would 
like to begin by affirming a negation and by weakening a program­
mation. This text is not the exact transcription of the conference that I 
presented at the congress on Anthropology and Semiotics that took 
place last year in Tartu (whose proceedings can be found in this 
volume). The original title of my communication was Towards a Se­
miotics of Anthropology and Anthropology of Semiotics. I had to cut 
parts off my original communication because of more limited space 
granted for written texts. The risk was to undermine the value of the 
chaotic flux of the fortuitous coincidence and to lose the fresh and 
necessary taste of what was said during the oral communication. I 
eliminated a part of the communication that concerned the anthro­
pology of semiotics and I decided to concentrate on the semiotics of 
anthropology. This necessity, motivated here by practical reasons, is a 
theoretical and unavoidable component of any anthropological project 
and deserves a thorough examination. This necessity passes, in my 
individual project, as a reflecting reverberation concerning the impos­
sibility to recover the whole process (the enunciation in its effective 
unfolding and the practice in its development) and the possibility to 
eliminate, at will but without damage, some elements of the orga­
nization of the message to be conveyed (the superfluous remainders of 
the utterance and the redundant constituents of the abstract meta­
language). 
Can anthropology of semiotics be considered, in its complex 
whole, a superfluous remainder? I would not say so. I would rather 
say it is a necessary reference inside other referring elements whose 
series create a grid of meaning, a mythical ground upon which one can 
situate a transitory origin of impalpable relationships existing between 
subjects and objects. By creating multiple references (and by im­
planting grids), one can hope to better focus on an (apparent trans­
parent) object to study and on the (apparent public) meanings as­
sembled by private subject carrying out researches. By combining 
references and grids, one can disarm the traps of transparency and the 
illusions of 'pre-shared-once-for-all' meanings. 
Lévi-Strauss had already had the insight that references and grids 
were the base of the constitution of myth and even founded the 
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meaning of life1. Following his example concerning myth and life (as 
well as the principle of constitution and foundation of a scientific 
elaboration), I reserve the right to start here a reflection on the semio­
tics of anthropology and to refer in the future to the anthropology of 
semiotics. I am, as a consequence, in the passive position of someone 
who concentrates on the semiotics of anthropology as if it was a 
central element, but who does not either forget that, at the same time, 
the act of relegating in the periphery (the anthropology of semiotics, 
in this specific case) is only occasional and it is not tantamount to the 
recognition of a substantial Otherness or an ultimate meaning. It is a 
question of balancing Self and Otherness: 'keeping oneself on the 
threshold, 'running after' a reference and 'holding back' on the 
structuring of an unfolding grid. The programmation and the random 
intervention, the necessity and the coincidence, the part and the whole, 
the enunciation and the utterance, the theories and the practices, the 
subjective investment and the transparent objectivity, the reference 
and the grid are some categories that inescapably cross one another 
and intermingle in the (re)presentation of a past event (including oral 
communication). 
Most of the work of an anthropologist is situated on the brink 
between a 'past event' and the 'event to represent', between a 'mes­
sage to convey' and the 'fleeting enunciation to recover'. That is why 
he cannot help thinking as a linguist and a semiotician or improvising 
himself as a philosopher of daily life driving off those abstractions 
that introduce themselves, furtively and restlessly, in the grain of 
experience to be converted into texts. An anthropologist does his 
work, implying himself thoroughly and using his personal experience, 
to obtain a more general and systematic knowledge on Man and a 
more specific and concrete knowledge on men. Independently from 
"Dans tout ce que j'ai écrit sur la mythologie, j'ai voulu montrer qu'on 
n'arrive jamais à un sens dernier. Y arrive-t-on d'ailleurs dans la vie ? La 
signification que peut offrir un mythe pour moi, pour ceux qui le racontent ou 
l'écoutent à tel ou tel moment et dans des circonstances déterminées, n'existe que 
par rapport à d'autres significations que le mythe peut offrir pour d'autres 
narrateurs ou auditeurs, dans d'autres circonstances et à un autre moment. Un 
mythe propose une grille, définissable seulement par ses règles de construction. 
Cette grille permet de déchiffrer un sens, non du mythe lui-même mais de tout le 
reste : images du monde, de la société, de l'histoire, tapies au seuil de la 
conscience, avec les interrogations que les hommes se posent à leur sujet" (Lévi-
Strauss 1988: 197). 
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his effective declinations of the discipline (for example, a preference 
for abstraction or for concreteness), his belonging to a precise school 
of thought or a more autonomous approach, the recourse to experience 
remains constant and indispensable. 
Nevertheless, any experience becomes an accessory component 
(somewhat elusive) if it is not rendered through its codification and 
communication. Even though the recourse to experience is inevitable, 
an anthropologist could not produce the 'results' of his research 
without a text that concentrates (and at the same time eliminates) part 
of the situations and interactions that he had directly on location. Any 
experience has to be converted in ordered semiosis and has to be 
supported by a comprehensible text for a receiver. Similarly, a confe­
rence given in a specific context, with a real audience, in conditions of 
effective interaction, has to be 'adapted' for a larger audience, follo­
wing modalities that belong, for example, to the written language 
(which codifies experience in its own terms). Experience cannot be 
conveyed as such, and neither would be useful if it were possible: 'to 
take shape', experience needs a supplementary and founding passage 
consisting in the 'constitution' of a discursive order (Foucault 1971). 
In my opinion, the opposition characterising the anthropologist's 
work, caught between the poles of experience and the order of narra­
tion to his readers (and to himself), is, more generally, a founding 
principle in anthropology that cannot be solved in one sense or 
another. It is because this opposition is conflicting and unsolved that 
the anthropologist's work is an interesting object of study. All the 
more so since this function established between experience and 
narration is amplified by the implicit role of translator fulfilled by an 
anthropologist: he translates processes and conceptualisations 
connected to experience into narrations for an 'arrival audience' often 
different, by language and culture, from the 'source audience' (Montes 
2000-2001). In this perspective, it doesn't sound excessive to stress 
the syncretism of the roles by saying that an anthropologist is also, 
even if unconsciously, a semiotician who passes from one code to 
another, from an oral language to the written one, from a concrete 
situation to the metalinguistic formalization, from a context to the text, 
from a cultural semiosphere to another. 
I spoke of an 'anthropologist' (and not of 'anthropology') for a 
concrete reason. An anthropologist is a man (or a woman) who thinks 
and acts, suffers and has emotions as any other human being. 
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Anthropology is on the contrary a discipline that (as most disciplines) 
tends to abstract the concrete dimension connected to experience and 
tends to produce "un principe de contrôle de la production du 
discours" (Foucault 1971: 37). In my contribution, I will neglect 
anthropology as a generalized knowledge and I will take into account 
the production of the anthropologist's discourse starting from his 
individual 'saying' and 'doing': that is a scholar, with a specific com­
petence and background, but also a subject, similar to anyone else, 
who goes through an exceptional experience such as the ethnographic 
research. 
It is true that an anthropologist cannot escape the principles that, in 
one period or another of history, dominate in a culture and are trans­
formed into a stereotyped and generalized knowledge. This affir­
mation, however, more than a real objection is a solid reason to con­
centrate on single anthropologists and on their specific usage of 
discursive forms, on their textual representation of the context, on the 
most adapted metalanguage chosen to investigate Otherness in ethno­
graphies (Montes 2005a). I prefer, therefore, to focus on some anthro­
pologists rather than on anthropology because in this way one can 
better take into account the specific evenemential and cognitive dimen­
sions of their discourses (Greimas 1983). As we shall see later, the 
detailed analysis of evenemential and cognitive dimensions is essen­
tial to understand the general configuration of the anthropologists' 
knowledge as a plot of thought, action and emotion. 
There is also another reason which justifies my semiotic perspec­
tive. If we cannot deny that an anthropologist is an 'author(Geertz 
1988) or, better, the crystallisation of an author-function (Foucault 
1994 [1969]), then neither can we neglect that an anthropologist is 
also a native. In my contribution, I will try to show that an anthro­
pologist is also a native, a member of his own culture in constant 
balance between intercultural 'objectivations and dialogisms' (Miceli 
1990). An anthropologist is an individual born in an exact place, who 
has learned one or more languages, follows specific customs, respects 
some laws and refuses others, someone with habits and manners 
typical of the culture he belongs to. The consequence is that an 
anthropologist's viewpoint on some cultures usually reveals important 
features characterizing these cultures but it also reflects his cultural 
origin and belonging. What I propose here, even if in a short and 
experimental form, is to study anthropologists as natives: that is 
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members of their own culture who cannot help being centred on their 
culture and, in the meantime, who try to integrate themselves into the 
culture they are studying. 
Following Foucault (who, nevertheless, concentrated more on the 
notion of author), one can presuppose that an anthropologist's be­
longing (his 'being native') constitutes, in an archaeological dimen­
sion of knowledge, a real and true function that I will call 'native-
function'. In the history of anthropology, the features representing an 
anthropologist as a native (with his cultural belonging and individual 
predisposition) are often omitted, and with it are occasionally 
cancelled those unsolvable (and necessary) oppositions that, more 
generally, characterize anthropology: the combination of experience 
and narration, the tension between individual research and the whole 
definition of a culture, the relationship between processes and struc­
tures, the objectifying work and the subjective investment. I think, 
more particularly, that an anthropologist's research is effectively 
marked by a semantic figure: the oxymoron. 
The multiple paths of realisation, neutralization or cancellation of 
conflicting categories, in the form of a cognitive and evenemential 
intrigue taken into account by an anthropologist, specify the 
approaches and orientation of different schools in anthropology. Since 
I cannot explore the cognitive and evenemential dimensions 
(contained in thick ethnographies) that would reveal the singular 
usages of these features, I will resort to a shortcut that is in itself a 
neglected itinerary in semiotics and in anthropology: the analyses of 
forewords2. My choice is therefore intentionally restricted to two texts 
written by two famous anthropologists: Bronislaw Malinowski and 
Clifford Geertz. If it is true that these anthropologists are inter­
nationally known and that references to their ethnographies are 
countless, it is also true that their forewords have never been analysed 
comparatively to show the metadiscursive nature of their reflection 
and their epistemological positioning (sometimes implicit) contained 
in very short texts. 
2 For practical reasons, I restrain here the analysis to texts without taking into 
account the subsequent discourse of anthropologists and informants on their own 
ethnographies and forewords. An anthropology of anthropology questioning itself 
on the connections between 'what has already happened' and the 'reflection a 
posteriori' of anthropologists on their work is a research that should become an 
integral part of a larger program centred on the exploration of the native-function. 
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Perhaps, one might wonder why a semiotician should focus on 
short forewords rather than choosing to analyse the general thought 
and practice of anthropologists. The motivation is deeply rooted in a 
semiotic posture: forewords are a concentrate of key concepts and 
these concepts are situated in these texts that are, as a matter of fact, a 
real and true genre (Taverna 2006). Analysing a foreword means to 
study a textual genre and, in parallel, (as stressed by Greimas in his 
article on the foreword by Dumézil) what the author "lui-même pense 
de son discours, de sa finalité et de son organisation" (Greimas 1983: 
174). This theoretical attitude is based on the postulate that concepts 
and texts are tightly connected and that the textual genre contributes to 
assign a specific meaning to concepts (Montes 2005b). I start, there­
fore, by analysing the foreword written by Malinowski (1922a [1921]) 
to pass later on to the foreword written by Geertz (2000). 
Malinowski's text (1922b) is generally considered a founding text 
in anthropology and, in the meantime, an essential reference for the 
Functionalist school. Any discipline tries to give itself an origin and a 
foundation, both 'situated' in some texts considered as classical texts, 
references for future scholars. Commonly, Malinowski's text is con­
sidered a founding text because it marks, conceptually, the passage 
from the Evolutionist school to the Functionalist school (with the 
affirmation of participant observation as a distinctive practice). In my 
perspective, this text by Malinowski is founding because the passage 
from one school to another is engraved into the text by some narrative 
and rhetorical strategies that build a simulacrum of a reader, inside the 
text, whose duty consists in producing a recognition and a sanction on 
the 'doing' and 'saying' of the enunciator. In other words, this passage 
from one school to another becomes a value to communicate that the 
text conveys by means of refined and complex procedures construc­
ting an idea of 'foundation'. 
As we shall see, in the foreword by Malinowski the sanction is 
emitted as a narrative element already acquired, taken for granted by 
the implied reader whose role consists in crediting (1) ethnology as a 
positive and scientific knowledge, in confirming the discontinuity 
existing (2) between the professional ethnologist and the "amateur's 
work" and (3) between the Evolutionist school and the Functionalist 
school. Upon these elements ('crediting with a value' and 'situating a 
discontinuity'), the enunciator builds a different ethnology, a discip­
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line with a scientific knowledge that possesses a 'foundation' and an 
'origin'. 
In the incipit a 'foundation' is created through the ostentation of a 
program of research that should be accomplished rapidly (before the 
natives disappear) and by defining the figure of the anthropologist as a 
solitary hero. The program of research and the subject (competent to 
realise it) are two features tightly connected, already in the incipit, to 
questions equally central according to Malinowski: the scientific foun­
dation of ethnology and the difficulty emanating from the dis­
appearance of its object of study. Malinowski maintains that: 
Ethnology is in the sadly ludicrous, not to say tragic, position, that at the very 
moment when it begins to put its workshop in order, to forge its proper tools, 
to start ready for work on its appointed task, the material of its study melts 
away with hopeless rapidity. Just now, when the methods and aims of 
scientific field ethnology have taken shape, when men fully trained for the 
work have begun to travel into savage countries and-study their inhabitants -
these die away under our eyes. (Malinowski 1922a: xv) 
Malinowski's discourse revolves around the scientific foundation of a 
kind of ethnology which is seen, in this fragment, as a discipline 
already possessing the instruments to accomplish its specific mission: 
studying the savages of faraway countries. The object to study is 
considered as "material": the natives are not real and true persons with 
whom to construct some kind of knowledge, but 'motionless indi­
viduals' to observe through the lens of ethnology. The figure of the 
anthropologist, paradoxically, seems to be absorbed by the discipline 
and its programmatic knowledge. This is justified by the fact that, in a 
scientific perspective (the one defended by Malinowski), it is not 
uniquely the value of a single ethnologist to count, with his subjective 
insights and discoveries, but also the method of the discipline. 
In this way, by opening his foreword with this incipit, the enuncia­
tor represents ethnology as a science possessing objective and trans­
parent features. The only trace of the ethnologist's presence is 
revealed, in this incipit, by the syntagm "under our eyes". As a 
counterpart to the absent figure of the ethnologist, we can find an 
almost lifeless object to study, "material" for observation, represented 
by the lexeme "inhabitants". Rather than people to interact with, the 
inhabitants are considered objects to observe. They are represented as 
something solid (that could melt), as something material possessing a 
Malinowski, Geertz and the anthropologist as native 365 
form and a consistency. Even the method of ethnology "take(s) shape" 
(becoming solid) and the inhabitants "die under our eyes" (liquefying 
as objects). In other terms, Malinowski's discourse turns around an 
idea of solidity and presence (owned by the discipline and by the 
object to observe), while the ethnologist takes on the features of a 
collective actant and the natives vanish as interacting subjects. In this 
short incipit, are therefore outlined, through different modalities, three 
key figures: the (1) ethnologist, the (2) inhabitants and (3) ethnology. 
If (1) ethnologists are "men fully trained for the work", the (2) Others 
are "inhabitants" of "savage countries" and (3) ethnology is repre­
sented as a discipline with a positive and a well defined knowledge. 
On one hand, we see a discipline that has already a constitution, 
with a "workshop", its "tools" and its "task" and on the other hand we 
see material (the natives) represented in terms of solidity and pre­
sence. The only difficulty perceived by Malinowski is the 'foreseen' 
disappearance of the native: the material to observe. It is important 
here to insist on the meaning of the lexeme 'material': something that 
one can manipulate and examine without a lively resistance. It is a 
circumscribed and motionless object that doesn't escape the obser­
vation of a subject and that demands reduced forms of interactions. 
From the linguistic viewpoint, the rapidity of the ethnologist's 
action and the responsibility with which he is charged are urged in two 
ways: thanks to the (1) redundancy of the adverbial locutions ("at the 
very moment when"; "Just now, when") and to (2) the coincidence 
created between the inchoative aspect of the discipline which is ready 
to face scientifically his duty (ethnology that "begins" and is ready "to 
start") and the terminative aspect of the object of study which 
disappears. Time is therefore conceived as the ethnologist's time: 
someone who has to hurry up to do his work before the definitive 
'death' of the natives. 
The insufficient time and the material nature of the object are 
tightly connected through the isotopy of the 'solidity' and 'visible' 
that characterises the incipit. Malinowski's usage of some metaphors 
strengthens this isotopy spread all over the foreword: see for example, 
"the material of its study melts away"; "these die away under our 
eyes". Obviously, the semantic features selected for a 'discourse of 
foundation' can be multiple. In this specific case, the enunciator 
accentuates the passage from a previous phase to the following one 
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and emphasizes the figure of a rival, an anti-actant to be discredited: 
the amateur. Malinowski writes: 
The research which has been done on native races by men of academic 
trainings has proved beyond doubt and cavil that scientific, methodic inquiry 
can give us results far more abundant and of better quality than those of even 
the best amateur's work. Most, though not all, of the modern scientific 
accounts have opened up quite new and unexpected aspects of tribal life. They 
have given us, in clear outline, the picture of social institutions often 
surprisingly vast and complex; they have brought before us the vision of the 
native as he is, in his religious and magical beliefs and practices. (Malinowski 
1922a: xv) 
The "amateur" fulfills at least two critical roles: he is somebody who 
lacks the necessary competence to do fieldwork and he is also an anti-
actant through which one can see, by a negative comparison, what is 
the real duty of an ethnologist endowed with "academic trainings" and 
willing to do a "methodic inquiry". If, in the incipit, the accent is laid 
on ethnology in itself (and on the potential manque produced by the 
rapid disappearance of the material to study), in this fragment the 
enunciator focuses more specifically on a new figure of ethnologist 
who is defined in (1) positive terms and by using a (2) negative 
comparison: (1) positively, by the syntagm "men of academic 
trainings" and by the attribution of "results far more abundant and of 
better quality than those of even the best amateur's work"; (2) 
negatively, through the discredit of the anti-actant (the amateur) who 
summarizes a performance and a competence to refuse because (for 
the enunciator) they are already overcome by modern science. 
As we have seen, in order to construct a scientific knowledge 
Malinowski maintains that there are two moments in the history of the 
discipline: the first one marked by the amateur's work (those who 
improvised themselves as ethnologists) and the second one, scientific 
and modern, dominated by the 'real' ethnologist with a program of 
research based on some essential elements (for example, method and 
academic trainings) that characterise his competence and define his 
performance (with a triple object of value such as "aspects of tribal 
life", "the picture of social institutions" and "the vision of the native 
as he is"). 
By affirming the existence of different periods (and the passage 
from the first one to the second one), the enunciator obtains a double 
effect. The enunciator builds a simulacrum of a reader who can 
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positively describe the new figure of ethnologist (belonging to the 
present and to science) to the detriment of the amateurs (belonging to 
the past and non-science). In the meantime, the enunciator can imply 
that also all the others who did research before the Functionalists are 
overcome and did not produce real science. This rhetorical strategy is 
therefore effective to advance an implicit meaning that could have not 
been expressed manifestly by Malinowski: the polemics with the 
Evolutionists. Stressing a difference between what is old and over­
come (the amateur) and what is new and modern (the new figure of 
ethnologist) has also the function to sanction positively a kind of 
ethnologist (Functionalist) to the detriment of others (for example, the 
Evolutionists). 
Furthermore, if in this fragment the ethnologist's program is more 
precisely defined, then also the isotopy of the object to be studied as 
material and seized by observation is also strengthened. In fact, for the 
ethnologist the "social institutions" become a "picture" and the native 
becomes a "vision" that is "before us" (the ethnologists). In sum, in 
this fragment we can find a whole story with a subject charged to act 
(the ethnologist), an explicit anti-actant (the amateur), an implicit 
anti-actant (the Evolutionist), a triple object of value ("tribal life", 
"social institutions" and "the native") and a helper-instrument (the 
observation). 
The tight association between the rhetorical and the narrative 
strategy helps avoiding an open polemics with the Evolutionists and, 
more specifically, is effective to convey furtively two fundamental 
narrative segments: the competence and the sanction. The competence 
of the subject charged to act (the ethnologist) is seen as if it was the 
only and exclusive kind of scientific knowledge; the sanction is built 
as if it was taken for granted, that is a sanction not to verify ("the 
research [...] has proved beyond doubt and cavil [...]"; "They have 
given us, in clear outline, the picture of social institutions"). The 
positive (and anticipated) sanction is the result of a strategy used to 
obtain (1) the recognition from the reader and (2) the manifest 
acquisition of two features conferring scientific and natural value: 
'clearness' and 'visibility'. 
If the role of observation is confirmed both in the incipit and in this 
passage, what is modified is here the meaning of the object to study. If 
the object ("the native") was considered as 'material to observe', in 
this passage the "native" becomes above all (and somehow implicitly) 
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a goal to reach through observation. In other terms, it is here implied 
that the clearness obtained following research and the greater visibility 
of material correspond to an increment of knowledge. In this way, the 
enunciator communicates the presupposition that the goal of science 
does not only consist in the application of the look to material that is 
"under our eyes", but also in the capacity to make clearer (always 
through observation), more visible and more objective the material 
studied. Therefore, the "native" is material that has to be studied 
initially by the power of observation, but it has also to be transformed 
to further become a "vision" and a "picture". Even though observation 
is still present in the initial state ("material") and in the augmentation 
of knowledge concerning the final stage ("picture"), we see that (in 
the transformation produced by research and in the passage from one 
phase to the other) there is an acquisition of two fundamental 
elements: (1) the material to observe becomes a picture that has the 
characteristics of a more general and complex whole and (2) the native 
becomes what he really is, an essence. 
A rhetoric of observation is therefore fully confirmed in this 
analysis of the foreword written by Malinowski. In his ethnographies, 
it is an effective strategy to affirm the presence of the ethnologist in 
the field, his 'being there' who persuades the reader that his story is 
true, but it is also a manner to propose a method of research founded 
on a real and true contemplative epistemology and on an inductive 
method (Kilani 1990). What is even more stunning is that, at least in 
this foreword, observation has two values: it is used to apply to (and to 
contact) an object and to produce a transformation of this same object. 
This transformation is a synonym of knowledge. This knowledge is 
the result of a procedure that, just because it is built on the her-
meneutic power of observation, (1) eliminates the problem concerning 
the complicated interaction with the native and (2) affirms an episteme 
typical of western thought. Even though Malinowski is considered the 
father of participant observation, this oxymoron, at least in this 
foreword, is solved in favour of observation while the native, rather 
than an individual with whom to interact, is seen as an object to 
observe. As far as the western episteme (implicitly suggested by Mali­
nowski) is concerned, we can say that it is founded on observation as 
an instrument of truth and on the augmentation of knowledge obtained 
through the application of observation that reveals the interiority (and 
the essence) of things. The 'truth' advanced by this kind of western 
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knowledge is associated to (1) visibility as a whole ("picture"), to a 
(2) static object ("material") and to a (3) penetration of the external 
façade in order to bring (a) what is the internal ("mind") to the (b) 
external surface ("the native as he is"). 
This association is even stronger in the following passage of the 
foreword: 
They have allowed us to penetrate into his mind far more deeply than we have 
ever done before. (Malinowski 1922a: xv) 
By reading these lines, one realizes that it is not only a question 
concerning the way an ethnologist shows himself (on location and in 
the text he writes) and how he sees his object (his conception of 
Otherness). More specifically, in this foreword, an implicit knowledge 
'passes' underneath the appearance of a newly conceived discipline. 
This fragment is, therefore, fundamental because it solves (or tries to 
solve) an implicit oxymoron lying in the ethnologist's program based 
on the difference (and association) between the categories subject/ 
object and external/internal. Initially, the native is de-subjectivised 
and becomes material to be observed for a subject (the ethnologist); 
afterwards, observation allows the ethnologist to overcome the 
frontier separating the 'external envelope' and the 'internal essence' 
and to penetrate into the depths behind the surface in order to bring 
outside what was hidden. The (apparent) paradox is that, initially, it is 
given value to the external object (corresponding to de-subjectiva-
tion); afterwards, it is given value to what, logically, could not be 
seen: the internal essence. 
Even though both themes are dear to western tradition ('penetra­
tion into an interior' and 'valorisation of essence'), the originality of 
Malinowski's approach consists in the association of the conflicting 
terms (the oxymoron) and in its development into a narrative syntagm 
that transforms the paradigms that constitute it (subject/object; 
external/internal) into a powerful instrument of knowledge: that is a 
story in which 'observation' is an instrument of knowledge and, in the 
meantime, it is a semantic operator of essences into visible materials 
that keep an 'essential' value. What has to be underlined is that this 
transformation of the oxymoron (of knowledge into a narrative 
intrigue) precedes and implies another, more famous oxymoron: the 
participant observation and the rhetoric of the ethnologist's presence 
as a truthful saying. To say this differently, the oxymoron regarding 
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participant observation is the result of a more basic oxymoron: the de-
subjectivation of the native (subject -> object) and the 'penetration' 
into the internal depths of his mind (external —> internal). In the 
foreword, the resolution of this oxymoron remains conflicting 
because, on one hand, the ethnologist's observation is equally a means 
to seize 'what is outside' (based on the couple subject/object) and 
'what is inside' (based on the couple external surface/internal mind) 
and, on the other hand, participation (even if less important than 
observation) demands somehow the recognition of the status of 
subject to the native. 
One can suppose that this specific organization of the oxymoron 
is both the outcome of Malinowski's belonging to western culture and 
the fruit of his originality. In this perspective, the passage from an 
improvised ethnology (the amateur) or an old-fashioned ethnology 
(the Evolutionist) to a professional ethnology is not as marked as 
Malinowski would like to make us believe in the incipit. Firstly, 
because the relationship between observation and participation is not 
obvious. Participation and fieldwork, usually considered innovative 
elements introduced by Malinowski3, are actually dependant on the 
observation of a subject who does not fully seize, in the field, the 
dynamism of Otherness, and 'carries' elsewhere (geographically, in 
far-reaching locations) the spirit of the laboratory research of the 
nineteenth century European man. Secondly, the "picture" that 
Malinowski would like to seize (culture as a whole to study in itself) 
has also the goal, more typical of Evolutionism, to take into conside­
ration, through the primitive, the origin of Man. The native's Other­
ness, then, rather than a whole composed of parts with constitutive 
rules, is transformed into a sort of 'originally degraded identity' of 
mankind, an object (the native) lagging behind in the history of 
evolution: 
From the new material scientifically hall-marked, students of comparative 
Ethnology have already drawn some very important conclusions on the origin 
of human customs, beliefs and institutions; on the history of culture, and their 
3 For a critical discussion concerning this point and the parallel importance of 
history that 'situates' the researcher in time and space see Valeri 2002. For a 
further development on the related question concerning subjectivity in 
anthropology and in some related fields see Buttitta 2003. 
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spread and contact; on the laws of human behaviour in society, and of the 
human mind. (Malinowski 1922a: xv) 
As shown in this fragment, the polemics with the previous schools and 
with the amateurs is not centred on a monolithic and exclusive defi­
nition of culture. In fact, in the foreword one can see an alternation of 
at least two definitions: one more functionalist that considers natives 
as an object to study as a whole constituted of integrated parts and 
another more evolutionist that conceives the native as a primitive 
prototype of the man of the past to study to get to conclusions on the 
origin of modern man and on the evolution that brought mankind from 
primitive man to civilized man. In other terms, the primitive man is 
seen sometimes as a man to study as a product of his culture and 
sometimes as a specimen of the past. Both definitions are not 
conflicting with two main recurrent features: insufficient time and the 
power of observation. These features characterize research: 
The hope of gaining a new vision of savage humanity through the labours of 
scientific specialists opens out like a mirage, vanishing almost as soon as 
perceived. For though at present, there is still a large number of native 
communities available for scientific study, within a generation or two, they or 
their cultures will have practically disappeared. The need for energetic work is 
urgent, and the time is short. Nor, alas, up to the present, has any adequate 
interest been taken by the public in these studies. The number of workers is 
small, the encouragement they receive scanty. I feel therefore no need to 
justify an ethnological contribution which is the result of specialised research 
in the field. (Malinowski 1922a: xv-xvi) 
To realize the importance of these features in the foreword, it is 
enough to bring to remembrance a few terms belonging to the 
semantic field of observation ("vision", "mirage", "vanishing", "per­
ceived") and to the temporal axis ("within a generation", "disap­
peared", "short"). The association between these two elements 
('observation' as an instrument of penetration of Otherness and 
fleeting 'time' as a means to produce acceleration) is not casual. In 
fact, besides confirming traces of evolutionist thought in the episte-
mology conceived by Malinowski, this association suggests that the 
goal of ethnology should consist more in the search of 'essences' to 
encase in the path of mankind rather than in the study of dynamism 
and relationship inside a system. Actually, both paths of research, one 
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more functionalist and another more evolutionist, intermingle in the 
foreword and they are not clearly distinguished. 
Conversely, in the following passage the implied enunciator speaks 
for the first time and qualifies himself directly through the first person 
of the pronoun "I" to communicate, this time with determination, what 
are the features characterizing Functionalism: fieldwork and a holistic 
conception of culture. Malinowski points it out: 
In this volume I give an account of one phase of savage life only, in 
describing certain forms of inter-tribal, trading relations among the natives of 
New Guinea. This account has been culled, as a preliminary monograph, from 
Ethnographic material, covering the whole extent of the tribal culture of one 
district. One of the first conditions of acceptable Ethnographic work certainly 
is that it should deal with the totality of all social, cultural and psychological 
aspects of the community, for they are so interwoven that not one can be 
understood without taking into consideration all the others. The reader of this 
monograph will clearly see that, though its main theme is economic — for it 
deals with commercial enterprise, exchange and trade — constant reference 
has to be made to social organisation, the power of magic, to mythology and 
folklore, and indeed to all other aspects as well as the main one. (Malinowski 
1922a: xvi) 
To communicate this message, the enunciator feels the need to speak 
in the first person and to refer overtly to a symmetrical figure: the 
"reader". As a matter of fact, the reader is intentionally mentioned 
because he represents the pole of the communication that has to 
confirm, with his explicit intervention, the 'clearness' and the 'foun­
dation' owned by methodology. Furthermore, the reader is mentioned 
because he is connected to the refusal of the enunciator to justify his 
work in the previous fragment of the foreword ("I feel therefore no 
need to justify an ethnological contribution"). Malinowski refuses to 
give a justification concerning his own work because he is aware that 
the interest of ethnographies is limited to a specialized public and he 
would like, on one hand, to show the legitimacy of these studies and, 
on the other hand, he would like to open to a larger public and confirm 
this disciplinary knowledge. 
To establish a direct communication between the enunciator and 
the reader, between a kind of'doing' and the reception of this 'doing', 
authorises what has been prospected as a new discipline from the 
methodological viewpoint. In this perspective, the strategy concerning 
enunciation goes hand in hand with the rhetorical strategy. The 
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positive sanction is emitted from an enunciator who takes for granted 
to receive an acceptance from the addressee: the sanction of the reader 
is connected to the performance of the anthropologist-enunciator; the 
point of view of the reader (who can "clearly see") corresponds to the 
"account" of the anthropologist. Therefore, if the enunciator speaks as 
an "I" it is because he addresses to the corresponding figure of 
enunciation (a "you" represented by the reader) in order to stress the 
role of solitary hero that he is advocating. 
If in the first part of the foreword, method was praised and the 
birth of a new ethnology founded on a positive knowledge was also 
proclaimed, in the second part the more specific duty of a subject 
(who has to accomplish a 'mission' based on some relevant features) 
is stressed: the solitude of his work, the displacement in a faraway and 
exotic country, the considerable duration in time, the linguistic 
competences, the natives' life as a 'spectacle' constantly before his 
eyes. Nevertheless, even in this segment, living with the natives 
becomes for the solitary ethnologist, more than a real participation, a 
spectacle to observe: 
The geographical area of which the book treats is limited to the Archipelagoes 
lying off the eastern end of New Guinea. Even within this, the main field of 
research was in one district, that of the Trobriand Islands. This, however, has 
been studied minutely. I have lived in that one archipelago for about two years 
in the course of three expeditions to New Guinea, during which time I 
naturally acquired a thorough knowledge of the language. I did my work 
entirely alone, living for the greater part of the time right in the villages. I 
therefore had constantly the daily life of the natives before my eyes, while 
accidental, dramatic occurrences, deaths, quarrels, village brawls, public and 
ceremonial events, could not escape my notice. (Malinowski 1922a: xvi-xvii) 
More generally, the attempt is, on one hand, to obtain the recognition 
of Functionalism's methodological objectivity (from the implied 
reader) and, on the other hand to underline the .power of penetration 
into the natives' culture possessed by a subject provided with specific 
competences. One might say, without exaggeration, that all the 
foreword tends towards the effacement of the opposition existing, in 
principle, between a method declared objective and a solitary hero 
who cannot help being an individual subject (of observation, com­
prehension, effort, capacity to learn, to resist, and so on). We can 
easily compare the ethnologist's work (as it is meant by Malinowski) 
with the process of penetration of the spermatozoid into an ovule. 
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Only one spermatozoid (the ethnologist endowed with competences 
who knows how to face the discomfort of life among savage peoples) 
has the privilege to penetrate into the ovule (the natives' culture). In 
both cases (the spermatozoid and the ethnologist), the mission can be 
considered accomplished if they overcome the barriers separating the 
'external space' from the 'internal space' and when a selection is 
made in the group charged with the duty to penetrate (the weakest 
spermatozoids corresponding to the evolutionists and the amateurs). 
This comparison is not excessive. The value of 'penetration' (the 
overcoming of frontiers separating the 'façades' from the internal 
'essence') and vertical digging is so rooted in our western culture that 
this parallel can help to highlight some mechanisms contained in our 
common thought and in the metaphorical dimension of scientific 
metalanguages (Montes 2006a). 
In this perspective, the theme 'justification' acquires an additional 
connotation. It is a recurrent theme whose function is to diminish the 
excessive opposition between the first part of the foreword (defending 
the virtues of the functionalist method) and the second part (stressing 
the penetrating power of the single subject into the natives' culture): 
In the present state of Ethnography, when so much has still to be done in 
paving the way for forthcoming research and in fixing its scope, each new 
contribution ought to justify its appearance in several points. It ought to show 
some advance in method; it ought to push research beyond its previous limits 
in depth, in width, or in both, finally, it ought to endeavour to present its 
results in a manner exact, but not dry. The specialist interested in method, in 
reading this work, will find set out in the Introduction, Divisions II-'X and in 
Chapter XVIII the exposition of my points of view and efforts in this 
direction. The reader who is concerned with results, rather than with the way 
of obtaining them, will find in Chapters fV to XXI a consecutive narrative of 
the Kula expeditions, and the various associated customs ano beliefs. The 
student who is interested, not only in the narrative, but in the ethnographic 
background for it, and a clear definition of the institution, will find the first in 
Chapters I and II, and the latter in Chapter III. (Malinowski 1922a: xvii) 
The oxymoron resulting from the association between the 'objectivity 
of method' and the 'observation of a single subject' is solved by 
Malinowski by using a powerful spatial figure which becomes, in 
itself, a general model for research. In effect, behind the theme of 
justification, the enunciator proposes some elements characterizing 
research that belong to the semantic field of space: a path upon which 
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one can install future research ("paving the way"), the axiologisation 
of becoming in terms of limits to overcome ("beyond its previous 
limits") and some coordinates concerning verticality ("in depth") and 
surface ("in width"). Space is therefore used as a referent to anchor an 
imaginary relative to 'progression', 'penetration' and the 'overcoming 
of limits'. The spatial metaphor is connected to the physical 
ethnologist's displacement that takes on a central relief in an exotic 
anthropology: the displacement is in effect essential and preliminary 
for the ethnologist's work and the subsequent participant (observation) 
in far-reaching locations is an integral part of his mission. 
At this stage, it is necessary to bring to mind that participant 
observation is itself an oxymoron, a syntagm that associates two 
semantically conflicting concepts. It is inevitable that anthropologists 
tend to solve this constitutive oxymoron in one sense or another. In 
this foreword, the oxymoron is solved by neglecting 'participation' 
and by focusing on a process of 'de-subjactivation of Otherness': by 
effacing the native's authority and reducing him to material to 
observe. 'Observation', 'solidity' and 'passive presence' of the 
subject-object to observe characterize the discursive order imple­
mented by Malinowski. 'Participation' is restrained to geographical 
displacement in a faraway country and to amplification of the 
anthropologist's solitude. To know, an anthropologist has to cope, by 
himself, with the complications of life in a village. Even though the 
foreword evokes the help received on location, the people mentioned 
are not part of the anthropologist's team who is, on the contrary, 
represented as an individual mastering the local language. Can one 
really master a language in a couple of years, keeping into account 
that an anthropologist works with people speaking different dialects? 
In any case, Malinowski speaks of the language as a> means and an 
instrument to accomplish his research. In this way, he lays value onto 
the language as means to be used directly for communication, but he 
tends to consider it more as an instrument than a goal leading to the 
understanding of culture. Malinowski concludes, then, his foreword 
by official and ritual thanksgiving to all those people who contributed 
positively to his research. 
By grossly summarizing the analysis of Malinowski's foreword, I 
would like to stress, among other central features, the exceptional 
importance of at least three oxymora, even if only one is commonly 
mentioned by specialists: participant observation. Logically, the 
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oxymoron conjugating participation and observation should be solved 
by a syntagm that highlights firstly 'participation' (above all learning 
the local language with natives) and secondly careful 'observation' 
(above all studying the natives). On the contrary, as we have seen, 
Malinowski combines (and solves) it in his own way. In synthesis, one 
can say that an 'ideology' of programmation prevails in the solution 
of oxymora and in the presentation of the ethnologist's work. 
On this concern, it is impressive to compare this ideology, subja­
cent Malinowski's work, with the viewpoint expressed by Clifford 
Geertz (2000 [1973]) in his foreword to The Interpretation of Cultu­
res. If Malinowski bases his research on the asymptotic and cumu­
lative path of programmation, Geertz, on the contrary, in his field-
work and in the interpretation of cultures, underlines the punctual and 
beneficial virtues of coincidence4. Each of these anthropologists 
resorts to a different 'ideology' considering it the only possible way to 
do fieldwork and to see ethnology. The recourse to one kind of 
ideology is also, more generally, a strategy to communicate to the 
public the only manner by which a specialist 'must' (Malinowski) or 
'can' (Geertz) do fieldwork and, in the meantime, a manner through 
which one can affirm the presence (Malinowski) or absence (Geertz) 
of norms in the ethnologist's work. For Malinowski, it is a question of 
affirming the presence of normative features and, symmetrically, to 
endow ethnology with a scientific knowledge. Geertz's concern, on 
the contrary, consists in cancelling the possibility to conceive a 
program (theoretical and practical), preliminary to the presence in the 
field of the ethnologist who, for this same reason, can only proceed by 
being prey to coincidence, by adjustments and reconsiderations. To be 
more precise, for Geertz, the casual progression (and even, sometimes, 
the chaotic drifting) concerns both fieldwork and its communication to 
his readers: 
When, at the beginning of the seventies, I undertook to collect these essays, all 
of them written the decade before, during the fabled sixties, I was far from 
4 By using terms as programmation and coincidence, I make an explicit 
reference to the model proposed by Eric Landowski according to whom there are 
four fundamental intersubjective kinds of interaction: programmation (based on 
regularity and predictability), adjustement (based on reciprocity), coincidence 
(based on the unforeseeable) and manipulation (based on contractualization) 
(Landowski 2006). 
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clear as to what it was that interconnected them aside from the fact that I had 
written them. A number were on Indonesia, where I had been working for 
some years, a number were on the idea of culture, an obsession of mine, 
others were on religion, politics, time, and evolution, and one, which was to 
become perhaps the most famous, or infamous (it reduced both Marxists and 
advanced literati to angry sputtering), was a rather off-beat piece on the 
deeper meaning of cockfighting among the Balinese. (Geertz 1999: v) 
As we have seen, Malinowski's foreword is accurately divided into 
two parts: in the first part, the enunciator camouflages his presence 
and ethnology appears as if it was speaking by itself (neutrally and 
transparently) about scientific foundations and norms; in the second 
part, the enunciator reveals himself as an ethnologist telling his 
fieldwork and, through this special assumption of responsibility, 
implicitly conferring a further and deeper scientific nature to ethno­
logy. Both strategies fulfill a difficult and mirroring task: to assign a 
scientific value to ethnology and to establish a set of norms to 
consider as science. Conversely, (already in his incipit) Geertz lays 
stress, through the singular first person ("I"), : on the inseparable 
syncretism associating a researcher and his field, the enunciator of the 
foreword and the writer of the text. The intention is to show that a 
researcher is only apparently a unity, a single person endowed with a 
clear direction and a definite program. As fragmented and incidental 
as the researcher in the field, the book is divided in different chapters 
which have no unit or global conception. To show it, the enunciator 
focuses on a precise theme: the lack of interconnection of the essays. 
More specifically, the enumeration is the stylistic figure that becomes, 
on this concern, the instrument to underline the variety of themes 
approached in the essays and the absence of a common lead. All these 
features (actantial syncretism, focalisation on the absence of inter­
connection, recourse to enumeration) indicate that, in his perspective, 
coincidence is all pervading in the performance of an ethnologist who 
cannot follow the principles of programmation. Since his research was 
the result of coincidences, his book also lacks interconnection and is 
the result of coincidence (and vice versa). The rhetorical question 
clears and underlines this 'non-connection' between incidental 
research and incidental chapters in the book: "Did they add up to 
anything: a theory? a standpoint? an approach?" (Geertz 2000b: v). 
The question closes the segment concerning the incipit and, in the 
meantime, opens a new important section in which the enunciator 
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starts telling a story with a sender (the editor) who has also the role of 
a helper (the editor), an object of value ("a position" and "a slogan"), a 
subject potentially charged with a performance ("I"), but actually 
devoid of the necessary competence. Paradoxically, by writing the 
theoretical essay introducing and 'connecting' all the other articles of 
the book, the subject passes from a situation of imbalance (lack) to a 
situation of balance (solution of lack). This classical transformation, 
foreseen in simple fairy tales and in more complex literary stories, 
poses here a problem since the cognitive acquisition on the part of the 
subject is contradictory. How can an author-subject justify a 
theoretical essay if his perspective is based on the affirmation of 
coincidence and on the absence of a theory? By telling a story in 
which the subject of performance acquires the competence (that makes 
him ready for cognitive action) through a manipulation showing that 
even a theoretical essay is the fruit of a coincidence and not of a 
program intentionally conceived: 
I didn't even have a title for the thing, much less a rationale. I had thought to 
call it Meaning and Culture, but the lamented Marvin Kessler, who was my 
editor at Basic Books, and whose idea it was in the first place to collect the 
essays, rightly did not think much of that — the evasion was too. obvious, and 
the phrasing uninspired — and he urged me to write an extended analytical 
introduction stating my general position. I said I didn't know that I had one. 
He said (there were editors in those days): "You'll find one." And thus 1 
produced "Chapter I. Thick description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of 
Culture," and discovered both a position and a slogan I have been living with 
since. (Geertz 2000: v) 
Geertz acquires a 'theoretical awareness' by interacting with his editor 
who helps him to find out something he had previously ignored: a 
position and a slogan. One might say that Geertz passes from an 
ideology of coincidence to an ideology of manipulation ("You'll find 
one") and, for some aspects, to an ideology of adjustment ("There 
were editors in those days"). What is more impressing is that Geertz, 
by passing from one position to the other, does not speak of 
interaction with the native. The kinds of interaction that concern him 
are with his editor and with his writing. 
This backward order of things — first you write and then you figure out what 
you are writing about — may seem odd, or even perverse, but it is, I think, at 
least most of the time, standard procedure in cultural anthropology. Some 
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pretenders to high science and higher technique aside, we do not start out with 
well-formed ideas we carry off to distant places to check out by means of 
carefully codified procedures systematically applied. We go off to those 
places, or, increasingly these days, ones closer by, with some general notions 
of what we would like to look into and of how we might go about looking into 
them. We then in fact look into them (or, often enough, look instead into 
others that turn out to be more interesting), and after doing so we return to sort 
through our notes and memories, both of them defective, to see what we might 
have uncovered that clarifies anything or leads on to useful revision of 
received ideas, our own or someone else's about something or other. (Geertz 
1999: v-vi) 
If Malinowski is more concerned with the problem of 'observation' 
than 'participation', Geertz is more concerned with the problem of 
'writing' (and justifying a position) than interacting with his Other. As 
a matter of fact, both anthropologists neglect the active role that 
natives play in the construction of interaction and acquisition of 
knowledge. For Malinowski, the opposition existing between observa­
tion and participation is solved in favour of observation. For Geertz, 
the opposition existing between the process of writing and the 
preliminary idea is solved in favour of writing. Rather than outlining a 
hypothetical process of research, in its whole and its linearity, as a 
syntagmatic development in which some segments can prevail upon 
others or precede others (for example: selection of a problem —> 
bibliographic research —> first theoretical hypothesis -» fieldwork 
research —> participation -» observation —> fieldwork notes —> 
interpretations —> structurations —> writing), Geertz prefers opposing, 
by using dichotomies, those who follow a "standard procedure" and 
the "pretenders to high science and higher technique": the value of the 
first ones is emphasized while the value of the second ones is 
cancelled. 
As we have seen, Malinowski is in conflict with the Evolutionists, 
but he cannot say it overtly. Geertz cannot say what kind of anthro­
pology he discredits, but, if one reads the whole foreword, one might 
suppose that Geertz thinks of Structuralism in negative terms. 
The writing this produces is accordingly exploratory, self-questioning, and 
shaped more by the occasions of its production than its post-hoc organization 
into chaptered books and thematic monographs might suggest. (Geertz 2000b: 
vi) 
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Therefore, this foreword written by Geertz presents ethnologists as 
men without certainties in their work, men caught in the "web" of 
meanings they have themselves produced. Even though an ethnologist 
has acquired competences that make him suited for fieldwork (and for 
interpretations of cultures) he has to enact a series of interactions more 
with his editor (and his own texts) than with the real and true Others: 
the natives. In the case of Geertz, the ethnologist's work is reduced to 
multiple forms of writing: (1) writing as conclusion of a research, (2) 
writing as introduction to a book, (3) writing as questioning of the 
anthropologist. In sum, these are all different ways of writing focusing 
on the return to the ethnologist's Self, to his subjectivity devoid of any 
reference to what is usually understood as the real object of study: 
culture and Otherness. 
The paradox is that, to advance in the crumbling of any form of 
programmation, Geertz produces a discourse based on dichotomies 
that reminds us of the binary oppositions used by Structuralists to 
speak of myth. As in the previous fragments ("standard procedure" vs 
"pretenders to high science"; "first you write" vs "then you figure 
out"), also in this part of the foreword, Geertz proceeds by using 
bipolar couples: for example, "occasions of its production" us "post-
hoc organization". 
This concluding phase of work — concluding until we go off somewhere 
again, or turn to other concerns — is consequently both crucial and a Lit of 
sleight-of-hand. Crucial, because without it we are left with an assortment of 
vignettes and aperçus, fragments in search of a whole. Sleight-of-hand 
because it presents what is in fact a trailing construction as though it were a 
deliberated thesis happily confirmed. Anthropological arguments — and The 
Interpretation of Cultures is most definitely such an argument — are like 
excuses, made up after the stumblings that make them necessary have already 
happened. (Geertz 2000b: vi) 
From the aspectual viewpoint, the ethnologist's work is formulated by 
Geertz as if it was a process being continuously re-elaborated and 
reproduced. If coincidence is important for Geertz, writing, in its 
multiple forms, is determining: in the initial and in the conclusive 
phase of fieldwork. Stressing the multiplicity of writing is a manner to 
reject unity and homogeneity. 'Coincidence' and 'process' are 
associated in Geertz's discourse to disrupt any form of static category 
and any form of preconceived essence (in favour of multiplicity and 
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dynamism). Even the conclusion of a work is considered as a 
postponement to another work, a dynamic non-conclusion. By this 
strategy, it is affirmed not only the quality of coincidence but also the 
importance of the imperfective process of the never-ending work. 
Slowly proceeding by using bipolar couples, positively stressing one 
term and negatively posing another one, Geertz amplifies the force of 
coincidence by reversing any possible cause and effect relationship: 
(1) between the essays of his book, (2) between the idea (that should 
precede) and its writing, (3) between a theoretical essay (that should 
introduce) and the other essays. 
In any case, whether forethought or afterthought, general statements, such as 
that I was so fortunately pressed into (fortunately for the direction of my work 
and for its impact) in the "thick description" piece, make sense in anthro­
pology as commentaries on particular inquiries, such as those which compose 
the rest of the book. Detached from them they seem mere promissory notes, 
empty boxes, possible possibilities. The pieces on a disrupted Javanese 
funeral, on Balinese conceptions of time and identity, on shadow plays or 
Indie states, and yes, on cockfighting and the closet melodrama of animalised 
status rivalry, are what give the more general statements, not just in the thick 
description piece, but in "Religion as a Cultural System," "Ideology as a 
Cultural System," or "The Growth of Culture and the Evolution of Mind," 
whatever suggestiveness and plausibility they might have. Despite my initial 
uncertainties, the book is a book, the chapters are chapters, and the whole has 
a certain informing rhythm. (Geertz 2000b: vi) 
As a matter of fact, to elaborate a discourse of multiplicity and non-
causality, Geertz cannot avoid building on some categories and 
generating hierarchies. Even though Geertz tries to disrupt all the 
logical relationships between cause and effect, he is compelled to 
admit that he has a position and the book has a coherence. This final 
acceptance is tautological: "the book is a book, the chapters are 
chapters". This is in harmony with the isotopy founding the more 
general discourse of Geertz's foreword: the justification, in any 
possible way, even resorting to tautology, of a work that would like to 
be free of constraints and essentially based on concrete situation and 
on particular coincidences. 
Even though Geertz's discourse of justification is more evident, 
there is anyway behind it a more powerful discourse denying all 
efforts accomplished by Geertz to affirm non-causality and multi­
plicity: the opposition between the whole and the part, unity and 
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fragmentation, connection and separation. If Malinowski, to give a 
scientific foundation to ethnology, has to fix some criteria upon which 
to build the value of science, Geertz, to affirm a discourse of 
multiplicity and non-causality, has to insist on some features that give 
a solid foundation — exactly what he wanted to conjure up — to his 
discourse. Geertz concludes his foreword by debating himself in the 
web he himself created: on one hand, by stressing the importance of 
dynamic postponement (general research conceived as non terminative 
process) and, on the other hand, by founding the final value of a goal 
(his own research anticipating the "hares" to be chased by future 
ethnologists). One might malignantly suppose that the intention to 
crumble all general and fixed categories is the preliminary act to 
affirm the value of a single researcher: the value of his own specific 
research. 
It is now more than a quarter of a century since it was published. It's 
republication now, after so much has happened, both in the world and in 
anthropology, is perhaps a sign that some of the hares, I started then have 
turned out to be worth chasing. I am, in my case, still chasing them. (Geertz 
2000b: vi) 
By comparing Malinowski's foreword and Geertz's foreword, we can 
say that a question concerning the enunciators consists in the way one 
can lay a discipline with scientific value (Malinowski) and in the way 
one can highlight a specific and incidental performance of a researcher 
(Geertz). Fundamentally, both enunciators resort to stories that frame 
complex argumentations. 
What kind of story tells Malinowski (and the enunciator who 
replaces him in the text)? In his foreword, at least two superposing 
stories are being told: the first one is the tale of the performance of a 
subject endowed with competences (Malinowski in the Trobriand 
Islands) and a discipline possessing a positive knowledge (ethnology); 
the second one is the tale of exchanged message (with relative 
sanction and counter-sanction) between an enunciator and addressee, 
between an enunciator who has to make the first tale believable and 
the addressee who has to confirm the validity of this message. As we 
have seen, both stories, distinguished from the viewpoint of analysis, 
are superposing and referring one another, in the text, in order to build 
the scientific nature of ethnological knowledge. 
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As far as Geertz's foreword is concerned, we can remark that the 
enunciator has recourse to two stories: the first one concerns the 
interaction between Geertz and his editor; the second one, larger and 
including, concerns the reformulation of the logical relationship of 
causality and reaffirmation of coincidence. The paradox is that, for an 
interpretativist as Geertz, he tells in his foreword, following a 
structuralist manner, a tale in which the discursive categories are laid 
by opposite couples. Equally paradoxical, to give value to coincidence 
(logically connected to context and 'being in situation'), the enun­
ciator neglects the question of experience and stresses the importance 
of writing in its multiple forms. Finally, in Geertz's foreword a binary 
discursive epistemology and a style of thought that privileges the non-
terminative and imperfective process are combined. 
As far as I am concerned, the comparison of two forewords is a 
premise to a larger project based not only on similarities and diffe­
rences existing between the textual genres of two great anthro­
pologists (see, for example, Boon 1983 concerning Frazer/Mali-
nowski). My project is also an exploration of the modalities according 
to which, in the ethnologist's work, some questions are interrelated 
and reformulated: the communication-interaction between actants and 
actors, the invention-application of metalanguages and the 
intercultural translation of concepts and processes. The starting 
hypothesis is that the performance of an ethnologist (or an 
anthropologist, the distinction being at this point useless) takes the 
amplitude of a syntagmatic process containing (and developing) the 
paradigmatic modelization of a discipline, of the society to which the 
ethnologist belongs and of the society to which the Others belong 
(Montes 2006b). In this perspective, the narrative intrigue of the 
evenemential and cognitive dimension, besides being, an integral part 
of the effective ethnologist's work, can constitute, read in the light of 
semiotic analysis, a real and true epistemological configuration in 
which the features characterising the ethnologist's belonging (and 
more generally, the native-function) acquire a central meaning 
(Montes 2006a). 
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Просто предисловие? 
Малиновский, Гирц и антрополог как абориген 
Сквозь призму семиотического анализа нарративная интрига работы 
антрополога (т.е. ее событийное и когнитивное измерения) обнажает 
эпистемологическую конфигурацию, заключающуюся в некторых 
центральных проблемах антропологии: общение и взаимовлияние 
антропологов и других участников коммуникации, то, как антропо­
логи изобретают и применяют метаязыки, и последовавшй после 
изобретения метаязыка межкультурный перевод понятий и про­
цессов. Для анализа названной конфигурации я сравниваю два пре­
дисловия: Малиновского и Гирца. В предисловии Малиновского 
имеются две совпадающие истории. Во-первых, история о 
действующем субъекте, только что наделенным профессиональной 
компетенцией (этнолог), и о научной дисциплине, которая обладает 
более современным и позитивистским знанием (функционалистская 
этнология). Во-вторых, мы видим симметричный обмен сообще­
ниями (вместе с прилагающимися санкциями и противосанкциями) 
между высказывающимся (задание которого — заложить основы 
своей научной дисциплины) и адресатом (который должен принять 
решение по поводу обоснованности сообщений). Для сооружения 
основ своей науки высказывающийся имплицитно выдвигает эписте­
мологию, основывающуюся на определенных ценностях («вторже­
ние», «прорыв», «преодоление ограничений»), предпочитая про­
странственную метафору и кумулятивный аспект процесса. 
В предисловии Гирца мы находим две отдельные истории. Во-
первых, история, касающаяся общения между Гирцем и его редакто­
ром, чтобы оправдать герменевтическую позицию исследователя. 
Вторая история гораздо объемнее и охватывает перевертывание 
каузальных отношений во имя оправдания важности случайности. 
Если в предисловии Малиновского названные истории используются 
для нового определения программных принципов (комбинация «трех 
оксюморонов» и «дисконтинуальности»), посредством которых 
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этнология могла бы приобрести научный характер и новые основы, 
то Гирц выделяет в своем предисловии именно «совпадение» и 
«письмо» в их всевозможных формах и комбинирует парадоксаль­
ным образом (для сторонника интерпретативности) бинарную 
дискурсивную эпистемологию с образом мышления, предпочитаю­
щим неконечные и несовершенные процессы. 
Lihtsalt eessõna? Malinowski, 
Geertz ja antropoloog kui pärismaalane 
Semiootilise analüüsi prisma läbi paljastab antropoloogi töö narratiivne 
intriig (st selle sündmuslik ja kognitiivne dimensioon) epistemoloogilise 
konfiguratsiooni mõnede antropoloogia kesksete probleemide ümber: 
antropoloogide ning teiste osapoolte vaheline suhtlus ja vastasmõju, see, 
kuidas antropoloogid leiutavad ja rakendavad metakeeli, ning metakeele 
leiutamisele järgnev mõistete ja protsesside kultuuridevaheline tõlge. 
Nimetatud kompleksi analüüsimiseks võrdlen ma kahte eessõna: ühte 
Malinowskilt ja teist Geertzilt. Malinowski eessõnast leiame kaks kattuvat 
lugu. Esiteks, lugu toimivast subjektist, keda on värskelt õnnistatud 
ametialase kompetentsiga (etnoloog), ning teadusvaldkonnast, mis valdab 
tänapäevasemat ja positiivsemat teadmist (funktsionalistlik etnoloogia). 
Teiseks näeme lausuja (kelle ülesandeks on püstitada oma teadusdistsipliini 
alustalad) ja adressaadi (kes peab otsustama sõnumite kehtivuse üle) 
vahelist sümmeetrilist sõnumitevahetust koos sinnakuuluvate sanktsioonide 
ja vastusanktsioonidega. Oma teaduse alustalade püstitamiseks pakub 
lausuja implitsiitselt välja teatud väärtustel ("sissetungimine", "edasi­
minek", "piirangute ületamine") põhineva epistemoloogia, eelistades 
ruumimetafoori ning protsessi kumulatiivset aspekti. Geertzi eessõnas aga 
leiame kaks eraldiseisvat lugu. Esiteks lugu, mis puudutab suhtlust Geertzi 
ja tema toimetaja vahel (mitte suhtlust pärismaalastega), et õigustada uurija 
hermeneutilist positsiooni. Teine lugu on märksa ulatuslikum ning hõlmab 
põhjuslikkussuhete pea peale pööramist selleks, et kinnitada juhuslikkuse 
tähtsust. Kui Malinowski eessõnas kasutatakse nimetatud lugusid selleks, et 
defineerida uuesti teatud programmilisi põhimõtteid ("ebapidevus" ja 
"kolme oksüümoroni" kombinatsioon), mille kaudu etnoloogia võiks oman­
dada teadusliku iseloomu ja uued põhialused, siis Geertz väärtustab oma 
eessõnas just "kokkusattumuslikkust" ja "kirjutamist" nende kõik­
võimalikes vormides ning kombineerib (tõlgenduslikkuse pooldajale) 
paradoksaalsel moel binaarse diskursiivse epistemoloogia ja mõtteviisi, mis 
väärtustab mittelõplikke ja mittetäielikke protsesse. 
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Abstract. Collecting ethnographic items for the Estonian National Museum 
has been linked to the practice of buying objects during fieldwork. Often we 
can find metaphors or expressions connected with trading in the Komi 
fieldwork diaries. Comparing ethnographers with merchants is a stereotypical 
way of describing the activities of Estonian researchers in the field. If ethno­
graphers use, in their diaries, metaphors and expressions connected to trading, 
it may be just a spontaneous phrasing or inter-textual play of words. Inside the 
community of Estonian ethnologists there exists some kind of discourse style, 
which is followed in the fieldwork diaries, more or less consciously. This style 
of narration is also connected to the specific social and historical context in 
which ethnographers act. At the same time, even satiric inter-textual 
quotations do not exclude the possibility that some of this discourse is related 
to a deeper level of human consciousness. 
In his Argonauts of the Western Pacific, Bronislaw Malinowski argues 
that ethnographers must pay more attention to the context of their 
whole research process: 
Many writers do not exercise the full searchlight of methodical sincerity, as 
they move among their facts but introduce them to us from a position of 
complete obscurity. I consider that only such ethnographic sources are of 
unquestionable scientific value, in which we can clearly draw the line 
between, on the one hand, the results of direct observation and of native 
statements and interpretations, and on the other the inferences of the author. 
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[...] In Ethnography, the writer is his own chronicler and the historian at the 
same time, while his sources are no doubt easily accessible, but also very 
elusive and complex; they are not embodied in fixed, material documents, but 
in the behaviour and in the memory of living men. In Ethnography, the 
distance is often enormous between the basic material of information [...] and 
the final authoritative presentation of the results. [...] A brief outline of an 
Ethnographer's tribulations [...] may throw more light on the question, than 
any long abstract discussion could do. (Malinowski 1987 [1922]: 3-^4) 
Perhaps, the most (in)famous fieldwork diary in the history of anthro­
pology1 is written by Malinowski during his stay on the Trobriand 
Islands (Malinowski 1967). This text caused a sensation as it consists 
of quite sharp opinions about indigenous people that Malinowski 
studied2. Naturally, most researchers feel sometimes tired and have 
been bored by people they live beside, although usually nobody 
recognises this. An anthropologist can modify his or her instinctual 
impulses in a socially acceptable manner by writing everything down 
in a diary, as Malinowski did. 
The possibility to write down everything in our mind, during field 
trips, makes diaries somehow spontaneous'and intimate documents. In 
Estonian ethnology,' there exists an opinion that fieldwork diaries report 
'"unwilling evidence' of history" (Pärdi 1995: 83). But the issue is not 
as straightforward as Pärdi states. In most cases, field travellers are 
professional ethnologists (this is the case with almost all Komi diaries 
of the Estonian National Museum), and thus one should be wary of 
examining the "unwillingness" of the message. Also, the conception of 
"stylistically pure and direct observation", suggested by Pärdi (1995: 
83), should be further discussed. Supposedly, observation by an ethno­
logist tends to be charged with theories, attitudes, or else pre­
suppositions. A researcher can also construct "direct experience" and 
thus expose the most illuminating aspects of his or her personality'. 
We use the terms 'anthropologist', 'ethnologist' and 'ethnographer' as syno­
nyms in this article. 
2 For example: "The boys and girls behaved in a silly or perhaps hostile 
manner" (Malinowski 1967: 71); "I was irritated by the niggers" (Malinowski 
1967: 208); "I felt so low that even the company of those fellows was pleasant" 
(Malinowski 1967:209). 
3 As it appears, Malinowski was also aware that his diary may somehow 
become accessible for extended audience: "I had some essential thoughts about 
keeping diary and adding depth to my life. [...] Ideas about the historical value of 
the diary" (Malinowski 1967: 170). 
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Clifford Geertz (1997 [1988]: 2) notices that anthropological texts 
seem to be based clearly on facts and are literary unpretentious. But 
somehow we can compare ethnographic writings with poems and 
novels, as we may find there complicated imagery, metaphors and 
phraseology. 
The ability of anthropologists to get us to take what they say seriously has less 
to do with either a factual look or an air of conceptual elegance than it has 
with their capacity to convince us that what they say is a result of their having 
actually penetrated (or, if you prefer, been penetrated by) another form of life, 
of having, one way or another, truly "been there". (Geertz 1997 [1988]: 4-5)4 
In the diaries, stored in the archives of Estonian National Museum 
(ENM), we can find more personal notes and thoughts than from the 
papers that are written purely for research purposes. At the same time, 
we must take into consideration that, although the fieldwork diaries 
have not been written for publication, the authors of these texts (who 
have been mainly professional ethnologists) were aware that their 
diaries would be publicly accessible. We cannot be sure to what extent 
one or another discourse in these texts was influenced by the factor of 
the potential use of diaries by other researchers. 
The authors of this article have put themselves into a quite compli­
cated reflective situation. From July to August 2006, we were a part of 
a research group doing fieldwork in the Komi Republic, among the 
Vylysezhvasajas ('the Komis of Upper Vychegda River' in Komi). 
Naturally, we wrote fieldwork diaries. But we had carried out research 
about the ENM's Komi diaries even earlier (see Leete 1998a; Koosa 
2006). Thus, when writing our last year's fieldwork diaries, we were 
aware (and Art Leete has also recognised the issue during his earlier 
fieldwork trips) of the content of our colleagues' field-notes and this 
influenced us during our field research. But, at the same time, some 
spontaneous ideas have been left out of our notes because our 
colleagues' texts have been known to us and we consciously did not 
want to elaborate the same kind of discourse5. 
About the construction of ethnographic and anthropological knowledge, see, 
for example, Atkinson 1994: 110; Biolsi, Zimmerman 1997: 7. 
Art Leete: Sometimes I have used hidden inter-textual quotations from 
previous Komi diaries in my field-notes. By doing so, I have had mixed feelings. 
It's because I felt myself too obviously on a power position. I had a possibility to 
put former researchers' texts into any context I wished. At the same time, I was 
390 Piret Koosa, Art Leete 
Komi expeditions and diaries at the ENM 
The Komis inhabit the north-eastern corner of the European part of 
Russia, westwards of the Ural Mountains. The Komi language belongs 
to the Permian branch of the Finno-Ugric language family. According 
to the last official census in 2002, there were 296 000 Komis and 
125000 Komi-Permyaks living in the Russian Federation6. 
Traditionally, the Komis are divided into eight ethnographic groups by 
scholars. 
The fieldwork trips to the Komis have been organised by the ENM 
in 1967 (among the Komi-Permyaks), 1969 (among the Izhma Komis, 
izvatas, and the Sysola Komis, syktylsajas), 1976 (among the 
syktylsajas and Luza Komis, luzsajas), 1981 (among the Izhma 
Komis), 1989, 1996 (among the Upper-Ezhva, or Upper-Vychegda 
Komis, vylysezhvasajas), in 1997 (among the Lower-Ezhva, or Lower 
Vychegda Komis, ezhvatas), 1998 (among the: Udora Komis, 
udorasajas), 1999 (among the Pechora Komis, pechorasa)1 and 2000 
(among the Yemva Komis, yemvatas). From 2001 to 2006, the 
fieldwork has been done among the vylysezhvasajas and organised by 
the Department of Ethnology of the University of Tartu. Most of these 
fieldwork trips were conducted in cooperation v/ith the National 
Museum of the Komi Republic (NMKR). From the mid-1990s, the 
NMKR has been represented in our team by Vladimir Lipin. 
sure that only few people (if anybody at all) would read these diaries and it was 
also unclear, if anybody could understand these hidden connections. Also, in later 
diaries I started to avoid metaphors, used by former ethnographers, because I did 
not want to create any intertextuality too consciously. 
Piret Koosa: I have not used quotations or metaphors from previous Komi 
field-notes in my diary intentionally (in fact, I attempted to avoid this). But I had 
read over all previous Komi diaries at the archives of ENM and I had nc previous 
experience in writing a fieldwork diary by myself. So it may be possible that 
stylistic and thematic influences of earlier texts (although not so conscious ones) 
can be found in my diary. My diary also consists of some hints to events of earlier 
fieldwork. But these hints may stay unnoticed by readers who are not familiar 
with these texts. And for sure, I was aware that my diary would be read by my 
fieldwork mates and, possibly, by a wider range of researchers. So I censored my 
notes essentially in some parts of the texts. It means, perhaps, that one cannot find 
too sincere emotions in my diary. 
6 See www.perepis2002.ru. 
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The topographical archives of the ENM contain 18 Komi field-
work diaries . These diaries are quite different in their character. 
Every author has his/her own, recognisable style. Earlier expeditions 
were dedicated basically to the collection of ethnographic items and so 
these diaries reflect mainly collection work. In this sense, diaries 
written by Art Leete, Janno Simm, Jaanika Jaanits, Piret Koosa and 
Kristi Tinkus do not deal with this topic to the same extent as the 
previous fieldwork notes, as during their fieldwork the collection work 
had lost its previous importance. This tendency is in accordance with 
the general change in Estonian ethnographers' fieldwork practices 
since the 1990s. Less attention is paid to the collection of items and 
researchers work more on participant observation and recording visual 
and textual materials (see Leete 1998b). 
The diary of the 1989 expedition differs from the others because it 
is a result of a collective effort. Every day is described by a different 
fieldwork team member, as was the quite normal practice during the 
ENM's expeditions from the 1970s to the 1980s. We can guess that 
the awareness about the fact that all fieldwork participants could read 
each other's notes immediately, influenced the authors to apply self-
censorship to some extent. At the same time, this situation could 
encourage some persons to attempt to use a more attractive style and 
we can also find some linkages between different parts of the diary 
text. For example: 
I documented data about the collected items into the collection entry book. 
[...] The diligent student Eve started to fix numbers on these items. (TAp 
858: 25, Alop 1989) 
On our way back to the bus / was entrusted with a specific Komi manure fork, 
which I then tried to use to the full. Unfortunately, an eager museum worker, 
Terje could not evaluate the use of the dung fork as a walking stick. (TAp 858: 
37-38, Randoja 1989) 
These diaries are written by Kalju Konsin (TAp 576 — 1969, 7 pp), Aleksei 
Peterson (TAp 679 — 1976, 82 pp), Edgar Saar (TAp 760 — 1931), Heiki Pärdi, 
Terje Alop, Aldo Luud, Anneli Säre and Eve Randoja (TAp 858 — 1989, 48 pp); 
Art Leete (TAp 909 — 1996, 25 pp; TAp 905 — 1997, 51 pp; TAp 915 — 1998, 
34 pp; TAp 919 — 1999, 8 pp; TAp 924 — 2000, 10 pp; TAp 929 2001, 14 
pp; TAp 933 — 2002, 14 pp; TAp 939 — 2004, 14 pp; TAp 941 — 2005, 17 pp) 
and Janno Simm (TAp 918 — 1998, 10 pp). Art Leete's diary from 2003 and 
diaries by Jaanika Jaanits, Piret Koosa, Kristi Tinkus and Art Leete from 2006 are 
not registered in the archive yet. 
Here and later, bold by the authors of this article. 
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Discourses related to the metaphors of trading 
in the ENM's Komi fieldwork diaries 
Collecting of ethnographic items for the ENM has been linked to the 
practice of buying objects during fieldwork9. So it is not surprising 
that often we can find metaphors or phrases connected to trading in 
the Komi fieldwork diaries. 
In general, Kalju Konsin's diary is textually minimised, even 
further than suggested by Heiki Pärdi, to the form of "[...] boringly 
formal and dull accounts of 'what I ate this morning, how many 
households I visited, what kind of things I collected / did not collect, 
and what the weather was like'" (Pärdi 1995: 82). The laconic notes of 
Konsin can be interpreted as fulfilling a boring obligation to transfer 
something to the ENM's archives. But, anyway, the hint of trading in 
the Soviet style (an attempt to obtain objects that belong to the list of 
deficit goods) can be found even in this shqrt text: 
Aug., 12,h. — A ride by bus to Mezhadov village at Syssolski district in the 
southern part of Komi ASSR with A.M. Rubtsov, head çf department of 
Syktyvkar Museum of Regional Studies10 Photographing buildings. Inquiry 
about clothes and buildings. Search for the possibility to obtain the exhibits. 
(TAp 576: 3, Konsin 1969) 
In his diary, Peterson often describes the collecting of objects by 
metaphors of trading. Peterson's expressions are closer to a descrip­
tion of business in the capitalist style: 
In one household there is a whole chest full of all kinds of socks and stockings, 
and the Syktyvkar women bought a lot. We have spent a lot. I had 150 roubles 
with me, in 2 days 50 roubles is gone. Soon we will be bankrupt. (TAp 679: 
14-15, Peterson 1976) 
9 Analysis of the Komi diaries of the ENM reveals different kinds of meta-
phoric discourse. In this paper, we concentrated only on one possible approach. 
Beside the metaphoric discourses of object collecting, we can find information 
about different aspects of fieldwork in the Komi diaries: the organisation of a field 
trip, problems that occur while being in the "field", process of collecting work, 
local people's understanding of ethnologists' work and the way ethnologists have 
described their personal emotions in diaries, conditions of local everyday life, 
ethnologists' living conditions, their opinions about the work of local researchers 
and museums, contacts with the official institutions and the representations of 
local people's character. 
10 Nowadays NMKR. 
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What can we get here? Mostly stockings and mittens. First of all women's 
stockings with beautiful patterns - just give 20 roubles, and the pair is yours! 
Too expensive, actually the work is worth it, all they ask is the same price 
(even 25 roubles per pair, and 5 roubles per mittens), as if they had agreed 
about iL You can buy or not if you do not want to. Bargaining would not 
help much. Also, there are shirts and sarafans available. The lower parts of 
the shirts have been removed, and the tops are sold for 3-5 roubles. So are 
the belts, not valuable. And this is all for textiles, represented by things. There 
are very few towels and other items. Towels tend to be new and bought, and 
sometimes embroidery is on the bought cloth. There are lots of wooden things, 
and often you can get them for free. (TAp 679: 23-25, Peterson 1976) 
We called into some houses, and got some objects. First of all, both Nadyas" 
trade in textiles. (TAp 679: 36, Peterson 1976) 
Now, we set out to a longer trip about 15 km from the schoolhouse along the 
asphalt. Some old crone takes us there, saying that there is all kinds of bric-a-
brac available. (TAp 679: 37, Peterson 1976) 
At first we were not lucky, but then all kinds of things were laid out. As we 
did not have any money, we could not do any shopping. We were net struck 
by anything worth buying. All textile goods were already known to us. (TAp 
679: 46, Peterson 1976) 
Here we get a number of things for free. (TAp 679:- 50, Peterson 1976) 
In two hours we are in the city and unload the cargo. (TAp 679: 77, Peterson 
1976) 
Edgar Saar's expressions are more modest than Peterson's ones. Saar 
uses, like Konsin, descriptions that connect collecting to usual practi­
ces of obtaining deficit goods during the Soviet period. 
As I have obtained relatively few objects for the museum this year, I'll pay the 
main attention to obtaining objects. I got for the museum one more bag for 
handicraft, ladle, wooden platter, three rings and breast ornament, made by 
beads. (TAp 760: 45, Saar 1981) 
For the museum, I was able to obtain the Komi woman 's cootume: a sarafan, 
apron, cloth cap and a jacket. Ï was also offered a child's maalitsa'2, but as 
its fur was coming off, / did not buy it. (TAp 760: 45-46, Saar 1981) 
In Peterson's diary, Nadya I is Nadezhda Mityusheva from the Komi State's 
Research Museum of Regional Studies (KSRMRS) (present National Museum of 
Komi Republic). Nadya II is Nadezhda Titova from KSRMRS, who also 
participated in the expedition. 
Maalitsa — a shirt-like coat of reindeer hide with the fur inside in the style of 
Nenets, Komi, Khanty, Mansi and the other Arctic peoples. 
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During the expedition of 1989, a self-ironic and reflexive statement 
about field collection work was made: 
As real travel sellers or peddlers, we have obtained quickly the Komi names of 
the main articles of trade as вонь — belt, дором — women's shirt, сера 
чувки — ornamented stockings, myec — birch bark vessel, пестерь — back-
basket (made from birch bark) and some others, quite similar ones. (TAp 858: 
31-32, Pärdi 1989) 
Expressions connected with trading can also be found in Art Leete's 
and Janno Simm's diaries: 
There is a lot of all kinds of stuff, of course. [...] Today as well 1 got for the 
ENM this and that. (TAp 905: 22, Leete 1997) 
I paid for the stockings 100 roubles and for the mittens 30. I must moan just 
as the ethnographers of previous decades — items are costly, although 
actually the work is worth it. (TAp 915: 5, Leete 1998) 
With the help of the locals we captured a lady, more than 90 years old. From 
her we buy several objects. [...] As we must carry all the obtained stuff on 
our backs, we can 7 stock weighty items. (TAp 918. 6, Simm 1998) 
Another woman scuttled here and traded me a sarapan13 & stockings. I have 
already bought five items. Lady did not tell me the price but I had no 
choice— the smallest banknote was 50 roubles. VovaN had escaped with the 
10 rouble banknotes. (TAp 924: 4, Leete 2000) 
A metaphorical connection between the expeditions of collecting 
ethnographic items and trading trips appears in several fieldwork 
diaries of the ENM. Discourse of trading can be found, for example, 
in the diary of Gustav Ränk's15 fieldwork among the Karelians as 
early as in 1929 (Ränk complains about quick bankruptcy — TAp 
610: 26, 52; see also Nõmmela 2006: 59). At the same time, clear 
inter-textual connections are not usually observable, although the 
expressions look quite similar in different diaries. But the discourse of 
trading is represented in all earlier Komi diaries in the ENM. 
13 Sarapan - 'sarafan' in Komi. 
14 Vladimir Lipin from NMKR. 
15 Gustav Ränk (1902-1998), one of the founders of Estonian ethnology, the 
first Professor of Ethnography at the University of Tartu. 
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Discussion 
Let us compare the self-reflections of Estonian field ethnographers 
with the metaphoric self-image of Estonian folklorists. Ülo Valk, 
Professor of Folklore at the University of Tartu, analyses the way 
Estonian folklorists described their work at the end of the 19th and in 
the beginning of the 20th centuries: 
These are metaphors, similes and expressions that were drawn from the 
collective textual pool of the Estonian intellectuals, most of whom had their 
roots in the peasants' culture. [...] These ideas are connected with economic 
and cultural developments in Estonian village, with the growing number of 
farmers who had become masters through purchasing land from their Baltic-
German landlords. (Valk 2004: 266) 
Valk also writes: 
Explaining and building up the value of something as Vague as oral heritage 
was not simple in the earth-bound Estonian society, and it was easier to 
introduce new ideas by using the vocabulary of progressive farming, 
comprehensible for most people. (Valk 2004: 267) 
A question appears: why do Estonian ethnologists continually use 
metaphors related to trade16 and Estonian folklorists reflect their work 
metaphorically as agricultural? Perhaps, one part of the answer is 
related to the issue that collecting (and often buying) ethnographic 
items is, by itself, more close to trade than recording folk narratives, 
songs etc. During the ethnographers "trading" procedures objects will 
be given over to a new owner (an ethnographer representing the 
ENM). But folklore texts remain in the heads of the people even after 
the narratives or songs have been recorded for folklore archives. So 
we can apply the metaphors of agriculture more easily in the case of 
folklorists' fieldwork. One can "harvest" the same folklore "field" 
several times. The image of an ethnographer as "a peddler" may be 
also important in the case of Komi fieldwork. An ethnographer — a 
In fact, the other popular images that can be found in their diaries of Estonian 
ethnologists are connected to hunting, fishing, gathering, robbery and war. But the 
analysis of these expressions is more closely connected to the specific vocabulary 
of the Estonian language and it is too difficult to attempt to write about these 
metaphors in English. 
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travel seller — moves from one remote village to another and makes 
some "trade" with local inhabitants.17 In the case of Komi field trips it 
is hard to see the relationship with settled work that benefits the 
prosperity of fields of Estonian national culture (as it was an issue 
with Estonian folklorists a hundred years ago). 
At the same time, we must take into consideration that Estonian 
folklorists presented their self-image as metaphoric peasants in public 
texts but the trader's image of Estonian ethnologists can be revealed 
from fieldwork diaries, meant to be stored in the ENM's archives. 
These diaries were not supposed to be public (although, in principle, 
everybody can read these texts in the ENM's archive and there is 
always a possibility that some of those texts will be published). 
Anyway, it means that the image of Estonian ethnologists "as 
peddlers" is much more hidden from the public than the peasant's 
image of folklorists. Obviously, in public texts no ethnologist will 
represent him- or herself as a trader. It does not look solid enough. In 
fact, Peterson has presented the Estonian ethnographer's work to the 
public audience also through the metaphors of agriculture. For 
example, his book about the history of the ENM was titled "The 
Storehouse of Treasures" (Peterson 1986). 
Konsin and Saar stay basically apart from the other Komi field 
researchers' shared discourse's style, related to trading metaphors (see 
Fig. 1). They both use sporadically the term "obtain" {hankima in 
Estonian) that is connected with the everyday jargon of the Soviet 
period, when ordinary people were forced to carry out a hard job in 
"obtaining" goods that were not available in stores. From the others, 
only Simm uses a similar expression. 
17 Geertz, for example, reminds that if an anthropologist went off to remote non-
Western societies, "there was no one else around, [...] or if there was — a 
missionary, a trader, a district officer, Paul Gauguin — he or she was mentally 
pushed aside" (Geertz 2001: 92). In our case, we can interpret the situation in a 
way that sometimes an ethnographer may take over the position of a trader, whom 
he or she has mentally dismissed. 














Cargo, Articles of Trade 
(ethnographic objects) 
Obtaining (getting 
ethnographic objects as 
deficit goods) 
Actually the Work is 
Worth it 
(ethnographic objects 





Bankruptcy (ethnographer is out 
of money and can't buy 
ethnographic objects any more) 
Figure 1. Relationship between the use of trading metaphors and expressions in 
ENM's Komi diaries (and Gustav Rank's Karelian diary). 
Although Ränk makes his field-note about bankruptcy already in 
1929,14 we can consider Peterson to be the real initiator of trading 
discourse in the ENM's fieldwork diaries (the Komis, perhaps, are just 
!" It may be possible that the trading metaphors and expressions can be found in 
many early fieldwork diaries of the ENM. ENM's archives consist of more than 
900 fieldwork diaries and we are not familiar with all the material. 
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one example19). Peterson starts to designate ethnographic objects as 
"cargo", "stuff' and "bric-a-brac" {kaup, trään, kraam in Estonian). 
Pärdi, Leete and Simm follow Peterson's style (Pärdi adds the term 
nõudluskaubaartiklid — "articles of trade" in Estonian). Describing 
the process of getting ethnographic objects, Peterson writes about 
"bargaining", "trading" or "doing business" (kauplemine in Estonian). 
Pärdi compares ethnographer to a peddler (harjusk in Estonian) that is 
clearly connected with trading paradigm. Leete uses expressions like 
Peterson (adding ärima — "to do business", "to trade" in Estonian). 
Simm describes the accumulation of objects by the expression "to 
stock". This style has parallels in early Estonian museology20. Simm 
makes his statement independently from former researchers. The 
connection is intuitive, although not less interesting. 
Leete uses trading metaphors and expressions as a parody 
regarding Peterson's way of describing fieldwork situations. It is 
especially clear in the case when Leete repeats Peterson's remark that 
"actually the work is worth it" (both complaining about the price 
which the Komis ask for ethnographic items). Simm (who was on 
fieldwork with Leete), perhaps, heard these expressions from Leete 
and used a few of those in his diary, as well. Pärdi was definitely 
aware of Peterson's attitudes towards collecting work and the style of 
writing. But Pärdi's expressions do not actually repeat Petersen's 
ones. So we assume that Pärdi follows the general way of how 
Peterson treats the collecting process but does not make any conscious 
inter-textual quotations. Later, the Komi fieldwork trips were not 
connected to collecting ethnographic objects anymore and thus fhe 
trading metaphors and expressions disappear from the diaries. 
By drawing more or less conscious allusions between the Komi 
fieldwork diaries, later researchers attempt to distance themselves 
from Peterson's aggressive and extensive collecting tactics. These 
(quasi-)quotations have been made in humorous way. Later re­
19 For example, Peterson uses expressions such as "stuff', "trading" and "ma­
king business" also in his Udmurt fieldwork diaries (see Peterson 2006: 25, 36, 
68, 69). 
20 F. Linnus described the ENM's collections as "unorganized stock of old 
things" (Leinbock 1930: 45). A. M. Tallgren wrote about the threat that EMM 
would remain just "a reserve stockhouse of old treasures" (vanavara tagavaraladu 
in Estonian) or "an unorganized stock of curiosities and devices" (Tallgren 1921a: 
5; 1921b: 2). 
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searchers try to point at the grotesque that can be observed in 
Peterson's working and writing style. Just imagine: communist Peter­
son acts and expresses himself according to the paradigm of capitalist 
economic discourse. He trades with the Komis as a peddler and 
complains about the possible bankruptcy. And Soviet citizens meet 
only modest moral standards concerning trade: they are not willing to 
give much away without getting paid. Can we observe some silent 
irony towards the Soviet regime if we see that capitalist attitudes are 
very much alive among the Komi population? Or was the practice of 
collecting items, in fact, an attempt to "obtain deficit goods" in the 
Soviet style and just decorated by capitalist-style discourse in 
fieldwork narratives? 
As it appears, the ENM's Komi fieldwork diaries' texts include 
several discourses related to the metaphoric concept of trading. 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980 and 1999) interpret the every­
day level of thinking as largely metaphoric: 
The concepts that govern our thought are not just matters of the intellect. They 
also govern our everyday functioning, down to the most mundane details. Our 
concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around' in the world, and 
how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role 
in defining our everyday realities. If we are right in suggesting that our 
conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think, what we 
experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor. 
(Lakoff, Johnson 1980: 3) 
And: 
They [metaphors] cut to the deepest questions of what we as human beings are 
and how we understand our everyday world. (Lakoff, Johnson 1999: 118) 
We are not sure that the analysis of the ENM's Komi fieldwork diaries 
confirms this view adequately. Even if ethnographers use in thçir diaries 
metaphors and expressions connected to trading, it does not necessarily 
reflect any deeper layers of thinking. It may be just a spontaneous 
phrasing or inter-textual play of words. Inside the community of Esto­
nian ethnologists circulates some kind of discursive style that is 
followed in the fieldwork diaries more or less consciously. This style of 
narrating is also connected to the specific social and historical context in 
which the ethnographers act. At the same time, even satiric inter-textual 
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quotations do not exclude the possibility that some discourses are 
related to 'deeper' level of human consciousness.21 
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Этнограф как торговец: о метафорах в дневниках 
полевых работ в Коми 
Собирание материалов для Музея эстонского народа всегда было 
связано с покупкой предметов в ходе полевых работ. В дневниках 
полевых работ мы часто находим связанные с торговлей метафоры и 
выражения. Сравнение этнографов с торговцами является стереотип­
ным образом в описаниях полевых работ эстонских ученых, причем 
можно отметить определенную модель дискурса, которой более или 
менее сознательно следуют авторы. Разумеется этот стиль рассказы­
вания связан со специфическим социальным и историческим кон­
текстом деятельности этнографов. В то же время, учитывая обнару­
женные сатирические интертекстуальные аллюзии, нельзя исклю­
чать и возможность того, что некотрые дискурсы связаны с более 
глубокими уровнями человеческого сознания. 
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Etnograaf kui kaupmees: metafooridest 
komi välitööpäevikutes 
Etnograafiliste materjalide kogumine Eesti Rahva Muuseumi jaoks on 
ajalooliselt olnud seotud esemete kokkuostmisega välitööde käigus. Komi 
välitööpäevikutest leiab tihti kauplemisega seotud metafoore ja väljen­
deid. Etnograafide võrdlemine kaupmeestega on stereotüüpne kujund 
eesti teadlaste välitööde kirjeldustes. Kui etnograafid kasutavad oma 
märkmikes metafoore või väljendeid, mis on seotud kauplemisega, siis 
võib see olla kas spontaanne sõnavalik või intertekstuaalne sõnamäng. 
Eesti etnoloogide välitööde päevikutes võib täheldada teatud diskursuse-
tüüpi, mida vähem või rohkem teadlikult järgitakse. See jutustamisstiil on 
loomulikult seotud etnograafide tegevuse spetsiifilise sotsiaalse ja ajaloo­
lise kontekstiga. Samal ajal ei saa lausa satiiriliste intertekstuaalsete 
viidete tõttu välistada ka võimalust et nii mõnigi diskursus on seotud 
sügavamate inimteadvuse tasanditega. 
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Abstract. Semiotic square and the interpretation of myths. Greimas' 
semiotic square is built upon the hypothesis that thé concept of elementary 
structure of signification is operational only if subjected to a logical 
interpretation and formulation. However, Greimas' commentaries on that 
model are questionable. On ihe one hand, he. asserts that logical nature of the 
connection between any two terms, Sj and s2, is undetermined; on the other 
hand, he provides the relations - non st, s2 - non s2, $i - non s2 and s2 -
non Si with a logical status. Now, since these two statements are inconsistent, 
a choice must be made: either these four relations have a logical significance, 
and then the semiotic square is a logical square, so that Sj - s2 has to be 
interpreted as an incompatibility relation; or s, - s2 has no logical meaning, 
and then not only the status of the other relations given in the model is not 
logical either, but also the simple fact of applying negation to the terms $i and 
s2 is meaningless. 
That dilemma follows from an argument, that Greimas has laid down as a 
principle, under which linguistic communication depends on the existence of a 
deep level (or immanent level) of the significance, that is supposed to precede 
its manifestation in speech. If, conversely, we assume that significance is 
produced at discursive level, and that consequently the patterning >of linguistic 
codes relies on what could be called a semantic sedimentation process, which 
comes out from linguistic activity, there is no more dilemma. 
Such a thesis, which implies that the elementary structure of signification 
must be seen as the schematization by the describer of speakers' mental 
activity, leads to a point of view inversion. Nevertheless, the two conditions 
which, according to Greimas, are required for catching the meaning are still 
relevant, except that, contrary to Greimas' opinion, they now apply at the 
speech level; two discursive units can be opposed if they simultaneously 
include a common feature which join them, and a distinguishing feature which 
disjoin them. 
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In order to illustrate that point, an analysis of two short amerindian myths, 
which Lévi-Strauss has already investigated, will be undertaken, and finally 
specific problems related to the interpretation of that kind of narratives will be 
outlined. 
J'ai rencontré la pensée de Algirdas Julien Greimas lorsque j'ai entrepris 
d'analyser des mythes d'origine de la riziculture que j'avais recueillis au 
Laos (Pottier 1994), ce qui m'a amené, non seulement à réfléchir sur la 
signification anthropologique des thèses de cet auteur, mais aussi à 
réinterpréter, ou à reformuler, certaines d'entre elles. C'est de ces con­
sidérations que je voudrais vous faire part aujourd'hui. 
Au point de départ de la démarche de Greimas, il y a une réflexion, 
de portée extrêmement générale, sur la notion même de signification. 
Dès les premières pages de son ouvrage intitulé Sémantique structu­
rale (1986; lere édition en 1970), qui est généralement considéré 
comme le texte fondateur de ce qu'on a appelé "l'école de sémiotique 
de Paris", Greimas s'interroge sur les conditions minimales de la 
saisie du sens. Fidèle à Г enseignement de Saussure, la réponse qu'il 
propose est que "la signification présuppose l'existence de la relation" 
(Greimas 1986: 19), mais il précise immédiatement (et c'est sur ce 
point qu'il commence à innover) que la relation possède une "double 
nature : elle est à la fois conjonction et disjonction" (Greimas 1986: 
20). Il en résulte que, pour saisir la relation entre deux termes, deux 
conditions doivent, selon Greimas, être réunies: 
1 ) Conformément au principe saussurien selon lequel la langue est 
faite d'oppositions, ces deux termes doivent posséder un trait 
distinctif qui les disjoint. 
2) Ils doivent aussi posséder un élément commun qui les conjoint, 
car épistémologiquement, deux objets ne peuvent être comparés 
que s'ils partagent au moins un trait identique, ce qui, linguisti-
quement, revient à dire que deux termes ne sont opposables que 
s'ils appartiennent au même axe sémiotique. 
Greimas a cherché par la suite à élaborer le modèle de la "structure 
élémentaire de signification" qui rend compte de l'articulation des 
"structures profondes et abstraites", et qui permet de "représenter les 
faits sémiotiques antérieurement à la manifestation" (Greimas, Cour-
tés 1993: 363). La construction de ce modèle, que Greimas a appelé 
"le carré sémiotique" repose sur le principe que les faits sémiotiques 
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sont, au moins partiellement, interprétables en termes logiques, et 
c'est ce principe, que je voudrais maintenant soumettre à discussion, 
car il n'est pas dépourvu de conséquences quant à la manière 
d'aborder l'analyse des récits. 
Selon Greimas, 
le concept de structure élémentaire ne peut devenir opératoire que si celle-ci 
est soumise à une interprétation et à une formulation logiques. C'est la typo­
logie des relations élémentaires (contradiction, contrariété, complémentarité) 
qui ouvre la voie à de nouvelles générations de termes interdéfinis, et qui 
permet de donner une représentation de la structure élémentaire sous forme de 
carré sémiotique. (Greimas, Courtés 1993: 362) 
Sur la base de ces principes, Greimas considère deux termes objets 
quelconques Si et s2 à partir desquels il engendre, par application de la 
négation, les deux termes contradictoires non Si et non s2. A des fins 
didactiques, il construit ensuite un schéma sur lequel il dispose en 
carré les quatre termes obtenus, et où il fait figurer les relations qu'ils 
entretiennent entre eux. Plutôt que d'avoir recours à cet artifice visuel, 
je raisonnerai, pour résumer le commentaire que fait Greimas de ces 
relations, sur l'opposition nature vs culture, que notre auteur considère 
comme un universel sémantique (à tort, du reste, ainsi qu'il ressort des 
travaux de Philippe Descola — cf. ,2006). 
— La relation st vs non S] est appelée par Greimas "relation de 
contradiction". Il la définit "par l'impossibilité qu'ont deux termes 
d'être présents ensemble" (Greimas, Courtés 1993: 30). Dans notre 
exemple, cela signifie qu'un objet ne peut pas être à la fois naturel 
et non naturel. Du point de vue d'une logique de classes, poser 
l'existence de la classe non $i revient à affirmer que la classe Si ne 
se confond pas avec l'univers du discours (tous les objets de cet 
univers ne sont pas naturels, sinon la notion même de nature 
perdrait toute signification) : comme toute classe logique, S\ a 
nécessairement un complément non Sj. Du point de vue d'une 
logique de propositions, la relation - non Sj est une relation 
d'alternative (tout objet de l'univers du discours considéré est 
nécessairement soit naturel, soit non naturel). 
— Il va de soi que le même raisonnement s'applique à la relation s2 vs 
non s2. Greimas appelle dès lors "relations de complémentarité " 
les relations S] — non s2 et s2 - non sj. Du point de vue d'une 
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logique de classes, ce sont des relations d'inclusion, et du point de 
vue d'une logique de propositions, ce sont des relations d'implica­
tion. Si l'on poursuit l'exemple précédent, cela signifie que la 
classe des objets naturels (sj) est incluse dans la classe des objets 
non culturels (non s2), comme celle des objets culturels (s2) est 
incluse dans celle des objets non naturels (non Si), ce qui revient à 
dire, dans les termes de la logique des propositions, que l'existence 
d'objets naturels implique l'existence d'objets non culturels (ou 
encore que l'existence d'objets naturels implique que tous les 
objets de l'univers du discours considéré ne sont pas culturels), et 
que de même l'existence d'objets culturels implique celle d'objets 
non naturels. 
— Enfin, Greimas appelle "relation de contrariété" la relation entre 
les deux termes-objets initialement considérés S) et s2. Il explique 
que la nature logique d'une telle relation reste indéterminée parce 
que ces deux termes "sont susceptibles d'être présents de manière 
concomitante" (Greimas, Courtés 1993: 31). 
C'est à ce point précis qii'on voit apparaître dans l'argumentation de 
notre auteur une difficulté, qui tient essentiellement à l'articulation 
entre structures logiques et structures sémiotiques. Tout en indiquant 
qu'il "peut être utilement comparé à l'hexagone de R. Blanché, aux 
groupes de Klein et de Piaget", Greimas souligne que le carré 
sémiotique relève "de la problématique épistémologique portant sur 
les conditions de l'existence et de la production de la signification", de 
sorte qu' il "se distingue [...] des constructions logiques, ou mathé­
matiques, indépendantes, en tant que formulation de syntaxe pure" et 
que, par conséquent, "toute identification hâtive des modèles sémio­
tiques et logico-mathématiques ne peut être [...] que dangereuse" 
(Greimas, Courtés 1993: 32). 
Greimas affirme donc clairement, dans ce passage, que les 
structures sémiotiques 'ne sont pas assimilables à des structures 
logiques, ce qui paraît quelque peu contradictoire avec le principe, qui 
lui a servi de point de départ, selon lequel la structure élémentaire de 
la signification ne peut devenir "opératoire" qu'à condition d'avoir été 
soumise "à une formulation logique". C. Calame a, dès lors, beau jeu 
d'objecter qu'en réalité, le carré sémiotique est construit sur le modèle 
du carré logique (Calame 1977: 325). Essayons de développer ce 
point. On a montré depuis longtemps que les connecteurs logiques 
Semiotic square and the interpretation of myths 407 
peuvent être regroupés en quaternes, selon une structure qui possède 
des propriétés remarquables. Selon Robert Blanché, celle-ci "apparaît 
lorsqu'un terme comporte deux sortes de négations, une forte 
(postposée) et une faible (préposée), qui, en se composant, donne un 
quatrième terme" (Blanché 1968: 55). Pour ceux qui ne seraient pas 
familiarisés avec le vocabulaire de la logique, précisons que la 
négation forte porte sur le connecteur alors que la négation faible porte 
sur les termes de la relation. "Dans une telle structure", poursuit R. 
Blanché, "chaque terme est relié à chacun des trois autres par une 
relation d'implication (subalternes), d'alternative (contradictoires) et 
d'incompatibilité (contraires) ou de disjonction (subcontraires)" 
(Blanché 1968: 55). 
Il est effectivement aisé de vérifier que si l'on assimile, comme le 
fait Greimas, les relations Sj - non s2 et s2 - non Si à des relations 
d'implication, il en découle nécessairement que la relation Si - s2 est 
une relation d'incompatibilité (celle-ci équivalant, en logique des 
propositions à la négation de> la conjonction, et correspondant en 
logique de classes au complément de l'intersection), car les pro­
positions "$i implique non s2", "s2 implique non Si" et."sj incompa­
tible avec s2" sont logiquement équivalentes. Pour faire saisir 
intuitivement ce point, revenons à notre exemple : il revient exacte­
ment au même de dire que l'existence d'objets naturels implique celle 
d'objets non culturels, ou bien que l'existence d'objets naturels 
implique celle d'objets non culturels, ou encore qu'un objet ne.peut 
pas être à la fois naturel et culturel. Réciproquement, si l'on pose que 
$i est incompatible avec s2, toutes les autres relations figurées dans le 
modèle du carré sémiotique s'en déduisent immédiatement. Il devient 
même possible de compléter le schéma en précisant que la relation 
non sj - non s2 est une relation de disjonction. Les nombreuses 
applications auxquelles procède Greimas (par exemple dans ses Essais 
sémiotiques) de la notion de carré sémiotique à, notamment, des 
catégories modales confirment du reste cette conclusion : qu'il 
s'agisse de catégories déontiques ou épistémiques, ses- analyses 
recoupent très exactement les travaux des logiciens qui démontrent la 
possibilité de disposer les opérateurs modaux selon la formule du 
carré logique (cf. Greimas 1983: 67-133 et Blanché 1968: 83-88). 
Dès lors, de deux choses l'une : ou bien Sj - s2 est une relation 
d'incompatibilité, et alors toutes les autres relations décrites par 
Greimas en découlent, mais celui-ci a tort d'affirmer que la nature de 
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cette relation n'est pas logiquement déterminée ; ou bien il a raison de 
maintenir une telle affirmation, mais alors il en résulte que les autres 
relations figurées par le carré sémiotique ne sont pas non plus 
logiquement interprétables et c'est le modèle lui-même qui doit être 
rejeté ! 
L'histoire des rapports entre la logique et le langage devrait nous 
inciter, me semble-t-il, à choisir la seconde option. En un sens, toute 
l'histoire de la logique est celle d'un effort pour s'affranchir des 
limites qu'impose au raisonnement formel la langue naturelle, si bien 
que les logiciens ont fini par inventer des langages symboliques qui 
n'ont plus du langage que le nom. Certes, il est possible de raisonner 
en langue naturelle, mais nous savons bien que, dès que le raisonne­
ment porte sur des abstractions, l'exercice demande un effort d'atten­
tion, car il n'a rien de spontané. En d'autres termes, nous pouvons 
sans aucun doute traiter les catégories sémantiques comme des catégo­
ries logiques, mais il n'en découle nullement que celles-ci soient 
intrinsèquement, ou originairement, de nature logique. 
J'ajoute qu'à maintes reprises, Greimas a lui-même dénoncé "les 
illusions des logisticiens qui pensent pouvoir opérer avec des formes 
sans signification'' et qui oublient cette évidence que "nous sommes 
définitivement' enfermés dans notre univers sémantique" (Greimas 
1986: 117). La vraie question est donc de comprendre pourquoi, bien 
qu'il se montre conscient du caractère irréductible des procédures 
sémiotiques empiriquement observables à des opérations logiques, il a 
tenu à élaborer un modèle dans lequel il nous propose une formulation 
logique du concept de structure élémentaire de signification. La 
réponse à cette question, c'est, je pense, que le modèle du carré 
sémiotique est destiné à rendre compte, non pas des "faits de surface" 
(c'est-à-dire manifestes), mais d'un niveau "profond" où le divorce 
entre logique et sémiotique serait susceptible de s'évanouir. C'est la 
raison pour laquelle, selon notre auteur, "l'application quasi-méca-
nique de ce modèle aux phénomènes de surface ne constitue, le plus 
souvent, qu'une caricature des procédures sémiotiques" (Greimas; 
Courtés 1993: 363). On voit que la constitution même du modèle sur 
lequel nous nous interrogeons est inséparable du principe selon lequel 
la possibilité de la communication langagière est subordonnée à 
l'existence d'un "niveau immanent" de la signification, pour reprendre 
la terminologie de Greimas, qui serait antérieur à sa manifestation 
dans le discours. Or un tel principe va-t-il de soi? 
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Certes, pour que la communication soit possible, il faut bien que 
les locuteurs disposent de codes communs. Pour le sujet individuel qui 
apprend le langage le code précède le discours, mais il est également 
évident que, puisqu'il n'y a de signification que pour un sujet, seul le 
discours est producteur de significations. Il paraît donc raisonnable de 
postuler, à la suite de Patrice Charaudeau (1983: 15-36), qu'il y a 
antériorité logique du discours (c'est-à-dire des "faits de surface" dans 
la terminologie de Greimas), et que la structuration des codes linguis­
tiques résulte, selon l'expression de Charaudeau, d'un processus de 
"sédimentation sémantique" qui s'accomplit au sein même de 
l'activité langagière. Cette hypothèse implique que les faits linguisti­
ques qui se rattachent au "niveau profond" traduisent une certaine 
autonomisation des signes par rapport au discours, mais que cette 
autonomisation n'est jamais achevée et reste relative, ce qui permet de 
comprendre que les langues (les codes phonologiques comme les 
codes sémantiques ou syntaxiques) évoluent constamment et ne sont 
pas assimilables à des systèmes fermés. Il résulte d'une telle con­
ception que le sens se construit au niveau discursif et ne saurait se 
déduire d'un processus de structuration des significations qui serait 
antérieur au discours. Comme le montre encore Patrice Charaudeau, la 
communication langagière suppose, de la part des locuteurs, un effort 
d'élucidation qui repose lui-même sur l'existence d'un savoir plus ou 
moins partagé (savoir sémantique, savoir encyclopédique - et savoir 
socio-culturel), ce qui a pour conséquence que le sens d'un discours 
recèle toujours une part d'ambiguïté. 
L'abandon du postulat de l'antériorité logique du "niveau profond" 
entraîne un renversement de perspective, mais il n'implique nullement 
de renoncer à la notion de "structure élémentaire de signification", car 
les deux conditions de la saisie du sens énoncées par Greimas n'en 
restent pas moins pertinentes. Il s'agit seulement d'adopter désormais 
un point de vue résolument constructiviste et de concevoir la structure 
élémentaire comme un schème purement mental dépourvu de tout 
statut objectai, ou plus exactement comme la schématisation par le 
descripteur de l'activité mentale mise en œuvre par les locuteurs. 
Prenant le contre-pied de ce qu'affirme Greimas, je soutiens dès lors, 
que les deux conditions qu'il énonce ne sont applicables qu'à des 
unités discursives. J'en déduis que deux unités quelconques du 
discours (deux lexèmes si l'on considère le niveau du signifié) sont 
opposables si elles incluent à la fois un trait distinctif qui les disjoint 
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et un trait commun qui les conjoint. Ces traits correspondent à des 
unités minimales de sens, donc par définition à des sèmes. Tout 
lexème renvoie, cependant, à une pluralité de sèmes. Dans le procès 
de la communication langagière, en fonction des contextes textuel et 
intertextuel (les compatibilités et incompatibilités qui naissent du 
rapprochement des termes, et les sélections de sens antérieurement 
effectuées dans le même texte ou dans d'autres textes auxquels 
renvoie celui-ci), ainsi qu'en fonction des circonstances de discours 
(situation d'énonciation et représentation collectives), le sujet parlant 
sélectionne les traits pertinents en les homologuant ou en les opposant, 
ce qui détermine des "effets de sens" que Greimas appelle des 
"sémèmes". Toutefois, l'unité minimale de sens qui est commune à 
deux unités du discours n'ayant elle-même d'existence que pour 
autant qu'elle s'oppose à une autre, il en résulte que la perception 
d'une opposition entre deux termes situés sur un axe sémantique 
déterminé est subordonnée à la possibilité de percevoir une opposition 
entre deux autres termes qui s'opposent sous le même rapport que les 
deux premiers, mais qui soni conjoints sur un axe différent, 
quoiqu'appartenant au même système sémantique (ou "code" dans la 
terminologie ,çle Claude Lévi-Strauss). 
Pour illustrer cette conception de la structure élémentaire de la 
signification, considérons l'analyse que nous propose Lévi-Strauss 
(1964), dans le premier volume des Mythologiques, de deux mythes 
amérindiens de l'origine du feu de cuisine, qui sont, selon lui, en 
rapport de transformation. Le premier de ces deux récits, qui est un 
mythe gé (Lévi-Strauss 1964: 74-75) raconte qu'aux premiers temps, 
le jaguar, qui connaissait le secret du feu de cuisine,; utilisait, pour 
chasser, un arc et des flèches, alors qu'inversement les hommes 
ignoraient ces deux techniques. Un jour, le jaguar rencontre un jeune 
Indien qui se trouve en situation périlleuse. Il le sauve, et comme son 
épouse ne lui a pas donné d'enfant, il décide de l'adopter. Cependant, 
la femme du jaguar déteste notre héros et ne cesse de le menacer. Son 
père adoptif lui ayant donné un arc pour se défendre, il tue sa belle-
mère d'une flèche, puis il s'enfuit, terrifié, en emportant ses armes 
ainsi qu'un morceau de viande grillée. De retour à son village, il 
distribue la viande. Les Indiens, décident alors d'organiser une 
expédition pour voler un jaguar le secret du feu. A la suite de leur 
succès, le jaguar, ulcéré par l'ingratitude de son fils adoptif, fait le 
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serment de renoncer à la viande cuite et de chasser avec ses griffes et 
ses crocs. 
Dans le deuxième récit, qui a été recueilli chez les Indiens du 
groupe tupi-guarani, le secret de la cuisson des aliments est détenu aux 
premiers temps, non plus par un jaguar, mais par des vautours 
charognards urubu. Lévi-Strauss le résume en ces termes : "Le héros 
civilisateur feignit un jour de mourir, de façon si réaliste que son corps 
commença à pourrir. Les vautours allumèrent alors un feu pour le faire 
cuire, mais le héros s'agita, mit les oiseaux en fuite, s'empara du feu 
et le donna aux hommes" (Lévi-Strauss 1964: 149). 
Faute de temps, je me dispenserai de reprendre en détail 
l'ensemble de l'analyse de Lévi-Strauss. Coupant au plus court, je me 
contenterai, en reprenant un propos que j'ai déjà tenu dans la 
conclusion de mon Anthropologie du mythe (Pottier 1994: 211 sq.), 
d'indiquer que cette analyse recèle au moins deux contradictions et 
une incertitude : 
- Après avoir affirmé que les oppositions fondamentales mises en 
œuvre dans les deux récits sont cru vs cuit et frais us pourri, Lévi-
Strauss av?nce que la première définit l'axe de la culture, car le 
cuit est la transformation culturelle du cru, alors que la seconde 
caractériserait l'axe de la nature, car le pourri est la transformation 
naturelle du frais. Dans la suite de l'analyse, cependant, c'est 
l'opposition cru vs pourri qui définit l'axe da la nature. 
- Initialement, il rattache les termes "cru" et "cuit" au seul axe de la 
culture. Ultérieurement, pourtant, il homologue l'opposition cru vs 
cuit à l'opposition nature vs culture, et par la suite, il reprend 
constamment cette interprétation dans les quatre volumes des 
Mythologiques. 
- Il affirme que, dans le mythe tupi, c'est l'opposition pourri vs cuit 
qui est homologuable à l'opposition nature vs culture, et il précise 
que cette opposition a un sens plus radical que la précédente, sans 
qu'on sache très bien ce qu'il entend par là. 
A l'évidence, le choix des oppositions pertinentes, dans les analyses 
de Lévi-Strauss, n'est pas dépourvu d'arbitraire et semble, dans bien 
des cas, répondre aux seuls besoins de la démonstration. De mon point 
de vue, cet arbitraire est inséparable du statut objectai qu'erronément 
Lévi-Strauss accorde à la notion de signification. Inversement, 
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lorsqu'on conçoit la structure élémentaire de signification comme un 
schème purement mental construit par les locuteurs, les contradictions 
que j'ai mentionnées se résolvent aisément. On s'aperçoit alors que les 
deux récits comparés articulent la même structure élémentaire de 
signification et que deux des quatre termes qui constituent cette 
structure apparaissent dans la narration alors que les deux autres 
restent implicites, avec cette différence, cependant, que les termes qui 
doivent être reconstitués mentalement par le récepteur du message 
pour percevoir la structure ne sont pas les mêmes dans les deux récits. 
Dans le mythe gé, les termes cru et cuit, qui ont en commun, selon l'inter­
prétation de Lévi-Strauss, l'élément culture, s'opposent entre eux sous le 
rapport non transformé vs transformé. Toutefois, la notion de culture n'a elle-
même de sens que pour autant qu'elle est opposable à la notion de nature. La 
possibilité de percevoir l'opposition cru vs cuit est donc subordonnée à la 
possibilité de percevoir une opposition entre les termes frais et pourri, qui ont 
en commun l'élément nature, et qui s'opposent pareillement sous le rapport 
non transformé vs transformé. Dans le mythe tupi, en revanche, l'opposition 
des termes pourri et cuit, qui ont en commun l'élément transformé, s'opposent 
sous le rapport nature vs culture, si bien que la possibilité de percevoir cette 
opposition implique la possibilité de percevoir une opposition entre les termes 
frais et cru, qui s'opposent sous le même rapport, mais qui ont en commun 
l'élément opposé non transformé. (Pottier 1994: 212-213) 
Je voudrais, pour finir, dire quelques mots des problèmes particuliers 
que pose l'analyse des mythes. Lévi-Strauss a montré que le mythe a 
ce qu'il appelle une "structure feuilletée". Cette expression imagée 
renvoie à une idée qui constitue, à mon sens, une contribution impor­
tante à la théorie du mythe, à savoir que l'articulation de tout récit 
mythique repose sur l'homologation de plusieurs codes. A titre 
d'illustration, il est facile de constater que le mythe gé met en œuvre 
trois codes différents: le code culinaire, le code de la chasse et le code 
familial. Leur homologation repose sur les équivalences suivantes : 
père = cuit = chasseur 
fils = cru = non-chasseur 
- épouse (du père) = pourri = gibier 
- mère = frais = non-gibier. 
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Il va de soi que les relations entre les termes constitutifs des codes 
mythiques sont d'ordre analogique, si bien qu'en un sens, chaque récit 
mythique (et, à la limite, la mythologie entière) constitue une 
métaphore développée. En conséquence, comme c'est le cas lorsqu'on 
interprète une métaphore, la perception d'une isotopie de signification 
passe par la construction, non pas d'une structure sémantique simple 
qui articule, des catégories sémiques, mais d'une structure méta-
discursive qui articule des catégories interprétatives. C'est ce qui 
explique le recours par Lévi-Strauss à la catégorie nature vs culture, 
qui à l'évidence possède un statut purement interprétatif, puisqu'elle 
n'est pas donnée par les récits eux-mêmes. Il n'est pas absurde, en 
effet, d'affirmer qu'en transmettant à son fils les techniques du feu et 
de la chasse, le père lui transmet métaphoriquement la culture (ce qui 
rend compte de l'homologie du code culinaire et du code de la 
chasse), et que de même, en tant que détenteur de l'autorité au sein de 
la famille, il est le représentant des valeurs culturelles (ce qui fonde 
l'homologie du code familial avec les deux autres). Ce qu'on peut 
reprocher toutefois à une telle interprétation, c'est qu'elle repose sur 
l'utilisation d'une catégorie de pensée typiquement occidentale qui, si 
l'on en croit les travaux des spécialistes du monde amérindien est 
inconnue des Gé eux-mêmes ! Pour être légitime, l'interprétation des 
mythes doit donc reposer sur l'élaboration de catégories qui aient un 
sens pour ceux qui racontent et qui écoutent ce type de récit, soit qu'il 
s'agisse de catégories emic auxquelles la connaissance de la langue et 
de la culture aura donné accès à l'ethnologue, soit qu'il s'agisse de 
catégories dont on postule l'universalité, mais cette question, que j'ai 
tenté d'aborder dans У Anthropologie du mythe, sortirait largement du 
cadre de cette contribution. 
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Семиотический квадрат и анализ мифа 
Семиотический квадрат Греймаса построен на гипотезе, что понятие 
элементарной структуры значения работоспособно только в том 
случае, если его интерпретируют и формулируют в рамках логики. В 
то же время комментарии самого Греймаса по поводу этой модели 
оставляют желать лучшего. С одной стороны, он утверждает, что 
отношение между любыми двумя членами (si и s 2) не определено. С 
друргой стороны, он утверждает, что отношения s, - не-S i ,  s 2  - hc-s 2 ,  
S] - He-s2 и s 2  - не-S] логичны по своей природе. Эти два утверждения 
противоречат друг другу и нужно выбрать одно из двух: или все эти 
четыре отношения имеют логическую ценность и весь семиоти­
ческий квадрат является в этом случае логическим квадратом, что 
означало бы, что отношение Si — s2 является несовместимым отно­
шением, или у отношения Sj - s 2  вообще отсутствует какая-нибудь 
логическая ценность. И это означает не только то, что и все осталь­
ные отношения в квадрате не являются логическими, но и то, что 
придание членам s, и s 2  негативной ценности совершенно бес­
смысленно. 
Указанная дилемма восходит к основному принципу теории 
Греймаса, согласно которому языковая коммуникация зависит от 
наличия глубинного уровня значения, которая предшествует рече­
вому выражению. Но если мы решим, что значения возникают на 
дискурсивном уровне, и, исходя из этого, что процесс паттернизации 
языковых кодов, который можно назвать процессом семантического 
оседания, рождается от языкового действия, то дилемма исчезает. 
Это решение предполагает, что элементарная структура значения 
является по существу схемой мыслительного действия разговари­
вающих, записанной аналитиком. Это в свою очередь означает и 
перемену позиции описывающего и говорящего. В то же время эти 
два условия, которые по Греймасу необходимы для понимания 
значения, по-прежнему существенны. Только в отличие от мнения 
Греймаса они теперь применяются на уровне речи: две дискурсив­
ные единицы модно противопоставить, если они обе одновременно 
содержат какое-то свойство, их объединяющее, и какое-то свойство, 
их различающее. 
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Для подтверждения указанного утверждения в данной статье 
анализируются два мифа американских индейцев, которые в свое 
время рассматривал уже Леви-Стросс. В конце анализа приводятся и 
специфические проблемы, которые возникают при интерпретации 
подобных нарративов. 
Semiootiline ruutja müüdianalüüs 
Greimasi semiootiline ruut on ehitatud hüpoteesile, et elementaarse 
tähendusstruktuuri mõiste on töövõimeline vaid siis, kui teda tõlgenda­
takse ja formuleeritakse loogikat järgides. Samas on Greimasi kommen­
taarid selle mudeli kohta küsitava väärtusega. Ühelt poolt väidab ta, et 
ükskõik millise kahe liikme (s, ja s2) vaheline suhe on määratlemata. 
Teiselt poolt väidab ta, et suhted Si - mitte-Sj, s2 - mitte-s2, $i - mitte-s2 
ja s2 - mitte-Sj on loomult loogilised. Need kaks väidet on vastuolulised 
ja tuleb teha valik: kas kõik need neli suhet on loogilise väärtusega ja 
kogu semiootiline ruut on seega loogiline ruut, mis tähendaks, et suhe $! -
s2 on ühildamatu suhe — või puudub suhtel Sj - s2 üldse mingi loogiline 
väärtus ja see tähendab mitte ainult seda, et ka kõik teised suhted tema 
ruudus pole loogilised, vaid ka seda, et liikmetele Sj ja s2 negatiivse 
väärtuse omistamine on täiesti mõttetu. 
Nimetatud dilemma tuleneb Greimasi teooria aluspõhimõttest, mille 
kohaselt sõltub keeleline kommunikatsioon teatud tähenduse süvatasandi 
(ehk olemusliku tasandi) olemasolust, mis väidetavalt kõnelisele väljen­
dusele eelneb. Kui me aga otsustame, et tähendused tekivad diskursiivsel 
tasandil, ning, sellest tulenevalt, et keeleliste koodide mallistumise 
protsess, mida võiks nimetada semantilise settimise protsessiks, sünnib 
keelelisest tegevusest, dilemma kaob. 
Nimetatud väide eeldab seda, et tähistamise elementaarstruktuur on 
sisuliselt analüütiku poolt üles tähendatud kõnelejate mõttetegevuse 
skeem. See tähendab ühtlasi kirjeldaja ja kõneleja positsioonide 
vahetumist. Siiski on need kaks tingimust, mis Greimasi hinnangul on 
tähenduse mõistmiseks vajalikud, endiselt olulised. Ainult et erinevalt 
sellest, mida arvas Greimas, rakenduvad nad nüüd kõne tasandil: kahte 
diskursuslikku ühikut on võimalik vastandada, kui nad mõlemad sisal­
davad ühtaegu mingit ühist omandust, mis neid ühendab, ja mingit 
eristavat omadust, mis neid lahutab. 
Nimetatud väite tõestamiseks analüüsitakse käesolevas artiklis kahte 
ameerika indiaanlaste müüti, mida omal ajal käsitles juba Lévi-Strauss. 
Analüüsi lõpuks tuuakse välja ka taoliste narratiivide tõlgendamisega 
kaasnevad spetsiifilised probleemid. 
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Abstract. I analyse here some histories of people who lived in concentration 
camps and told their experiences: De Gaullé Ar.thorrioz (La Traversée de la 
nuit), Geoffroy (Au :emps des crématoires...), Semprun (L'Écriture ou la vie). 
These histories represent the- üvee of survivors, but they are also a form of 
literary expression with a narrative structure that codifies a genre. More parti­
cularly, I focus the attention on the incipit, a strategic place in which some of 
the specific features of the global meaning and structural organization of the 
whole text can be seized. My hypothesis is that in histories of survival, 
already in the incipit, the authors strive to convey the emblematic value of 
their history: an extreme and traumatic experience which is difficult to 
express. The analysis of these incipit shows that experiences related to 
concentration camps, to be expressed, need an elaborated message and that an 
artistic aim can contribute to the representation of these experiences. From the 
structural viewpoint, histories of survival amplify a dichotomy existing in 
several literary genres and currents: 'external reference' and 'internal organi­
zation', mimetic 'truth' and narrative 'structure', 'reality' and 'convention', 
'experience' and 'narration'. In my opinion, histories of survival solve these 
oppositions by reconciling some contraries through the use of oxymora. Even 
narratives structures or key figures such as the author, the narrator, the 
observer, the witness and so on, tend to become oxymora. The study of these 
features (and combination) is pertinent for anthropology (by seizing facts 
thanks to elaborated 'ways of uttering' authors often redefine forms of 
humanity) and for semiotics (any form of expression, even if original, has to 
be collectively shared and based on a system of signs). In my opinion, a joint 
semiotic and anthropological approach can help analysing histories of survival 
as a 'literary genre' and as a 'historical tragic phenomenon'. 
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Raconter bien, ça veut dire : de façon à être entendus. On 
n'y parviendra pas sans un peu d'artifice. Suffisamment 
d'artifice pour que ça devienne de l'art ! 
Jorge Semprun, L'Ecriture ou la vie 
1. Histories of survival 
as a narrative structure and genre 
In this contribution, I will take into account histories of survival: more 
particularly, histories of those people who survived the Nazi 
concentration camps and told their experiences as witnesses to these 
tragic events. I will concentrate on the semiotic modalities according 
to which, in these histories, experience is codified (through the filter 
of memory) and becomes a written text. The semantic universe of 
histories of survival is often approached by scholars following two 
'interpretative styles' which are apparently conflicting: either as a 
referential message, the -analogue' of reality that the uttering subject is 
supposed to record in a purely mimetic form; or as a narrative system 
that conveys reality thanks to the montage of his structuring elements. 
In the semiotic perspective that I adopt here, on the contrary, 'referent' 
and 'narration' are two intertwined components: historical reality is 
obviously undeniable, even though the textual reconstitution of this 
same reality can be rendered through multiple narrative shapes. 
As a consequence, the semiotic approach is not to be seen as a sort 
of negation of those terrible events lived by witnesses (events which 
remain irrefutable and dramatic) or a refusal of the effective and 
implacable violence of genocide1, but as an attempt to seize, through 
textual analysis, the constitutive features that gather these texts and 
form this specific genre that is, in my opinion, camp literature. From 
the semiotic and anthropological viewpoint, the specificity of this 
genre is the result of the mixture of three fundamental elements: (1) 
the traumatic experience lived by the narrator-witness, which is in 
itself unseizable and volatile; (2) the chaotic and fragmentary universe 
of the memory that recovers, along the time, the event; (3) the 
1 The question of negationism has already been approached, largely and by 
many scholars, in several publications. See, for example, Ternon 1999 and Coquio 
(ed.) 2003. 
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codification of events and its communication to the reader. One can 
say that, in its simpler form, this is a kind of communication that 
includes an addresser, a receiver and a message. Nevertheless, there is 
a greater complexity that depends on the semantic structure of the 
message and this complexity is based on the fact that experience and 
memory are impalpable and evanescent entities: they belong to the 
sensitive and cognitive dimensions, difficult to seize in themselves 
unless they are transformed into a text (written, filmed, drawn, 
painted, mimed, and so on) which 'contains' prototypically the consti­
tutive semantic features of a specific genre. 
In this contribution, starting from these preliminary considerations, 
I intend to focus the attention on the incipit, a strategic place in which 
some of the specific features of the global meaning and structural 
organization of the whole text can be seized. My hypothesis is that in 
histories of survival, already in the incipit, the authors strive to convey 
the emblematic value of their story: an extreme and traumatic expe­
rience which, if not inexpressible, is at least difficult to tell. The 
analysis of three incipit will heip to show not only the substantial 
differences existing between three authors, but also to reflect on some 
structural elements that these incipit have in common. 
2. The conciliation of contraries 
in the semantic universe of histories of survival 
Histories of survival represent the experience and thoughts of those 
who lived in concentration camps, but they are also a form of literary 
expression with its thematic and figurative registers and with its cores 
of aesthetic constitutions: in a word, they are a real and true genre. In 
this specific genre, the author function plays a fundamental role. It is 
elaborated on the basis of a 'structural oxymoron' that associates the 
author of a text' and the 'subject of experience': on the one hand, we 
can find an 'author' who tries to cancel the traces of his presence (to 
say that better, the traces of the uttering author) to install the 'subject' 
himself who lived the traumatic experience and also to* communicate 
the experience as exactly as it was felt; on the other, we see an author 
who reappears — voluntarily or involuntarily — in the shaping of the 
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complex stratification of the text2, a shaping and stratification that are 
sometimes very refined and show the 'artistic nature' of the message 
seeming in this way to evacuate its referential function. By this 
mechanism, a very subtle relationship is established between the 
sensitive material that constitutes the primordial 'substance' of these 
testimonies (that tend to manifest themselves as referential stories of 
events) and the artistic system of signs (anyhow conventional and 
upon which the uttering of the history of survival is built). 
An example of the intertwining of the 'literary' and of the 'non-
literary' (the 'artistic text' and of the 'testimonial document') is 
L 'Ecriture ou la vie by Jorge Semprun (1994)3. In this text, the subject 
of the traumatic experience who relives his past and tells his life in the 
camps (trying to convey what happened 'as exactly as it happened'), 
mingles with the author who makes an extremely refined montage of 
these events: 
Il n'y a qu'à se laisser aller. La réalité est là, disponible. La parole aussi. 
Pourtant, un doute me vient ЕГЛГ la possibilité de raconter. Non pas que 
l'expérience vécue soii indicible. Eile a été inévitable, ce qui est toute autre 
chose, on le comprendra aisément. Autre chose qui ne concerne pas la forme 
d'un récit possible, mais sa substance. Non pas son articulation, mais sa 
densité. Ne parviendront à cette substance, cette densité transparente que ceux 
qui sauront faire de leur témoignage un objet artistique, un espace de création. 
Ou de recréation. Seul l'artifice d'un récit maîtrisé parviendra à transmettre 
partiellement la vérité du témoignage. Mais ceci n'a rien d'exceptionnel : il 
est arrivé ainsi de toute les grandes expériences historiques. (Semprun 1994: 
25-26) 
: See, for example, White 2006 (and more particularly the chapter 6: 125-138) 
a work in which the author analyses Se questo è un uomo (Primo Levi 1963) and 
shows the poetic nature of the text, even though Levi tried to «manifest the 
scientific objectivity» of his writing. 
In 1943, Semprun was arrested by the Gestapo because he was a member of 
the French resistance. He was then sent to the concentration camp of Buchenwald 
as a political prisoner. He was kept in the camp until 1945. After his liberation he 
remained silent for years until when, in 1963, he publishes Le Grand voyage, his 
first 'testimony' telling his tragic experience. Dans L'Ecriture ou la vie, written 
fifty years after he gained freedom, his intention was not only 'to tell the events 
but 'to make people understand', by using literary devices, what really meant to 
live in the camps. 
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On the basis of a poetic device, Semprun elaborates a complex 
shaping of involuntary memory which is introduced in the narration in 
an intermittent, fragmentary and disorderly way: the minute fragments 
of memory relative to the detention in the camps (and sometimes 
preceding the life in the camps) are inserted in the linear course of 
narration (which starts textually from his liberation from the camp) in 
the form of small and loose notes. Each of these fragments of memory 
is recalled to mind thanks to meetings, objects, sounds, smells, looks, 
and whatever else can be attributed to the sphere of phenomenological 
experience. These 'mnemonic notes' find their musical echo in 
successive returns where they are recovered starting from the same 
linguistic syntagms previously used, sometimes with slight changes 
and with further developments or with gradual and progressive refor­
mulations: 
Le temps a passé, Halbwachs était mort. J'avais vécu ld mort de Halbwachs. 
Mais je ne voulais pas vivre la mort de ce Juif hongrois que je tenais dans 
mes bras, quelques mois plus tard, un jour d'avril 1945. Je supposais qu'il 
était hongrois, du moins. Son matricule en tout cas [...] laissait supposer qu'il 
faisait partie des convois de Juifs en provenance de Hongrie. (Semprun 1994: 
63, my emphasis — L. T.) 
Mais je ne veux pas vivre la mort de ce Juif anonyme, peut-être hongrois. Je 
le tiens dans mes bras, je lui parle doucement à l'oreille. (Semprun 1994: 66, 
my emphasis — L. T.) 
In this way, a sort of repetitive symphony is created: an articulated 
cognitive paradigm of memory is shaded and gradually modulated by 
its projection on the narrative syntagm. This first shaping of free and 
involuntary memory is further complicated by an interplay of two 
different kinds of memory: the first one is older and relative to the 
detention in the concentration camps; the second one is more recent 
and rendered in the present by a narrator 'who says what he's seeing 
and who feels what he's uttering', a memory that refers to the period 
following his liberation4. In other terms, Semprun recomposes his past 
and recalls its traces spread in his memory through a subtle stylistic 
research. Nevertheless, this cannot be considered as a research of 
This more recent memory remains anyway a literary device since the libera­
tion of Semprun dates back to 1945, while the author writes his text many years 
later, in 1994. 
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'aesthetic beauty', but rather a 'rhetorical effect', a specific strategy 
that the 'testimonial document' conveys through the balanced regula­
tion of the power of uttering. 
The co-occurrence of the figure of the author and of the figure of 
the witness is accompanied by another conciliation of contraries 
structurally inscribed in these texts: the 'personal vicissitudes' and the 
'collective facts'. In effect, the author would like not only to cancel 
his 'literary' intrusion to leave the experience of the witness in the 
foreground, but he would also like to diminish the value of his 
personal experience to better represent the whole community who 
lived his same tragic events. An exemplary and extreme case of the 
co-presence of the single individual who dissolves himself into the 
community is the one represented in the volume Au cœur du système 
concentrationnaire nazi (Sachso 1982), in which the author, if it can 
be defined as such, is the community: more precisely the Amicale 
d'Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen abbreviated with the acronym Sachso. 
In this collective volume, 'truthfulness' passes through the voice of a 
collective figure represented by an association of survivors (the 
Amicale): 
Au-delà de ce que chacun peut relater de son expérience personnelle, seul un 
ouvrage collectif comme celui-ci est susceptible, pensons-nous, de donner une 
approche globale de la réalité vécue par les Français. (Sachso 1982: 7) 
In other words, the individual experience is effaced to the advantage 
of the experience of the community; the single individual voice — the 
voice of all the individuals who speak and tell the same facts — is 
effaced before the collective voice which is raised to the unison: a 
reiterated and obsessively repetitive act of parole that is apparently 
devoid of an author who, for this same reason, seems to acquire the 
paradigmatic features of 'impersonality', 'evidence of facts', 'objecti­
vity' and of a 'real and true representation'. 
This strategy leads to a third and extremely important question. 
The 'truthfulness' of the histories of survival is accompanied by a 
semantic of the non-possible and non-descriptive. The words used by 
the authors are various: 'inexpressible', 'unnamable', 'indescribable', 
'unthinkable', 'unbelievable', 'unimaginable' (to refer to a term dear 
to Robert Antelme): 
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Comment nous résigner à ne pas tenter d'expliquer comment nous en étions 
venus là ?[...] Et cependant c'était impossible. A peine commencions-nous à 
raconter, que nous suffoquions. À nous-mêmes, ce que nous avions à dire 
commençait alors à nous paraître inimaginable. (Antelme 1948: 5) 
In these lines, even though he uses opposing terms (to give up vs to 
try; to explain vs to experience; impossible vs possible; starting to tell 
vs to keep on telling; to say vs to suffocate; imaginable vs unimagin­
able), Antelme does not resign himself to silence and speaks in order 
to try to solve these semantic (and existential) conflicts. These few 
lines by Antelme are representative of a whole literary genre and give 
an idea of this new form of uttering created by authors of histories of 
survival. In effect, even though it does not reach the same semantic 
density, camp literature is written in oxymora in which the 'inexpres­
sible is nothing more than what is effectively expressed'. The 
'inexpressible' — the 'expressed that cannot be expressed', correspon­
ding very often to the affirmation of powerlessly and thanks to which 
pass the (im)possibilities of language itself — is part of these semiotic 
modalities through which texts of survival are made.5 
Before analysing the incipit of three authors, I briefly summarize 
the oppositions upon which lays the structural organization of 
histories of survival: (1) the 'non-literary code' and the 'literary code' 
(that is what is told as a purely referential plot of events and the 
artistic component of 'telling the truth'); (2) the co-presence of the 
experiencing subject and of the author of the text (3) the dissolution of 
classical frontiers between personal identity and collective identity and 
the constitution of a constant parallel between an individual (who is 
inscribed in the text with an ample gamut of emotions and recalling of 
facts) and the prototype of an entire community represented by an 
individual spokesman; (4) the emotional and cognitive impossibility to 
express the experience of horror and death and the infinite expressive 
possibilities of language. In my perspective, to analyse histories of 
survival means to concentrate above all in the new forms that the 
imbrications of these 'structural oxymora' take up: referential story 
On this subject Rinn affirms that «La pratique de l'indicible [est] l'expression 
d'une stratégie discursive. [...] cet indicible-là, en tant que technè, recherche 
I adhésion du récepteur en textualisant un "impossible persuasif'. [La] vérité 
ontologique [de la réalité] ne se qualifie pas à l'aide d'une hiérarchisation 
axiologique extérieure — objective —, mais en termes de perfectionnement d'une 
réalité subjective mise en scène» (Rinn 1998: 271, 272). 
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and artistic component, experience and narration, individual and com­
munity, impossibility to tell the inexpressible events and reiterated 
expression of these events. 
3. The inexpressible as spectacles of the 'Self and 
the 'Other' in L'Écriture ou la vie 
The incipit of a literary text is a strategic place due to the fact that the 
foundations of developing the plot and building the characters are 
already laid, though in a seminal way, in this small part of the text that 
produces furthermore an inevitable rupture between the 'real world' 
and the 'fictional world'. The incipit of histories of survival take up an 
even more emblematic value since these texts are the report of a real 
event and characters are men and women who effectively lived the 
experiences they related. In these incipit one can find, in a succinct 
and condensed way, some central mechanisms of signification, impor­
tant uttering strategies and the rhetorical devices used to introduce the 
reader into the spatial and temporal universe of the inexpressible, the 
centre of emotional and physical hell, the concentration camps, where 
the 'witness' was forced to live. In this sense, the incipit of L'Écriture 
ou la vie by Semprun is striking. In the first two lines, the author tries 
to communicate the feeling of abandonment and the feeling of loss 
that is characteristic of experiences concerning concentration camps: 
Ils sont en face de moi, l'œil rond, et je me vois soudain dans ce regard 
d'effroi: leur épouvante. (Semprun 1994: 13) 
The sense of loss and the sense of self-identification do not have their 
origin in the Self of the narrator, but both pass through the look of the 
Others. The common features of these two opposed movements 
regarding the meaning of identity are terror {l'effroi) and fear 
(/ 'épouvante). In a few lines, the narrator summarizes one of the most 
important questions for human beings: the definition of Self in 
conditions of extreme adversity and outside his possibilities. Notwith­
standing the inconceivable conditions of existence in the camps, the 
affirmation of identity is realized here through the co-presence of the 
author with the "trois officiers, en uniforme britannique" (Semprun 
1994: 14), in the look that concentrates on the detail of the round eye, 
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an eye that is reduced to two feelings: terror and fear. Due to the 
absence of the constitutive features that normally determine the sense 
of identity, the only anchorages remain volatile details and fleeting 
feelings. The Self (je) of the narrator disappears in the apparent 
confrontation with the officers (ils) in British uniforms and the sight 
of the Others is transformed into the levelling of the full presence and 
the presentation of a weak return to the Self.6 
This text is sô effective because it begins without a real beginning, 
because it gives some pieces of information on the identity of an 
individual through the representation of his annihilation. The narrator 
does not give any narrative anchorage concerning the events going on, 
he does not situate this representation temporally and spatially, but he 
restrains the narration to the foregrounding of a confrontation between 
the Self and the Other. This confrontation — which, according to the 
rules of the genre, is not a real confrontation since the people who are 
confronting the narrator are there to free him from prison — is in 
effect a disintegration of personal identity. It does not become, for this 
reason, a total affirmation of a collective identity. The only remaining 
way for the author to see himself is in the bewildered look of the 
Other. In this way, beginning and non-beginning, confrontation and 
liberation, representation and annihilation of identity are meeting in 
the form of narrative and structural oxymora. In these few lines, one 
can find a dialectics of the affirmation and refusal, the oxymora of 
presence-absence, the presentation and dissolution of a look that 
instead of being an instrument of knowledge becomes the only kind of 
observation of the Self. 
In this incipit, some essential questions intermingle powerfully: to 
represent oneself without forgetting the others, representing oneself 
concretely even though survivors are physically and mentally unre­
cognisable, deprived of their identity. One can say that the absence 
I the "without" that is not always present grammatically) is a structu­
ral, latent element that takes on the most different shapes in the 
This return on the Self through the look of the Other is recurrent in the text 
and used to define, in a transitive and reflexive way, the identity of the narrator. 
More particularly, the uncertain and suffered identity of the narrator is seized 
thanks to all different kinds of look and people. For example, the look of the 
officers in British uniforms is compared with the look of the narrator's friends in 
the concentration camps, Maurice Halbwachs while dying, the Germans soldiers 
and, even if paradoxical, tens of corpses. 
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narrative manifestation of L'Écriture ou la vie and, more generally, in 
the camp literature. This "without" is only a preposition, but it is an 
important preposition because it can indicate either imposition or 
indétermination7. 'Indétermination' can be considered positively as 
the core starting from which one defines the different realizations of 
the forms of humanity: all forms that are not hierarchically ordered, 
but equal without exceptions. 
At the same time, the opposed pole, the 'imposition' of a form of 
humanity onto the others (and, as a radical consequence, 'extermi­
nation'), produces violence and injustice. This second conjugation of 
humanity is obviously to reject ideologically, but it is also to study 
anthropologically for the simple reason that it manifested itself histo­
rically defining some conditions of human resistance (in the 
concentration camps) and a negative idea of the principle of humanity. 
This anthropological reason (the definition of man in positive and in 
negative) has to be coupled with a semiotic reason and research: how 
can a narrative text represent the identity of a man who lived in 
inhuman condition? And how can a written text convey something 
that is belonging to the order of the inexpressible? If, more parti­
cularly, we refer to L'écriture ou la vie, the preposition "without" 
becomes a vaster narrative device: it does not only define a clear and 
strong opposition between the privation and the acquisition, the non-
accomplishment and the accomplishment, but it represents the 
syntagmatic deployment of a process and a temporal becoming. This 
becoming is the becoming (of the identity) of the narrator-witness who 
passes through the corporeal breaking up and the mirror of the Other. 
The following scene illustrates this hypothesis: 
Depuis deux ans, je vivais sans visage. Nul miroir, à Buchenwald. Je voyais 
mon corps, sa maigreur croissante, une fois par semaine, aux douches. Pas de 
visage, sur ce corps dérisoire. De la main, parfois, je frôlais une arcade 
sourcilière, des pommettes saillantes, le creux d'une joue. J'aurais pu me 
procurer un miroir, sans doute. On trouvait n'importe quoi au marché noir du 
camp, en échange de pain, de tabac, de margarine. Même de la tendresse, à 
l'occasion. 
Mais je ne m'intéressais pas à ces details. (Semprun 1994: 13) 
According to Coquio, the "spectre de l'humain passe [...] par ces deux pôles 
extrêmes: l'un positif et utopique, qui possibilise sans fin l'humanité à travers 
1 idée d'indétermination, l'autre négatif et historique, qui réalise sans fin 
l'inhumanité de l'extermination" (Coquio 1998: 385). 
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The "without" is present in the text grammatically, but its meaning is 
also manifest in the text as a narrative strategy that realizes more 
largely the sense of privation. It is thanks to this strategy that a close 
relationship is created between the flowing time and the thinness of 
the body of the narrator, between the 'totality' of the concept of 
identity and the 'details' which compose its figure. The privileged 
focus on the face of the narrator (compared to rest of the body), the 
face of the Other as a mirror, the mirror as an element of identity are 
all features which characterize this passage. The shaping of the textual 
form is very refined. On the one hand, the narrator focuses on the 
details of the body, on his fragmentation in parts; on the other, he says 
that he is not interested in details and that he does not want to get a 
mirror. Between the two first lines and this passage there is a strong 
difference. In the first two lines, the narrator does not give temporal 
and spatial indications, while in this passage he starts narrating what 
happened in Buchenwald, in the concentration camp. 
If the reflex in the look of the Other is the effect of an event that is 
belonging to the order of the inchoative, in the following passage the 
'life without face' of the narrator takes place in the durative of the 
years passed in Buchenwald. This aspectual difference between the 
inchoative of the beginning and the durative of the following passage 
opens a series of possible interpretations. For example, one can think 
of the narrator's desire to communicate the feeling of estrangement 
and displacement that the face of the Other produces every time on the 
narrator-witness. One can also advance the hypothesis that the 
opposition between the inchoative and durative tends to represent the 
impossibility to get used to fear and terror generated in the concentra­
tion camps. Did survivors get used to what was inconceivable and to 
what was unthinkable? More than a confirmation to an interpretive 
path, what is important here is Semprun's use of a refined narrative 
strategy which consists in a bipolar process: affirming and denying, 
aggregating and breaking up. If, for example, the look (onto the Other 
and from the Other) has an important place in this beautiful page by 
Semprun, the body also plays a central role, thanks to the sense of 
touch. The narrator says that he could have gotten a mirror, but he did 
not do it. He manifests the precise desire to see himself in the look of 
the Other: he wants the others to be a reflection of his situation, 
f urthermore, he is not interested in the details of his body or to look, 
by a mirror, to the changes of his body. Nevertheless, these changes 
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are attracting his attention and he is observing them through the sense 
of touch, a sense that is giving him an indirect perception of the 
corporeal process: 
Je voyais mon corps, de plus en plus flou, sous la douche hebdomadaire. 
Amaigri mais vivant : le sang circulait encore, rien à craindre. Ça suffirait, ce 
corps amenuisé mais disponible, apte à une survie rêvée, bien que peu 
probable. 
La preuve, d'ailleurs : je suis là. (Semprun 1994: 13) 
The body, as an inseparable complement of the 'Г, a natural comple­
tion of the identity, is blurred more and more, until it becomes a 
"flou", and starts living a life of its own ("amaigri mais vivant 
"amenuisé mais disponible", "apte à ..."), as if it was a detached 
appendix isolated on purpose to underline the loss of identity. At the 
same time, this body reduced to an organ without soul is also the 
reaffirmation, even if weak and subdued^ of some kind of survival: 
"une survie rêvée". This loss and reaffirmation of identity is revealed 
by a narration that foreshadows both an omnipresent subject and the 
presence of the others, the body of the subject and the look the others. 
On the other hand, this implicit intention of the author is confirmed 
by the title of the first chapter of L'Écriture ou la vie, that is Le 
regard, a look that is declined according to different typologies 
(terrorized, scared, fraternal, disgusted, hated, etc.), each of them takes 
on a precise function for the shaping of the concept of identity: 
Ainsi, paradoxalement, du moins à première et courte vue, le regard des 
miens, quand il leur en restait, pour fraternel qu'il fût — parce qu'il l'était, 
plutôt — me renvoyait à la mort. [...] Notre être était défini par cela : être 
avec l'autre dans la mort qui s'avançait. [...] Nous tous qui allions mourir 
avions choisi la fraternité de cette mort par goût de la liberté. 
Voici ce que m'apprenait le regard de Maurice Halbwachs, agonisant. 
Le regard des S.S., en revanche, chargé de haine inquiète, mortifère, me 
renvoyait à la vie. Au fou désir de durer, de survivre [...] 
Mais aujourd'hui, en cette journée d'avril, [...] à quoi me renvoie-t-il, le 
regard horrifié, affolé, des trois officiers en uniforme britannique ? 
A quelle horreur, à quelle folie ? (Semprun 1994: 39) 
Car il n'y avait pas de survivant [...] Les regards étaient tournés vers nous 
[...] souvent au prix d'une violente torsion du cou. Des dizaines d'yeux 
exorbités nous avaient regardé passer. 
Regardés sans nous voir. 
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Il n'y avait plus de survivants, dans cette baraque du Petit Camp. Les yeux 
grands ouverts, écarquillés sur l'horreur du monde, les regards dilatés, 
impénétrables, accusateurs, étaient des yeux éteints, des regards morts. 
(Semprun 1994: 41) 
In practice, the indirect look is an adequate and necessary instrument 
for the acquisition of the knowledge of Self and Other. By the puzzle 
of the look and the intermittent memory (both privileged for the 
reconstruction of experience and situations lived in the camps), 
Semprun creates a sort of 'window' through which one can observe 
the horror that took place in the camps and through which the look of 
the implied reader passes. In this way, the difficult obstacle of the 
'inexpressible' experience is overcome by Semprun thanks to the 
paved passage of the 'visible'. The possibility of the testimony is 
subjected to the verification of the look that takes on the function to 
make tangible what can be possibly said and expressed. The resulting 
hypothesis (that should be investigated in other histories of survival) is 
that the ellipsis of seeing entails an inevitable fall of the possibility to 
express (and say) the concentration camps and the survival. More 
generally, the whole semantic universe of histories of survival should 
be tested in order to see what are the relationships between the 
discursive order of the transitive look and the reflexive look, between 
the expressible and the inexpressible experience, between the seeing 
and the saying. 
4. Loss and reaffirmation of identity 
in La Traversée de la nuit 
The analysis of the text written by Semprun has shown that an 
experience to be expressed needs an elaborated message whose artistic 
aim can contribute to the representation of this expression: the more 
the experience is inexpressible, the more we need a refined strategy; 
the more we want to communicate a deep feeling of estrangement, the 
more the inexpressible has to take an appropriate form. Nevertheless, 
if the expression of an identity passes in Semprun through the 
manufacture' of a look (and the breaking up of a body), it is also 
important to wonder how, more generally, life in concentration camps 
and the sense of identity of other authors are represented. Even though 
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the narrative strategy used by Semprun is powerful, experience in 
concentration camps is not limited to his 'model'. To show some 
differences, I have chosen the beginning of La traversée de la nuit de 
Geneviève De Gaulle Anthonioz (1998)8, a text in which an estrange­
ment of the subject is underlined spatially and focusing on the over­
coming of a frontier, which is represented by the door of a prison cell: 
La porte s'est refermée lourdement. Je suis seule dans la nuit. A peine ai-je pu 
apercevoir les murs nus de la cellule. En tâtonnant je trouve le bat-flanc et sa 
couverture rugueuse et m'y allonge en essayant de renouer avec le rêve 
interrompu : tout à l'heure je marchais sur un chemin éclairé par la lune, une 
lumière si douce, si bienfaisante, et des voix m'appelaient. Soudain il n'y eut 
plus que le faisceau d'une lanterne, le visage effaré de notre chef de baraque, 
l'ordre rauque de me lever et l'ombre de deux SS. Cauchemar ou réalité ? 
Baty et Félicité, mes voisines de paillasse, se sont réveillées. Elles ont 
rassemblé quelques objets, dont mon quart et ma gamelle, m'ont aidée à 
descendre du châlit, m'ont embrassée. Quel sort m'attend ? Il arrive que les 
exécutions aient lieu ainsi de nuit. 
Pour le moment, je suis dans un bâtiment à l'intérieur du camp de 
Ravensbrück, appelé bunker. C'est une prison qui sert aussi de cachot. (De 
Gaulle Anthonioz 1998: 9-10) 
In this initial passage, the narrator stages, ever since the first instants 
of his narration, the loss of the subject before an incomprehensible 
reality characterized by the sudden sense of closure and the noisy 
door, the expression of solitude connected to the impossibility of 
seeing, the blinding light, the scared look of the chief, the soldiers 
similar to shadows in the night. These are altogether a series of 
elements that underline a cognitive loss in the subject. This feeling of 
loss is suggested (and even conveyed) to an astonished and disoriented 
reader who, at least initially, does not realize what is going on and 
what the character is doing and suffering. In effect, the narrator mixes 
8 De Gaulle Anthonioz, young resistance member and nephew of De Gaulle, 
was arrested in 1943 in a library, in Paris, because she was carrying illegal 
identification cards. She will spend six months in a prison in Fresnes, before being 
transferred to the concentration camps of Compiègne and then, definitively, to the 
camps of Ravensbrück. There, after a year of suffering she was imprisoned in a 
bunker of the camp because Himmler wanted to use her to negotiate with De 
Gaulle. She was freed in 1945. In La Traversée de la nuit, De Gaulle Anthonioz 
chooses to tell only the last three months of her detention, those months spent in 
darkness and solitude. 
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ambiguously three different temporal and spatial events: the character 
being closed in the bunker, the indefiniteness of the situation deriving 
from a dream suddenly interrupted and the rapid awakening of the 
subject from sleep. The events follow a form of writing adjusted to the 
absurd experience, the temporal order is intentionally confusing and 
the different experiences are superimposed one onto the other in an 
estranging amalgam. Nevertheless, it is possible to get a logical order 
of events. If one positioned them on a temporal axis, there would be 
first the dream of the narrator, then the sudden entrance of the German 
soldiers in the barrack (where the narrator lives with the other female 
detainees) and, finally, the imprisonment and the solitude of the 
character in the bunker. The feeling of estrangement of the narrator is 
protracted until it mixes with the feeling of the reader: this device 
emphasizes the sense of loss of the Self and makes immediately 
perceptible (and absurd) the situation of the detainees in the camps. 
Like the beginning by Semprun, the past is not proposed through 
the memory recalling events, but it is narrated as if it was lived and 
perceived in the present, in the same moment the 'witness' sees, feels 
and lives the facts. By this device, the figure of the narrator' is 
transformed into the figure of the 'observer' and the past is not 
anymore 'told', 'remembered', 'reconstructed', but it is described in a 
transparent manner. This rhetorical strategy allows to underline the 
'truthfulness' of saying because the volatile experience is graved in an 
indelible way in the perception hie et nunc of the body and in the 
symmetric acknowledgment of the mind. According to Ricœur (2000: 
731-747), this spontaneous evocation, this "presence of memory" is 
opposed to the difficult "search of memory" through which the me­
mory is transformed into an image of something else that is no more 
existing and that, for this same reason, could be confused with a 
hallucination or, even worse, a pure fiction9. Far from being 
commemorative, the "presence of memory" is, on the contrary, 
According to Ricœur, "la problématique de la mémoire s'engage dans la voie 
périlleuse de la similitude, de la mimesis, qu'on n'a jamais fini de dissocier d'un 
côté du fantasme et de l'autre de l'image-copie, sans que puisse être rompu, d'un 
côté ou de l'autre, le sentiment d'un lien d'adéquation, de convenance de l'image-
souvenir à la chose souvenue [...]" (Ricœur 2000: 733). 
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belonging to a "declarative" order and it presupposes an act of trust on 
the part of those who listen.10 
Like in L 'Ecriture ou la vie by Semprun, also in La traversée de la 
nuit by De Gaulle Anthonioz the reaffirmation of identity — 
threatened and weakened by the lack of points of references — passes 
through the body, although with a different modality compared to the 
one adopted by Semprun. In the case of De Gaulle Anthonioz, the 
subject becomes the perceptive receptacle of a negative synesthesia: 
the blinding light, the strong noise of the door slamming behind the 
prisoner's back, the staggering character, the bare walls, the roughness 
of the covers, the harshness of the voice contribute to create a melange 
of senses. Nevertheless, the loss of the Self is assimilated and strongly 
reconverted by the subject who suffers it through a surprising and 
unexpected mixture of dream and reality: 
tout à l'heure je marchais sur un chemin éclairé par la lune, une lumière si 
douce, si bienfaisante, et des voix m'appelaient. (De Gaulle Anthonioz 1998: 9) 
The negative experience of reality (to the point that it is lived as a 
"nightmare") is compared to another virtual experience (it is virtual 
because it is only dreamed) which proposes again a similar synesthe­
sia, but inverted, as in a play of embellishing mirrors that reflect the 
positive aspects of a nightmare (the possibility to see thanks to the 
moonlight, the sweetness of the light, the friendly voices) as if the 
cognitive subject wanted to affirm obstinately her own threatened 
identity and re-establish a perceptive order1. 
This positive approach to life, constitutive of a strong personality, 
is anticipated by the title through the reference to the crossing of the 
night (La traversée de la nuit). The 'crossing' is a temporary state of 
10 In effect, Ricœur writes: "C'est alors que se propose, à l'orée de l'entreprise 
qui de la mémoire conduira à l'histoire, un acte de confiance dans une expérience 
qu'on peut tenir pour l'expérience princeps dans ce domaine, l'expérience de la 
reconnaissance" (Ricœur 2000: 733). 
11 It is important to say that De Gaulle Anthonioz wrote this text in 1998 when 
she was 78, that is fifty years after her painful experience. Furthermore, the 
strength to overcome the negative effects of life is confirmed by the determination 
through which she faces every obstacle. For example, she fought for ten years in 
order to have a law adopted against poverty. She succeeded in having the law 
voted in 1998. In addition to this, for a long time she deeply engaged as a 
permanent voluntary member in a humanitarian movement. 
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imbalance that foresees a liquidation of this state and the acquisition 
of a positive state. A crossing is a spatial path including a beginning 
and an end. The excipit of the text coincides with the episode in which 
the main character gains her freedom from the concentration camp: 
Nous échangeons un regard, nous n'osons nous parler encore, mais je lui tiens 
la main pour descendre les trois marches du bunker. Ensemble, encadrées des 
deux SS et de la surveillante, nous franchissons la porte du camp. Il y a encore 
de la neige, un vent glacé. J'essaie de me retourner et vois de loin les 
silhouettes courbées des femmes qui portent les lourds bidons de café. L'aube 
se lève à peine, c'est peut-être celle de l'espérance ? (De Gaulle Anthonioz 
1998:81-82) 
This passage confirms once again the desire of the narrator to trans­
form a negative experience in positive terms. As in a reflecting mirror, 
La traversée de la nuit opens and closes on the same, though inverted, 
elements. The conflicting situation of the beginning (the sudden and 
violent awakening and the isolation of the bunker) is dissolved in the 
excipit to the advantage of a quiet final scene in which the main 
character meets some other people with whom she finds mutual 
understanding and her internal world finds reconciliation with the 
surrounding external world. Giving up her feelings of estrangement 
and the fear to die, she welcomes an optimist attitude and hopes for 
the future. In the end, a situation of order (the "three steps", a "focus" 
on the subject) and a state of emotive peacefulness take over the 
cognitive loss of the subject and her perceptive disorder of the 
beginning (the negative synesthesia). Even though the final scene is 
still characterized by an absence of communication ("we dare not yet 
speak"), there is also evidence of other kinds of contact with other 
people and with the surrounding world: the hand of the fellow 
prisoner, the insistence on the comforting and exchanged look, the 
pleasant and reviving colour of the snow, the feeling of freshness 
coming from the blowing wind, the announcing brightness of dawn. 
All these elements can be seen both as a cognitive opening of the 
subject to the world and the rising hope of a new life. If in the incipit 
the subject crosses a spatial threshold that will isolate him from the 
rest of the world and place him in a narrow space of internal and 
external closing (the bunker, darkness, absence of contact with 
people), in the excipit the same subject crosses another threshold, 
opposed to the previous one, that takes him into an open and more 
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powerful space: the door of the concentration camp corresponding to 
the acquisition of freedom and the end of a nightmare. 
5. Realism and historical truthfulness 
in Ли temps des crématoires... 
After the analysis of the incipit by Semprun and by De Gaulle 
Anthonioz, here it is important to take into account a very different 
one: the incipit of Au temps des crématoires... by Jean Geoffroy.12 If 
in Semprun and in De Gaulle Anthonioz the situations were lived by 
the protagonists through a more subjective dimension, in Geoffroy the 
attempt is, on the contrary, to translate experiences in a more objective 
dimension. Both the author's intentions and the work's form point out 
a 'perspective of events' corresponding to a testimony of what the 
subject has lived and should be left as a trace of written memory: 
Mon but est tout à fait modeste. Je n'ai pas même la prétention d'apporter la 
moindre contribution à l'histoire de cette tragique aventure. 
Ce simple récit est destiné à mes camarades de Hradischko, aux familles 
de ceux qui ne sont pas revenus et à mes amis. 
Je ne veux pas oublier. Pus tard, lorsque le temps aura fait son œuvre, je 
retrouverai quelques points de repère qui me permettront de me souvenir. 
(Geoffroy 2005: 8, Introduction) 
In the introduction, the reader is informed that the 'discourse of truth' 
is the main purpose of the work: this truth is not connected to a 
'scientific historical reconstruction', but it is based on a 'personal 
memory' that, for this reason, is even truer. The discourse of truth and 
the traces of memories to recover are seen jointly as the instruments to 
fix events. 
This preoccupation for the "stabilisation of the material memory" 
(Assmann 1999: 277) is typical of man and culture and has to be 
investigated anthropologically in all its different declinations. From the 
semiotic viewpoint, it is also crucial to interrogate what are the 
12 Jean Geoffroy was arrested in 1943 and deported first to Buchenwald, then to 
Flosenburg and finally to Hradischko. Geoffroy was freed in 1945, but he wrote 
Au temps des crématoires... two years after, in 1947, "not to forget...", as written 
in the epigraph. 
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mechanisms that translate anthropological devices into concrete texts 
that, as a consequence, permit this stabilisation of memory. The close 
connections between anthropology and semiotics focus on some central 
questions. For example, where does memory place itself as a starting 
point in culture and texts? In which point of the temporal axis of 
experience can we insert the most important events to which the ensuing 
narrative material is hooked? As we have seen, the engraving of 
memory in the body and in immediate feelings is one of the most 
recurrent mechanisms used, among others, by Semprun and De Gaulle 
Anthonioz. In the case of Geoffroy, the possibility of stabilisation seems 
to be connected to the indispensable 'objective fixation of events' in 
space and time. This is why in Au temps des crématoires... begins with 
a precise foregrounding of the spatial and temporal context: 
Le 7 août 1943, j'ai été arrêté par la Gestapo en gare d'Avignon. (Geoffroy 
2005:13) 
There is no hint of subjective bewilderment, no trace of distorted or 
disoriented perception of events. There is not even a small evocation 
of the loss or recovery of identity. The reader has no element to get 
grasp of the horror existing in concentration camps. On the contrary, 
reality is manifested thanks to concrete points of temporal (day, month 
and year) and spatial (the Avignon train station) reference. The 
concrete anchorage and the clear positioning of some narrative facts 
remind some realist texts (Balzac, for example) or even some 
naturalist texts (Zola, for example). In this objective beginning, the 
different layers of reality and its natural development are analysed in a 
detached and rational way: 
Avec quelques précautions, j'aurais pu éviter cette fois de me faire prendre. Les 
avertissements ne m'avaient pas manqué. Léon Arnaud, chef du Centre 
Téléphonique d'Avignon, m'avait tenu au courant des investigations auxquelles la 
Gestapo s'était livrée dans mes fiches de communications interurbaines. Je quittais 
Avignon, mais j'eus le tort d'y revenir dans la nuit du 6 au 7 août. J'attendais le 
train de Grenoble vers 3 heures du matin, lorsque je constatai brusquement qu'un 
cercle s'était formé autour de moi, un cercle composé de messieurs élégants, à 
l'allure sportive, vêtus de clair. (Geoffroy 2005: 13) 
It is certain that this incipit is not containing a strong emotive charge. 
As a consequence, the reader is not 'modelled' in the same way it is in 
the incipit by Semprun or De Gaulle Anthonioz. In Au temps des 
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crématoires... by Geoffroy the reader is firmly anchored to a spatial 
and temporal dimension which is the outcome of a linear development 
of events. Nevertheless, this 'referential linearity' is tricky: the 
objectifying feature of the text is equally constructed by its author. 
The truthfulness of the story uttered by Geoffroy is the result of a 
complex figurative form that turns around the effective symbolic use 
of space. The narrator introduces, almost gradually, the reader into a 
universe of closure typical of concentration camps, starting from an 
initial narrowing of space ("un cercle s'était formé autour de moi"), a 
symbolic isolation that anticipates, as a sort of semantic prolexis, 
some features (for example, a physical and emotional oppression) 
characterizing life in concentration camps. This first closure is 
underlined by the insistence of the narrator on a parallel series of 
similar spatial seclusions: "la petite guérite où se tient habituellement 
l'employé qui retire les billets", the "poste de garde", the "prison de la 
caserme", the "cellule n° 6", the "camion" that takes to the "train" and 
finally the concentration camp. 
6. Conclusion 
To show the complexity of histories of survival, I have underlined the 
centrality of a strategic place of texts: the incipit. I adopted a 
comparative perspective to stress similarities and differences in the 
incipit by Semprun, De Gaulle Anthonioz and Geoffroy. This 
perspective, both semiotic and anthropological, should be extended to 
other texts concerning histories of survival in order to extrapolate all 
theoretical outcomes out of this perspective. As a temporary conclu­
sion, two points have to be briefly pointed out here. 
Histories of survival amplify a dichotomy existing in several 
literary genres and currents: the categories of 'external reference' and 
'internal organization'. Romanticism, Realism, Naturalism, Surrea­
lism, etc., each of this current solves, in its own terms, this dichotomy 
based on mimetic 'truth' and on narrative 'structure', on 'reality' and 
'convention', on 'experience' and 'narration'. My hypothesis is that 
histories of survival solve these oppositions by reconciling some 
contraries through the use of oxymora. Even narratives structures or 
key figures such as the author, the narrator, the observer, the witness 
and so on, tend to become oxymora. 
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The second question that I have outlined in this contribution 
concerns the forms of uttering through which histories of survival are 
recalled to mind and written. These forms of uttering are, in my 
opinion, new and characterize the genre of histories of survival. It is in 
this kind of 'literature' that one can remark the effort of authors to 
face some oppositions by combining structural oxymora and new 
ways of uttering the event. The study of these features (and 
combination) is pertinent for anthropology (by seizing facts thanks to 
elaborated 'ways of uttering' authors often redefine forms of huma­
nity) and for semiotics (any form of expression, even if original, has to 
be collectively shared and based on a system of signs). In my opinion, 
a joint semiotic and anthropological approach can help to better 
analyse histories of survival as a 'literary genre' and as a 'cultural 
negative phenomenon'. 
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Как начинаются истории выживания: 
Начальные слова как стратегическое место для выражения 
невыразимого 
В статье анализируются истории людей, побывавших в концлагере: 
Де Гол ль Антониоз (La Traversée de la nuit), Жоффруа (Au temps des 
crématoires...) и Семпрун (L'Ecriture ou la vie). Эти истории расска­
зывают о жизни выживших, но в то же время представляют и лите­
ратурную форму, нарративная структура которой кодифицирует код 
самостоятельного жанра. Более детально я сосредотачиваюсь на 
введении — на стратегическом отрывке в тексте, в котором 
выявляются определенные черты общего значения и вся композиция 
текста. Я предполагаю, что в историях выживания авторы уже в 
начале стараются передать эмблематическую ценность своей исто­
рии: это пограничное и травматическое переживание, которое труд­
но выразить. Анализ выбранных введений показывает, что для выра­
жения опыта концлагеря необходима определенная работа над 
формой выражения и художественные достоинства при передаче эти 
переживаний идут только на пользу. С точки зрения структуры 
произведения нарративы выживания расширяют уже существующие 
во многих литературных жанрах и течениях дихотомии: «внешняя 
референция» и «внутренняя организация», миметическая «правда» и 
нарративная «структура», «реальность» и «конвенция», «опыт» и 
«рассказ». По моему мнению, истории выживания решают эти про­
тиворечия, согласуя оппозиции с помощью оксюморона. Даже 
нарративные структуры и такие ключевые фигуры как автор, 
рассказчик, наблюдатель, свидетель и т.д. имеют склонность прера-
титься в оксюморон. Анализом названных составляющих (и их 
комбинаций) занимается как антропология так и семиотика. Антро­
пология — поскольку авторы, осмысляя факты с помощью сложных 
способов высказывания, зачастую заново определяют понятие 
человечности. Семиотика — так как любой способ выражения, сколь 
бы он ни был оригинальным, всегда коллективен и основывается на 
какой-либо знаковой системе. Я считаю, что соединение антрополо­
гического и семиотического подхода позволяет анализировать исто­
рии выживания одновременно в качестве как «литературного 
жанра», так и «трагического события истории». 
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Kuidas saavad alguse ellujäämislood: 
Avasõnad kui strateegiline koht väljendamatu väljendamiseks 
Analüüsin käesolevas artiklis paari koonduslaagris elanud ja hiljem oma 
kogemusest rääkinud inimese lugusid: De Gaulle Anthonioz (La Tra­
versée de la nuit), Geoffroy (Au temps des crématoires...), Semprun 
(L'Écriture ou la vie). Need lood räägivad ellujääjate eludest, kuid samal 
ajal esindavad nad ka kirjandusvormi, mille narratiivne struktuur moo­
dustab eraldi žanri koodi. Täpsemalt keskendun ma avasõnadele — stra­
teegilisele lõigule tekstis, milles avalduvad teksti üldise tähenduse teatud 
jooned ja kogu teksti kompositsioon. Pakun välja, et ellujäämislugudes 
üritavad autorid juba avasõnadega edastada oma loo emblemaatilist 
väärtust: see on äärmuslik ja traumaatiline elamus, mida on raske väljen­
dada. Valitud avalõikude analüüs näitab, et koonduslaagrielamuste väljen­
damiseks on vajalik teate sõnaosavus ning kunstilised kaalutlused tulevad 
nende kogemuste esitamisel ainult kasuks. Teose struktuuri seisukohast 
laiendavad ellujäämisnarratiivid paljudes kirjandusžanrides ja -vooludes 
juba eksisteerivaid dihhotoomiaid: "osutus" ja "sisemine organiseeritus", 
mimeetiline "tõde" ja nairatiivne "struktuur", "reaalsus" ja "kokku­
leppelisus", "kogemus" ja "jutustus". Minu arvates lahendavad ellu­
jäämislood need vastuolud, lepitades vastaspoolused oksüümoroni kaudu. 
Isegi narratiivsetel struktuuridel ja sellistel võtmefiguuridel nagu autor, 
jutustaja, vaatleja, tunnistaja jne on kalduvus oksüümoroniks muutuda. 
Nimetatud elementide (ja nende kombinatsiooni) analüüs kuulub antro­
poloogia ja semiootika pädevusse. Antropoloogia valda, kuna keerukate 
väljendusmallide abil fakte mõtestades annavad autorid tihti inimlikkusele 
uue definitsiooni, ja semiootikasse, kuivõrd igasugune väljendusviis, 
ükskõik kui originaalne, on alati kollektiivne ning põhineb mingil märgi­
süsteemil. Arvan, et antropoloogilise ja semiootilise lähenemise ühenda­
mine võimaldab ellujäämislugusid analüüsida üheaegselt nii "kirjandus-
žanri" kui "traagilise ajaloonähtusena". 
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Abstract. An analysis of the mnemonic mechanisms at work in the narrative 
of the concentration camp experience, based on the case of Robert Antelme. 
This survivor of the Buchenwald camp gave a first spoken version of what 
was to become his major work, l'Espèce humaine (The Human Species), to his 
friend Dionys Mascolo. Mascolo's testimony concerning the narrative that 
was told to him and his reception, some time later, of the written narrative 
(with the transition between the two versions marked by forgetting), question 
the notion of loss — in particular, the loss of a "0" text which is the text of 
death. This postulate allows us to explore the notion of the ineffable and to 
reveal its cultural implications; in other words, to approach the concept of 
survival as a narrative category. 
There are two different approaches to survivor narratives. On the one 
hand, one may read them as literary texts constituting a sign system in 
relation to the referential world. On the other hand, one may also read 
them as testimony. In the latter case, survivor narratives amount to an 
object of anthropology of memory1 as their main aim is to preserve a 
trace of the events2. The narrative of Antelme, the genesis of which 
we have precise knowledge about, opens a vast field of study dealing 
with the mechanics of handing down experience3 as well as issues of 
its effacement4. 
Cf. Ricoeur 2000. 
2 Cf. Nora 1997. 
Cf. Boursier 2002. 
Cf. Agamben 1998, 
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Robert Antelme, writer and resistance fighter, was arrested in 1944 
and deported first to Buchenwald and then to Dachau (Lignes 21, 
1994). On his liberation in 1945, he had the opportunity, of which 
others in the same situation were painfully deprived, of immediately 
describing his experience to the friend who had come to fetch him at 
the camp, Dionys Mascolo. These were, in a way, ideal conditions in 
which to produce testimony: the words spilled out freely, without any 
judicial, political or other sort of consideration, and they were 
received by a listener who was fully aware of the importance of his 
task and ready to offer his collaboration, insofar as it was possible, to 
create a lasting trace of the event by becoming a sort of co-witness. 
We have, in addition, the testimony given by Mascolo, the person who 
received this first spoken text, who was to be confronted with the 
problems of memory and forgetting experienced by the witnesses 
themselves. The literary document L'Espèce Humaine (The Human 
Species) would thus be coupled with a literary document concerning 
the genesis of this text, Autour d'un effort de mémoire (On an effort of 
memory) by Dionys Mascolo. This little book published in 1987 by 
Editions Maurice Nadeau allows us to investigate the blurred area 
which generally surrounds the genealogy of texts emerging from the 
experience of the concentration camps. 
The spoken text elaborated by Robert Antelme immediately 
following his liberation prefigured, minus one episode, the written text 
of L'Espèce humaine. When, in 1947, Dionys Mascolo read the book, 
he recognised the spoken text and identified the one episode which 
had been added to the written version. This was the episode about 
sweeping the factory office (Antelme 1978: 56-57). Antelme, prisoner 
in the Buchenwald camp, weak and exhausted, was an unbearable 
sight for the young German employee who witnessed his desperate 
efforts to sweep the office. In the end, she grabbed the broom away 
from him and threw him out of the room. 
Mascolo, however, does not tell us whether any part of the spoken 
text was omitted from the written version. For, although when he 
received the spoken narrative, he became its privileged and faithful 
guardian, no trace of the original remained when L 'Espèce humaine, 
at the moment of publication, supplanted the spoken version. Forty 
years later, when he wrote his homage to Robert Antelme, his memory 
failed him: "[...] I am unable to retrieve the source of almost any of 
his words" (Mascolo 1987: 51). 
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Nevertheless, in a letter written to Mascolo, Antelme seems to say 
that he used the distance that separated him from the experience to 
make his selection: 
I would like to tell you other things on this subject that seem important to me, 
but I realise that I run a serious risk: D. I think that I no longer know what can 
be said and what cannot be said. In hell we say everything, in fact that must be 
how we know it is hell; as far as I am concerned, this is mainly how it was 
revealed to me. In our world, however, we tend to choose, and I think that I no 
longer know how to choose. (Mascolo 1987: 14) 
Antelme and Mascolo made the return trip to Paris together, during 
which Antelme described, in jumbled order, all of the episodes which 
had taken place during his period of detention. 
I know however that I registered these words, as they were being told, and in 
such a way that I could have written down the essential points myself if it 
happened that he died; we knew this, both of us, at the moment. This was the 
reason for our reciprocal avidity, for him to make me see, for me to discover 
the unimaginable, and our complicity, against the backdrop of his possible 
death, which did not permit us to rest. To be silent, to sleep, these were things 
we could not do without committing a crime. (Mascolo 1987: 51) 
We could say that Mascolo lent his memory to Antelme in the physio­
logical and medical sense of the word. At a certain moment, he 
substituted himself for Antelme, immersing himself in his experience 
to the point of being capable of bearing testimony in his place. But at 
another moment, he had already forgotten it all. The words were 
inside him, but he could no longer unreel them, as if he had swallowed 
the text. 
It is precisely because I know everything that I cannot retrieve the source of 
almost any of his words. I must therefore, in what follows, place my 
confidence above all in the images I have kept of what surrounded us, the 
scenes or events that served as the external environment of these words, like 
their décor. (Mascolo 1987: 51) 
The spoken text flowed from Antelme's memory into Mascolo's. 
Mascolo possessed the reality of the camps in place of his friend. 
Then, he evacuated it. We cannot impute this forgetting to the passing 
years. The forgetting of the source by the person who witnessed its 
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outpouring dates from the era of the first reading of L'Espèce 
humaine. The episode that Mascolo remembered at that time was the 
one in which, during the death march from Buchenwald to Dachau, 
Antelme escaped from the column and was caught by some children. 
Why this episode rather than another? A wave of pity submerged the 
listener at this moment, writes Mascolo. For one instant, the listener 
ceased being the double of the witness, taking up his true place, that of 
an outside listener, through the filter of emotion. 
As for the rest, I know only that, when I read it, I remembered that I had heard 
him tell it to me. (Mascolo 1987: 50) 
In which moment was the spoken text evacuated? Visibly, at the 
moment of the discovery of the written text, it was already about to 
efface itself, for otherwise Mascolo would not have used the word 
"remember" which implies a re-memory, a rising to the surface of 
memory. The spoken text, first conscientiously registered, then 
entirely forgotten, rose to the surface once again at the moment of 
reading, both supplanted and resuscitated by the written word. 
Mascolo had appropriated the text so as to substitute himself for 
Antelme in the event of his death, for Antelme's survival was not yet 
certain. Memory functioned as a temporary graft; when the written 
text came into being, the body of the recipient was emptied. At the 
moment of transmission, Antelme was not yet a completely living 
person; he shared with those who had disappeared a knowledge 
immersed in oblivion. It was Antelme's potential death which gave 
the narrative its framework. 
[...] For it's important for you to know, D., that during the first days when I 
was in my bed and when I talked to you, to you and to Marguerite especially, I 
was not a man of this earth. I insist on this fact which haunts me 
retrospectively. (Mascolo 1987: 92) 
As long as Antelme remained a man not of this earth, Mascolo kept 
the text in his memory (Lignes 33: 210-211). If this text was no 
longer in his memory when Antelme showed that he had returned to 
life by putting his testimony into writing, it is because the spoken text 
no longer had a reason to exist. And, if Mascolo had forgotten a text 
that was of such importance to him, it is because it was not in his 
power to preserve it. The oral testimony emerged from the place of 
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death. By lending his memory to Antelme, Mascolo was able to join 
him in that place, which he had subsequently to leave in order to 
continue to live. 
This is thus a text whose emergence takes place in immediate 
contact with death and with which the survivor must cut his ties. Once 
the danger of death has been averted and the return to life given form 
in writing, the first text plunges into oblivion, making room for a 
lasting document which no longer risks being lost. 
What gives us the sense of something irretrievable in the written 
documents concerning the concentration camps, something which 
cannot be put into words, would thus be due to the effacement of a 
text prior to testimony, the text of death, and its definitive supplanting 
by the written word. It is not because the experience of the camps 
cannot be put into words, but because it can be done so all too 
completely, whether in a language limited to a dozen terms or in an 
epic narrative, that the loss of this first document endures as a kind of 
primal wound which leaves its mark on all subsequent testimonies. 
What we call ineffable in the experience of the camps would thus be a 
way of naming a posteriori this disappearance of the text, associated 
with the return to life. 
But what about the ineffable experience of which they (the words) are the 
echo? It is not the experience of the camps, which is only the cause, a 
necessary one to be sure. [...] The ineffable to which these words refer is 
itself contained in words which the present speaker sees himself as the witness 
of. [...] here, uniquely, the ineffable designates not what he, now a witness, 
heard as told to him (he was told), but indeed what he in his emotion, actively 
heard himself being told : and told to others — or told to us. (Mascolo 1987: 
12) 
We should keep in mind that this notion of the ineffable relies on what 
I would call the apophatic a priori, a major premise of European 
culture according to which a primary object exists which cannot be 
captured in thought or language. The narrative of the camps, trans­
mitted within a given culture, inevitably assimilates its mechanisms 
while at the same time modifying them. The notion of the ineffable or 
inexpressible is one of the tools used by our culture to inhabit its 
shadowy or inaccessible areas, postulated as ante-predicative or meta-
predicative. 
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What Mascolo recounts in his late testimony concerning the 
conditions in which L'Espèce Humaine was written is the loss of this 
first version of the text, an oral "rough draft" destined to disappear for 
the very reason that it was inscribed in the witness's body, in that 
particular state still linked to death (Sofsky 1995: 250). 
We can thus postulate that in his role of substitute witness, 
Mascolo, whether he wished it to be so or not, reproduced the 
conditions of the testimony's emergence and that it was the text itself 
and not an individual memory which dictated these conditions. The 
body of the survivor, from which and in which the witness's testimony 
unfolds, has the dual status of object of investigation and exhibit. The 
paradox of reproducing the reality of the concentration camps consists 
precisely in this: at the very moment when the necessary words come 
into being, the body which authenticates this reality is no longer that 
of the wordless subject to which the testimony refers. The body of the 
Survivor at the moment of the writing has regained the vitality which 
the prisoner, lying between life and death, lacked. In the case of 
Robert Antelme, the written word came into being within two bodies, 
that of Antelme, who lived through the experience, and that of 
Mascolo, who did not; a body lying between life and death and whose 
outcome — life or death — was uncertain, and another body 
belonging to a healthy man who had never experienced this state, but 
who absorbed the text which reproduced it, like a cassette tape or a 
sheet of paper, thus becoming a medium, the materiality of Antelme's 
spoken text. Mascolo tells us nothing, for example, about the 
difference in tone between the spoken narrative and the written one, 
which henceforth belongs to the realm of literature, nor does he tell us 
anything about the writing in and of itself, nor about the way in which 
it transforms the testimony, he speaks only of the way the different 
episodes fit together, of their architecture; never does he discuss the 
text's corporality. He knew nothing of this, no doubt, when he 
received the testimony, for the simple reason that it was his own body 
which served as the guarantee of this corporality. Without him, the 
narrative would have remained in a phantom state, or more precisely: 
as a phantom pain. Or, to formulate it differently, Mascolo himself 
was the body of the text. When the text acquired a different 
materiality, that of the written word, he was then quite naturally 
divested of it. What could have been perceived of as an appropriation 
was in fact only a step in the elaboration of the testimony and was no 
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more destined to "endure" than a single coat of paint amongst the 
successive coats of a painting elaborated with the glazing technique. 
It is interesting to note that other Survivors of the camps were, in 
one way or another, threatened with the phenomenon of forgetting. 
Some would object to the term "threatened", considering that 
forgetting, in this case, was the result of a mechanism of self-defence 
set in motion precisely by a logic of survival, and that it could be 
considered as a salvation. Indeed certain recent psychoanalytical stu­
dies (Rosenblum 2000) tend to show that the obsessional conversion 
of memory into narration does not necessarily imply a logic of 
salvation but can on the contrary rekindle the trauma. To write about 
the experience of the camps would thus be tantamount, in a way, to 
not surviving. The suicide of a number of former prisoners (Primo 
Levi, Piotr Rawicz, Bruno Bettelheim, Tadeusz Borowski, Jean 
Améry, Sarah Koffman) seems to support this tendency or, at least, to 
alert us. Nevertheless, according to the witnesses themselves, 
forgetting would have added to the unbearable trauma of the camps, 
one more loss in the series of losses bome during imprisonment, thus 
becoming a reactivation of the experience of the camps. Here is what 
another French survivor of Buchenwald, David Rousset, says on the 
subject: 
When I recovered from the typhoid fever, I experienced a very difficult 
period. Of course, I did remember that I had been imprisoned in the Nazi 
prison camps. For other people, forgetting everything would have been a 
veritable liberation, but not for me. I had the terrible feeling of having lost 
something essential, something extraordinarily precious. 
Then came the period of my convalescence. [...] By dint of eating heavy 
cream, milk and fresh eggs, my health returned. I gained nearly a kilo every 
day. And, little by little, my memory came back. It was an impressive 
phenomenon. Each day, a new section of my memory returned so that in the 
end I had gotten it all back, except — and I didn't give a damn about that and 
still don't — part of the time I spent in hospital that never came back to me 
and that has been completely erased from my mind. (Copferman 1991: 77) 
The section of his memories which had been definitively forgotten, 
which does not seem to have much value for David Rousset, most 
probably corresponds to the moment of his passage from death to life, 
precisely this same moment of passage which similarly occupies 
Mascolo's memories while subsequently being conspicuous by its 
absence, characterised by loss. Memory as it functions through words, 
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and which indudes the category of anteriority, cannot be achieved 
other than through the materiality of a body which has returned to life. 
Rousset's testimony is extremely precise concerning this point : 
memory depends on the weight of the flesh growing back onto the 
muscles. What, then, does the memory of a person who is at the limit 
between life and death consist in? Although Mascolo does not say 
much about Antelme's spoken narrative, for the simple reason that he 
cannot be at the same time both inside and outside the narrative (he 
cannot "visualise" it, because he is its receptacle), it is nonetheless 
significant that he mentions that Antelme told the story in jumbled 
order. In other words, the spoken narrative was not organised into a 
temporality implying a sequence of events going from a "before" to an 
"afterwards", but instead all the episodes were treated in a dis­
organised manner or as if they had all happened at the same time, in 
any case, in a non-linear time-space. If we keep in mind the fact that 
in the testimonies of most of the survivors, the temporality of the 
concentration camp was assimilated into a sort of present tense with­
out past or future, without depth or evolution, we can thus conclude 
that the first spoken narrative was oriented towards a temporal model 
different from ours which mimed the temporality of the concentration 
camps. This "disorder" showed not so much the chaotic aspect of 
memory but rather a specific organisation of time that was perceived, 
from our vantage point, as disorder. The passage from the spoken to 
the written word, the "translation" of the experience into the language 
of the living implied a conversion into the reader's temporality, a 
conversion which took place precisely in the act of writing. The 
linearity which permitted the narrative to unfold, to be orchestrated 
into sequences, could not take place until the body's corporality had 
been retrieved and, with it, all the spatio-temporal co-ordinates in 
which it moved. Forgetting, the momentary loss of memory of the 
camps, probably corresponded to the passage from one temporality to 
the other, from the spatialised present to the linearity of successive 
instants (Halbwachs 1968). 
As for Mascolo, he had never experienced the degradation of the 
body. If forgetting was only dependent on physical functions, there 
was no reason for him to mime the survivor's experience in this way. 
This enables us to affirm that the forgetting which affected Mascolo's 
testimony was, in a certain way, programmed by the text itself; it was 
a physical function of the text. The surviving body superimposed itself 
The case of Robert Antelme 449 
on the body of the text, with identical mechanisms taking place in 
each of them. What happened to Mascolo must also have happened to 
Antelme: he also forgot the first text. Indeed, the first text which 
contained the entire experience and adhered to it almost to the point of 
merging with it in an imperious desire to tell the story, together with 
other physical needs such as eating, drinking, and sleeping, could not 
be preserved in its principiality, for otherwise it would ensure the 
continuity of the very lack of differentiation which characterised the 
conscience of the concentration camp prisoners (Levi 1997). 
This is what Antelme himself had to say about the first spoken 
narrative when L'Espèce Humaine was published: 
Two years ago, during the first days following our return, we all, I believe, fell 
prey to a veritable delirium. We wanted to speak, to be heard at last. We were 
told that our physical appearance was already sufficiently eloquent. But we 
had just returned, we carried with us our memory, our living, breathing 
experience, and we had a frenetic desire to describe it as it had been. Yet, 
from the very first days, it seemed impossible for us to bridge the gap we 
discovered between the language available to us and this experience which, 
for most of us, we were still pursuing in our flesh. How could we resign 
ourselves to not trying to explain how we had gotten to this point? We were 
still there. And nevertheless it was impossible. No sooner had we begun to 
speak than we choked on the words. What we had to say began to seem 
unimaginable even to us. (Antelme 1947: 9) 
We have seen elsewhere that the passage from one temporality to 
another implies a choice, and that even if Mascolo is unable to tell us 
anything about this choice, we can suppose that it was made in the act 
of writing. The first spoken text, in comparison with the written 
version, presents a kind of completeness, since we have been told that 
in hell everything could be said. From an act of speaking which 
includes everything we move to an act of writing filled with gaps, and 
at the same time, from the total solidarity of all the moments taken 
together, we move to a hierarchical organisation on the temporal axis. 
However, this "everything" that can be put into words is at the same 
time "nothing", since at the moment of leaving the concentration 
camp, nothing has yet been said and, precisely, everything has yet to 
be said. The totality of the word in the concentration camp is a mute 
word, total because it is mute and mute because it is total. It suffers 
from a globality that is cured by the language of a man who, once he 
has returned to "normal" life, can finally bear testimony. We might as 
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well say that it is the metaphorical function of language that, in the 
concentration camps, is ill. The word is so close to the thing it 
designates that it is inextricable from it. 
The word "hell" used by Antelme is not a metaphor, it is "hell". 
The "everything can be said" of the camps implies that the gaps or 
incompleteness of language are not expressed: language thus loses one 
of its functions, which is to express its own insufficiency. The litera­
ture that emerged from the camps abounds in statements expressing 
the incapacity of words to describe the experience, statements that 
have justifiably given weight to the concept of the inexpressible. "This 
cannot be put into words": such is the leitmotiv running through 
innumerable testimonies about the camps. More generally, written and 
spoken language has the capacity to indicate the inadequacy of 
expression between what is experienced and how it is represented. 
However paradoxical it may seem, the ability to "say everything" 
supposes that the language of the camps, no matter how reduced it 
may be in the case of an exhausted prisoner, perfectly adheres to what 
it is trying to express and is thus wholly able to put the experience into 
words. (The more limited the language, the more significant is each 
sequence.) 
When Antelme described his experience of the camps to Mascolo, 
he was no longer using this "total" language, because in the camps 
experience is not described, the events are not doubled by the spoken 
word but engraved in the body which alone is capable of reproducing 
them. We can nonetheless suppose that he attempted, in this first 
spoken version of the events, to represent that language. The pressure 
of the words makes us think that indeed something close to corporeal 
was taking place in the first moments following his liberation. 
In his state of physical exhaustion, his only form of existence was through 
words. I didn't need to question him. He spoke about everything. Everything 
he had lived through for the past year, episode after episode, in no special 
order, each episode referring to another. To remain silent more than a few 
instants was impossible for him. He spoke in a continuous flow. Without 
hesitation, without commotion, as if under the pressure of a continuous 
source, possessed of the truly inexhaustible need to tell as much as he could 
before his possible death, and even death apparently had no importance for 
him other than this urgency to speak which its imminence imposed on him. 1 
5 Cf. Foucault 1969. 
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think that we did not sleep more than four or five hours during the two days of 
the return trip. (Mascolo 1987: 49-50) 
In conclusion, I would say that the fear of losing the testimony which 
forced Antelme to speak at the risk of his life, no doubt reveals a 
veritable loss in the passage from the experience to its representation. 
The concentration camp rendered after the event via its narrative 
conveys the idea (a kind of negative, infernal Utopia) of an on-the-spot 
ontology, without recourse to the mediation of language. Something 
of this type of ontology can be seen in numerous accounts. However 
terrible the experience was, it nonetheless reveals a state of being 
which, on the verge of disappearing, can no longer be told and no 
longer needs to be told, attaining the self at the moment of the ultimate 
loss of self. As the space severed from the vast narrative of the world, 
the gaping yawn in the universal story, the camp itself cannot be 
described, in that the prisoner in his extreme state of existence no 
longer needs the personal narrative in order to communicate with his 
inner self. His inner self is directly accessible to him, and this 
accessibility is the very point at which he descends into death. It is 
probably this paradox that another Survivor, Primo Levi, tried to 
convey when he said that he had,lived some of the most intense 
moments of his life in Auschwitz. 
The Survivor moves away from this state of being, and his survival 
cannot be achieved except at this cost. By re-entering the narrative 
mechanisms that control our perception of the world, he returns to the 
living. The narrative leaves the body and organises itself on paper in 
ordered sequences of time rather than in blocks of speech which vie 
with the vital functions. What is at stake here, together with the 
biological phenomenon of the return to life, is sur-vival as a narrative 
category: regained life ceases to be the sole objective and is doubled 
by a narrative which superimposes itself upon it by pushing the pure 
sensation of existence into the zone of presupposition, not directly 
accessible by perception. 
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Случай Робера Антельма 
Настоящая статья анализирует на примере Робера Антельма мнемо­
нические механизмы, которые работают при рассказе об опыте 
жизни в концлагере. Робер Антельм выжил в Бухенвальде и первую 
версию о своих переживаниях (позже на этой основе была издана его 
главная книга «Род человеческий») он рассказал своему другу 
Дионису Маскало. Высказывания Маскало по поводу этого рассказа 
и своего отношения к описанному потом в книге (разницу в двух 
версиях можно характеризовать ключевым понятием забвение) 
ставят в фокус понятие потери — точнее, потери так называемого 
«нулевого текста», т.е. текста смерти. Подобное утверждение по­
зволяет нам изучить понятие невыражаемого и выявить культурные 
импликации невыражаемости. Другими словами, таким образом 
становится возможным описать понятие выживания в качестве нар­
ративной стратегии. 
Robert Antelme'i juhtum 
Artikkel analüüsib Robert Antelme'i näitel mnemoonilisi mehhanisme, 
mis toimivad koonduslaagri kogemuse jutustamisel. Robert Antelme 
pääses eluga Buchenwaldi laagrist ning esimese versiooni tema läbi­
elamistest, millest hiljem sai Antelme'i peateos l'Espèce humaine {Inim­
sugu), esitas ta suulise jutustusena oma sõbrale Dionys Mascalole. 
Mascolo ütlused selle loo kohta, mida talle jutustati, ning see, kuidas ta 
hiljem kirjutatud loo vastu võttis (nende kahe versiooni vahel toimunud 
muutuse võtmesõnaks on unustamine), seavad fookusesse kaotuse 
mõiste— täpsemalt nn "nullteksti", st surmateksti kaotuse. Taoline väide 
annab meile võimaluse uurida väljendamatuse mõistet ning tuua esile 
väljendamatuse kultuurilised implikatsioonid, ehk teisisõnu saab selle läbi 
võimalikuks käsitleda ellujäämise mõistet kui narratiivset strateegiat. 
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Abstract. Victor Klemperer, German philologist and Professor at the Univer­
sity of Dresden, bears testimony to his survival during the Nazi years in his 
Diaries (1933-1945). Progressively excluded from all social life because of 
his Jewish religion, Klemperer is forced to recognize himself as a non-subject 
by the end of the war, calling himself "Nobody" in reference to Ulysses with 
Polyphemus, the Cyclops. Our article aims to show the mental — cognitive 
and corporal — process underlying this recognition. Our study will explore 
the two-pronged thrust of this process: faced with the inexorable destruction 
of his self, Klemperer has to acknowledge the limits of his analytical capaci­
ties. But this extreme experience will enable him to create somatic knowledge 
destined to recognize what he calls "thought of extinction". To conclude, we 
show how this reasoning is based upon action language which consists in 
naming the body. 
We shall try to show how the exceptional testimonial value of Victor 
Klemperer's Diaries (1933-1945) emerges from a formal analysis of 
his writing. A German citizen declared to be a Jew by the laws of 
Nuremberg, Victor Klemperer appropriates his writing as a philo­
logical investigation of what he calls the LTI (the Lingua Tertii 
Imperii), the language of the 3rd Reich invading the sphere of public 
and private life. Our study will center on how Klemperer develops 
over the years a rhetorical strategy designed to textualize an extreme 
experience. On the conceptual level, this strategy is based upon the 
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new formalization of the rhetorical category of the plausible: the topic 
of implausible truth. 
We propose to develop two hypotheses: on the one hand, Klem­
perer tries to make his testimony credible by availing himself of the 
argumentative domain of ethos. In the rhetorical tradition, construc­
tion of a self-image (ethos) attempts to make the listeners trust the 
orator, highlighting his character, the sensible nature of his approach 
and the virtue from which he draws his inspiration. On the other hand, 
threatened by the Nazis' policy of annihilation, Klemperer will be 
forced to redefine the relation to self and others, modalizing a testi­
monial discourse which articulates the argumentative domain of 
pathos. If the discourse of ethos tends toward abstraction, giving rise 
to a philological reflection on the LTI, its counterpart in the domain of 
pathos proceeds by emotional concretion in order to situate the very 
place of destruction: the body. 
1. Diaries of a non-subject 
Victor Klemperer, who was born in 1881 in Landsberg and died in 
1960 in Dresden, began keeping a journal in his youth, writing a 
chronicle of his life and times.1 A philologist, a specialist in Romance 
languages renowned in the field of French literature, a professor at the 
universities of Munich, Dresden, Greifswald, Halle and, at the end of 
his career, at Humboldt University in East Berlin, he became a major 
witness to the Nazis' criminal policy (Mieder 2000; Jacobs 2000). 
Victor Klemperer was from a family of rabbis, and he converted to 
Protestantism at the age of twenty-two in order to make it clear that he 
lit into German culture. A firm conviction made him reject all incen­
tives to flee the Hitlerian regime in spite of ever more threatening 
signs. He managed to survive this catastrophe, undergoing many 
ordeals in the process. 
The object ol our study is less the exceptional testimonial value of 
the Diaries which Victor Klemperer kept during the Nazi period 
Among the 16,000 pages of manuscripts in the Dresden library, the following 
major works have been published: Curriculum vitae. Erinnerungen 1881-1918 
(Klemperer 1989); Leben sammeln, nicht fragen wozu und warum. Tagebücher 
1918-1932 (Klemperer 1996) and So sitze ich denn zwischen allen Stühlen. 
Tagebücher 1945-1959 (Klemperer 1999a). 
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(Dirschauer 1997) than the shaping of his own language. Sometimes 
ironic and sarcastic, sometimes friendly and generous, but above all 
intentionally lucid vis-à-vis a self-image which appears to be 
irrevocably condemned, this total revelation is inspired both by a 
sense of duty to bear witness and by the spirit of the man of letters: 
this textualization of the limit consists in representing that which 
escapes immediate apprehension and assigning a linguistic place to an 
evolving thought process, particularly in the realm of modern art.2 
Klemperer's Diaries thus seek to attribute a verbal form to an ever-
elusive reality, defining a living condition whose entire social 
foundation is progressively undermined. This loss directly threatens 
the scriptorial act, not in its very materiality, as shown by the 
hundreds of notes, but in its capacity to refer to a world of established 
meaning. By established meaning we mean the semio-noetic back­
ground postulated, proven, and validated by the doxa, the meaning 
that is necessary for the development of a topic centered on the logico-
discursive domain. Klemperer's Diaries bear the signs of his times 
which, from a cultural point of view, will always be — no matter 
what— ours, in his attempt to formulate that which finds infinite 
expression only in the representation of radical negativity — the 
Shoah — and in his appeal to silence, imposed by destruction itself.3 
Klemperer also shows that the constant vacillation which marks his 
status as potential deportee corresponds to an organizing principle 
characterized by an inexorable logic of destruction. If the testimonial 
act records the elements necessary for the restoration of an individual 
present, guarantor of a form of existence, however precarious it may 
be, Klemperer cannot rid himself of the social, cultural and religious 
identity which defines him, according to the criteria established by the 
Some passages in the Diaries are of considerable literary value, as seen in our 
analysis (Rinn 1999a). See also our article on the Hungarian writer Imre Kertész 
(Rinn 2005). 
Imre Kertész (1999: 88), Auschwitz survivor, draws the following conclusion: 
"But the conditions that made Auschwitz were already there, previously, in 
everyday life; otherwise, Auschwitz couldn't have existed. And knowledge of 
those conditions remains, precisely, our unfinished business. [...] How can I 
explain? There are quite simply, in each person's life, unclear areas. They must be 
swept under the carpet. If we don't come to terms with them, we end up having to 
deal with forces that surpass our strength". 
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Nazis, as a non-subject destined to be put to death.4 Klemperer's 
journal is proof of the unbearable tension between the will to survive 
in the present of writing and the anticipation of his ultimate destiny. 
2€ Destruction of the self-image 
The first hypothesis that we shall develop in this article, the imple­
mentation of writing, must be viewed as a procedure for the building 
of a self-image (which the rhetorical tradition calls ethos), with the 
aim of strengthening the credibility of the logico-discursive argumen­
tation. However, Victor Klemperer will be unable to escape the role of 
non-subject inflicted upon him by the Nazis, in spite of the remarkable 
intellectual effort he makes in order to develop awareness of his 
situation. What is even worse is that his writing will become the 
theatre of a formidable conflict between the detailed analysis of the 
Nazis criminal policy on the one hand, and his quest for identity 
which will doggedly affirm that he belongs to German culture. For a 
long time, the journal will confirm Klemperer's' choice to stay in 
Germany in spite of the Nazis, even if staying eventually becomes 
synonymous with the inability to remain detached from what is 
happening around him. Thus, in spite of his criticism, Klemperer will 
be all but incapable of escaping the machinery of genocidal logic, a 
fact having great significance for the media exposure given to 
genocide in our time. 
The excerpts we have chosen will serve to illustrate the tragedy of 
conscious thought caught in its own trap. The following passage 
represents the culmination of an inner struggle which grows out of the 
narrative project to go all the way and its logical consequence, the 
enactment of extreme events, giving rise to the following question: to 
what extent can the act of writing create favorable conditions for the 
commission of a criminal act? It is the eve of the destruction of 
Dresden which took place on the night of February 13, 1945, in which 
the deaths numbered in the tens of thousands. 
4 In our research on genocide narratives, we treated this social semiosis as an 
act of designation by means of which the S. S. speaker defines the category to 
which his victims belong (Rinn 1999b). 
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13lh February [1945], Tuesday afternoon, perfect spring weather 
(I) Odysseus in Polyphemus's cave. — Yesterday afternoon Neumark had me 
called over; I had to help him deliver letters this morning. I was quite 
unsuspecting. In the evening Berger was up here with me for a while, I told 
him, and he was annoyed and said, it'll be for digging trenches. I still did not 
grasp the seriousness of the threat. [...] 
(II) For the first quarter of an hour my heart let me down completely, then 
later I was completely blunted, i.e. I made observations for my diary. The 
circular to be delivered stated that one had to present oneself at 3 
Zeughausstrasse early on Friday morning, wearing working clothes and with 
hand luggage, which would have to be carried for a considerable distance, and 
with provisions for two to three day's travel. On this occasion there is to be no 
confiscation of property, furniture etc., the whole thing is explicitly no more 
than outside work duty — but is without exception regarded as a death march. 
The most cruel separations are taking place: Frau Eisenmann and Schorschi 
stay here, Lisel, the 11-year-old [girl] who wears the star, has to leave with 
father and Herbert. No allowance is made for old age or youth, not for 70 nor 
for 7 — what they mean by 'capable work' is quite incomprehensible. [...] 
(III) Even more pitiful was Frau Bitterwolf in Struvestrasse. Again a shabby 
house; I was vainly studying the list of names in the entrance hall when a 
blonde, snub-nosed young woman with a pretty, well-looked-after little girl, 
perhaps four years old, appeared. Did a Frau Bitterwe If live here? She was 
Frau Bitterwolf. I had to give her an unpleasant message. She read the letter, 
she said several times, quit,e helplessly: 'What is to become of the child?', 
then signed silently with a pencil. Meanwhile the child pressed up against me, 
held out her teddy bear and, radiantly, cheerfully, declared: 'My teddy, my 
teddy, look !' The woman then went silently up the stairs with the child. 
Immediately afterwards I heard her weeping loudly. [...] 
(IV) At Neumark's the whole office was crowded with those to be deported, I 
shook hands with Paul Lang, Reger, Lewinsky — 'You're coming too? No?' 
with that there was already a gulf between us. I went upstairs to the 
Eisenmanns for a moment, the whole family had assembled extremely 
upset. I went to Waldmann, who remains here. He set forth the gloomiest 
hypothesis with very great certainty. [...] And we who remain behind, 'we 
have nothing more than a reprieve of perhaps a week. Then we'll be fetched 
out of our beds at six o'clock in the morning. And we'll end up just like the 
others.' I threw in: Why are they leaving such a small remnant here? And 
now, when they've got so little time? He: 'You'll see, I'll turn out to be right'. 
(Klemperer 2000: 493-495) 
The passage recounts the last episode in the extermination of the Jews 
in Dresden. In February 1945, only a few dozen people remained from 
a community which included, according to the defining criteria 
established by the racial laws of Nuremberg, 4675 Jewish inhabitants 
in 1933. During the twelve previous years, from one deportation to the 
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next, section by section, and at an unforeseeable yet inexorable pace, 
this population was methodically decimated. Klemperer, both lucid 
observer of this process and its designated victim, had every reason to 
fear the worst. In previously recorded notes, he had long acknow­
ledged, in his own handwriting, the meaning of the kind of 
Arbeitseinsatz to which the Jews would be called. 
Thus, the first paragraph raises the question as to why Klemperer 
refuses to acknowledge that at this precise moment he is playing the 
role of messenger of death. According to our hypothesis, his very 
method of investigation, his approval of his own reasoning is what 
makes him blind. Unlike the episode in which Ulysses visits Polyphe­
mus, the famous passage in The Odyssey to which he refers, here the 
weapon used in an attempt to deceive the Nazi Cyclops backfires on 
him. The act of writing, instead of enabling him to remain impartial in 
his evaluation of the Nazis' murderous logic, helps to seal his own 
fate and that which is reserved for the Jewish community. 
In the second paragraph, an unbearable passage, the juxtaposition 
between apathy and testimony dramatizes the reversal of the ancient 
scenario. If Ulysses introduces himself to his jailer as "Nobody", a 
ruse that facilitates his survival and that of his companions, Klemperer 
is precisely forced to adopt the identity of "Nobody", a non-subject 
reduced to a state of radical passivepess and entirely abandoned to the 
mechanism of destruction, a role that enables him to return to the 
observation post, an indispensable condition for the writing of his 
Diaries. The next sequence shows Klemperer as he is drawn into the 
depths. In his role as messenger of death, but already incarnating 
"Nobody", he meets actual human beings, Frau Eisenmann, Schorschi, 
Lisi, Herbert, and Frau Stühler who, once they have signed the 
circular, will in turn be plunged into the anonymity of the human 
masses destined for extermination. 
The most shocking scene is that of the little girl who, already 
deprived of her name, asks Klemperer to look at her teddy bear (III). 
But Klemperer can no longer answer her; in the eyes of "Nobody", 
this little girl is already doomed to death. Indeed, the written trace left 
by the messenger of death testifies to the unbearable violence used by 
the Nazi regime in its attempt to destroy a human community. But 
how can one reconcile redemptive writing with the fact of being the 
spokesman for Evil? 
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When Klemperer's task has been completed and he returns to the 
Jewish community office (IV), he becomes aware of the process that 
is taking place, the separation between those destined to be put to 
death in the near future, and those whose sentence has been deferred. 
But what escapes him and his unfortunate interlocutors is that their 
attempt to understand what is happening to them will always come up 
against the narrow limits imposed by Nazi logic. So long as the latter 
prevails, any kind of reasoning that tries to go beyond this incommen­
surable, radical Evil will be doomed to failure. Nonetheless, the re­
markable quality of the Diaries consists in rigorously exploring this 
zone of impossible truth, ever trying to remain disengaged from the 
ultimate limit, up to the moment when the act of writing itself be­
comes instrumental in the production of nothingness. 
The first part of the Diaries nonetheless shows that the mental gap 
between Nazi logic and the meaning Klemperer tries to assign it in 
everyday life defines his very writing project. Thus, the passage dated 
February 21, 1933, afternoon: 
(I) Increasingly I fall back on reading aloud. Own work almost completely at a 
standstill. A review for the Germ.-Rorr.. Literaturblatt, that's all. I've put aside 
the 'Image of France' once again. Perhaps during the holidays. On the one 
hand I'm tortured by a lack of time: a drudge lighting stoves, washing up, 
shopping; on the other a sense of worthlessness. What difference does it make 
if I leave behind more or less one book! Vanitas... 
(II) Lectures are coming to an end. Today is my last Tuesday because it's 
Carnival next week. For some while I've been reading the Italy course to four, 
five people. Monday the conclusion of the France course — next semester the 
lecture theatre will be even more gapingly empty. Things are throttled more 
and more. 
(III) For something like three weeks now the depression of the reactionary 
government. I am not writing a history of the times here. But I shall neverthe­
less record my embitterment, greater than I would have imagined I was still 
capable of feeling. (Klemperer 1999b: 4) 
Klemperer draws up a list of the elements that have created a strong 
feeling of gloom in him: his research is no longer progressing, house­
work is becoming a burden, and the number of students following his 
courses keeps shrinking. Rather than constituting the psychological 
self-portrait of a fatalist, this assessment gives particular meaning to 
the era in which he lived. Hitler has just been appointed chancellor — 
on January 30, 1933 — and he has not yet been granted full powers. 
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Klemperer is thus not yet a victim of the measures against Jews 
that he will subsequently relate in all their monstrosity. Nonetheless, 
his branch of teaching no longer suits the spirit of the times, for a new 
mentality had taken hold well before Hitler's takeover. Thus, 
considering the German original (I'm suffocating), one must interpret 
reference to the garrote as the manifestation of a Kulturkampf 
launched by the National-Socialist movement. 
Therefore, the resentment felt by Klemperer does not stem from 
the fact that he feels personally threatened by the course of History, 
but from an ever greater questioning of German culture as he sees it. 
The journal thus becomes a weapon that he will use to prove over and 
over that he belongs to that culture. He will emerge as the victor in 
this inner struggle as long as he is able to explore the field of obser­
vation assigned to him. But, as we noted in the previous passage, once 
he is removed from his observation post, this weapon will backfire on 
him, leaving him at the mercy of Nazis' Weltbild. 
Most of the journal occupies an intermediate position, however. In 
spite of the continual aggravation of his situation, Klemperer manages 
to view himself and his entourage with lucidity, which enables him to 
preserve a degree of independence — albeit relative — with respect to 
the ongoing extermination process. The description of his incarcera­
tion in the prison at the Dresden police station from June 23 to July 1, 
1941 exemplifies this tendency. Entitled "Cell 89", the note begins 
with a recollection of the events that led to his conviction: an un-
boarded window at night, the reporting of this all in all minor incident, 
punishable by a mere warning and, finally, the sentencing to one 
week's imprisonment on account of the "J" on his identity card. 
The sequences we have chosen form a part of the narrative that 
begins when Klemperer crosses the prison threshold: 
Cell 89,23rd June — Is' July 1941 
(I) For a moment I thought: 'Cinema'. A huge rectangular hall; glass roof, six 
galleries with glass floors, as if to break the fall of trapeze artists, but behind 
all the bright transparency the uniform rows of dark spots, the handleless cell 
doors. [...] 
(II) 'Undo your tie, unbutton your braces. Faster. In the time it takes you to 
remove your tie, I'd be completely undressed.' It did not sound excessively 
brutal, but the order was roughly given. Only now did I know I was not 
watching a film. 'How shall I hold up my trousers?' — 'With your hands. You 
can pull them tight somehow in your cell. Your briefcase. Nightshirt and 
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toothbrush you can keep, hairbrush is superfluous, books and spectacles stay 
here.' — 'But I was told...' — 'We make the rules here.' [...] 
(III) How could I know beforehand, what imprisonment, what a cell is? Only 
at the second that the door fell shut, that the latch fell into place, did I know it 
with a nameless fear. [...] 
(IV) I came out of the shock of the door shutting because of a loud, regular, 
continuous hammering sound above my head, tap-tap-tap-tap. I realized 
immediately: the prisoner above me is pacing his cell. [...] I had to break free 
of this idea of emptiness. The cell was my room, equipped with all that was 
necessary, I had only to study it in every detail. [...] 
(V) War reports no doubt, the usual victories, the usual ridicule and abuse of 
enemies — of what interest was it to me in my cage? The excitement with 
which I normally waited for these reports was extinguished just as was the 
need to smoke. But now I clearly heard unintelligible, 'Deutschland über 
alles' and the Horst Wessel Song. So a big routine, a special announcement, 
some very big success. Only now did I think of the Russian campaign, which I 
had used to raise my spirits on the last Sunday at home — how dreadfully 
long ago that was. And all at once I was afraid the final victory could be 
Hitler's and with it his permanent rule. (Klemperer 1999b: 477-499) 
In the first three passages (I—III), we can recognize a typical characte­
ristic of the Diaries: describing the dispossession of his ability to 
comprehend the reality with which he is confronted, Klemperer tries 
to reconstitute the cognitive processes used to familiarize himself with 
the new situation. If he is still able to list the objects before his eyes, 
the staging of this situation escapes him and forces him to live in an 
unspeakable present. Deprived of the spectator's role that he has been 
compelled to adopt in order to preserve a certain form of existence, he 
becomes aware of the abyss opening before him. 
The next sequence (IV) shows how Klemperer tries to restore 
meaning to this present. Placed in a position of radical inferiority with 
respect to the masters of the house, he begins to reconstruct a tangible 
reality, reassembling the known, identifiable, nameable elements. In 
the isolation of cell 89, Klemperer thus sets about reclaiming this 
limited zone. This act of sheer willpower fills several pages in the 
Diaries, revealing remarkable psychological and intellectual strength. 
But according to the theory that we have tried to explore in this essay, 
the density of this mental work is precisely what makes him forget 
that imprisonment is an integral part of the dehumanization process of 
which he is a victim. Paradoxically, by asserting himself he appears 
simultaneously to dispossess himself. 
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In the last paragraph (V), the intrusion of the outside world, 
crudely proclaiming the victory of the Hitlerians, brings Klemperer 
cruelly back to the reality surrounding him. Existential fear unmasks 
his mode of existence through a writing project conceived of as a 
philological construct that will have no influence on the course of 
events. 
3. A semiotics of annihilation 
Our second hypothesis, using pathos as a means for structuring argu­
mentation, attempts to show how the presence of testimony responds 
to the absence of body. Writing thus helps to accredit the loss of his 
own corporality. The somatic invests the cognitive, carnal life touches 
social life, the denotatum invests the sign, the thing says the word. 
Victor Klemperer's Diaries show that in an extreme situation the 
rhetorical act can no longer deal with the domain of the plausible, but 
with that of truth — the destruction of one's own body, a process 
which seems implausible. Indeed, the state of non-subject will always 
remain beyond the reach of cognition. 
As the following excerpts illustrate, words progressively lose their 
power of representation. From now on, the receptor must try to 
understand them literally. This reversal of the structure of meaning 
consists in systematically leveling the semantic categories that rule the 
conventional world of meaning. 
10 lh August [1933], Thursday 
A friend freed from a concentration camp. There, as a man who wears 
spectacles, he had to answer to the name "spectacle hound", he had to fetch 
his food bowl crawling on all fours if he wanted to eat any food. (Klemperer 
1999b: 34) 
In this passage, Klemperer relates the experience of a political 
prisoner imprisoned for an insignificant reason. The semantic transfer 
from the category of human animate concrete to that of animal 
animate concrete appears, however, to be a key element in the Nazis' 
strategy of progressively marginalizing a part of the German 
population as soon as they took power. If Klemperer complains of 
being more and more isolated during this same year, 1933, another 
way of expressing the first signs of the deterioration of his social 
situation, he uses a powerful metonymy to characterize the "leper" 
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status to which the openly racist Nazi policy has reduced him in 1938. 
This transfer of meaning from the human animate concrete to the 
natural inanimate concrete already foreshadows the measures that will 
progressively lead to the physical annihilation of the Jewish people. 
13th January [1940], Saturday evening 
The situation is made infinitely more difficult by the unsuspecting tomcat, 
whom we keep alive with almost the whole of our meat ration and for whom 
our moving out will be a death sentence. Eva is passionately fond of the poor 
creature, which is basically better off than we are. (Klemperer 1999b: 397) 
Unlike the previous passage, this one shows a correspondence 
between the human and animal conditions in Klemperer's life. The 
domestic animal, recalling his former life, can be kept alive only at the 
expense of his master, on account of the food shortage among the 
Jewish population. In this passage we see how the procedures of 
meaning through concretion are intertwined with those that function 
by abstraction. As of 1940, Klemperer will experience ever greater 
difficulty in keeping himself at a distance from the policy of annihila­
tion to which he is subjected as a designated non-subject. Thus we 
read: 
30lh August [1940], Saturday 
I am now wearing the unfashionably tight trousers of a suit from about 1922, 
my carpet slippers are nearing their end, the situation with socks is very bad 
[...] [It] is impossible to see how I can continue to get by with respect to 
clothing. But we have strictly accustomed ourselves not to think beyond 
tomorrow. (Klemperer 1999b: 431) 
The last clause shows how the body's foregrounding, responding to 
the imperative of physical survival, limits the procedures of cognition. 
In spite of impressive willpower, Klemperer will find it very difficult 
to venture beyond the spatio-temporal field dictated by the mere 
present. One might think that the reduction of intellectual faculties 
was an integral part of the Nazis' criminal strategy. Thus, one of the 
numerous official decrees which Klemperer mentioned in his Diaries: 
It is to be emphasized that Jews are not allowed to store foodstuffs, 
but only to buy as they need for immediate consumption" (March 27, 
1942; Klemperer 2000: 41). Accordingly, our second hypothesis holds 
that argumentation by means of pathos contributes to a kind of 
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knowledge that can be qualified only as somatic, bestowing complete 
meaning upon mere corporal presence. 
19th June [1942], Friday forenoon 
Until now I had found our situation just as literally unimaginable: I had 
always been told about being beaten and spat upon, of trembling at the sound 
of a car, at every ring at the door, of disappearing and not coming back 
again — I had not known it. Now I know it, now the dread is always inside 
me [...]. (Klemperer 2000: 100) 
Using somatic knowledge, Klemperer is able to give meaning to 
linguistic concretion. As shown by the entry on July 2, 1942, he can 
now have recourse to a pathemic topology in appropriating his state of 
non-subject: "Hunger, which in the last few days has ceased to be in 
any way metaphorical" (Klemperer 2000: 110). The leveling of se­
mantic categories, blocking conventional transfers of meaning 
between the known and the unknown, thus creates what Klemperer 
(note of July 5, 1942; Klemperer 2000: 114) calls "the thought of 
extinction". Paradoxically, this essentially somatic form of thought 
appears to lack a cognitive dimension: "we know nothing of the 
present, because we were there" (note of July 2, 1942; Klemperer 
2000: 115). But the destruction of established semantic hierarchies 
makes it possible for him to define the place of annihilation — his 
body — as a place held in common, a shared place of habitation for 
the bodies doomed to annihilation. Viewed as a discursive topos, the 
place where all bodies intermingle is constitutive of meaning5. 
The following passage which relates the final destruction of Dres­
den exemplifies this: 
Piskowitz, 22nd-24lh February [1945] 
Fires were still burning in many of the buildings on the road above. At times, 
small and no more than a bundle of clothes, the dead were scattered across our 
path. The skull of one had been torn away, the top of the head was a dark red 
bowl. Once an arm lay there with a pale, quite fine hand, like a model made of 
wax such as one sees in barber's shop windows. Metal frames of destroyed 
vehicles, bumt-out sheds. Further from the centre some people had been able 
to save a few things, they pushed handcarts with bedding and the like or sat on 
boxes and bundles. Crowds streamed unceasingly between these islands, past 
the corpses and smashed vehicles, up and down the Elbe, a silent, agitated 
As Jacques Rancière has shown in Malaise dans l'esthétique (2004: 145-173), 
the concept of "indistinction" has an important political issue. 
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procession. Then we turned right towards the town again — I let Eva lead the 
way and do not know where. (Klemperer 2000: 500-501) 
In the description of this confusion, one can note how the indistinction 
of semantic categories is precisely what enables the author to juxta­
pose animate and inanimate bodies indiscriminately. We can recog­
nize here the fusional principle of Klemperer's pathemic argumen­
tation. Confronted with an impossible choice on account of the 
inextricable mixture of bodies, he decides to blend in with the crowd 
of wandering bodies that invade Germany this spring of 1945. 
Conclusion 
As we have seen, in spite of his remarkable background in the huma­
nities, his mastery of philological methods and an unfailing analytical 
sense with respect to his own person, Victor Klemperer was unable to 
escape the Nazi doxa which he criticized so tenaciously. Those among 
us who see themselves as the distant successors of this Romance 
philologist will thus have every reason to fear the worst: the failure of 
their critical enterprise before the growing power of increasingly 
totalitarian information networks whose forerunner was the model put 
in place by the Nazi regime. To establish the meaning of the place of 
extermination is thus to carry out an ultimate act of resistance. 
Reading the Diaries will also contribute, however, to the discovery 
of a more secret conversion, that of a human being reduced to the state 
of non-subject, of "Nobody", refusing to silence himself and to silence 
voices who have forever disappeared in the turmoil. Victor Klem­
perer— precisely by naming his body — will thus have infinitely 
surpassed the limit set by the Nazis. The validation of somatic know­
ledge makes it possible to break the link between monstration and 
signification, opening up the possibility of choices to the speaking 
subject. Thus, the mixing of the argumentative domains of ethos and 
pathos that characterizes Victor Klemperer's journal allows us to 
analyze the functioning of an action language whose esthetico-ethical 
importance in contemporary discourse merits further study.6 
Translated by Thomas Buckley, Université de Bretagne Occidentale. 
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Называние тела никого: 
правда в дневниках Виктора Клемперера 
Немецкий филолог и профессор Дрезденского университета Виктор 
Клемперер описывает в своих дневниках свое выживание в период 
нацизма (1933-1945). Клемперера из-за его приверженности иудаизму 
последовательно выдворяли из общественной жизни, пока наконец, к 
концу войны ему не пришлось признать себя «не-субъектом», называя 
себя по примеру Одиссея «Никто». Цель моей статьи — показать 
ментальный (когнитивный и телесный) процесс этого узнавания. Ана­
лизируется двунаправленность этого процесса: оказавшись лицом к 
лицу со своим неизбежным уничтожением, Клемперер был вынужден 
признать ограниченность своих аналитических способностей. Но этот 
пограничный опыт позволяет ему дойти до соматического понимания 
идеи «вымирания». Настоящий текст демонстрирует рождение этой 
логики из языкового употребления, сосредоточенного на назывании 
тела. 
Eikellegi keha nimetamine: 
Tõde Victor Klempereri päevikutes 
Saksa filoloog ja Dresdeni Ülikooli professor Victor Klemperer kirjeldab 
oma ellujäämist natsismiperioodil oma päevikutes (1933-1945). Klem­
pereri sunniti juudi usu tõttu järk-järgult taanduma kogu seltsielust, kuni 
viimaks, sõja lõpus tuli tal end tunnistada mitte-subjektiks, nimetades end 
Odüsseuse ja kükloop Polyphemuse loo eeskujul "Eikeegiks". Minu 
artikli eesmärgiks on näidata selle äratundmise mentaalset — kognitiivset 
ja kehalist — protsessi. Minu analüüs jälgib selle protsessi kaheharulisust: 
seistes vastamisi enda vältimatu hävinguga, tuleb Klempereril tunnistada 
oma analüütiliste võimete piiratust. Kuid see äärmuslik kogemus lubab tal 
jõuda "väljasuremisidee" somaatilise mõistmiseni. Käesolev tekst demonst­
reerib seda, kuidas see loogika sündis keha nimetamisele keskenduvast 
verbilisest keelekasutusest. 
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Critical events of the 1940s 
in Estonian life histories 
Tiiu Jaago 
Department of Estonian and Comparative Folklore, University of Tartu 
Ülikooli Str. 18, 50090 Tartu, Estonia 
e-mail: tiiu.jaago@ut.ee 
Abstract. The article observes how critical times, conditioned by events 
concurrent with Soviet power and World War II, are currently reflected in life 
histories of newly independent Estonia. Oral history analysis comprises texts 
from southern Läänemaa: oral life history interview (2005), written responses 
to the Estonian National Museum's questionnaire "The 1949 Deportation, Life 
as a Deportee" (1999) and a written life history sent to the Estonian Literary 
Museum's relevant competition "One Hundred Lives of a Century" (1999). 
Aiming at historic context, materials from the Estonian Historical Archives 
and Läänemaa County Archives have been used. The treatment focuses on 
two issues. First, whether oral and written narratives only differ by the form of 
presentation or do they also convey different messages (ideologies). Secondly, 
whether memories and history documents solely complement each other or do 
they more essentially alter the imaginations obtained from the events. The 
public is presented with experience narratives on coping under difficult 
circumstances, both at practical and mental levels. Narratives are presented 
from a certain standpoint, pursuant to narrators' convictions, with the main 
message remaining the same in different presentations. The addition of history 
sources enables to better observe the evolving of narrative tradition (narration 
rules) and highlight new questions (hidden in the narrative). 
The history of 20th century Europe is characterised by the intervention 
of aggressive politics into everyday life. Regarding life history narra­
tives, this brings about the interweaving of the narrator's personal life 
events with these of historical ones. Analogously, Alessandro Porteiii, 
a researcher of Italian oral history, writes: "War keeps coming back in 
narratives and memories as the most dramatic point of encounter 
between the personal and public, between biography and history" 
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(Porteiii 1997: ix). At the same time, it is impossible to phrase abso­
lute criteria to be used for deciding upon the criticality of a historical 
period, based on the personal narrative. The qualities attributed to the 
time are revealed in comparison with other "times". 
Research background: problems, 
subject matter, sources 
The current article focuses on the depiction of the 1940s in Estonian 
life history narratives,1 where the subject matters gyre around the 
imposing of Soviet power, events of World War II and repressions. 
Criteria of criticality in these narratives comprise extreme situations in 
personal life associated with political changes, expressed in conflicts 
between personal wishes and forced choices, and also in the loss of 
close people and one's home, deportation, imprisonment and interro­
gation situations. Currently, the "post-war years are being prevailingly 
described through traumatic experience" conveyed by the mentality of 
the pre-war time (i.e. the time of independent Estonia) (Hinrikus 2003: 
198). The critical nature of this period is being experienced not only as 
personal but concerning the fate of the whole nation. However, when 
adding the Russian-language narratives to the Estonian ones, it be­
comes evident that different ethnic groups in Estonia may sporadically 
perceive and interpret the events of the 1940s in a contradictory 
manner (Jaago 2004: 179-181). 
Why do Estonian narrators focus on the critical period of the 
1940s? Rutt Hinrikus (2003) highlights a couple of important aspects. 
First, the suitability of dramatic events for the creation of narratives as 
the history of dramatic experiences mostly contains a complete story, 
including the exposition as well as culmination(s) and exotic details which are 
never existent in peaceful and monotonous everyday life. (Hinrikus 2003: 
191) 
To this, Hinrikus adds a psychological need to reminisce. In addition 
to the above-mentioned, I emphasise the impact of the quality 
regarding the time of narration on the choices as to what periods of 
Regarding the research on Estonian life history narratives, see Kirss et al. 
2004. 
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history people prefer to talk about. 2  The 1990s were a pivotal period 
in Estonia where history was rendered rethought from a new 
standpoint. Historic events of the 20th century have offered plenty of 
opportunities to experience that relationships between people do 
change on the boundary of stable and critical times. This has induced 
discussion on behavioural preferences and norms, by way of analysing 
concrete situations. The subject matters, referring to analogous earlier 
situations, become actualised in the framework of the discussions. 
The narrators of the life stories used in the article were born in the 
1920s. Their childhood passed in a stable society. By the dawn of 
pivotal times in 1940 they had become adolescents. Their parents, 
born at the beginning of the century, had been in contact, to a smaller 
a greater extent, with revolutions and wars. 3  The grandparents of the 
narrators had lived in the "tsarist time" (also "manor time", "serfdom 
time"), revealed in the narratives by way of social confrontations 
rather than those deriving from power conflicts. The experiences, 
obtained within the family and kinship relationships, are amalgamated 
in the narratives regarding the 1940s, intermittently in opposing and 
supportive ways. 
All the analysed life history narratives originate from the same area 
in West-Estonia. The examples have been received by three different 
archives during 1999-2005. Firstly, author's fieldwork materials 
located in the Department of Estonian and Comparative Folklore of 
the University of Tartu. Secondly, the written life history narratives in 
the Estonian Literary Museum. 4  The third source comprises the 
written responses to the thematic questionnaires compiled in the 
Estonian National Museum. 5  Upon creating the context, history 
documents from the Estonian Historical Archives and the Läänemaa 
County Archives have been used. 
The prerequisite for narration is the existence of the impetuses for 
remembrance (Tulving 1994: 68). Real life stories are being designed proceeding 
from the time and goals of narrating: although the events remain to be what they 
were, they are attributed certain meanings during the narration process, 
proceeding from the time of narrating and the impetuses of remembering. 
1905-1907 and 1917 revolutions, World War I 1914-1918, War of 
Independence 1918-1920. 
1 Regarding "Estonian Life Histories" collection, see Hinrikus, Kõresaar 2004. 
(Electronically published) questionnaires of the Estonian National Museum: 
www.erm.ee/?lang=EST&node=58. 
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The following treatment has proceeded from oral history-related 
research opportunities. In Estonian research tradition, I refer to this 
domain as popular narrated history {pärimuslik ajalugu), which, in its 
wider sense, is related to oral history.6 Popular narrated history is a 
research direction that was developed in Estonian folkloristics in the 
1990s, relying, on one hand, on the internal renegeration of the 
particular discipline since the 1970s and, on the other hand, on the 
change of society at the end of the century. Within the science, this 
primarily means an interest in contemporary folklore which positioned 
itself next to the research of classical types (these of the past) of 
folklore (e.g., the works by Linda Dégh, Jan Harold Brunvand, Bengt 
Klintberg and Leea Virtanen; in Estonia, the works by Mare Kõiva 
and Eda Kalmre). At the same time, the disciplines of humanities and 
social sciences were converging, incl. the highlighting of inter-
disciplinarity in the 1990s (cf. Brednich 1998 [1990]: 8-13; Thomp­
son 2000: xi-xii). In Estonian folkloristics, this purported delving into 
the research method proceeding from the folklore group, counter­
balancing the text-centred research of folklore, predominant in Soviet 
folkloristics (cf. Ivanova 1994). In the case of the latter, it was 
preferably the opportunities of literary science that were utilised or 
instead, folklore was primarily related to literary texts — this is also 
characteristic of the analysis of texts that reflect real-life events, as, for 
instance, the treatment on the songs and folk narratives of the 1877— 
1878 Russian-Turkish War (Rüütel 1977; Hiiemäe 2000 [1977]) or 
that of the revolutionary songs (Tampere 1970). 
Side by side with the developments inside the scientific discipline 
itself, the elaboration regarding the research method of narrated 
history was also affected by historical-political developments in 
society (first and foremost, the collapse of the Soviet Union) which 
activated the disputes on various treatments of the past. The research 
of narrated history, evolved in the 1990s in Estonia, has indeed been 
servicing the ascertaining of different interpretations of the past. 
Nevertheless, this is not a discipline of history (differently from oral 
history) as the study of narrated history proceeds from narrating, 
intrinsic of folk tradition, and methods of folkloristics. The "route" of 
oral history is just the opposite: when creating the source of 
6 For comparative research overview of oral history (popular narrated history) 
in Estonia, Finland, Latvia and northeast Russia, see online folkloristics journal 
ELORE 1/2006, http://cc.joensuu.fi/~loristi. 
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research — oral history interview — it is the events of history that are 
the starting points, and, as a rule, the interviewer as one of the creators 
of oral history is a historian by profession (Grele 2000 [1998]: 42^43). 
The researcher of narrated history does not focus on the classical 
history-related question as to "what happened" but instead, on how the 
narrator, in his or her story, presents the impact of the past events and 
situations on the period of time that remains between the narrated 
event and the time of narrating.7 At the same time, folkloristics has 
been determinedly studying the connections between the real-life 
based narratives with the stories existing prior to the event - folk 
tradition, i.e. the narrative is created as an outcome of cooperation 
between real life experience and the existent means of expression 
(narrative tradition) (see, e.g., Hiiemäe 1978: 62-67; Nekljudov 
1998). 
The connection between history and folklore has been obvious 
from the very beginning of this branch of science. Regarding the 
development of this relationship, Peter Burke differentiates between 
three stages: the age of harmony (1846-1920s) characterised by 
"popular antiquities", one of the denominations of folklore, establish­
ment of (national) museums and dealing with the domains official 
history was not paying attention to (such subject matters as the state 
and religion); the age of suspicion (1920s-1970s), characterised by the 
sharpening of the boundaries between the disciplines of science and 
also the specialisation of research branches; and the age of rapproche­
ment (since the 1970s), exemplified by interest towards local history, 
popular culture and the so-called "history from below" in the 
disciplines of history, and, in folkloristics, towards socio-cultural 
processes (Burke 2004; cf. Thompson 2000 [1978]: 71-81). Ac­
cording to the periodisation by Burke, it is possible to see the 
following events in Estonia. In the middle of the 19th century, 
Friedrich Reinhold Kreutzwald wrote about historical legend as one of 
many possible sources to study the past (Kreutzwald 1844). History 
"through the eyes of the people" was also the principal idea of the 
folklore programme for Jakob Hurt, the organiser of large-scale 
folklore collections, whereas in the sense of "folklore", he used the 
concept "folk memories" (cf. the above-mentioned "popular anti-
Rcgarding the unity of the past, present and future time in folklore texts, see, 
e.g. Gcrndt 1986 [1981]: 38. 
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quities") (Jaago 2005: 46-52). This direction of folklore research 
became topical again in the 1920s and 1930s, but really, differently 
from contemporary study the approach described above was 
discipline-centred (Jaago 2002). 
The study of narrated history, or folkloristics oral history in Esto­
nia, is characterised by simultaneous use of different types of sources: 
both oral interviews as well as written recordings thereof, written 
thematic narratives which in turn were created both spontaneously (for 
one's own family and descendants) and as responses to the calls by 
archives (Estonian Literary Museum, Estonian National Museum, 
National Archives of Estonia). Regarding the study of narrated 
history, preference is given to the narratives where the participation of 
the researcher (interviewer) is minimal. In addition to this, classical 
history documents and other public texts (research on history, media 
texts, school textbooks) are being used. Indeed, the study does 
proceed from the narrative, however, one source is not preferred to 
another: the issue is in the comparison of different viewpoints and 
angles, rather than finding the so-called truth. The narrator's view­
point is positioned in a relationship with other texts and the results are 
analysed within the historical context in order to ask as to why the 
studied narrative (or a viewpoint) could be namely the way it is. For 
instance, the study of kinship history by way of mutually comparing 
the family folklore and documents of history, the aim of which, 
differently from genealogy, is not to ascertain the "proper" history but 
rather in finding the social and cultural factors that affect the 
emergence and evolving of knowledge existent in family folklore 
(Jaago, Jaago 1996). 
In the current article the focus is on two issues. First, whether oral 
and written narratives only differ by the form of presentation or do 
they also convey different messages (ideologies8). Secondly, whether 
the sources from different archives solely complement each other or 
do they alter the imaginations obtained from the events in a more 
essential manner. Both the above-mentioned main issues are in turn 
permeated by an axis: how are the time of the events and the time of 
narration interrelated? 
x In Estonian life history research, Ene Kõresaar (2005) uses the concept "ideo­
logy of life" so as to describe the system and logic of narrators' interpretation of 
the past. 
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"Confluence of times": 
reality, remembering and narrating 
In the following subsection, I will introduce the two somewhat contra­
dictory opportunities for depicting the coherence of times within an 
interview. Firstly, how are the flows of times being related in a 
narrative once the earlier "times" start to reduce in the memory? Se­
condly, how, due to the similarity of personal life experience and that 
of the parents, are relevant "times" also being related in the narrative? 
Recording of the interview in question took place in connection 
with a more lengthy work when I was looking for data about Madli 
Kindel, a folk singer from Läänemaa. Her songs had been written 
down in 1889. Differently from other folk singers whose song texts 
were written down at the time, there was no genealogical data 
available about her in the Historical Archives. The reason for dealing 
with this subject matter proceeded from the research on the socio­
economic context of the persistence and alteration of Estonian old folk 
song tradition. In summer 2005, I went to the villages where the 
studied folk songs had been written down. During the past 117 years, 
the consistency of settlement had significantly altered and I did not 
expect to find the descendants of the then folk singers. Nevertheless: 
Jaan Kindel was one of the indigenous inhabitants in the locality - he 
had the same family name as the singer I was interested in and I asked 
him whether he knew Madli. The man responded: "Yes, Madli is my 
grandmother. She was so old that she even wasn't deported!"9 Such a 
reply surprised me for two reasons: on one hand, consistency of the 
folk singer's family indeed existed in the same locality (true, in a 
neighbouring village). On the other hand, the second half of the 
sentence — "she was so old that she even wasn't deported". 
Deportation is the subject matter which is abundantly talked about 
both now as well as during this fieldwork to southern Läänemaa in 
August 2005.10 Tape recording of the conversation with Jaan Kindel 
and his wife Laine also twists around the issue of deportation, 
On March 25, 1949, approximately 23,000 inhabitants were sent from Estonia 
to Russia by the Soviet power (Rahi 2004: II 16). Narrator's grandmother Madli 
Kindel (b. 1861) is in the list of those to be deported, however, with a note "not 
deported" (Õispuu 1999: 188). 
Fieldwork materials are located in the Department of Estonian and 
Comparative Folklore, University of Tartu (MK: Läänemaa 2005). 
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although my questions were related to family and genealogical 
history.11 
Jaan talked about the origin of his grandmother. When comparing 
the obtained oral data with the documents of the Historical Archives, 
it became evident that what I heard from Jaan about his grandmother 
Madli was actually partially associated with Madli's parents: in the 
family history narrative, the time of two generations had merged into 
one. When I asked whether Jaan remembered his grandmother's 
stories and songs, he said his grandmother used to talk about hard 
work for the landlord. This is intrinsic of family tradition to know the 
19th century by way of narratives on hard physical labour. The 20th 
century narratives, on the other hand, turn around the impact of 
political events. In family narratives, these periods are revealed as 
times with a different quality, offering the then and current narrators a 
whole spectrum of totally different experiences. In 1949, Jaan Kindel 
was taken to Siberia from his ancestors' farm and he could not return 
to his home any more. "My father's home was rebuilt into a kolkhoz 
grain drier, working at full speed: Thus my family could not stay 
there," Jaan described the situation when he returned from deportation 
in 1959.12 The narrator distances himself from his ancestors due to the 
difference in life experience and the loss of their common home. 
"Confluence of times" in the narrative is connected to the dispersion 
of facts as what has been heard from the older generations has become 
passive tradition. 
The next example from the same interview, however, discloses a 
contradictory tendency: experiential narrative heard from parents 
becomes actualised due to reoccurrence of a similar situation. 
Conversation continued to focus on kinship and family history, with 
the narratives reaching the time of World War I (1914-1918). Jaan 
described this period by way of hard work and lack of food. His wife 
Laine took over with a phrase "yes, the times were very difficult also 
for our family". She talked about the war-time hunger experience of 
her mother and aunt: eating brick crumbles; finishing the jar of honey 
meant for the mother in her sickbed: children knew that is was 
forbidden, but they were so hungry. These are episodes with well-
elaborated imagery language where difficulties conditioned by historic 
" Recording is in the Department of Estonian and Comparative Folklore, 
University of Tartu (MK: Läänemaa 2005, CD-2). 
12 Estonian National Museum (ERM), KV 874, p. 188 (1999). 
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events (children's hunger), family destinies (heavy illness of the 
mother of children) and characters (strict father but still capable of 
understanding children) become intertwined. Suddenly the narrator's 
voice broke. She made pauses to keep back the tears, said single 
phrases: "it was a difficult time...", "that's what mother used to 
say...", "it was as if in Siberia...", "mother and I were eating couch 
grass...", "there was nothing to eat..." These couple of phrases reveal 
that narratives about World War I had become actualised after 1949 
when she had and her mother had been taken to Siberia. During the 
interview, she, surprisingly to herself, associated these real-life 
episodes by way of the similarity of emotional "charges", jumping the 
gap of more than three decades between the chronological sequence of 
the events. Still, these associations had to be existent during earlier 
narration situations: as she mentions "that's what mother used to say". 
Such a temporary loss of control in the narrator, which in turn 
evoked stronger empathy in me as a listener, induced the question as 
to why the presentation of the hunger-topic differed from the way of 
presenting other subject matters. I analysed this nearly 40-minutes-
long interview, inspired by the treatment of Alessandro Porteiii, 
researcher of oral history (2000 [1991]: 65-66). According to this 
method an oral text is being interpreted by considering the reciprocal 
harmony of the narrative (subject matters, transfers from one topic to 
another, etc.) and the features of the rhythm of speech and voice (tone, 
speed, etc.). The analysis revealed that Laine was telling a story of 
coping, presented from the standpoint of the outcome. What came in 
the forefront were the summaries which at first sight remained in the 
shade of the event-related narratives but in the end remarkably shaped 
the messages regarding the very events of the critical time: 
We've been burnt down once and we have wandered about and we've been 
abroad and... we've been all around. We've started from scratch and we 
haven't been naked either and have always had bread on the table... and 
we've raised and schooled four children ... So it's not been too bad. We have 
always coped. 
The critical time in Laine's life history narrative as the rupture (see 
Kõresaar 2005: 69) of naturally ongoing life starts with her father's 
imprisonment in 1945 and ends in 1959 when she returns to Estonia 
with her family, after ten years of deportation. She summarises the 
time between her father's arrest and the deportation of the family 
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(1945-1949) as "constant harassment was going on". To her know­
ledge, the "category" (i.e. reason) for her being deported is as follows: 
"Germans' henchmen"13. More logically understandable reasons for 
imprisonment and deportation are generally not given in the life 
history narratives of Estonians. How were the accusations being 
perceived and how were they justified by the Soviet power will 
probably be one of the subject matters for future research.1 
Both Jaan and Laine describe the moments of deportation by 
focusing on the events rather than feelings. Laine mentions that at the 
night of deportation her mother could not stay calm and her younger 
sister was "small, slim, only in the fifth form". Laine was the one who 
packed the things at the presence of gunmen because "I already knew 
what life was about". As a background to this knowledge she talks 
about the norms in forest work, established by the Soviet power, that 
she, a 19-year-old girl had to fulfil. She talks about the difficulties 
(cold, lack of tools, distance of the residence from the work site, wet 
clothes that could not be dried for the next workday etc.) and also 
about the measures to attempt to solve the situation (hints to 
cooperation with fellow sufferers). She talks about the threatening: if 
the norms are not fulfilled, the future would be Siberia or prison. She 
fell severely ill. The episode which started with the claim "I already 
knew what life was about" she concludes with the statement of the 
time: "as far as I'm concerned, they [Soviet authorities] can send me 
to Siberia or another Siberia or kill me right here, I will not go back 
there [in the forest] any more". She did not touch upon the starvation 
experience during deportation narratives within this conversation. 
13 Indeed, I came across such a definition, "Germans' henchmen", in 1945, in 
the lists of "people's enemies" compiled by Soviet power representatives (LMA-
198-1-15), but soon it was replaced by an expression "Germans' myrmidons". 
During the Soviet time, it was quite difficult to avoid being listed under this 
category within the territories that had been under the German occupation. 
14 In 1989, the Estonian Heritage Society collected data on the destiny of 
arrested and deported persons, by way of a questionnaire. The respondents 
consistently mention that the reasons for imprisonment and deportation remained 
unclear for them. For instance "were taken away without court ruling, my husband 
was in prison and I was taken away with two underage children. Those who took 
us away were men in military uniforms" (f born in 1918. Materials in the 
Läänemaa Museum: Memory, 1989). The Soviet authority's standpoint could be 
researched after the collapse of the Soviet Union when access was opened to the 
archives of Soviet power institutions (see Mandel 2005). 
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Has Laine presented different descriptions regarding starvation 
experience? During our conversation, she mentioned that she had sent 
her narrative on her deportee-life to the Estonian National Museum. 
Indeed, the Museum has her responses to the questionnaire, compiled 
by researchers, on the following subject matter "The Deportation of 
1949, Life as a Deportee".15 The questionnaire focuses on the events 
and situations. Some questions also target the situation with food and 
hunger. Laine responds laconically, however, providing abundant 
information: 
Food was very bad before we got land (later we got more land, ten hundredth, 
1955). There was no bread, not even for those who went to work. We picked 
nettle and orach leaves (at cattle barns, they were more lushy there, growing 
on piles of manure). We chopped them, boiled with water and salt and ate. In 
1953, the kolkhoz gave 9 kg of rye flour per family (irrespective of the size of 
the family, imagine this!). We also ate edible flower bulbs and other edible 
plants that we searched for in the steppe. Malnutrition was horrible! (ERM, 
KV 874, p. 165) 
At the end of her writing, additionally to the responses to the 
questions presented by researchers, she once again returns to this 
subject matter: she expresses gratitude to an old woman with whom 
they were living in the village to where they were deported. It was 
namely this old woman who had taught them to eat all kinds of plants. 
Laine's mode of presentation is subject to narration goals and 
situations. The framework of the narration creates room for variation 
(written responses to the questionnaire; interview situation, etc.). At 
the same time, she has a distinct repository of core narratives and a 
well-established system of assessments, which become evident in all 
of her presentations. 
Events in the narrative and history 
In the following subsection I focus on the other facet of the problem: 
when the time (situation) of narration intermingles in itself the actual 
time of narration and the layers of earlier narrations, then how is it 
possible to separate the earlier time layers from the narratives? In 
15 ERM, KV 874, pp. 156-170 (1999). 
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order to achieve this goal, I will again use different types of sources. 
The analysed example is based on Lembitu Varb lane's narrative.16 
Similarly to Jaan and Laine Kindel, he comes from the same region in 
southern Läänemaa. Parallel sources comprise the minutes of the local 
authority meetings from 1944 to 1950, located in the Läänemaa 
County Archives in Haapsalu. The focus is on the depiction of post­
war village life: in autumn 1944, warfare again reached Estonian soil. 
In places reached by the Red Army, Soviet power was established, 
and new life commenced with reorganisations, incl. the compilation of 
the lists of the so-called kulaks and Germans' myrmidons, accom­
panied by imprisonments and culminating in the large-scale 
deportation on March 25, 1949. 
The narrator was recruited in the German army in 1943 (at that 
time, there was German occupation in Estonia). He managed to evade 
this by escaping to Finland where he served in the Finnish army. This, 
in turn, was a fact that had to be hidden from the new, Soviet power. 
In the following quote, there is an episode he was to face when 
returning home from Finland: 
I reached home during the early hours of 23 September [1944]. There 
were tears of joy when meeting my mother and also the concern, 
sadness and enormous unknowing. My mother knew nothing about my 
father and brother. My brother had managed to escape safe and sound 
from the Lihula Self-Defence unit's17 battle against Russians at 
Kärevere bridge, had come home in the meantime and then was taken 
away again. What kind of Self-Defence tasks did my father fulfil and 
where he was, my mother didn't know. To extinguish my hunger, I was 
given proper farm bread and milk. I couldn't wish for more. 1 wouldn't 
talk about my feelings about home-made bread. Dead tired, I fell in bed 
in order to rest a little. I felt terribly sorry to leave my mother alone. 
(KM, EKLA f 350: 921, p. 10) 
This relatively squeezed description reveals the confusion at the 
private level, intrinsic of the end-of-the-war times: no knowledge 
about the destiny of the father and brother, hunger, food-related 
sensations, tiredness, empathy towards mother. Facts and feelings are 
densely intertwined. The stability, having been achieved step by step, 
16 Estonian Literary Museum (KM), EKLA f 350: 921. Lembitu Varblane has 
sent his written life history narrative to the relevant competition of "One Hundred 
Lives of a Century" (1999). 
Local police units, consisting of civilians, which operated during war-time. 
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is described in a more hinted manner, by way of adding a discussing 
summary: 
In autumn 1948, my brother Vambola came home from war 
imprisonment. Somehow we managed to pay the increased norms and 
taxes imposed on the farm. Even my mother regained her mental 
balance. Both sons were safe and sound! We had to live on and worry 
less. The turns of Stalinist dictatorship could not be predicted. (KM, 
EKLA f 350: 921, p. 12) 
Going back to the documents of the time, one can only imagine how 
complicated was this period (1944-1948) in reality. In March 1945, 
the local authority has already compiled a list of those referred to as 
kulaks and Germans' myrmidons. Regarding the village where the 
narrator of the above-quoted story comes from, there were four people 
in such a list, including the narrator's mother.18 These lists were not 
easy to be compiled neither for local inhabitants nor for authorities. 
Among the documents of the Läänemaa County Archives, there is an 
official reply to an official accusation as to why are there "only eight 
kulaks" in the rural municipality (the response is dated December 16, 
1947).19 This letter reflects the conflict between the representatives of 
power, recruited from among the local population, and those 
representatives of power who had arrived from elsewhere: local 
people know each other and therefore the attempt to "find" kulaks was 
not successful. The reply evidences that the situation is becoming 
"better" — the list already comprises 34 kulaks. 
Who occurred to be in the list of kulaks? Jüri Kindel has, e.g. 
worded this in his response to the Estonian National Museum's 
questionnaire "Post-war village" as follows: there were five kulak-
type farms in my home village. The farms were "blamed for" the 
following: "excellent farm and breeding animals", "threshing machine 
and newly cultivated lands", "Saaremaa-type post-windmill, threshing 
machine and a well-kept 40 ha farm", "Dutch-type windmill and well-
kept lands and household" (this refers to his parents' home), 
"excellent smithy and large newly cultivated fields".*"0 When reading 
the minutes of the local authority from 1944 to 1950, consolidated into 
a file titled "Agriculture", it turns out that in the given municipality, 
Läänemaa County Archives LMA-198-1-15, pp. 5-6. 
19 LMA 198-1-66. 
20 ERM, KV 901, p. 53 (2000). 
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two major groups of inhabitants were considered to be the enemies of 
Soviet power: "kulaks" (the list of kulaks seemed to be supplemented 
by those who had used farmhands or servants in their farms prior to 
1944, despite the fact that these servants and farmhands had not filed 
any complaints) and the "myrmidons of Germans" (whose relatives 
had served in the German army or in other way had themselves fought 
against Soviet power). Who is who, these were constant discussions, 
testimonies, accusations, contra-statements — during 1944-1949, 
people had to suffer enormous pressure in their daily life. Some were 
forced to give statements, some to justify themselves. In addition, land 
reform was conducted at the time, referred to by norms and excessive 
tax burden imposed on farms within the above-discussed narratives. 
(Forest work experience in Laine Kindel's narrative; in Lembitu 
Varblane's story: "Somehow we managed to pay the increased norms 
and taxes imposed on the farm".) Regarding the entire period, there 
are only a couple of sentences in the narrative: "We had to live on and 
worry less. The turns of Stalinist dictatorship could not be predicted." 
In general, people claim they had no idea about their possible future 
by any other means than rumours or hunches. Likewise, Jaan and 
Laine Kindel state the same.21 Archive materials, however, show that 
such lists were compiled, discussed and disputed also at the local 
level. 
Reading the minutes in the file "Agriculture" was a far more 
terrible experience for me than reading and listening to the narratives 
on this period. It can be stated that the depiction of such a reality is 
generally not a subject matter for narratives. There could be different 
reasons for this, e.g. the fact that the situation came to a solution in 
1949 in connection with deportation and formation of kolkhozes. In 
narratives, they are topical as dominant events which indeed provided 
another direction to the course of life in the future. Undoubtedly, also 
the fact that these times are full of inconveniences, secrets and other 
issues that people would rather like to forget. There is no more 
lengthy contemplation on these people and themes. 
People know the worst side of the daily life of the critical period, 
and that of their social group, however, they would not narrate about 
these issues but instead, mention the statements that have become the 
words of wisdom. In Lembitu Varblane's narrative, there are 
21 ERM, KV 874, p. 156; p. 180 (1999). 
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numerous hints to unwritten rules for behaving in a critical situation 
and also to relevant violations. For instance: 
The situation in the fronts became more difficult every day. I decided not to 
go to the German army. I was hiding myself and worked in my aunt's farm. In 
the village, they knew who I was but a sensible rural family would not poke 
its nose into the issues of anther family22 (KM, EKLA f 350: 921, p. 2) 
The narrator provides a contrary example of an episode where he 
returns from Finland - in the port of Tallinn, there is a German patrol 
checking his documents. He produces the papers of a Finnish navy-
man but one faithful Estonian-speaking gendarme had understood 
from his name that he was an Estonian, and consequently, evading the 
German army, and thus the narrator was put into the Pagari Street 
23 prison. 
The issue of intra-family relationships may also become lost in the 
descriptions of the critical time. For instance, in the above-described 
story, the narrator, when describing the deportation day (March 25, 
1949) presents contemplation of the time: what else could this family 
expect if their "father [had] been sentenced to prison by the tribunal, 
as the enemy of Soviet power, and had died there." The father is 
mentioned once more when the narrator himself has been arrested and 
he described the interrogations where his father is being referred to as 
the enemy of Soviet power. When was the father imprisoned? ~4 When 
did he die? How did they learn about this? Was it already known in 
1949 (the way the narrator presents it in his story, by uniting his 
knowledge of his father's death and the deporting of her mother, 50 
years after the described event) or did they actually learn about this 
(father's death) later? If in the pre-war description, the father is 
depicted as a relatively concrete character, then after the war, the 
father disappears from the narrative, even at the level of mentioning 
Here and in the following example, emphasis by T. J. 
23 KM, EKLA f 350: 921, p. 9. 
Pursuant to the published list of arrested persons (Õispuu 1998: 568) Jaan 
Varblane was arrested on November 28, 1944; the tribunal charged him guilty on 
March 14, 1945, pursuant to § 58-la (ten years in prison plus 5 years as a 
deportee). However, nothing is said about the future destiny. According to a 
historian Aigi Rahi (2004: II 9), during 1944-1945, approximately 10,000 men 
were arrested due to political reasons, "half of them died within the first two 
years". 
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the facts. When reading the minutes of the local authority meeting, 
dated from April 9, 1948, where once again, there is a discussion 
whether the narrator's mother should be declared the "myrmidon of 
Germans", due to her husband's activity, it turns out as if the spouses 
had been quarrelling and separated in 1942, where-after family ties 
had been broken."5 A decision follows: as the spouses were not living 
together during the German occupation, it is not necessary to consider 
the wife's household as "the household of the Germans' myrmidons". 
(Despite this she was deported on March 25, 1949.) Such a 
consideration could have been either a partial or full self-protection. 
The husband had already been arrested (or even dead), it was 
impossible to protect him, however, it was still possible to protect the 
remaining members of the family. The narrative also comprises the 
tactics used at interrogation (March 1949): 
Concerning my biography, I repeated what had been written down in the 
questionnaire and the CV. They were particularly interested as to who I was 
hiding at in Pirita. I knew that this men had fled to the West, that's why I 
could make up more lengthy things out about my life. (KM, EKLA f 350: 921, 
p. 15.) 
The impact of critical times on people's course of life becomes 
predominant in narratives. In the newly independent Estonia, 
deportation and life as a deportee are public themes, similarly to the 
serving in different armies. Changes in family relationships in a histo­
rically critical era, and particularly the issues regarding interrogations 
and informers are of marginal relevance in the public or totally absent 
in the narratives. However, I have heard this privately (in the family 
and close circle) since my childhood. 
For the current treatment, only one layer (the depiction of the 
critical time) has been chosen from Lembitu Varblane's 19-page-long 
life history narrative, being limited within one theme (post-war life in 
Estonian village). At this level, it is intrinsic of the built-up of the 
narrative to describe the events, assess the situation from one's own 
standpoint and decide as to how to cope. The latter also involves the 
valuing of wisdom based on earlier life experience. For instance, the 
summary of the situation and an advice from a great-uncle "who had 
suffered a lot during his young age". "David won Goliath with 
25 LMA 198-1-66, p. 19. 
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cleverness, don't do anything thoughtless! Stay calm and see what's 
going on."26 Similar experience to behave exactly in such a manner, 
during the post-war critical times, can be found in different wordings, 
which means - this is a more general understanding than only 
presenting a standpoint of a single family or a man.27 I have inter­
preted this life history narrative as an experience narrative which 
unites personal experience and that of the others into a uniform 
wisdom. 
In conclusion 
Using the example of three narrators, the article dealt with the 
depiction of critical times in a post-World War II village in West-
Estonia. The depiction of the 1940s consolidated earlier family history 
and the later destiny of the narrators. The coherence of times in 
narratives refers to tradition-based perception of time, and speci­
fically, to the quality attributed to the time. Times with similar 
qualities rely on each other, and thus become actualised over and over 
again. The knowledge, about times that differ from the narrator's own 
experience, moves to the more passive side of the tradition. 
The ideology regarding the narratives of critical times is one and 
the same, irrespective of the fact whether the story has been 
immediately told to listeners, presented as a written response to ques­
tions or created as a free-structured written narrative. The narratives 
proceed from the narrator's point of view and his or her convictions 
which have evolved during a longer time period and are now, as an 
analysed text, one of the outcomes of the tradition. Current socio-
historic background in Estonia created preconditions for the selection 
of certain themes. During the post-Soviet time, the themes regarding 
arrests, deportations and the serving in different armies have become 
public. By way of this, the knowledge on the size and the boundaries 
of the 'our-group' is becoming more thorough, and relates to the 
issues concerning the moulding and designing of identity in society. In 
26 KM, EKLA f 350: 921, p. 11. 
"7 E.g., one of the narrators from Saaremaa says the following about what he had 
heard in his village: you can 7 always get a medal and solve situations with a lot 
of noise... "Living between big nations, we could have been milled into powder a 
long time ago if we hadn't had the skills to manage our things little by little under 
each emperor." (KM, EKLA f 350: 1809) 
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narratives, the focus is on one's decisions and behaviour within the 
framework prescribed by history. The subject matter regarding 
collaboration with the totalitarian occupation authorities (informers) is 
only hinted at, whereas the intra-family relationships-related topic 
"loses grip". The latter is undoubtedly conditioned by the lack of 
interest and even knowledge regarding the destiny of the close ones, a 
phenomenon intrinsic of the 1950s. At that time, it was impolite to ask 
strangers (e.g., schoolmates) about their origin or anything concerning 
their personal life. This domain was associated with the experience of 
the 1940s repressions, but could also affect the life of people towards 
an undesirable direction, during the entire Soviet period. 
Discussions have been held whether memoirs are a reliable source 
for the research of the past. The same way, we could ask whether the 
NKVD materials are reliable. What kinds of tactics were used by 
Soviet functionaries to get testimonies? What kinds of tactics were 
used by those being interrogated? Regarding the standpoint of the 
current research, the issue of the reliability of facts is not of greatest 
relevance. Within the extent of the observed materials, the truths of 
the narratives did not become doubtful in the light of history docu­
ments, nor vice versa. Comparison of memories and archive materials 
offers intermittent alteration of distant and close-up views, enabling 
the observation of certain narration rules, as, for instance, the 
confluence of times, conditioned by forgetting in Jaan Kindel's 
narrative, actualisation of the theme in Laine Kindel's narration, and 
the screening out of wisdom in Lembitu Varblane's narrative. 
Juxtaposition of archive materials and narratives may indeed emerge 
questions (as in the case of Lembitu Varblane's mother and father), 
but this would not alter the perception regarding the events.28 
28 Research for this article was funded by the project "Aspects of Terminology 
and Source Criticism in the Study of Everyday Culture" under the national 
programme "Estonian Language and National Memory"; the European Union 
through the European Regional Development Fund; targeted financed projects 
"Folklore and Society: Tradition, Memory, Creativity, Applications". Translated 
by Mall Leman. 
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Критические события 1940-х годов 
в эстонских жизнеописаниях 
В статье рассматривается, каким образом критические времена, 
связанные с приходом Советской власти и Второй мировой войной, 
отражались в жизнеописаниях, написанных во вновь независимой 
Эстонии. Анализ устных рассказов сравнивает тексты из южной 
части Läänemaa (интервью проведены в 2005 году), матерьялом для 
анализа написанных историй послужили ответы на вопросник 
Эстонского национального музея и жизнеописания, собранные в 
сборнике «Сто жизнеописаний века» (1999). Исторический контекст 
был почерпнут из матерьялов Эстонского исторического архива и 
архива уезда Läänemaa. 
Исследование сфокусировано на двух главных вопросах. Первый: 
различаются ли устные и письменные нарративы только по форме, 
или они имеют и разное содержание (разные идеологии). Второй: 
воспоминания и исторические документы только дополняют друг-
друга, или они меняют наши представления о случившемся. Нарра­
тивы представлены с определенной точки зрения, следуя убежде­
ниям рассказчика, при этом главное сообщение остается тем же в 
разных презентациях. Рассказы основаны на опыте о том, как люди 
справлялись (как на практическом так и на ментальном уровнях) в 
трудных условиях. Конфликта между историческими источниками и 
воспоминаниями не наблюдается, но добавление исторических 
источников позволяет лучше прослеживать развертывание нарратив­
ной традиции (нарративные правила) и высвечивать новые вопросы 
(скрытые в нарративе). 
1940. aastate kriitilised sündmused eesti elulugudes 
Artiklis vaadeldakse, kuidas praegu, taasiseseisvunud Eestis kirjutatud 
elulugudes kajastuvad kriitilised ajad, mille tingisid Nõukogude võimu 
kehtestamise ja Teise maailmasõjaga kaasnenud sündmused (sõjaolukord, 
okupatsioonid, massirepressioonid). Pärimusliku ajaloo vaatepunktist 
analüüsitakse tekste Lõuna-Läänemaalt: suuline eluloointervjuu (2005), 
kirjalikud vastused Eesti Rahva Muuseumi küsitlusele "1949. aasta 
küüditamine, elu asumisel" (1999) ja vaba struktuuriga kirjalik eluloo-
jutustus, mis on saadetud Eesti Kirjandusmuuseumi elulugude kogumis­
võistlusele "Sajandi sada elulugu" (1999). Ajaloolise konteksti loomiseks 
on kasutatud materjale Eesti Ajalooarhiivist ja Lääne Maa-arhiivist. 
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Käsitluses on kesksed kaks küsimust. Esmalt, kas suulised ja kirjalikud 
jutustused erinevad vaid esitusviisi poolest või kannavad need endas ka 
erinevaid sõnumeid (ideoloogiaid). Teiseks, kas mälestused ja ajaloo-
dokumendid ainult täiendavad üksteist või muudavad nad olemuslikult ka 
sündmustest saadavaid ettekujutusi. Avalikkusele esitatakse kogemus-
jutustused, kuidas rasketes oludes hakkama saadi, seda nii praktilisel kui 
ka mentaalsel tasandil. Lood esitatakse teatud vaatepunktist jutustajate 
veendumuste kohaselt, mistõttu lugude põhisõnum jääb erinevates 
esitustes samaks. Konflikti ajalooallikate ja mälestuste vahel esile ei 
tulnud. Küll aga võimaldab ajalooallikate lisamine mälestuste uurimisse 
paremini jälgida jututraditsiooni kujunemist (jutustamisreegelid) ja esile 
tuua uusi (loos varju jäävaid) küsimusi. 
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Abstract. The construction of memory in colonial Eritrea: Eritreans, 
Mestizos and Italians. Focusing on some passages of life histories collected in 
Asmara and based on the 'memory of Italy', I study the representation of the 
past in order to reveal the shaping of the subjective experience by the colonial 
discourse in Eritrea. If the main aim of my essay is the understanding of the 
play of interactions between individuals and collectivity, one more important 
element I take into account is 'memory' seen as a "social selection of 
remembering" (Halbwachs). I try to connect the social position and narrative 
role of single members (of the Eritrean society) to the meaning it takes the 
'going back to the past' for them as individuals belonging to a group (an 
Eritrean, a Mestizo, an Italian) in relation to the past and the present. The 
consequence is that the logic dominant/dominated is inadequate to explain the 
internal articulations of the colonial context and that the focus must be shifted 
on individual and collective systems of expectations and on the negotiations 
of meaning resulting from a "past always to be recovered" and a "present 
always to be rebuilt". 
A partir de fragments d'histoires de vie collectées sur le terrain à 
Asmara (en Érythrée) et centrées sur la 'mémoire de l'Italie', je vais 
m'interroger dans la présente contribution sur les modalités de repré­
sentation du passé afin d'essayer de comprendre de quelle manière 
l'expérience subjective se configure sur le fond de l'expérience 
coloniale. Si, donc, la finalité réside dans la saisie du jeu d'interac­
tions qui se crée entre un sujet et la collectivité, un élément central est 
en outre constitué par le relais de la mémoire entendue en tant que 
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« sélection sociale du souvenir » (Halbwachs 2001). Celle-ci répond à 
des mécanismes liés à la position de l'interlocuteur dans la société 
érythréenne et à la signification que prend pour un individu (un 
érythréen, un métis, un italien) le « retour au passé » par rapport au 
contexte passé et présent. Dans cette perspective, la seule logique 
dominant/dominé n'est pas adéquate pour comprendre les articulations 
internes à la réalité coloniale, une réalité qu'il faut investiguer en se 
focalisant sur les systèmes d'attentes individuels et collectifs, sur les 
finalités subjectives et historiques, sur la base de négociations des sens 
stratifiés dans la sédimentation d'un « passé toujours à récupérer » et 
d'un « présent instable ». 
La mémoire, donc, entendue comme mécanisme dynamique qui 
récupère le passé tout en l'actualisant, c'est-à-dire en le faisant revivre 
à partir du présent. Pour cette raison, il faut souligner que, si la 
remémoration contribue à récupérer la signification d'un événement 
spécifique et isolé, la mise en relation de ces mêmes événements sur 
des séquences linéaires, engendre plusieurs parcours de sens qui 
dépendent de la coïncidence de traits différents tels que l'appartenance 
d'un individu aux divers groupes sociaux, leur articulation interne et 
les systèmes d'attentes qui les soutiennent. La configuration spéci­
fique de l'ensemble de ces éléments donne lieu à des représentations 
multiples et plurielles. Plus concrètement (bien que la question 
concerne de manière plus générale la connaissance anthropologique et 
la 'forme' que celle-ci prend conformément au paradigme théorique 
de référence1), choisir comme objet d'étude les histoires de vie — 
c'est-à-dire la mémoire qui, à travers ces histoires, se sédimente sous 
forme de texte — entraîne une réflexion sur le processus de la 
recherche, sur sa construction et sur Y interaction anthropologue/ 
interlocuteur privilégié (le 'natif ou L'informateur'). Dans la présente 
contribution, plutôt que d'aborder la question des histoires de vie dans 
toute son ampleur, je me limiterai à discuter certains points qui 
ouvrent des parcours de réflexion possibles. 
En ce qui concerne les exemples choisis, je suis obligé de les 
présenter comme représentatifs du groupe de référence dans sa totalité 
(érythréens, métis, italiens) et donc de passer sous silence des 
1 L'espace réduit de cette contribution ne permet pas d'approfondir la question 
et d'expliciter les connexions. Pour un approfondissement, cf. D'Agostino; 
Montes 2002-2004 et D'Agostino 2008. 
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articulations internes à chaque groupe". Il n'en est pas ainsi dans la 
réalité, mais j'espère parvenir à communiquer ici quand même la 
complexité du sujet étudié. 
Tout d'abord je voudrais exprimer certaines considérations sur 
l'emploi du terme «métis». Au début j'étais un peu réticente à 
l'employer mais l'expérience sur le terrain m'a fait comprendre que 
dans le contexte contemporain, il a « généralement » une acceptation 
neutre et dénotative. Au-delà de la connotation négative du terme dans 
le passé, dont les habitants d'Asmara sont bien conscients, le fait est 
que dans la société érythréenne contemporaine le terme "métis" est 
employé par les métis eux-mêmes couramment, sans aucune connota­
tion. J'aurais pu employer le terme "italo-érythréen" mais celui-ci 
évoque une condition juridique et sa neutralité apparente aurait occulté 
le caractère situationnel et historiquement déterminé du statut des 
individus en question, ainsi que la complexité de leur condition. En 
outre, de nombreux métis n'ont pas encore résolu leur position 
juridique et cherchent aujourd'hui encore à obtenir du Gouvernement 
italien la reconnaissance de leur ascendance paternelle. Utiliser la 
dénomination « italo-érythréens » les aurait exclus. 
Il semble que les quelques Italiens qui vivent encore en Erythrée et 
qui appartiennent aux classes moyennes, utilisent également le terme 
"métis" dans un sens exclusivement dénotatif. Par contre, pour les 
Erythréens non métis, le terme conserve nettement l'acceptation 
négative et méprisante de « bâtard ». L'ambiguïté inhérente au statut 
social des métis est assez bien exprimée par un dicton du Tigré que 
l'on peut encore entendre: «Attention aux Métis parce qu'ils ont deux 
cœurs ». Ce genre de représentation est rejetée par les Érythréens qui 
ont un certain niveau d'instruction et qui appartiennent aux milieux les 
plus favorisés. Toutefois elle continue à avoir cours, comme, par 
exemple, l'a exprimée un de mes interlocuteurs, représentant de l'élite 
d'Asmara. Le récit concerne une situation particulière du passé mais, 
comme nous le verrons, il y a une oscillation des temps des verbes 
(qui ne dépend pas d'une connaissance imparfaite de la langue 
italienne) et la narration finit par se référer au présent et se complique 
encore plus pour l'évocation de la composante "ethnique" éthiopien­
ne: 
Relativement à cet aspect, dans les dernières pages de cette contribution, 
j'insère un exemple sans pour autant le commenter: il s'agit de deux témoignages 
d'Italiens dont les parcours de sens sont toutefois très différents. 
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Les Érythréens se comportaient comme un groupe fermé, et les Métis étaient 
considérés comme des gens à part. Naturellement, il n'y a pas de différences 
substantielles de personnalités, car les Métis sont eux aussi nés ici, de mères 
érythréennes, mais c'étaient des dikala (« bâtards »); il y avait, et il y a sans 
doute encore, un préjugé à l'égard de cette classe sociale dérivant du 
complexe de supériorité de l'Érythréen, qui se sentait toujours supérieur aux 
autres, y compris par rapport aux Italiens. Même s'ils savaient très bien que 
les Italiens possédaient une technologie plus avancée et connaissaient 
beaucoup de choses, les Erythréens se sentaient supérieurs. Ils avaient la 
même attitude vis-à-vis des Arabes, ils les évitaient; c'est en ce sens qu'il faut 
comprendre tout cela, à cette époque-là, les Erythréens ne fréquentaient pas 
les gens des autres communautés 3. 
Les femmes érythréennes qui ont eu des enfants avec des Italiens étaient 
en général des domestiques qui faisaient surtout le ménage, puis la cuisine, 
etc. Elles sont indiscutablement érythréennes, mais il reste le fait qu'aucun 
Érythréen ne se mariera jamais avec elles, car elles ont désormais perdu leur 
dignité, avec leur virginité. En effet, tous les Erythréens prétendent que leur 
femme soit vierge au mariage et ils n'accepteraient jamais d'épouser une 
femme qui ne le serait pas, ils la considèrent comme une paria; à plus forte 
raison si elle a eu des rapports avec un Italien. Vous avez sans doute eu 
l'occasion de remarquer que les Métis, et en particulier les femmes, nés de ces 
relations sont très beaux, de tous les points de vue, mais leur beauté physique 
laisse les Erythréens indifférents, aujourd'hui comme alors. Seuls les 
Ethiopiens avaient osé se marier massivement avec des métis. Les Erythréens 
continuaient à rester très conservateurs, à constituer un groupe à part... 
(Kidane Zerezghi) 
La manière dont ce même interlocuteur érythréen s'exprime à propos 
de la composition et de l'organisation de la société est significative. Il 
privilégie la dimension « ethnique » et insiste encore une fois sur la 
composante éthiopienne4 qui, d'après lui, est responsable d'une 
déstabilisation supplémentaire: 
3 H est intéressant de remarquer la contradiction: s'il existent des métis c'est 
parce que des Érythréens (ou, plus exactement, des Érythréennes) ont fréquenté 
« d'autres communautés ». Le point de vue exprimé est très clair, comme on peut 
l'observer aussi dans le passage qui suit tout de suite après: c'est un point de vue à 
la fois élitaire (être Érythréen coïncide avec l'élite Eiythréenne) et androcentrique 
(être Érythréen correspond à être un mâle Érythréen). 
4 Nous savons que la guerre des Érythréens contre l'Ethiopie a été cruelle et 
qu'elle a duré plus de trente ans. L'Érythrée a obtenu l'indépendance en 1994, au 
moins du point de vue politique et formel. 
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Nous n'avions jamais de rapports avec les Italiens ni avec les Métis. Ce n'est 
pas que les Érythréens détestaient les Métis mais, pour une raison ou pour une 
autre, ils voulaient limiter leurs rapports aux autres Érythréens. Les mélanges 
entre les Métis et les autres n'ont eu lieu que plus tard, sous le régime de Hai lé 
Sélassié quand les Amhara ont commencé à se marier avec des Métis; aussi 
bien durant la période des Italiens qu'à l'époque anglaise, la société était 
comme divisée en classes: il y avait les Italiens, puis les Métis et enfin, les 
Érythréens... comme s'ils constituaient pour ainsi dire une caste à part; je ne 
me souviens pas qu'à cette époque un Érythréen se soit marié avec une 
métisse, les mélanges n'auront lieu qu'après l'avènement de l'occupation 
éthiopienne. (Kidane Zerezghi) 
Un Italien, né dans la Colonie, a des souvenirs différents: 
A l'école nous avions de bons rapports entre camarades, nous étions bien 
amalgamés, très bien même. Naturellement, plus la famille était riche, plus 
elle avait de possibilités d'être favorisée; [...] mais [...] la différence 
"ethnique" n'était même pas considérée, nous étions tous des êtres humains 
[...] nous avions beaucoup de choses en commun [...] Logiquement dans la 
vie sociale ceux qui avaient plus d'argent pouvaient avoir certaines relations. 
Par exemple, il y avait le club italien et il était très exclusif. Pour en faire 
partie, il fallait avoir la carte et payer les cotisations. Il y avait d'autres clubs, 
celui de l'université, le club sportif, que tout le monde pouvait fréquenter. La 
sélection se faisait donc sur la base du patrimoine. Le club italien était 
fréquenté par les riches, mais nous les jeunes, nous fréquentions les autres. Là 
il n'y avait pas de distinctions, les Érythréens et les Métis ne se sentaient pas 
rejetés. La différence se faisait en fonction de la situation économique, comme 
partout. (Vittorio Volpicella) 
Durant les rencontres sur le terrain avec mes interlocuteurs, j'ai 
délibérément choisi de les laisser exposer librement leurs opinions et 
leurs arguments. Je leur demandais seulement de se présenter et de 
commencer leur récit, en partant de leur nom et leur état civil. Si, en 
général, dans un récit autobiographique il n'est pas difficile de 
comprendre la fonction du nom propre comme «marqueur d'identité» 
(Bourdieu 1995: 75), dans ce contexte, il prend une valeur symbolique 
particulièrement significative et déterminante. Voici Yincipit de trois 
"histoires" racontées à Asmara en septembre 2003: 
Je m'appelle Giovanni Mazzola, je suis né à Asmara le 28 mai 1940. Je suis 
tailleur. Mon père s'appelait Salvatore. Je suis le troisième de six enfants: 
Alberto, Enzo, moi, Paolo, Sandro et Lidia. Mon père est arrivé à Asmara en 
1935-36 et il y est resté jusqu'en 1949. Quand il en est parti, j'avais neuf ans. 
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Je m'appelle Maria Mazzola, mon nom de jeune fille est Maria Bertellini. Je 
suis née le 4 septembre 1949. Mon père s'appelait Salvatore Mauro mais je ne 
porte pas son nom parce qu'il n'a pas pu me reconnaître. Je crois que mon 
père est arrivé en Érythrée avec les soldats italiens durant la guerre de 35. 
Je m'appelle Giacomo Tutone. Je suis né à Asmara le 9 avril 1935. J'ai vécu 
ici jusqu'en 1952. Mon père était italien, de Palerme, il a dû naître vers 1886. 
Il était venu comme militaire, avec les « chemises noires », entre 1926 et 
1930, je pense. Ma mère s'appelait Zaitù Gheremarià. [...] Mon père est resté 
ici jusqu'en 1950. 
En ce qui concerne les Métis dont nous venons de lire les témoigna­
ges, il est facile de comprendre combien la mémoire des pères 
constitue un dispositif fondamental pour mettre en forme la perception 
et la représentation d'eux-mêmes. Ce dispositif est étroitement lié à ce 
que j'ai appelé la « mémoire de l'Italie », thème plus général de ma 
recherche. La « mémoire de l'Italie » passe par la mémoire des pères. 
On retrouve une partie de l'histoire de l'Erythrée dans les récits de ces 
individus qui ont un père italien. Leur histoire se construit à partir 
d'une expérience douloureuse, d'un deuil qu'ils ne sont pas encore 
parvenus à élaborer. C'est cette expérience personnelle souvent 
inachevée, et douloureuse car inachevée, qui alimente les souvenirs et 
permet parfois de s'"inventer" un rapport. Le parent est une sorte 
d'ancêtre "mythique". Leur "identité" a du mal à trouver une collo­
cation précise. Elle renvoie à une condition différente du sentiment 
d'être "italien" ou "érythréen". Il s'agit d'une identité métisse 
justement, au sens propre du terme. Cette stratégie de se donner un 
passé, à la fois individuel et social, même sans avoir eu une 
expérience durable pour l'y ancrer5, constitue l'expérience subjective 
d'une condition objective: la position ambiguë des soi-disant métis 
dans l'imaginaire social. D'une manière confuse, contradictoire par 
rapport au contexte — du discours, de la situation — ils se 
représentent comme un peu moins que des Italiens et un peu plus que 
des Érythréens. Cette rencontre de l'Histoire (avec un H majuscule) 
5 II n'est pas rare que les gens aient peu de souvenirs de leur père, limités à une 
période brève et qu'avec le temps, ces souvenirs se soient exaltés. Dans le récit 
précédent, Giovanni Mazzola dit que son père est parti quand il avait neuf ans. 
Toutefois, sans s'apercevoir de la contradiction, il continue son récit de la manière 
suivante: «Je me rappelle beaucoup de choses de mon père, beaucoup de choses. 
C'était une personne très active, dynamique et inventive. Il faisait tout ce qu'il 
pouvait afin de nous inculquer l'intérêt pour l'école, pour les études ». 
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d'un territoire avec des histoires individuelles et familiales, le carac­
tère indissociable d'événements historiques et personnels, constitue 
une des caractéristiques de la sémiosphère relative à la "réalité" 
d'Asmara. 
Il peut être intéressant de confronter les textes précédents avec la 
manière de se présenter de l'interlocuteur cité au début: 
Je m'appelle Kidane Zerezghi, je suis érythréen à 100%, né à Saganeiti, à 62 
km au sud d'Asmara le 8 décembre 1931, durant la période coloniale 
italienne. Naturellement je ne me rappelle pas grand chose de mon enfance... 
mon père était un officier du gouvernement italien de l'époque, c'était un 
fonctionnaire des douanes, un haut fonctionnaire. A cette époque-là, Massaua 
dépendait de trois personnes et mon père était l'un des trois. C'étaient les 
fonctionnaires supérieurs de la douane érythréenne à Massaua. J'étais enfant à 
l'époque, mais peu à peu je me rendais compte que nous vivions sous la 
colonisation italienne. 
Dans les récits des Métis, la question de la "reconnaissance" des en­
fants nés d'hommes italiens et de femmes érythréennes occupe une 
position centrale. J'ai abordé ce sujet dans un article écrit avec Stefano 
Montes et je ne m'attarderai pas sur ce point (D'Agostino, Montes 
2002-2004). Toutefois j'évoque cet aspect, car il a une grande impor­
tance dans toutes les histoires que j'ai entendues: le rapport entre 
Y individuel et le collectif Même si les histoires de vies appartiennent 
à la sphère individuelle, leur construction reflète des connexions avec 
le social particulièrement prégnantes pour la compréhension du flux 
des événements en question. Bien qu'il s'agisse d'événements vécus 
directement par les narrateurs, qui les concernent donc directement, on 
observe une projection du sujet de l'énonciation hors de soi 
(idébrayage6) sous la forme d'un actant collectif: celui qui parle dit 
"nous", transférant à l'improviste le récit de la modalité d'énonciation 
à la première personne ("Je m'appelle", "je suis né", etc.) à 
l'énonciation collective. Ce glissement, ce décalage de l'énonciation 
comporte un ancrage à une condition dans laquelle ont lieu les 
vicissitudes personnelles. Même la naissance est considérée dans un 
Greimas et Courtés définissent le débrayage de la manière suivante: « 
L'opération par laquelle l'instance de l'énonciation disjoint et projette hors d'elle-
même, lors de l'acte de langage et en vue de la manifestation, certains termes liés 
à sa structure de base pour constituer ainsi les éléments fondateurs de l'énoncé-
discours. » (Greimas; Courtés 1993: 79). 
500 Gabrielid D 'Agostino 
cadre qui assume un caractère social, comme un phénomène collectif 
concernant un grand nombre de personnes. Puis, la responsabilité de la 
non-reconnaissance n'est jamais attribuée à la mauvaise volonté du 
père, mais à un ensemble de normes, de lois et d'obstacles imper­
sonnels que, dans tous les cas, les pères ont affronté: 
La loi ne reconnaissait pas ce fait. De nombreux Italiens étaient honnêtes et 
voulaient reconnaître leurs enfants, même provisoirement. [...] Notre père a 
été très correct parce qu'il est allé dans un tribunal et il nous a reconnus 
comme ses enfants légitimes avec le nom de Mazzola en présence de témoins. 
Puis il a déposé cet acte chez un notaire qui l'a ensuite transmis à la Cour et 
celle-ci l'a fait parvenir à la Mairie pour l'y enregistrer. Ainsi l'acte a été 
reconnu. (Giovanni Mazzola) 
Mon père n'avait pas pu nous reconnaître, ni mon frère ni moi, car il avait une 
femme en Italie, Giuseppina Greco, qui s'y opposait. [...] Pour cette raison, je 
portais le nom de ma mère, mais cela ne lui plaisait pas, elle disait toujours: 
"pourquoi la fille d'un italien doit-elle porter mon nom ?". (Maria Mazzola) 
Maria Mazzola explique pourquoi son père ne l'a pas reconnu et fait 
allusion à une norme, en vigueur alors, qui permettait à un Italien, 
avec l'autorisation de sa femme italienne légitime, de reconnaître des 
enfants nés dans les colonies de mères érythréennes. Elle continue son 
récit ainsi: 
Mon père et ma mère s'entendaient bien, je m'en souviens. Mais il y avait des 
moments où ils se disputaient parce que ma mère lui reprochait toujours de ne 
pas nous donner son nom et elle voulait savoir pourquoi il ne le faisait pas. 
[...] Elle l'a découvert plus tard [...] Ainsi elle a connu ce Monsieur Bertellini 
qui nous a reconnus, mon frère et moi, comme ses propres fils. Mon père était 
au courant... 
Giacomo Tutone explique lui aussi le fait que son père ne l'a pas 
reconnu, bien qu'il en ait eu l'intention, par un probable refus de 
l'épouse italienne. Toutefois, son frère aîné a exaucé le désir du père: 
Mon père tenait absolument à me reconnaître comme son fils, il y tenait 
beaucoup, j'étais son fils comme tous les autres. Mais à cette époque-là il y 
avait des lois très sévères ici. En outre, sa femme n'était probablement pas 
d'accord pour qu'il me reconnaisse et mon père a donc eu beaucoup de 
difficultés. Ce sont mes frères qui ont trouvé la solution pour le contenter et 
me faire reconnaître et c'est finalement mon frère, l'aîné, qui m'a reconnu. Il 
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était né en 1913, moi en 35, il y avait donc une belle différence d'âge entre 
nous. 
Certes, cela peut sembler bizarre, parce que du point de vue légal, je suis 
le fils de mon frère mais je n'y ai jamais accordé beaucoup d'importance. 
Mon père m'a dit qu'il ne fallait pas y accorder d'importance: "l'important, 
c'est que tu sois mon fils et que tu t'appelles Tutone", c'est ça qui était 
important pour mon père. (Giacomo Tutone) 
Un autre aspect intéressant qui émerge de ces histoires est le discours 
public du pouvoir. Foucault (1977, 1989) nous enseigne qu'une des 
images publiques du discours colonial concerne l'exercice du pouvoir 
sans l'utilisation directe de la force. L'imposition de Vordre du domi­
nateur (quel que soit le type de domination dont il s'agit) trouve un 
terrain d'application dans des domaines, seulement en apparence bien 
loin du pouvoir politique au sens strict du terme, comme l'hygiène, la 
sexualité ou la famille par exemple. 
Dans un long passage du récit de Giovanni Mazzola, cette re­
construction du souvenir du père assume des caractéristiques intéres­
santes: 
Mon père attribuait les terrains aux indigènes, certains acceptaient, d'autres 
étaient perplexes ou parfois se vexaient parce que souvent les terrains étaient 
loin de la ville. Quand il rédigeait ces actes de construction, mon père 
spécifiait qu 'ils devaient commencer par construire les services, la cuisine et 
les toilettes. Il n'approuvait l'autorisation de construire le reste de l'habitation, 
le salon et les chambres, qu'après avoir vérifié personnellement la 
construction effective des services. Je suis allé plusieurs fois avec mon père 
sur les lieux où il travaillait. J'étais petit, j'avais six, sept ans et je me rappelle 
qu 'il tenait beaucoup à l'hygiène. Par exemple il désapprouvait les femmes 
qui lavaient leur linge devant la route et y jetaient ensuite l'eau sale. 
Quelquefois, il renversait le récipient dans lequel elles lavaient leur linge, cela 
je le lui ai vu faire personnellement, de mes propres yeux. 
Giovanni Mazzola, sans s'en rendre compte, reprend un discours 
colonial fondé sur cette logique du pouvoir déclinée en termes de 
domination moins comme exploitation que comme action civilisatrice 
finalisée à l'introduction du seul ordre possible. En effet il ajoute: 
Je trouve qu'aujourd'hui la tâche est plus compliquée et la responsabilité plus 
importante par rapport à autrefois car la population a augmenté et les 
conditions d'hygiène se sont détériorées. La population devrait recevoir une 
éducation saine et civile dès la naissance et comprendre l'importance vitale de 
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l'hygiène, elle est nécessaire pour rester en bonne santé. Je le dis souvent aux 
gens dans la langue locale, ziriet addé tehennah, "l'hygiène est la mère de a 
santé", je le répète pour en convaincre les gens, je me rends dans les quartiers 
les plus sales, dans des endroits où beaucoup de gens refusent d aller à cause 
de la saleté. [...] je le fais pace que je suis convaincu qu'il est juste de le faire 
[...] 
La syntaxe privilégiée du discours du pouvoir colonial qui impose un 
ordre s'exerce en outre jusque dans l'articulation des espaces et des 
connexions entre eux; à ces espaces et à ces connexions on assigne (et 
on les laisse traverser par) les différentes composantes "raciales". Si 
Y apartheid est l'expression extrême du système de ségrégation (fondé 
sur une institution légale des "races"), des formes d'apartheid, plus ou 
moins rigides, ont été mises en place dans toutes les expériences de 
domination coloniale. Le cas italien, bien entendu, ne fait pas excep­
tion. Au contraire, de ce point de vue la fondation de la ville d'Asmara 
est exemplaire (comme à Massawa, l'autre réalité urbaine significative 
d'Erythrée). Dans l'attribution des espaces et la séparation, plus ou 
moins rigide mais évidente, des différentes composantes sociales 
"racialisées", se dessine une trame précise des lieux, comme on 
l'observe dans les récits des gens concernés. Ainsi s'exprime 
"l'Érythréen à 100%" de tout à l'heure: 
[...] en ce temps-là nous ne comprenions pas ce qui se passait, tout ce que 
nous savions c'était qu'on nous avait évacués de notre maison à Massaua. 
Nous étions allés à Saganeiti où nous n'aurions dû rester que cinq mois, 
d'après ce qu'on nous avait dit. J'avais huit ans, je ne me souviens plus très 
bien de ce qui s'est passé ensuite, mais je me rappelle que ma mère disait que 
nous avions eu une maison près du phare dans le port de Massaua, puis que les 
Italiens avaient décidé que ce quartier leur appartenait et ils nous ont relogés 
près de l'église orthodoxe... et de là ils nous ont à nouveau expulsés. (Kidane 
Zerezghi) 
Giovanni Mazzola se souvient: 
Le racisme se manifestait dans le fait que nous les jeunes métis, nous ne 
pouvions pas faire d'études supérieures, même si certains d'entre nous étaient 
intelligents. [...]. Je m'en souviens très bien, comme si c'était hier [...]: 
j'allais à la messe de huit heures à la Cathédrale parce que j'aimais me lever 
de bonne heure et chanter en chœur avec les autres fidèles. A un moment 
donné, une bonne sœur venait et me faisait changer de place pour me mettre 
derrière les autres. Je ne comprenais pas, puis je regardais autour de moi et je 
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voyais qu'ils étaient tous italiens, tous blancs. J'avais 11 ou 12 ans, mon père 
était déjà reparti et ce problème existait, aussi bien à l'école que dans la 
Cathédrale. (Giovanni Mazzola) 
Voici ce que dit Giacomo Tutone 
[...] je me souviens que les métis, sincèrement, vivaient dans des conditions 
difficiles parce qu'ils n'étaient pas acceptés, ni par les uns ni par les autres. En 
fait, ils constituaient un groupe à part, ils étaient exclus, pas tous naturelle­
ment, mais la plupart [...] Moi, personnellement, je dois dire la vérité, je n'ai 
rien subi de tout cela, à part une fois, un triste souvenir. J'étais allé trouver 
mon père à Dekemharè, avec ma mère, et comme mon père ne pouvait pas 
nous raccompagner à la maison nous avions pris le car. En général, dans les 
cars il y avait une situation terrible: les blancs se mettaient d'un côté et les 
noirs de l'autre, mais malheureusement dans ce car il n'y avait même pas 
cette distinction, c'était un véhicule réservé aux blancs. Avec nous il y avait 
une dame italo-érythréenne, elle aussi avait la peau plutôt claire, à peu près 
comme moi, et quand nous avons voulu prendre l'autobus pour rentrer à 
Asmara, ils ont laissé monter la dame et moi, mais ils ont interdit à ma mère 
d'entrer et lui ont fermé la porte au nez [...] (Giacomo Tutone) 
Le témoignage d'un autre interlocuteur, un Italien, est intéressant, 
ainsi que la justification qu'il donne: 
[...] quand je suis arrivé à Asmara je me suis rendu compte qu'il y avait des 
lignes d'autobus pour le transport civil où un séparé métallique, pas comme 
dans un fourgon carcéral bien sûr, divisait l'intérieur en deux et que la partie 
postérieure était réservée à la population locale. Mais pourquoi cela ? Je me 
refuse de croire que c'était parce qu'ils étaient noirs et que nous étions blancs. 
C'était pour une question d'hygiène, de manque de propreté, comme on peut 
le constater aujourd'hui encore à cause d'une mauvaise éducation; si en plus 
on pense aux parasites, aux comportements, aux habitudes, aux manières de 
manger et de s'habiller, tout cela en disait long ... d'ailleurs je crois 
sincèrement que les choses n'ont pas tellement changé, durant les soixante 
dernières années... Naturellement, aujourd'hui les blancs sont désormais une 
minorité par rapport à la population érythréenne, mais je ne crois pas qu'ils 
utilisent les moyens de transport public, à part le taxi, en tout cas ils ne 
prennent certainement pas l'autobus où c'est la bagarre, une bagarre qui en dit 
long (C. G.). 
Il s'agit d'un témoignage exemplaire. En prenant la forme d'un récit 
fondé sur des souvenirs personnels, la 'description' glisse immédiate­
ment sur un plan idéologique qui s'appuie sur la plupart des lieux 
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communs du 'discours' colonial. Sans tenir compte du manque de 
pertinence dans la référence à la 'manière de manger' par rapport au 
thème du récit (celui de la séparation dans les moyens de transport), 
on peut observer que le témoignage devient une énumération peremp-
toire des raisons exactes, concrètes et circonstanciées de la séparation 
entre les différents groupes. De cette manière, le témoignage finit par 
se configurer comme un refus qui n'est pas très bien caché, voire 
obstiné, d'accepter la condition de membre d'une communauté 
blanche et italienne qui désormais, depuis longtemps, n'est qu'une 
minorité dans un pays étranger. Bien qu'il s'agisse d'un Italien arrivé 
en Érythrée en 1946, on peut définir son attitude comme celle d'un 
'ex-colonial', si on veut utiliser la même catégorie à laquelle se réfère 
un autre interlocuteur, un italien qui est né et qui a toujours vécu à 
Asmara: 
Nous appelons ex-coloniaux tous ceux qui ont un âge compris entre soixante-
dix et quatre-vingt ans [...] qui sont arrivés en Erythrée avant 1935; mon père, 
par exemple, n'était pas un colonial parce qu'il était venu après [...]. Un ex­
colonial se distingue des autres par sa manière de se comporter face à la 
population locale. Habitués, comme ils étaient, au climat des années vingt, ils 
s'adressent par exemple à la population en tutoyant immédiatement, comme 
s'il s'agissait d'un domestique ou d'une femme de ménage. Aujourd'hui, on 
ne s'adresse plus même pas à eux de cette manière, s'il n'y a pas un rapport de 
confidence... Même dans les bureaux du gouvernement, ces gens-là se 
baladent en tutoyant tout le monde: « toi, tu..., tu..., tu... », qu'ils disent... Ils 
n'arrivent pas à comprendre, ne veulent pas comprendre que la situation n'est 
plus celle du passé. Ils n'arrivent pas à comprendre qu'ils doivent se 
comporter comme des Italiens à l'étranger. Ils pensent être chez eux. 
Autrefois, ils définissaient toutes les colonies comme une partie de l'Italie, un 
morceau de la nation italienne en dehors de l'Italie, même pas d"outremer', 
mais comme une partie du territoire métropolitain italien. C'est ce que 
faisaient les Français ou les Anglais avec leurs colonies. À l'égard de la 
population locale, ils étaient ceux qui étaient supérieurs. Aujourd'hui, il y a 
encore d'Italiens ici, à Asmara, qui gardent cette attitude de supériorité. 
(Vittorio Volpicella) 
Il est intéressant que, à partir d'une définition 'technique' du terme qui 
est ancrée dans une situation historique bien précise, l'interlocuteur 
étend ce signifié à un type d'attitude, à une modalité typique de se 
rapporter à un contexte. La manière de construire le texte est significa­
tive: le recours à un 'nous' est connoté immédiatement par l'apparte­
nance à une communauté locale, un 'nous' qui se distingue à la fois 
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d'un 'vous' (dont je fais partie moi-même en tant qu'anthropologue) 
('nous ici' par rapport à 'vous ailleurs') et d'un 'eux' (les ex­
coloniaux, c'est-à-dire les Italiens qui ont ce type de comportement, 
contrairement aux Italiens qui ne le font pas). C'est une prise de 
distance qui, dans les deux cas, a une valeur complètement différente. 
En conclusion, pour résumer la question centrale posée tout au 
long de ce texte, l'un des problèmes, débattu depuis quelque temps en 
anthropologie, concerne les modalités d'interaction (qui s'établissent 
entre l'anthropologue et les natifs), le traitement de la parole d'autrui 
et sa restitution dans le texte écrit par l'anthropologue. 
En amont, il y a la volonté de certains anthropologues de dévoiler 
la dimension asymétrique et hiérarchique (qui caractérisait, au début, 
la recherche sur le terrain), de s'interroger sur la conception multiple 
de l'altérité et d'apporter une réflexion critique plus approfondie sur le 
rôle et la signification de la discipline elle-même (à considérer 
désormais comme historiquement située). Bien qu'elles n'effacent pas 
la relation asymétrique qui s'instaure entre le chercheur et le natif (car 
c'est toujours le chercheur qui intervient sur ses « sources »), les 
histoires de vie permettent d'éviter tout de même que la « parole 
d'autrui » soit totalement cachée ou phagocytée par les considérations 
et les réflexions du chercheur. Elle reste là, même si elle est manipulée 
par le chercheur, prête à susciter d'autres lectures et interprétations. 
L'anthropologue, dans ce sens là, cesse d'être le seul interprète de la 
réalité et le seul auteur de son compte rendu ethnographique. 
En aval, il reste, toutefois, qu'une symétrie absolue ne peut jamais 
s'établir pendant Г interlocution, ni après dans la 'fabrication' du texte 
écrit. Il s'agit, à vrai dire, d'une impasse qu'on ne peut pas surmonter, 
à moins de renoncer au projet anthropologique de la connaissance de 
l'altérité qui se fonde, bon gré mal malgré, sur une forme (au moins) 
minimale de parole et de compréhension avec autrui. C'est précisé­
ment parce que je ne veux pas renoncer à cette tension vers une parole 
et une compréhension communes (qui correspond, par définition, au 
projet anthropologique), et en ayant conscience que quelqu'un voudra 
toujours parler pour quelqu'un d'autres, que, malgré les défauts, je 
continue à accorder ma préférence à l'anthropologue et à pratiquer 
l'anthropologie. 
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Построение колониальной памяти в Эритрее: 
эритрейцы, метисы и итальянцы 
Основываясь на отрывках некторых жизнеописаний, собранных в 
Асмаре и построенных на «итальянских воспоминаниях», в данной 
статье рассматриваются способы представления прошлого с целью 
показать, каким образом офицальный колониальный дискурс Эрит­
реи влияет на субъективный опыт. Главная цель эссе: понять игру 
отношений между индивидами и коллективом, существенным эле­
ментом в этом анализе является «память» как «социальный выбор 
воспоминания» {Halbwachs). Я пытаюсь связать социальную пози­
цию и нарративную роль отдельных членов общества (Эритреи) с 
тем, какое значение приобретает «возвращение в прошлое» в связи с 
настоящим и прошлым их как членов определенной группы 
(эритрейцев, метисов или итальянцев). Вывод — логика доминирую­
щего/доминируемого недостаточна для объяснения внутренних разг­
раничений колониальной ситуации, и внимание нужно обратить на 
системы индивидуальных и коллективных ожиданий и на конвен­
циональные значения, являющиеся результатом представлений о 
«прошлом, которое нужно открыть» и «настоящем, которое нужно 
заново построить». 
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Koloniaalmälu ehitamine Eritreas: 
eritrealased, mestiitsid ja itaallased 
Keskendudes mõnele Asmaras kogutud ja nö "Itaalia mälestustele" ehita­
tud eluloo lõigule, käsitlen käesolevas artiklis mineviku esitamise viise, 
paljastamaks, kuidas Eritrea ametlik kolonialistlik diskursus mõjutab 
subjektiivset kogemust. Minu essee põhieesmärk on mõista indiviidide ja 
kollektiivi vahelist suhtlustemängu ning üheks tähtsaks elemendiks, mida 
ma selle juures arvestanud olen, on "mälu" kui "mäletamise sotsiaalne 
valik" (Halbwachs). Üritan seostada üksikute (Eritrea ühiskonna) liikmete 
sotsiaalset positsiooni ning narratiivset rolli sellega, millise tähenduse 
omandab "minevikku tagasi minemine" seoses oleviku ja minevikuga 
nende kui teatud gruppi (eritrealaste, mestiitside või itaallaste gruppi) 
kuuluvate indiviidide jaoks. Järeldus on, et domineerija/domineeritav 
loogika ei ole koloniaalse situatsiooni sisemiste liigenduste seletamiseks 
piisav ning tähelepanu tuleb pöörata individuaalsetele ning kollektiiv­
setele ootuste süsteemidele ja võistlevatele tähendustele, mis tulenevad 
mõttesüsteemidest "minevik, mida tuleb avastada" ja "olevik, mida tuleb 
uuesti üles ehitada". 
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Parler de soi pour changer le monde 
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Abstract. Speaking about oneself in order to change the world. Juri Vella is 
a Forest Nenets reindeer herder, writer and fighter for his people's rights. In 
his private life, he enjoys silence, as it is a rule in his culture. But the public 
man, who is graduated from the Literature Institute in Moscow, is aware of 
the power of speech, and knows how to use it for his goals, to support his 
vision. He had to realise that the native peoples in Western Siberia have lost 
much of their skills and acquired none during the Soviet period, in which they 
were compelled to integrate in the society and to attend Soviet institutions as 
school or the army. This process has been intensified in the latest fifty years, 
with the invasion of their traditional territories by oil industry. But Juri Vella 
expects the oil reserves to finish one day, and then the aborigines will lack the 
goods bestowed upon them by "Western" society and will have to survive 
with the help of the traditional skills. He tries to promote his vision of the 
natives able to live in both worlds and able to recover their dignity. This 
article analyses his public speech in this behalf and the way Juri Vella speaks 
about himself, enlarging his "ego" both to his clan and the native peoples in 
general and connecting it very directly with the space around him. The main 
sources are Eva Toulouze's fieldwork at Juri Vella's taiga camp, living with 
the family five months, and the film Liivo Niglas has shot about him in 2003. 
Cette étude repose sur les travaux de terrain faits par Eva Toulouze en 
Sibérie occidentale en 1999 et en 2000, lesquels ont été suivis de 
contact permanent et de rencontres occasionnelles avec Juri Vella, qui 
fera l'objet de cet article; Liivo Niglas a eu l'occasion de faire un film 
à son sujet (Niglas 2003). Nous utilisons de plus ses écrits, métatextes 
d'œuvres littéraires ou interviews et les enregistrements qu'il a ou que 
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d'autres ont faits de ses paroles. Nous allons nous arrêter prioritaire 
ment sur son discours, mais celui-ci est de manière générale accom 
pagné d'actes, qui en sont indissociables, et qui souvent sont meme 
premiers par rapport au discours lui-même. Comme la parole n est 
jamais innocente, nous disposons de sources d autant plus riches 
qu'elles sont diverses. Les expériences des deux auteurs de cet article 
leur ont fourni des occasions fort nombreuses d'être témoins de 
l'usage par Juri Vella de la parole. Eva Toulouze a passé entre 1999 et 
2000 cinq mois chez lui, principalement dans son campement dans la 
taïga. Elle y a partagé la vie quotidienne du couple, non point en tant 
que chercheuse intéressée par les Nenets des forêts, mais en tant 
qu'amie qui venait traduire en français les poèmes du père de famille. 
Elle était donc en situation privilégiée pour suivre l'expression de Juri 
Vella dans sa continuité et sans la forcer, puisque sa pratique 
quotidienne était d'observer et d'écouter plutôt que de poser des 
questions. Liivo Niglas a connu Juri Vella à Tartu, en Estonie, lors du 
voyage de celui-ci à l'automne 2000. Il a montré à Juri Vella son film 
« Une brigade » (Niglas 2000), tourné avec la 7e brigade d'éleveurs de 
rennes nenets du sovkhose de Jar-Sale, après quoi Juri lui a demandé 
s'il ne voulait pas faire un film sur les Nenets des forêts. C'est ainsi 
qu'est né « Le monde de Juri Vella », qui a été une nouvelle occasion 
pour Juri de s'exprimer. 
1. Qui est Juri Vella? 
Juri Vella est un poète, un éleveur de rennes, un militant nenets. Le 
petit peuple dont il est issu est celui des Nenets des Forêts, habitants 
de la taïga de Sibérie Occidentale, qui sont restés longtemps isolés 
autour des hauts cours des affluents de la rive droite de l'Ob, dans une 
aire de toundra boisée où alternent forêts, lacs et tourbières et qui est 
située entre deux unités administratives, l'arrondissement des Khantys 
et des Mansis et l'arrondissement Yamalo-Nenets. Personne ne peut 
dire au juste combien ils sont, car ils ne figurent explicitement dans 
aucun recensement: si le chiffre donné pour les « Nenets » dans les 
statistiques concernant le premier de ces arrondissements nous donne 
une indication fiable, puisqu'il n'y a pas dans cet arrondissement 
d'autre Nenets, le nombre de Nenets des Forêts vivant plus au Nord 
dans l'arrondissement Yamalo-Nenets, nous est inconnu, puisque les 
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recensements ne les distinguent guère de leurs parents Nenets de la 
toundra, qui y sont largement représentés. Pourtant, les différences 
entre les deux peuples sont identifiables à l'œil nu: les langues sont 
suffisamment différentes pour que toute intercompréhension soit 
exclue, les modes de vie, commandés par l'écosystème dominant, ne 
peuvent se confondre. Il faut donc se contenter d'évaluations: le 
nombre total des Nenets des Forêts avoisine vraisemblablement les 
2000 personnes. 
Dans la région qu'habite Juri Vella, le bassin de Г Agan avec ses 
affluents, les Nenets des Forêts coexistent depuis au moins près d'un 
siècle avec les Khantys Orientaux, dits de Surgut. Originairement, 
ceux-ci habitaient des aires plus méridionales, autour du bas et du 
moyen cours de Г Agan. Avec l'enracinement du pouvoir soviétique, 
dans les années trente, puis avec la politique de sédentarisation qui a 
abouti dans les années cinquante, aussi bien les Khantys que les 
Nenets ont été rassemblés dans le village de Varjogan et ont dû pour 
la plupart abandonner complètement leurs campements dans la forêt. 
Ceci a resserré les liens entre les deux communautés, liens qui 
existaient déjà dans la première moitié du XXe siècle, puisque 
Verbov, qui a été le premier à avoir rendu compte dans une étude 
ethnographique de cette population, mentionne dès 1937 des règles 
d'exogamie entre les clans nenets et les clans khantys. C'est ainsi que 
la tradition des mariages mixtes unissant des Khantys de la région de 
Varjogan à des Nenets de la région de Halesovaja s'est longtemps 
poursuivie dans le XXe siècle. 
Juri Ajvaseda est issu du clan des Vella (cf. infra) et est né dans 
une famille d'éleveurs de rennes à proximité du village de Varjogan. 
Son père est mort quand il était très jeune et il est allé vivre au village 
chez sa grand-mère pour pouvoir aller à l'école. Sa grand-mère Nengi 
était une personnalité marquante, qui a beaucoup transmis de son 
savoir à son petit-fils. Juri a quitté le village pour aller faire son lycée 
à la grande ville de la région, Surgut, mais il n'y a pas trouvé sa place 
et a arrêté ses études secondaires pour retourner dans sa région. Le 
début de sa vie d'adulte ne diffère guère de celui d'un habitant 
ordinaire de ces régions. Il a épousé à dix-neuf ans une femme khanty 
de son âge dont il a eu quatre filles. Après son service militaire, il a 
fait plusieurs métiers, collecteur de poisson, facteur, responsable 
culturel ; il a même été maire du village dont sa femme était 
originaire, Agan. Plus tard il s'est installé dans son village à lui, à 
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Varjogan, plus au Nord, où il a travaillé comme chasseur dans l 
économique soviétique d'Etat. En même temps, dans les années , 
il a fini ses études secondaires pour s'inscrire à Moscou, à 1 institut e 
littérature, où il a suivi les cours de poésie par correspondance. est 
ainsi qu'il a publié en 1990 son premier recueil (Vella 1991a), qui a 
été suivi de plusieurs autres (Vella 1991b, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2004). 
En même temps il s'est fait remarquer dès les années 1980 par une 
approche originale et combative des problèmes rencontrés par les 
populations autochtones de la région, soumises à la pression des 
compagnies pétrolières, qui ont étendu leur champ d'exploitation 
jusque dans les régions les plus reculées de cette aire. Il a utilisé tous 
les moyens possibles pour faire valoir les droits des autochtones à 
vivre sur leurs terres et à protéger la nature, le premier garant de leur 
existence physique et mentale. Conscient des dangers que court cette 
même existence, il n'a jamais hésité à porter ses protestations au plus 
haut niveau, par exemple à écrire au président Putin. 
En même temps, il veille à préserver les valeurs qui lui sont chères 
et à vivre en conformité avec elles. Dans les années 1980, il a été à 
l'origine de la création d'un musée à Varjogan, lieu qu'il voulait 
interactif, tourné essentiellement vers la population locale, puisqu'il a 
fait transporter au village les constructions abandonnées par ses 
habitants dans la forêt avec le processus de sédentarisation. C'était le 
début d'une forme de réappropriation par la population de son identité, 
grâce à ces édifices qui étaient les leurs et qui les rejoignaient au 
village. Pendant un temps, ce « musée » a vécu, puisque les habitants 
du village allaient souvent dans leurs maisons, y faire du feu et y boire 
le thé avec les amis. Mais ce n'était là qu'un pis aller... Juri Vella est 
allé plus loin. Au début des années 1990 il a acheté une dizaine de 
rennes, à partir desquelles il a formé un troupeau aujourd'hui d'une 
bonne taille pour la région, avec lequel il vit dans la taïga avec sa 
famille. 
Cette rapide présentation de l'expérience de Juri Vella servira de 
cadre à nos propos ultérieurs. En tant que personnalité sociale, en 
effet, Juri Vella est très souvent amené à prendre la parole en public à 
représenter les autochtones de la région, voire à parler en leur nom En 
même temps, intellectuel au sens plein du terme, il a sa vision de 
l'avenir, vision qui l'amène à tenter de préserver les possibilités de 
choix pour ses successeurs. C'est l'idée qui régit toute son action Elle 
s'exprime dans tous ses actes et dans tout son discours 
Speaking about oneself in order to change the world 513 
2. Juri Vella et la parole 
Juri Vella est issu d'une culture du silence. Il se plaît souvent à 
évoquer comment deux Nenets se rencontrant dans la forêt se parlent 
comme s'ils poursuivaient une conversation depuis longtemps 
commencée. Le silence est espace de communication, un espace 
confortable et chaleureux, qui a cependant ces dernières décennies 
beaucoup souffert du contact avec l'Autre, avec le Russe porteur 
d'une culture de la parole. Cette deuxième culture, Juri la maîtrise: il a 
appris à la connaître et à la pratiquer dans les multiples contacts qu'il a 
eus avec le monde russe depuis son enfance, et il le fait avec un talent 
nourri de sa pratique universitaire et politique. C'est un orateur 
remarquable, toujours capable de surprendre son auditoire et de capti­
ver son attention. 
Mais dans la vie privée il privilégie le silence. Sa parole est ri­
goureusement ciblée. Elle est forcément toujours porteuse de message. 
Qu'elle se déploie dans sa maison avec des visiteurs occasionnels, 
avec les ethnographes de passage, avec les responsables de l'industrie 
pétrolière, ou bien dans des colloques internationaux, des assemblées 
de représentants des peuples premiers etc., elle répond toujours à un 
objectif précis, elle sert immanquablement une intention. Jamais Juri 
Vella n'utilise cet outil de manière banale. Son expression personnelle 
à lui serait plutôt le silence. 
3. Parler de soi: un moi double 
Bien sûr, dans ses autobiographies, Juri Vella parle de lui et met en 
évidence les éléments qui dans son expérience peuvent lui permettre 
de donner l'exemple. Un exemple en est la phrase suivante: 
Je continue même à l'heure actuelle à faire deux choses en même temps: je 
fais paître mes rennes, et j'enregistre des traditions orales — le miroir du 
niveau culturel de mon peuple aujourd'hui, avec que tout un chacun puisse 
regarder dans ce miroir. (Autobiographie, Vella 2004: 126) 
La première partie de la phrase met en évidence la dualité inhérente à 
l'expérience autochtone au XXe siècle, dans cette période au cours de 
laquelle les fondements même de l'identité autochtone ont été mis en 
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cause par l'invasion de l'Autre et par la domination que celui-ci a 
imposée. Jamais en effet la domination n'a été aussi marquee que dans 
la deuxième partie du XXe siècle. Si pendant l'époque tsariste, voire 
au début de l'ère soviétique, l'Autre exerçait une autorité sur le cadre 
extérieur de la vie des populations Nenets et Khanty, fixant les règles 
dans les rapports entre elles et ses propres structures, la pénétration 
soviétique a eu une double incidence: tout d'abord l'éloignement 
géographique a cessé d'être un facteur de protection, puisque 
l'exploitation des ressources naturelles n'a pas épargné les recoins les 
plus reculés de ce gigantesque réservoir de pétrole qu'est la Sibérie 
Occidentale. Donc le flux migratoire a pénétré absolument partout, il 
n'est plus un seul endroit qui puisse servir de refuge aux populations 
autochtones. Deuxièmement, de par sa vocation totalitaire, le régime 
soviétique ne se contentait pas de demander une allégeance formelle à 
ses règles: il voulait coloniser les cœurs et les esprits. Il aspirait ni plus 
ni moins à transformer le rapport des citoyens soviétiques au monde. 
Il a donc entrepris de toucher et de façonner tout le monde, y compris 
les populations autochtones de la toundra et de la taïga. Celles-ci, 
aujourd'hui, héritent d'un double patrimoine: celui transmis par leur 
culture héréditaire, qui est parvenu jusqu'à elles de manière plus ou 
moins développée, et celui inculqué par l'école soviétique, par l'ar­
mée, par la vie dans le cadre du kolkhoze, qui a perduré suffisamment 
pour avoir laissé une empreinte indélébile. Aucun de ces deux univers 
n'est aujourd'hui, comme ils l'étaient jadis, imperméable à l'autre: 
avec leur nature contradictoire, ils coexistent dans les consciences qui 
se trouvent ainsi tiraillées et cherchent des solutions pour les concilier. 
Cette dualité est portée à son comble chez Juri. En effet, non 
seulement il est porteur de la tradition nenets qui lui est chère, mais il 
a mené plus loin que personne parmi les Autochtones de la région la 
connaissance de la culture russe, ayant fait des études universitaires 
qui l'ont initié aux valeurs les plus universelles de cette tradition intel­
lectuelle et artistique. C'est finalement cette dualité qu'il matérialise 
dans la formule par laquelle il résume son activité. La première partie 
de sa phrase est «je fais paître mes rennes»: voilà le symbole s'il en 
est de la culture traditionnelle. A la fin du XXe siècle et au début du 
XXIe, l'élevage de rennes est devenu le signe distinctif de 
l'autochtone représentatif des peuples du Nord. Et cela même chez des 
peuples pour qui l'élevage des rennes n'a pas eu historiquement la 
même importance que chez les Nenets de la toundra, comme chez les 
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Khantys ou les Nenets des forêts. Pour ces deux peuples, en effet, 
1 élevage des rennes n'était, au XXe siècle, qu'une activité de 
subsistance parmi d'autres, comme la chasse, la pêche ou la cueillette, 
et certainement pas la plus importante. Pendant la plus grande partie 
du siècle, les rennes avaient comme fonction essentielle de servir de 
moyen de transport, la fonction alimentaire n'étant que seconde. Il est 
vrai que la modernité n'a fait que réduire le rôle effectif du renne dans 
la subsistance — en Sibérie Occidentale, et plus précisément dans la 
région de Juri Vella, l'attelage de rennes a cessé d'être le moyen de 
transport ordinaire, tant le scooter des neiges et la voiture tous terrains 
sont présents dans l'économie des foyers, et la part de la viande de 
renne dans l'alimentation, qui intègre de plus en plus d'éléments 
d'importation, a certainement diminué. Ce qui a en revanche aug­
menté, c'est la valeur symbolique du renne comme marqueur identi­
taire. J'ai été frappée de noter que dans les récits que la mère de Juri 
fait de sa migration entre le bassin du Pur et le bassin de Г Agan, 
quand elle était enfant, le quotidien qu'elle évoque semble bien plus 
proche de celui des Nenets de la toundra — dont toute l'existence 
tourne autour des rennes — que de la culture dont elle est elle-même 
issue. 
Juri, d'après ses paroles, fait deux choses: non seulement il fait 
paître ses rennes, mais aussi il enregistre des traditions orales. Artifice 
de style, car il a bien d'autres activités - il écrit des poèmes, des livres, 
il milite pour la cause des autochtones. Mais toutes ces autres activités 
relèvent de sa deuxième identité, façonnée par la modernité et par le 
monde russe. Certaines sont ambivalentes: le militantisme, ainsi que la 
collecte de folklore, qu'il fait ressortir dans son autobiographie et qui 
mettent directement les deux univers en relation. Juri Vella est un 
intellectuel conscient: s'il fait le choix de cette activité parmi d'autres, 
c'est qu'à elles deux, elles résument ce qu'il veut faire savoir, faire 
comprendre de lui-même, l'image qu'il veut façonner à usage externe. 
La collecte des traditions orales relève de l'entre-deux, c'est une 
activité de conciliation, d'adaptation entre les deux univers qui le 
déchirent. Elle a pour centre de gravité la culture autochtone, mais 
l'aborde avec un regard qui lui est toutefois extérieur. 
Enfin, la métaphore du miroir fait référence à la réconciliation de 
l'Autochtone avec lui-même. Ces populations, coincées au milieu du 
gué, ne savent plus qui elles sont. La société dominante joue le rôle 
d'un miroir déformant: elle leur renvoie une image trouble et 
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grotesque d'elles-mêmes, les amenant à se voir comme des bar ares 
en puissance. C'est ainsi que l'un des Nenets les plus instruits e 
Varjogan, Vladimir Talevic Ajvaseda, m'a expliqué un jour e p us 
sérieusement du monde que le Nenets étaient des représentants e a 
« société primitive », reprenant à son compte le discours « scienti 1-
que » soviétique sur les peuples premiers. Le miroir que Juri V ella 
entend leur proposer est un miroir valorisant, un miroir reflétant les 
valeurs originales des Nenets des Forêts, leurs valeurs intrinsèques. 
Un miroir qui fixe de manière précise les cadres de leur identité. 
4. Parler de soi: un moi élargi 
Quand Juri parle de lui, il ne parle jamais que de lui. Lui, c'est tou­
jours un être en osmose avec les autres, avec les « siens ». Un être qui 
sert de prétexte. 
Juri se définit tout d'abord, comme tout autochtone de Sibérie 
occidentale, par le clan. Les noms de clan sont d'ailleurs en Russie 
devenus des noms de famille, ce qui permet, sauf accident, d'identifier 
aussitôt une personne par son clan. Sauf accident: en effet, l'histoire 
de la famille de Juri comporte un épisode en fait non élucidé, qui fait 
que son nom de famille officiel n'est pas celui de son clan: 
Sur mon passeport, mon nom de famille est Ajvaseda, mais tous m'appellent 
Juri Vella. Et ce n'est pas seulement un pseudonyme littéraire, c'est là le 
véritable nom de famille de notre clan. 
Les interprétations diffèrent sur l'origine de ce décalage: d'après 
certaines versions les Vella aussi bien que les Tjott étaient très 
pauvres, ils étaient arrivés à la fin des années 1920 dans la région de 
Г Agan, qui était peu habitée et riche en poissons et en gibier, et ils 
séjournaient chez les Ajvaseda, clan local. Pour que ceux-ci ne soient 
pas accusés d'être des exploiteurs, ils ont présenté au recensement 
local les nouveaux venus comme étant de leur famille. D'après une 
autre version, les Vella et les Tjott étaient arrivés dans la région en 
provenance de la région de Num-to, après le soulèvement de 1933-34 
Ils fuyaient les persécutions qui avaient touché l'ensemble des 
autochtones de cette région et pour ne pas se faire identifier ils 
s'étaient présentés sous l'identité des Ajvaseda. C'est ainsi que tous 
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ont été recensés sous le nom d'Ajvaseda. Et quand son père a épousé 
sa mère, tous ceux qui ignoraient cette histoire ont été scandalisés. Or 
sa mère appartenait au clan Tjott et son père était un Vella. 
Donc, d'emblée, parler de soi revient à parler de l'histoire de la 
région, de ses péripéties souvent douloureuses, au cours de l'époque 
soviétique. Parler de soi, pour Juri Vella, c'est aussi parler des person­
nes de son clan: 
Je n'ai que cinquante ans, mais depuis des années je suis le chef de mon clan. 
Ce n'est pas naturel. Pourquoi ? Parce que tous les hommes de mon clan ont 
été détruits par l'alcool. Il ne reste plus que moi, un cousin qui est en prison 
pour avoir blessé un homme alors qu'il était en état d'ivresse, et un enfant de 
trois ans. (Travaux de terrain mars 1999) 
Cette histoire non plus n'est pas innocente: elle sert d'exemple 
édifiant à ses invités. Elle a été racontée un jour dans son campement, 
alors qu'il venait d'accueillir deux voiturées de visiteurs russes qui lui 
apportaient en cadeau de la vodka. Il a convoqué tout le monde dans 
sa maison et a « joué » les chefs de tribu. Il leur a parlé des règles de 
la vie dans la forêt et a voulu leur faire comprendre qu'avec ce type de 
cadeau, ils alimentaient l'alcoolisme qui détruit de l'intérieur les 
communautés autochtones. Juri lui-même ne boit pas... 
5. Au-delà du clan 
Le sens d'appartenance du moi dépasse largement les limites du clan. 
Le « moi » englobe certes la famille, comme il le dit en russe « moi 
rodstvenniki ». Mais les limites du clan ou de la famille sont larges et 
inclusives: on le voit bien dans un passage du « Monde de Juri 
Vella », où il parle du sort de gens de « sa famille ». Or parmi les 
« gens de sa famille », il cite nominativement son père et Aleksandr 
Aipin. Cette citation est intéressante pour tous ceux qui connaissent la 
Sibérie occidentale et la répartition des clans par peuple et par région. 
Les Aipin, en effet, sont des Khantys. Ils ne sont guère apparentés par 
le sang aux Nenets et Juri Vella n'a pas de sang khanty, même si sa 
mère est remariée à un Khanty, un Kazamkin. 
Cela montre clairement comment pour Juri Vella, la frontière du 
moi est flexible: face au monde extérieur, son tout premier « moi » est 
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caractérisé par l'identité de l'autochtone par rapport au nouveau venu, 
au Russe ou à l'Européen de manière générale. Dans cette région 
d'interpénétration Nenets-Khanty, les «miens» ne sont plus seule­
ment les Nenets, mais aussi les Khantys. Il est fort possible que ce soit 
là la conséquence d'une perte partielle d'identité, due à la pression 
exercée sur les autochtones par une colonisation russe de plus en plus 
envahissante ; les Nenets sont d'ailleurs, dans la région de Г Agan, en 
minorité par rapport aux Khantys et ils se fondent effectivement dans 
la masse des autochtones. Mais sans doute, avant tout, le fait est 
qu'aujourd'hui, l'opposition principale n'est plus (comme elle l'a été 
pendant longtemps, comme nous le révèle le folklore) entre ethnies 
autochtones, mais bien entre les nouveaux venus et les populations 
locales, Nenets et Khantys réunis. D'ailleurs cette évocation de Kyli 
Vella et d'Aleksandr Aipin intervenait comme illustration dans une 
histoire édifiante elle aussi: Juri Vella expliquait qu'il fallait savoir 
s'arrêter à temps. Il expliquait comment chaque individu a une mesure 
qu'il doit respecter. Lui-même étant chasseur, il avait abattu près de 
200 zibelines quand il a senti que sa mesure était pleine. Qu'il devait 
s'arrêter. Il a écouté cette « voix » et est devenu éleveur de rennes. Or 
Kyli Vella et Aleksandr Aipin n'ont pas écouté cette voix et ne se sont 
pas arrêtés. Ils sont morts jeunes tous les deux... Analogie avec les 
extracteurs de pétrole: s'ils ne s'arrêtent pas à temps, ce sont eux qui 
risquent gros. 
C'est ainsi que Juri Vella profite de cette expérience: expérience 
individuelle vécue autour de lui, qu'il élargit d'abord à lui-même et 
qu'assume pour faire passer des messages de manière imagée et 
expressive. 
6. Un moi spatial 
Souvent, la narration de soi est une histoire qui s'articule sur l'axe du 
temps. Chez Juri Vella aussi d'ailleurs, quand on lui demande de 
raconter sa vie. Mais une autre dimension semble être tout aussi 
importante: l'espace. D'une certaine manière, pour lui, le temps se 
traduit de manière plus intelligible et plus proche, en espace. 
Son activité préférée, quand il a des invités, c'est de les promener 
dans 1 espace qui est le sien et de le leur déchiffrer comme une 
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partition. Le rapport du moi et de l'espace est polysémique. L'espace 
est en même temps présence, absence et mémoire. 
L'espace présence: c'est la mise en rapport de la vie des siens et de 
son moi. Le jour où Juri Vella a décidé d'arrêter de chasser et de 
réaliser son rêve, de consacrer sa vie à un troupeau de rennes, il est 
allé s'installer sur les terres où ses grands-parents avaient séjourné: ce 
sont des espaces qui sont plus identité que propriété. La propriété de 
la terre est une notion inconnue des peuples du Nord. La terre 
s'appartient à elle-même, ce sont plutôt les hommes qui lui appartien­
nent. C'est cette conception, qui n'est pas à proprement parler 
proclamée, qui sous-tend la démarche de Juri Vella retournant avec 
ses rennes sur les terres qui avaient nourri les rennes de ses ancêtres. 
Cela apparaît on ne peut plus explicitement dans le film de Liivo 
Niglas, où Juri Vella conduit le cinéaste à un endroit où il lui montre 
l'espace habité par ses grands-parents: la caméra ne distingue rien de 
spécial, mais tout s'anime comme sur le visage de Juri Vella en gros 
plan. C'est là aussi que le chamane avait prédit la naissance de Juri: il 
avait annoncé, bien avant que l'enfant n'ait été conçu, que le couple 
n'aurait qu'un fils et que le père mourrait jeune. De la fusion avec 
l'espace découle aussi la justification de sa propre existence, la 
prédiction du chamane. Par là même, le diplômé de l'Institut Gorki de 
Moscou balise sa filiation, son lien organique avec la culture tradition­
nelle niée par les conceptions dominantes. En même temps, dans la 
brève histoire de sa grand-mère, depuis son mariage jusqu'à la 
sédentarisation, il résume de manière particulièrement frappante toute 
la tragédie qui a touché les autochtones de Sibérie occidentale: il sait à 
quel point les faits nus, dépourvus de tout mélodrame, ignorant les 
trémolos dans la voix, sont de nature à marquer son interlocuteur de 
manière particulière. Juri Vella affectionne le laconisme: loin 
d'assumer une tonalité de type « J'accuse », il laisse ses interlocuteurs 
tirer leurs conclusions. 
Mais aujourd'hui, l'espace est aussi synonyme d'absence, de perte. 
Dans l'espace qu'il nous indique dans le film, on ne distingue rien de 
spécial. Mais les flammèches de gaz des industries pétrolières sont 
omniprésentes. Ces terres dont les autochtones nomades assuraient 
traditionnellement la couverture sont aujourd'hui autrement couvertes: 
en parcourant en hélicoptère les espaces de Sibérie occidentale, l'œil 
distingue toujours, sans répit, une tour de forage quelque part à 
l'horizon. Ce sont deux conceptions de la terre qui s'affrontent: celle 
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pour laquelle la terre ne se partage pas et celle pour laquelle la terre, si 
elle n'a pas de propriétaire explicite, est exploitable à merci. Aux yeux 
des autochtones, il s'est produit un véritable viol. Les nouveaux venus 
ont envahi forêt, lacs, marais, les ont coupés, perforés, creusés, ils ont 
construit et par là même démoli. A huit kilomètres du village de 
Varjogan, où les autochtones de la région ont été relogés, il y a un 
bourg construit dans les années 1960, Novoagansk. C'est là qu'il y a 
l'hôpital, la poste, etc. Une partie de l'univers de Juri Vella. Au mo­
ment du tournage, il y avait une fête pour l'anniversaire de la com­
pagnie pétrolière de la région. L'occasion pour Juri Vella d'évoquer 
son enfance, ses souvenirs personnels: sur l'emplacement de Novoa­
gansk, il y avait les terres du clan Aipin. Cette phrase suffit. Et 
surtout l'expression résignée de son visage. Autour de lui, des 
bouteilles vides éparpillées, et la musique de la fête, retentissant à tue-
tête. C'est une terrible violence qui transparaît dans cette juxta­
position. Par là Juri Vella entend toucher ceux qui sont disposés à 
entendre son message: il contredit le discours stéréotypé des porteurs 
de la culture occidentale, qui, en toute bonne foi, raconte la saga des 
constructeurs, qui ont fiat surgir la civilisation là où il n'y avait rien. 
En effet, pour les Occidentaux - c'est à dire, dans ce contexte, pour 
les Russes — là où il n'y a pas de construction, là où ils ne voient que 
de la nature, il n'y a rien. Pour les autochtones, tout l'espace est signi­
fiant, animé — par les esprits à tout endroit, par leurs dieux dans les 
lieux sacrés, par eux-mêmes aux endroits où ils montaient leur campe­
ment, par le souvenir des ancêtres qui chassaient l'élan à tel ou tel 
endroit, qui mettaient des pièges à loutres à tel autre emplacement etc. 
Cela nous amène à l'espace mémoire: Juri Vella est avant tout 
obsédé par la transmission de la mémoire d'aujourd'hui projetée sur 
demain. L'une de ses dernières œuvres, à laquelle il travaille depuis 
2000, c'est un dictionnaire toponymique de sa région, le bassin de 
l'Agan avec ses affluents. Il a commencé à rédiger cet ouvrage en trois 
langues: en nenets, en khanty et en russe, les trois langues parlées dans 
la région. En effet, les lieux ont été appelés de manières souvent 
différentes par les locuteurs des trois langues. Ces noms évoquent des 
légendes, le passage de telle ou telle personne, les habitudes de tel ou 
tel clan. Juri Vella indique pour chaque endroit les noms nenets, 
khanty et russes, et il les commente chacun dans sa langue. Il est vrai 
qu'il ajoute en général en russe un résumé de ce qu'il a écrit dans ses 
autres langues, mais il tient à ce que le texte développé reste original, 
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intégral dans la langue dans laquelle il a été à l'origine conçu. L'idée 
qui préside à cette entreprise, c'est de préserver la mémoire des liens 
des autochtones avec ces terres, afin qu'un jour, dans quelques généra­
tions éventuellement, ses descendants puissent avoir des pièces à 
conviction prouvant qu'ils ont des droits à l'utilisation de ces terres. 
Cette idée lui vient sans doute de ce qu'il a entendu au cours de son 
voyage aux USA sur les pratiques des militants amérindiens. 
7. Un chaînon entre passé et avenir 
Comme Juri Vella l'explique dans le film de Liivo Niglas, il a une 
vision sombre de l'avenir. Pour l'instant, le Nord est utile à la Russie, 
l'argent coule à flots. Mais un jour les ressources naturelles finiront 
par s'épuiser et cette région n'intéressera plus personne. Ceux qui sont 
venus peupler le Nord repartiront vers des zones plus prospères et plus 
faciles, et il ne restera plus que les autochtones qui n'ont aucun autre 
endroit où aller. Ce jour-là, les savoir-faire issus de la tradition 
redeviendront essentiels pour la survie. Il ne faut donc pas qu'ils se 
perdent. 
Pour cela Juri Vella se voit comme un chaînon entre un passé 
proche — où les savoir-faire étaient encore répandus — et l'avenir, où 
ils risquent de redevenir d'actualité. Pour remplir sa fonction, il est 
présent sur deux tableaux. Donner à ses petits-enfants toutes les 
chances d'une part, et tenter de se faire comprendre des autres, des 
gens de l'extérieur d'autre part. 
8. Préserver toutes les chances 
C'est maintenant sur ses petits-enfants qu'il se projette. Juri doit 
constater qu'il a raté le coche avec ses propres enfants. Ses filles sont 
nées alors que le militant n'était pas encore suffisamment mûr. Peut-
être Juri Vella croyait-il encore aux bienfaits de l'éducation soviéti­
que. Il n'a pas essayé de leur donner une éducation traditionnelle. 
Toutes, elles n'ont comme langue maternelle que le russe, et elles sont 
fort peu sensibles à leur identité d'autochtones. D'ailleurs aucune 
d'entre elles n'échappe entièrement au fléau de l'Arctique, à 
l'alcoolisme qui fait des ravages. Juri Vella a pu voir les résultats de 
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cette formation donnée par l'école qui laisse les autochtones désem 
parés au milieu du gué: elle parvient à façonner leur vision du mon e 
et leurs aspirations de sorte que tous mettent en cause les notions 
traditionnelles, qu'ils perdent tout respect et toute sensibilité envers ce 
qui a fait la vie de leur peuple. Et que donne-t-elle à la place ? Rien. 
Ce n'est pas l'école qui leur ouvre les yeux sur les véritables richesses 
de la culture russe, sur les valeurs les plus humaines de l'idéologie 
dominante. Elle se limite à détruire, sans rien mettre à la place. 
Comme le dit souvent Juri Vella, les enfants, en sortant de l'école, 
sont incapables de vivre de manière autonome dans la forêt. 
Alors Juri Vella a mis son autorité, son prestige, au service de ses 
petits-enfants: il a ouvert dans son campement une école primaire. 
Pour que les enfants s'habituent à la vie dans la nature, sans pour 
autant perdre les avantages de la formation scolaire ordinaire. Il s'est 
battu avec les autorités et a obtenu non seulement l'autorisation, mais 
également les fonds pour faire vivre cette petite école. Réalisant ainsi 
pour ses petits-enfants le rêve qui était le sien quand il allait à l'école, 
à l'internat de Varjogan: regarder par la fenêtre et voir des rennes. Il 
tient à ce qu'ils aient le choix: continuer des études, vivre une vie 
urbaine s'ils le désirent, ou bien rester dans la forêt, élever des rennes, 
poursuivre avec dignité une vie traditionnelle alliée aux avantages du 
XXIe siècle. 
En même temps, il déclare souvent, en parlant de lui, que sa vie est 
un musée. Ainsi il réalise le deuxième volet de son aspiration: essayer 
de faire comprendre à l'Autre la valeur de son héritage et l'importance 
de le préserver. Et là, son discours sur sa vie rejoint le vécu quotidien. 
Sa vie dans la forêt, dans son campement avec son troupeau de rennes, 
est une construction qui vise à imiter le réel. Ce n'est pas réellement la 
vie suivant les traditions: il lui manque la spontanéité au quotidien. 
Juri n'effectue pas les gestes qu'il effectue parce que ce sont les siens 
et qu'il ne pourrait pas en avoir d'autres. La vie lui en a appris bien 
des différents. Il fait un choix conscient, celui de vivre suivant des 
règles qu'il a la possibilité de renier. Ce n'est pas en même temps une 
vie faussée, car ces gestes, il les connaît réellement depuis son 
enfance, ils sont enracinés en lui. Mais il les accomplit consciemment. 
Dans un but: celui de donner l'exemple. De montrer à tous qu'on peut 
vivre dans la taïga au XXIe siècle une vie digne et confortable, qui a 
des valeurs à enseigner à l'homme urbain du même siècle. Il n'est pas 
en mesure de construire une vraie vie: c'est particulièrement difficile 
Speaking about oneself in order to change the world 523 
quand on est entouré de gisements de pétrole. Surtout, il n'a personne 
qui partage sa vision: ses filles avec leurs familles séjournent de temps 
à autre dans son campement, mais rapidement sont davantage attirées 
par la vie au village, avec le chauffage central, la télévision et la 
vodka. Sa femme ne partage pas plus que lui sa vision. Mais elle le 
suit, en bonne épouse: elle, elle vit réellement sa vie dans le présent. 
De ce point de vue, elle ne lui donne pas seulement le soutien de 
principe que son rôle lui confère, mais aussi, elle représente l'élément 
de réalité: Juri est condamné à ne cesser de jouer son propre rôle ; son 
épouse vit. 
C'est pour leur montrer cette vie qu'il invite dans son campement 
tous les gens qu'il a l'occasion de rencontrer: les Khantys et les 
Nenets du village et des alentours, des Russes de Sibérie, des Russes 
du reste du pays, sans parler des étrangers, Allemands, Français, 
Néerlandais, Estoniens, Américains, et d'autres encore. Il les invite à 
regarder ce qu'est la vie autochtone, à être séduits par son charme, il 
leur révèle toutes les astuces, les savoir faire qu'il faut maîtriser, 
l'extraordinaire rationalité du mode de vie traditionnel. Il tient à ce 
qu'en repartant, ses visiteurs aient acquis non seulement une compré­
hension approfondie de sa culture, mais aussi un respect réel à son 
égard. Il espère contribuer à changer les attitudes dominantes envers 
les peuples premiers de Sibérie. Afin de rendre possible leur survie. 
Juri Vella vit donc en se racontant, exposé en permanence à son 
propre regard sub speciem aeternitatis. C'est du point de vue de 
l'avenir qu'il se regarde vivre et qu'il opère. Il impose une rude charge 
à ses proches, mais il a tout investi dans sa vision. Il ne compte pas de 
résultats dans le présent. Il n'espère sans doute pas en voir: il investit 
pour l'avenir, en espérant semer des graines qui germeront — peut-
être — un jour. 
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Говорить о себе, чтобы изменить мир 
Лесной ненец Юрий Веяла является оленоводом, писателем и право­
защитником. В своей частной жизни он наслаждается тишиной, как 
это принято в его культуре. Но как участник публичной жизни, кото­
рый окончил Московский Литинститут, он знает силу слова и умеет 
это использовать в интересах своего дела. Он осознал, что коренные 
народы Западной Сибири растеряли большинство своих прошлых 
навыков и при этом не приобрели новых за годы советской власти, 
когда им приходилось участвовать в работе советских институций 
(например в школах и в армии). Последние пятьдесят лет, когда их 
территорию захватила нефтепромышленность, только ускорили этот 
процесс. По мнению Юрия Велла, однажды нефть кончится и 
коренным жителям, лишившимся благ западного общества, придется 
тогда выживать при помощи своего традиционного образа жизни. 
Велла делится своим видением коренных жителей, которые спо­
собны жить в обоих мирах и смогут отвоевать свое достоинство. На­
стоящая статья анализирует речь Веллы на данную тему и то, как 
Велла говорит о себе, распространяя свое «эго» как на свое племя 
так и на коренных жителей в целом, связывая это с окружающим 
пространством. Главным матерьялом для статьи послужила полевая 
работа Эвы Тулуз в таежном лагере Велла, где она проживала с его 
семьей 5 месяцев, и фильм Лийво Нигласа, снятый им в 2003 году. 
Rääkida endast, et muuta maailma 
Juri Vella on metsaneenetsite soost põhjapõdrakasvataja, kiijanik ja mim-
õiguslane. Oma eraelus naudib ta vaikust, nii nagu ta kultuuris kombeks 
on. Kuid avaliku elu tegelasena, kes on lõpetanud Moskva Kirjandus-
instituudi, on ta teadlik kõne mõjust ning oskab seda enda ja oma näge­
muse huvides ära kasutada. Tal on tulnud mõista, et Lääne-Siberi põlisr­
ahvad on kaotanud enamuse oma kunagistest oskustest, kuid pole Nõu­
kogude perioodil, mil nad olid sunnitud ühiskonda sulanduma ning pidid 
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osalema Nõukogude institutsioonide töös (näiteks koolides ja sõjaväes), 
midagi juurde õppinud. Viimased viiskümmend aastat, mil nende tradit­
sioonilistele elualadele on tunginud naftatööstus, on seda protsessi vaid 
kiirendanud. Kuid Juri Vella arvates lõppevad ühel heal päeval naftavarud 
ning kuivõrd pärismaalased jäävad siis ilma hüvedest, mida "lääne" 
ühiskond neile seni jaganud on, tuleb neil traditsiooniliste oskuste abil 
elus püsida. Vella jutlustab nägemust põliselanikest, kes on võimelised 
elama mõlemas maailmas ning suudavad oma väärikuse tagasi võita. 
Käesolev artikkel analüüsib Juri Vella kõnet sellel teemal ning seda, 
kuidas Vella räägib iseendast, laiendades oma "ego" nii oma hõimule kui 
põlisrahvastele üldse ja seostab seda väga tihedalt end ümbritseva ruu­
miga. Põhilisteks materjaliallikateks käesolevale artiklile on Eva Tou­
louze'i välitööd Juri Vella taigalaagris, kus Eva Tolouze elas koos Vella 
perega viis kuud, ning 2003. aastal Liivo Niglase poolt Vellast vändatud 
film. 
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Abstract. From the semiotics of theatrical representation to cultural 
anthropology or why theater (resists)? In this paper I propose an epistemo-
logical approach to the field of theatre semiotics from the beginning of the 
20th century to our days. Firstly, I point out two different periods that have 
influenced theatre semiotics. The first one centres on reflections and studies 
by the Prague School of Structuralism. More precisely, I address Jan 
Mukarovsky's essays about art and society as well as Jindrich Honzl's 
contributions to the study of sign and system in theatre. The second period 
presented here is that of theatre semiotics in the early 70s and late 80s in 
France. 
My goal here is to expose the main reasons that led theatre semiotics to a 
deadlock in the early 90s. Theatre semiotic research has been rich and fruitful 
in the beginning of last century. However, in our days it is generally deemed 
unadvisable to describe theatre representation in terms of sign and system. 
Although theatre semiotics used to be presented in French university classes, 
it is no longer possible to do so. 
Even though general semiotics has progressed by denying the importance 
of structure and by refusing to search for the minimal sign and its code, 
theatre semiotics has remained faithful to old communicational semiotics 
research. 
Throughout my contribution, I would like to examine the kind of semiotic 
field best fit to approaching an artistic domain such as theatre. In other words, 
I would like to show that Western theatre, granted it can be seen as a semiotic 
object, is first and foremost an artistic and cultural one. 
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In order to do so, I propose a theoretical and methodological framework 
based on a specific semiotic model: the "indicial semiology propose y 
Anne-Marie Houdebine. Inspired by Juri Lotman's essays about eu tu re an 
art, I will try to set "indicial semiology" in the general field of a cu tura 
anthropology. 
Introduction 
Penser le théâtre en tant qu'objet sémiotique, culturel et artistique est 
l'objectif de cette contribution. Pour ce faire, nous allons suivre deux 
voies. Dans un premier temps, nous souhaitons tracer, brièvement, le 
parcours effectué par la sémiologie appliquée au théâtre depuis le 
début du vingtième siècle jusqu'à nos jours. Par la suite, nous allons 
mettre l'accent sur la nécessité d'ouvrir la recherche théâtrale vers un 
champ plus vaste, à savoir l'anthropologie culturelle. Il nous semble 
donc important d'observer d'une part les espaces théâtraux possibles 
dans lesquels la sémiologie peut intervenir. D'autre part, d'évoquer 
certains problèmes que le chercheur rencontre lorsqu'il pense l'oeuvre 
artistique et culturel sous l'angle de la sémiologie. 
Selon Roland Barthes (1964: 268) "le théâtre constitue un objet 
sémiologique privilégié puisque son système est apparemment origi­
nal (polyphonique) par rapport à celui de la langue (qui est linéaire)". 
En effet, un très grand nombre de recherches sur le signe et le système 
théâtral témoignent de l'intérêt de penser le théâtre comme un objet 
sémiotique. Les premières recherches sur ce qui peut définir la 
structure du théâtre occidental datent des années 1930 et des travaux 
de l'École de Prague. 
Depuis les années 1960 et jusqu'au milieu des années 1980, la 
sémiologie théâtrale a occupé une place très importante aussi bien 
dans la recherche que dans l'enseignement universitaire. Nous souli­
gnions, à titre indicatif, les travaux d'Anne Ubersfeld, de Tadeusz 
Kowzan et de Patrice Pavis. 
En revanche, depuis les années 1990, la sémiologie appliquée au 
théâtre trouve difficilement sa place dans le discours scientifique. Ce 
dernier défend l'impossibilité de penser la représentation théâtrale en 
termes de système ainsi que de postuler le fonctionnement du signe 
théâtral. La question que nous souhaitons donc poser vise, d'une part 
aux raisons ayant provoqué ce rejet, voire refus d'une sémiologie du 
théâtre. D'autre part, elle met l'accent sur la possibilité actuelle d'une 
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sémiologie théâtrale allant vers une anthropologie culturelle. Nous 
exposons ci-dessous — de façon à la fois sélective et pertinente — le 
parcours tracé par la sémiologie théâtrale. Aussi présentons-nous deux 
étapes distinctes des sémiologies théâtrales pratiquées en Europe 
depuis le postulat de cette science par Ferdinand de Saussure (1916: 
33). 
1. Les recherches en sémiologie théâtrale en Europe 
1.1. L'École de Prague 
Parmi les structuralistes de l'École de Prague, Jan Mukarovsky pense 
le théâtre aussi bien comme un objet sémiotique que social et 
esthétique. Plus précisément, les travaux de Mukarovsky accentuent la 
nécessité de relater le signe théâtral à l'esthétique et par là, de rendre 
compte du caractère dissociable entre le rationnel et le sensible, 
présents à la fois à l'intérieur d'une mise en scène. De là, Mukarovsky 
observe en parallèle deux dimensions essentielles de la représentation 
théâtrale. D'une part, il évoque le fonctionnement interne de la mise 
en scène. D'autre part, il s'intéresse au récepteur du message théâtral, 
autrement dit, à la conscience du public. 
En reliant de façon étroite ces deux dimensions, nous déduisons 
deux points pertinents. D'abord, nous observons que les évolutions 
sociales jouent un rôle important et sont ainsi capables d'influencer les 
valeurs esthétiques de la réception théâtrale. Pour Mukarovsky (1936: 
81) "la valeur esthétique est un procès dont le déroulement est 
déterminé d'une part par l'évolution immanente de la structure elle-
même et d'autre part par le mouvement et les modifications de la 
structure de la vie sociale des hommes". Nous soulignons donc qu'une 
place importante est accordée aux acquis sociaux et culturels du public 
sans pour autant que le postulat de système et de règles soit occulté. 
Un peu plus tard, un confrère de Mukarovsky, à savoir Jindrich 
Honzl (1940), va mettre l'accent sur la notion de circularité du 
système théâtral. Cette dernière s'organise autour de deux points. 
Le premier défend l'idée que le signe d un système théâtral 
possède une dynamique et que cette dynamique est susceptible de 
produire plusieurs significations. Honzl refuse alors toute dominance 
du signe sur le spectateur. En postulant la polysémie du signe dans le 
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théâtre occidental, Honzl annonce l'ouverture de l'oeuvre artistique, 
ouverture que nous retrouvons dans les travaux de Julia Kristeva e 
d'Umberto Eco pour ce qui est de l'oeuvre littéraire et artistique. 
L'idée que le signe théâtral est circulaire met l'accent sur le fait 
que les éléments de la structure scénique sont capables de remplir une 
fonction signifiante. Ce qui veut dire que le système théâtral est 
structuré et ordonné. Mais ce qui veut dire aussi qu aucun des 
éléments de ce système n'est étranger à la production du sens. С est à 
partir de ce constat que Honzl défend l'idée qu'un système théâtral 
peut être solide ou mobile. 
1.2. Système solide vs système mobile 
Un système solide présente des règles fermes, préalablement posées. 
Un système mobile est un système en cours de construction et induit 
une polysémie très importante. Selon Honzl, la structure du théâtre 
occidental est essentiellement mobile. Cette opposition entre structure 
solide et structure mobile est implicitement suggérée à travers les deux 
grandes tendances de la sémiotique de la culture — extensive et 
intensive — citées par Jacques Fontanille (2004: 9) dans sa préface de 
L 'explosion et la culture de Juri Lotman (2004). 
Si la culture extensive est définie par ses objets et ses pratiques, 
Fontanille (2004: 9) dit que ceux-ci doivent être décrits préalablement. 
Ils doivent être préalablement répertoriés comme culturels. De cette 
manière, une culture extensive concernerait des systèmes théâtraux 
solides, dont le code et le fonctionnement seraient définis au préalable. 
Elle pourrait éventuellement se référer à des formes théâtrales comme 
le Nô, le Kabuki ou bien la Commedia dell'Arte. Cependant, nous 
devons prendre en considération le fait que le théâtre n'est pas 
seulement un objet culturel. Il est aussi possiblement un objet 
artistique, et que même à l'intérieur des objets fortement codés, pour 
qu'il y ait art, il y a nécessairement, perturbation et réinvention, voire 
subversion du code. 
En ce qui concerne la culture intensive, Fontanille écrit qu'elle est 
considérée comme une activité globale de production, un champ dynamique 
réglé par des lois générales et par les propriétés syntagmatiques d'une praxis 
qui définissent ce qu'est une culture indépendamment des objets et des 
pratiques qui la constituent; dans ce cas, chaque culture particulière est définie 
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par les règles spécifiques qui en contrôlent le champ dynamique. Et 
inversement, les objets et pratiques ne sont reconnus comme culturels que 
dans la mesure où ils sont soumis à ces règles spécifiques. (Fontanille 2004: 9) 
Nous pouvons dire qu'il n'en va pas différemment de l'objet théâtral 
dont la structure est essentiellement mobile et dont les objets sont 
marqués par leur caractère dynamique. 
À travers la thèse de Honzl (1940) nous observons également une 
éventualité de lien sémiologique, la notion de système solide et de 
système mobile renvoyant possiblement à la notion de structure ferme 
et structure souple défendue par Anne-Marie Houdebine (1994). 
Intégrées dans la problématique d'une théorie sémiologique générale 
dite sémiologie des indices (Houdebine 1994: 43-46), la structure 
ferme est l'espace où les règles sont préalablement répertoriées, 
codées ainsi que classées comme culturelles. Cette structure ferme a 
toujours intéressé la sémiologie de la communication. En revanche, 
une structure souple, appelée aussi structuration, renverrait à la notion 
de culture intensive, dans laquelle aucune forme signifiante n'est 
construite au préalable, aucun signe n'est défendu dans sa binarité au 
préalable, non plus décrit en fonction d'un code préexistant. Lorsque 
le système d'un objet sémiotique est structuré par des éléments 
formels qu'Anne-Marie Houdebine appelle des signifiants indiciels, 
nous sommes face à des structurations. Selon Anne-Marie Houdebine 
le signifiant indiciel 
est défini comme proto-signifiant (signifiant à construire) ou indice, voire 
signifiant indiciel quand la structure est ouverte et que la relation forme/sens 
est à construire et non à dégager, c'est-à-dire quand on n'a pas affaire à un 
code social quasi livrant des unités ou à des signes symboliques, arbitraires et 
conventionnels. (Houdebine 1999; 220) 
Il s'agit donc des éléments présentant une dynamique et qui par consé­
quent pourraient conduire à ce que Juri Lotman (2004: 151-159) 
appelle / 'explosion. 
1.3. La sémiologie théâtrale en France. Les années 1970 et 1980 
La sémiologie théâtrale pratiquée en France pendant les années 1970 
et 1980 met en place un projet sémiologique selon lequel la représen­
tation théâtrale doit être travaillée en immanence. Toutefois cette 
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immanence est mise en question par l'éphémère de la représentation 
théâtrale et par le fait qu'un corpus théâtral ne peut jamais corres­
pondre à la mise en scène telle qu'elle se produit in vivo, lors u 
déroulement de l'oeuvre artistique. 
En même temps et au moment où les théories de la littérature 
postulent la notion de littérarité, la sémiologie théâtrale parle de la 
théâtralité de l'œuvre dramatique mise en scène. Un formalisme 
excessivement rigoureux commence à se développer autour de la 
notion de système de la représentation théâtrale. Des grammaires 
présentant des outils théoriques et méthodologiques dans le but 
d'analyser le théâtre apparaissent. Des règles générales définissant le 
théâtre, voire une typologie de lois systémiques au sein des genres 
théâtraux sont également tentées. 
Parallèlement, l'accent est mis sur la sémiologie de la com­
munication, à savoir celle du code, de l'unité minimale et de l'inten-
tionnalité des messages. Une sémiologie qui devient un outil d'analyse 
plutôt qu'une sémiotique des pratiques culturelles et signifiantes. Elle 
s'oppose alors au programme sémiologique postulé par Roland 
Barthes, à savoir l'étude de " la façon dont les objets peuvent signifier 
dans le monde contemporain" (1985: 250). 
D'une façon générale, la sémiologie du théâtre de ces deux 
décennies cherche donc à analyser cet objet culturel — et artistique — 
en tant que système systémique plutôt que comme système asystémi-
que, pour reprendre les termes employés par Eric Buyssens (1943: 
37). 
2. Le théâtre occidental: entre système et culture 
Pour que la représentation théâtrale soit décrite comme un système, il 
faut non seulement prendre en compte le caractère autonome et la 
dynamique de ce dernier mais aussi sa relation au contexte culturel, 
social et historique dans lequel elle s integre. Nous nous trouvons 
donc face à une tension, voire une contradiction, entre la nécessité de 
rechercher la cohérence de l'œuvre à l'intérieur de son propre système 
et une seconde nécessité qui est de rechercher sa relation au monde. 
Les préoccupations de Juri Lotman témoignent de cette problé­
matique. Lotman s'intéresse aux rapports qu'un système peut avoir 
avec ce qui n'est pas le système, avec, pour reprendre ses termes 
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le monde extérieur. Il souligne dès le début de L'explosion et la 
culture que 
les questions essentielles que pose tout système sémiotique sont, première­
ment son rapport avec ce qui n'est pas le système, et deuxièmement, les 
relations entre les aspects statiques et les aspects dynamiques. La dernière 
question pourrait être formulée ainsi: comment un système peut-il se 
développer tout en restant soi-même ? (Lotman 2004: 21 ) 
Dans le même ordre d'idées, Umberto Eco interroge le statut de 
l'œuvre d'art qui s'apprête à la recherche de sa genèse. Elle est "un 
objet dont on peut retrouver la forme originelle, telle qu'elle a été 
conçue par l'auteur, à travers la configuration des effets qu'elle pro­
duit sur l'intelligence et la sensibilité du consommateur" (Eco 1965: 
17). Cependant, la sémiologie du théâtre de ces trente dernières années 
n'a pas souhaité se confronter à ce rapport entre le système et le 
monde. A ce sujet, Patrice Pavis écrit que 
la sémiologie est préoccupée non pas par le repérage de la signification, c'est-
à-dire du rapport de l'œuvre au monde (question qui revient à l'herméneutique 
et à la critique littéraire), mais par le mode de production du sens tout au long 
du processus théâtral qui va de la lecture du texte dramatique par le metteur en 
scène jusqu'au travail interprétatif du spectateur. (Pavis 2002: 317) 
Pavis défend une sémiologie qui met l'accent sur le système et son 
processus de signifiance. Et pourtant Eco (1972: 24) souligne que "la 
sémiotique doit étudier aussi les processus qui, sans impliquer 
directement la signification, permettent sa circulation". Il est impor­
tant donc d'observer la relation susceptible d'exister entre le processus 
et le sens, autrement dit entre le système et le monde. Il est également 
nécessaire de comprendre les raisons qui ont favorisé la seule étude du 
processus du sens, de la signifiance, dans le domaine des recherches 
théâtrales. 
Certains chercheurs ont avancé l'hypothèse que le caractère 
éphémère de la représentation théâtrale ainsi que sa nature aléatoire ne 
permettaient pas de faire du théâtre un objet sémiotique. Poussé à son 
terme, cet argument interdit non seulement l'étude sémiologique, 
mais, pour ainsi dire, tout regard critique sur la représentation 
théâtrale. Ce n'est pas parce que nous ne pouvons pas travailler le 
Nous soulignons. 
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spectacle in vivo et que nous risquons de lui être infidele a posteriori, 
que nous ne pouvons pas porter un regard critique sur l'œuvre 
théâtrale, ni tenter de relier une représentation théâtrale au monde 
auquel elle appartient. 
La raison principale nous semble être plutôt que le propre de 
l'objet artistique est de ne pas dégager de significations arrêtées voire 
uniques, mais d'ouvrir sur une multiplicité d interprétations et de 
significations. Elle fait non seulement appel à notre perception ration­
nelle des choses, mais également à notre perception sensorielle, donc 
éminemment subjective. Pour certains, cette part de subjectivité dans 
la relation à l'objet artistique interdit toute mise en relation métho­
dologique du système de l'œuvre au monde. Il nous semble toutefois, 
qu'à condition de préserver le caractère ouvert et hypothétique de 
l'analyse, le recours à des outils méthodologiques demeure non seule­
ment possible mais souhaitable pour parvenir à cette mise en relation. 
D'où la nécessité de faire appel à des outils théoriques et métho­
dologiques capables de prendre en considération les particularités de 
l'œuvre artistique transformée en objet sémiotique. 
3. La sémiologie des indices : un modèle théorique 
Suivant le fil sémiologique tracé par Roland Barthes, c'est-à-dire une 
sémiologie des pratiques signifiantes et culturelles, le cadre théorique 
de la sémiologie des indices (Houdebine 1994: 43-46) retrouve ses 
ancrages dans la pensée de Ferdinand de Saussure en linguistique et de 
Jacques Lacan en psychanalyse. L'indice est une forme, une image 
privée, dans un premier temps, d'un "vouloir-dire" (Kristeva 1969: 
36). L'indice ou signifiant indiciel fonctionne comme une trace 
psychique qu'une expérience, un événement, un son ou une image 
laissent auprès du sujet interprétant. 
Se définissant comme structurale, indicielle et interprétative, la 
sémiologie des indices repense le système et l'immanence dans une 
dynamique impliquant l'évolution. Le système n'est toutefois qu'une 
vérité opératoire. Il est nécessaire sans pour autant être suffisant car 
souple et ouvert. 
Aussi l'étude d'une sémiologie théâtrale peut-elle être conçue 
comme un regard critique qui s'établit à travers le postulat suivant: 
une éventuelle structure du théâtre occidental est une expérience 
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sensible, vécue à travers des traces signifiantes, privées d'un vouloir-
ire évident et dotées d'un vouloir-dire sous-jacent. Dans cet ordre 
d idées, le théâtre peut être considéré comme un système de signes, à 
condition notamment de considérer ce système dans son évolution 
immanente mais aussi dans sa relation à la vie sociale. 
4. La sémiologie des indices: un modèle méthodologique 
L'ouverture et l'évolution de l'œuvre artistique créent donc une 
dimension hypothétique de l'interprétation qui nous conduit vers la 
notion d'hypothèses de sens défendue par Anne-Marie Houdebine à 
travers une analyse qu'elle qualifie de systémique (1994: 273-276). 
Cette dernière se construit en trois étapes distinctes : la description, 
l'explication et l'interprétation. Elle consiste en un travail objectif et 
exhaustif, certes laborieux, mais dont les résultats sont riches 
d'informations pour l'interprétation interne du système. Le système 
d'un objet théâtral peut, dans un premier temps, être mis à jour à 
travers ce qu'Anne-Marie Houdebine appelle l'interprétant interne. 
Cette notion consiste en la mise en relation des signifiants indiciels 
entre eux, en la contextualisation interne des éléments formels 
structurant l'objet sémiotique. 
Dans un deuxième temps, l'analyse doit aller au-delà de ce 
développement immanent, vers un développement liant le système 
avec une histoire donnée, une culture susceptible de l'accueillir, la 
mémoire du sujet interprétant, en un mot son imaginaire culturel. 
C'est ensuite, nous semble-t-il, que l'analyse peut permettre 
l'explosion, telle que la définit Lotman. C'est la mise en relation des 
interprétants internes entre eux et leur confrontation à des inter­
prétants externes qui va permettre le passage d'un processus de 
signifiance à des hypothèses de signification. 
5. En guise de conclusion: de la sémiologie théâtrale à 
l'anthropologie culturelle 
Si nous admettons avec Eco que "toute culture doit être étudiée en tant 
que phénomène de communication" nous devons également accepter 
le fait que ce n'est pas parce que "la culture 'doit être étudiée comme' 
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[communication] que la culture 'est' communication" (Eco 1972. 26). 
En effet, l'objet culturel qu'est le théâtre ne renvoie pas instantané­
ment à un processus communicationnel. Si le théâtre est un objet 
culturel, il n'est pas pour autant un objet sémiotique ordonné par un 
système de communication. En revanche, intégré dans un système 
culturel intensif\ le théâtre est cette œuvre artistique dialectale, 
dépendant aussi bien des connaissances et des pratiques culturelles, 
qu'individuelles. Lier les pratiques propres au créateur d'un processus 
artistique aux pratiques traçant le sujet interprétant serait placer la 
sémiologie théâtrale dans une perspective d'anthropologie culturelle. 
Cette idée se trouve en accord avec la nécessité de rechercher les 
limites et les lois de la sémiologie qui selon Barthes "est une science 
parmi d'autres, nécessaire mais non suffisante" (Barthes 1957: 184). 
Mais Barthes nous dit aussi que "postuler une signification, c'est 
recourir à la sémiologie" (Barthes 1957: 183). Il faut donc rechercher 
une complémentarité, un prolongement de cette science, particulière­
ment lorsque cette dernière s'intéresse à l'art et en l'occurrence au 
théâtre. Car, comme Barthes le dit encore, "le signe théâtral ne va pas 
de soi" (Barthes 1963: 269). Pour reprendre les termes utilisés par 
Jacques Fontanille (2004: 14) dans la préface de L'explosion et la 
culture, "l'innovation culturelle [est] facteur d'irréductible hétéro­
généité [et] provocation à la traduction et à la valorisation a posteriori. 
Le signe en art s'offre par définition à la résistance de l'interprétation. 
Il est toujours pour l'analyste une provocation. C'est à dire à la fois un 
défi et une incitation. 
Il est donc nécessaire à la sémiologie à la fois de reconnaître ses 
limites en circonscrivant le champ de son intervention et de 
s'adjoindre des complémentarités, de s'inventer des prolongements. 
La recherche du rapport existant entre le système d'une œuvre et le 
monde est une recherche profondément établie autour de l'anthropos. 
Une sémiologie du théâtre pourrait, par exemple, trouver au près 
d'une anthropologie culturelle le prolongement nécessaire lui 
permettant de mettre en relation les systèmes signifiants qu'elle étudie 
avec des pratiques culturelles capables d'enrichir le processus de 
signifiance. 
Pour paraphraser la définition saussurienne de la sémiologie, nous 
pourrions dire de la sémiologie du théâtre qu'elle étudie la vie des 
signes théâtraux au sein du théâtre, dans leur relation à la vie sociale. 
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От семиотики театральной репрезентации к антропологии 
культуры или почему театр (сопротивляется)? 
В статье дается описание семиотики театра с начала XX века до 
современности. Сначала выделяются два периода в истории семио­
тики театра. Первый период охватывает работы Пражского лингвис­
тического кружка, точнее эссе Яна Мукаржовского об искусстве и 
обществе и работы Индриха Хонцла по изучению знаков и системы 
в театре. Второй период охватывает французскую семиотику театра 
в конце 70-х начала 80-х гг. 
Моя цель — выделить те главные причины, которые привели 
семиотику театра в начале 90-х годов в тупик. Начало прошлого века 
в семиотике театра было богатым и продуктивным, но в настоящее 
время говорить о театральной репрезентации в терминах знака и 
системы считается неподобающим. Если раньше курс семиотики 
театра читали и в университете, то теперь это часто невозможно. 
Несмотря на то, что семиотика как дисциплина в целом движется в 
сторону отрицания важности структуры и отказа от поисков мини­
мального знака и кода, семиотика театра осталась верна старо­
модному коммуникационно-семиотическому анализу. 
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В данной статьте я пытаюсь показать, какая часть семиотики 
наилучшим образом подходит для изучения театрально! о искусства. 
Предлагаю теоретическую и методологическую рамку, которая осно­
вывается на одной специфической семиотической модели: на создан­
ной Анн-Мари Одебин «индексальной семиологии». С помощью 
работ Юрия Лотмана о культуре и природы эта «индексальная 
семиология» вкладывается мною в более широкий контекст антро­
пологии культуры. 
Teatraalse representatsiooni semiootikast 
kultuurantropoloogiani ehk miks teater (vastu paneb)? 
Käesolev artikkel kujutab endast tunnetusteoreetilist käsitlust teatrise-
miootikast 20. sajandi algusest tänapäevani. Kõigepealt piiritletakse kahte 
perioodi teatrisemiootika ajaloos. Esimese perioodi käsitluses kesken­
dutakse Praha strukturalistliku koolkonna töödele, täpsemalt Jan Muka­
rovsky esseedele kunstist ja ühiskonnast ning Jindrich Honzli tööle 
märkide ja süsteemi uurimisel teatris. Teine käesolevas artiklis käsitletud 
periood puudutab teatrisemiootikat 1970ndate lõpu ja 80ndate alguse 
Prantsusmaal. 
Artikli eesmärgiks on välja tuua need põhilised põhjused, mis viisid 
teatrisemiootika 90ndate alguses tupikusse. 20. sajandi algus oli teatri-
semiootikas rikkalik ning viljakas, kuid tänapäeval on märgi ja süsteemi 
terminoloogias teatrirepresentatsioonist rääkimine vaat et taunitavgi. 
Ehkki varem õpetati teatrisemiootikat ka ülikooliloengutes, pole see 
praegu enam sageli võimalik. 
Hoolimata sellest, et semiootika kui distsipliin üldiselt on edasi 
liikunud struktuuri tähtsuse eitamise ning minimaalse märgi ja koodi 
otsingute hülgamise poole, on teatrisemiootika jäänud truuks vanamood­
sale kommunikatsioonisemiootilisele analüüsile. 
Käesolevas artiklis olen üritanud analüüsida, milline semiootika haru 
sobiks kõige paremini teatrisuguse kunstilise valdkonna uurimiseks. 
Teisisõnu olen ma üritanud näidata, et Lääne teater on semiootilise 
objektina ennekõike kunstiline ja kultuuriline nähtus. Pakun välja teoree­
tilise ja metodoloogilise raamistiku, mis põhineb ühel spetsiifilisel 
semiootilisel mudelil: Anne-Marie Houdebine'i loodud "indeksikaalsel 
semioloogial". Inspireerituna Juri Lotmani esseedest kultuurist ja loo­
dusest, üritan asetada "indeksikaalset semioloogiat" laiemasse kultuuri­
antropoloogia konteksti. 
Index 00662 
ISSN 1406-4243 
